Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted allocatur in this case to consider the Superior Court's application of the standard of review and to evaluate the relevance of a parent's incarceration to a trial court's decision to terminate a father's parental rights. G.P. (Father), then nineteen, and B.D. (Mother), then approximately seventeen, were involved in an intimate relationship prior to Father's incarceration in December 2004 for the shooting death of his stepfather. While Father was incarcerated, S.P. (Child) was born in May 2005. After Child’s birth, Mother took her to visit Father several times while he was incarcerated at the county prison awaiting trial. In December 2005, Child was declared dependent, when Mother tested positive for THC, a chemical found in marijuana, and was involved in a domestic assault in the presence of Child. Following the declaration of Child’s dependency, Mother and Child apparently moved between several foster homes and Child’s grandmother’s home. In 2007, Child and Youth Services (CYS) filed an emergency shelter petition on behalf of Child when it could not ensure Child's safety. In 2008, Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to Child. At a hearing, testimony was presented that revealed Child suffered from developmental delays and was possibly autistic. A year later at another hearing, CYS moved to terminate Father's parental rights. As applied to this case, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court erred in reversing the trial court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights: "the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that “the conditions and causes of the incapacity . . . [could not] or [would] not be remedied” by Father."

In combined cases, the Supreme Court examined the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to decide whether several issues relating to the Act's notice provision mandate notice be sent to the appropriate tribe or to the Secretary of the Interior. Because the question of whether notice violations occurred in these cases began with determining whether the tribal-notice requirement was triggered, the Court first considered what indicia of Indian heritage sufficed to trigger the notice requirement. Further, the Court then considered whether a parent could waive the rights granted by ICWA to an Indian child's tribe and determine the appropriate recordkeeping requirements necessary to document the trial court's efforts to comply with ICWA's notice provision. "While it is impossible to articulate a precise rule that will encompass every possible factual situation, in light of the interests protected by ICWA, the potentially high costs of erroneously concluding that notice need not be sent, and the relatively low burden of erring in favor of requiring notice, we think the standard for triggering the notice requirement of 25 USC 1912(a) must be a cautionary one." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) sufficiently reliable information of virtually any criteria on which tribal membership might be based suffices to trigger the notice requirement; (2) a parent of an Indian child cannot waive the separate and independent ICWA rights of an Indian child's tribe and that the trial court must maintain a documentary record; and (3) the proper remedy for an ICWA-notice violation is to conditionally reverse the trial court and remand for resolution of the ICWA-notice issue.

The appellant in this case, Kenneth Adler, had been appointed as guardian ad litem for the children of Plaintiff-Respondent Joseph Abolafia and Defendant-Respondent Rebecca Reeves who were involved in a proceeding to modify the custody provisions of their divorce decree. After the parties reached an agreement to resolve their dispute and the magistrate court terminated Appellant as guardian ad litem. Appellant sought to appeal, challenging his termination. The district court held Appellant did not have standing to appeal, and dismissed the appeal and awarded attorney fees to the parents. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court: "Although he may have been miffed by his termination as guardian ad litem, injury to his pride is not justiciable. After he was terminated as guardian ad litem . . ., his actions in appealing to the district court have simply been those of an officious intermeddler. He had no standing to appeal."

Appellant is the mother of two minor children who were placed into the custody of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare on suspicion that they were abused or neglected. On March 27, 2009, the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney filed a petition under the Child Protective Act alleging that Appellant’s infant daughter was abused. On April 8, 2009, the prosecutor filed an amended petition adding Appellant’s son and alleging that he was neglected. A year later, the prosecutor filed a petition seeking to terminate Appellant’s parental rights in her two children. The matter was tried to the magistrate court, which on December 7, 2011, issued its decision. The court found that Appellant had failed to complete the tasks required of her under the case plan. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment terminating Appellants parental rights.

Johnette Cosby requested an administrative hearing to challenge a determination by the Department of Social Services that she was responsible for "indicated child neglect." Prior to the hearing, Cosby's son was adjudicated to be a Child in Need of Assistance based on the same allegations of neglect presented in the administrative action. As a result, the administrative law judge granted the Department's motion to dismiss Cosby's administrative appeal based on collateral estoppel. Cosby filed a petition for judicial review, arguing that amendments to Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law 5-706.1 precluded application of the common law defense of collateral estoppel. The circuit court reinstated Cosby's administrative appeal, but the court of special appeals reversed that determination. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that section 5-706.1 was not amended so as to preclude the common law defense of collateral estoppel when the elements are otherwise satisfied, and therefore, the dismissal of the administrative appeal was proper.

Pro se Plaintiff Robert Suprenant appealed a superior court order that dismissed his claims against Defendant Deborah Mulcrone under the doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Defendant was the guardian ad litem for Plaintiff's son in a contested case between Plaintiff and the son's mother. Defendant was appointed to investigate how Plaintiff and his son's mother should divide parenting time and residential responsibility for their son. Defendant stated in her report that although it was "commendable" that Plaintiff had no criminal charges since 1994, his failure to disclose his prior charges was "troubling." Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant alleging those statements in her report were negligently made and breached an implied contract with Plaintiff to observe "reasonable standards of care and fair dealing." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant was entitled to absolute immunity for her acts. Accordingly, the Court upheld the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff's lawsuit.

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Sabourin sued the University of Utah in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, claiming, among other things, that it had violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) by deciding to eliminate his position and then fire him for cause while he was on leave for childcare in 2006. The district court granted the University summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his FMLA claims. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: all of Plaintiff’s claims failed because the undisputed facts showed that the University’s adverse decisions were not based on Plaintiff’s taking FMLA leave. The decision to eliminate his position was made before he sought FMLA leave; and he was fired for engaging in a course of insubordination.

Plaintiff Edward Okeke and Tamara Shockley were unmarried when Shockley gave birth to a son. Shockley affirmed an acknowledgement of paternity form the parties executed after the birth. The last name of the child on the paternity acknowledgement was stated as 'Okeke.' The official birth certificate of the child, however, listed his last name as 'Shockley-Okeke.' Plaintiff filed with the department of public health and amendment of the child's birth certificate. A hearing officer denied Plaintiff's request. The superior court dismissed Plaintiff's administrative appeal. Plaintiff appealed, asserting that, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 19a-42(d)(1), the commissioner of public health has the authority to amend a child's birth certificate where the name on the birth certificate differs from that initially agreed upon by the parents on an acknowledgement of paternity form. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the commissioner did not have the authority to amend the birth certificate under the facts of this case.

When "Child" was three years and seven months old, his Mother was arrested while Child was in her care. Since Father was already incarcerated, the state declared Child to be in imminent danger. Child was placed in the the Department of Health and Welfare's custody, and a child protection case was initiated. The matter proceeded to trial, after which the trial court granted the Department's petition to terminate Father-Petitioner John Doe's parental rights. Father appealed. Finding clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father's parental rights were in Child's best interests, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to terminate.

This guardianship case began in the Youth Court for the City of Pearl. Petitioners Wanda Bell and Jane Dennis Morse requested that the case be transferred to the Rankin County Chancery Court. Later, Bell and Morse requested that the chancery court dismiss their petition, alleging that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. In addition to dismissing the case with prejudice, the chancellor awarded custody of the child to Frances Cathryn Dennis Finnegan, the child’s natural mother. Aggrieved, Bell and Morse appealed raising two issues: (1) whether the youth court erred by transferring the case to chancery court; and (2) whether the chancellor erred by awarding custody to Finnegan. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined the chancellor properly had jurisdiction of the case. However, the chancellor erred by dismissing the case and awarding custody to Finnegan without any on-the-record findings. The case was remanded for further proceedings.