Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Maria Seibold appealed a district court order that denied her motions for a second amended judgment and to hold Defendant-Appellee Paul Leverington in contempt and denied her request for a hearing on her motions. Seibold and Leverington have one child together. In 2006, a judgment was entered finding Leverington is the child's natural father, awarded Seibold sole legal and physical custody of the child, and awarded Leverington visitation. In 2009, Leverington moved to modify custody. After a hearing, the district court entered an order finding there was a material change in circumstances and it was in the child's best interests to modify custody. The court awarded Leverington sole legal and physical custody of the child and awarded Seibold visitation. The court also addressed the parties' parental rights and responsibilities and ordered that both parents have certain rights and duties related to the child, including the right to access and obtain copies of certain records related to the child and the right to contact the child by phone. An amended judgment was entered in September 2009. In 2011, Seibold moved for a second amended judgment, but the district court denied her motions without holding a hearing. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the court erred in denying Seibold's motions without providing her with sufficient time to schedule a hearing. The Court reversed the court's order and remanded for further proceedings.

At issue in this dependency case was the lawfulness of a juvenile court order that required a father not to interfere with the ability of a child who is a ward of the court to visit other children who live with the father but are not wards of the court. The Court of Appeals concluded that the juvenile court possessed the authority to enter the order under ORS 419B.337(3). "J.R.F," the Father in this case, contended that the Court of Appeals erred in its holding, because the order at issue did not involve visitation "by the parents or the siblings." The Department of Human Services (DHS) contended that the Court of Appeals was correct, because, although ORS 419B.337(3) did not explicitly authorize the order at issue, the dependency statutes, taken as a whole, authorized the court to "make any order designed to further the best interest of a ward and advance the reunification of the family." Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that even if the state was correct about the scope of the authority that the statutes conferred on the juvenile court, the record in this case was inadequate to support the order at issue. The Court therefore reversed the opinion of the Court of Appeals and vacated the order of the juvenile court.

Jane Doe appealed the termination of her parental rights with regard to her son, John Doe, contending that the magistrate court failed to properly consider her improved participation in mental health and family counseling services. Because there was substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate court's final Judgment that termination of Jane Doe's parental rights was in John's best interests, the magistrate court did not err in terminating her parental rights.

This appeal arose when the People of California adopted Proposition 8, which amended the state constitution to eliminate the right of same-sex couples to marry. At issue was whether this amendment violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court declined to address the more general questions presented to it concerning the rights of same-sex couples to marry. The court concluded that, through the proponents of ballot measures, the People of California must be allowed to defend in federal courts, including on appeal, the validity of their use of the initiative power. Accordingly, the proponents possessed Article III standing to prosecute this appeal from the district court's judgment invalidating Proposition 8. However, the court concluded that the People could not employ the initiative power to single out a disfavored group for unequal treatment and strip them, without a legitimate justification, of a right as important as the right to marry. By using their initiative power to target a minority group and withdraw a right that it possessed, without legitimate reasons for doing so, the People violated the Equal Protection Clause. Therefore, the court held that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional on this ground and affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court also affirmed the denial of the motion by the official sponsors of Proposition 8 to vacate the judgment entered by former Chief Judge Walker, on the basis of his purported interest in being allowed to marry his same-sex partner.

Respondent, the father of "Haley K.," appealed a family division order that terminated his parental rights. He argued that the trial court erred in finding the State provided reasonable services for his reunification with the child. Finding that Respondent failed to make adequate provisions for his child's care and support during his incarceration ("respondent's physical unavailability did not absolve him of his parental obligation to provide for the care of his child"), the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision terminating his parental rights.

Acting on a petition filed by the child's father, the Arapahoe County District Court assumed jurisdiction to modify a Maryland child custody order on the grounds that neither the child nor the child's parents "currently resided" in Maryland. Petitioner George Brandt and his child lived in Colorado, and Respondent Christine Brandt lived in Texas. Respondent sought relief from the Colorado court order. Upon review, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the district court failed to apply the appropriate standard of review when assuming jurisdiction to modify the Maryland child custody order. The operative statutory term "presently reside" is not equivalent to "currently reside" or "physical presence." Accordingly, the Court reversed and vacated the district court's order assuming jurisdiction and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Bethel Superior Court entered an order terminating an incarcerated father's parental rights to three of his five children. The father appealed, arguing that the superior court erred by finding that the State made active efforts to prevent the breakup of his family and finding that it was in the children's best interests for his parental rights to be terminated. Because the superior court's active efforts and best interests findings were supported by the record and not clearly erroneous, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's ruling terminating the father's parental rights.

"Martha" and "William" are the parents of six children. They appealed the superior court’s order adjudicating their two youngest children as children in need of aid and placing the children in the custody of the Office of Children’s Services (OCS). Martha and William argued that the superior court abused its discretion in making various evidentiary rulings and contended that it was clearly erroneous for the superior court to find that the children were in need of aid and that continued custody by the parents would be contrary to the children’s best interests. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision to adjudicate the children as in need of aid and to keep them in the custody of OCS for a period not to exceed 18 months.

In May 2008, seven-year-old Jordan Alexander Robertson was placed in foster care at the home of Verlin Spurgeon and Carol Spurgeon. In June 2008, Jordan drowned in the Spurgeons' swimming pool. James Brakefield, as administrator of Jordan's estate, sued the Spurgeons, among others, in circuit court alleging that they had negligently and/or wantonly caused Jordan's death. The Spurgeons moved the circuit court for a summary judgment, alleging, among other things, that the claims were barred by the doctrines of parental, State, and State-agent immunity. The circuit court denied the motion. The Spurgeons petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to dismiss the claims against them. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted their petition in part and issued the writ to direct the circuit court to dismiss the negligence claims against the Spurgeons. In all other respects, the Court denied the petition.

R.G., father of A.L., appealed a juvenile court order confirming a judicial referee's decision to terminate his parental rights to four minor children. In 2003, R.G. was placed on criminal probation, and in March 2009, his probation was revoked and he was sentenced to a three-year prison term. In September 2009, R.G.'s four children involved in this action were all less than four years old and were residing with their mother when the children were taken into protective custody by Benson County Social Services and placed in foster care after the mother left the children with relatives and did not return. In May 2010, the State petitioned to terminate the parental rights of R.G. and the mother. In August 2010, the juvenile court terminated the mother's parental rights and also found the children were deprived as to R.G., but the evidence was not sufficient to terminate his parental rights. The juvenile court stated R.G. was anticipating being paroled in January 2011 with release to a halfway house for three to four months. The court also stated R.G.'s early release was contingent upon his completion of a drug and alcohol treatment program. After a hearing, a judicial referee terminated R.G.'s parental rights to the four children, finding R.G. was not granted his early parole as anticipated because he had not yet completed his drug and alcohol treatment program due to his conduct in the prison facility. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the court did not clearly err in finding the children were deprived, and did not abuse its discretion in terminating R.G.'s parental rights.