Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Janet Hornbeck appealed an order of the circuit court, arguing that the court erred by affirming the family court's ruling that the Bureau of Child Support Enforcement (BCSE) method of distributing child support arrearage payments between principal and interest is appropriate even though it deviates from the way those allocations are generally made for court-ordered money judgments not involving support. At issue was the validity of a procedure established and followed by an administrative agency. After concluding the procedure to be an interpretive rule under the APA, the Supreme Court held that the BCSE rule is within the authority granted the agency in W. Va. Code 48-11-105. Affirmed.

Tonya Lindhorst and Eric Lindhorst divorced in 1998. The dissolution decree ordered Eric to pay $1,100 monthly in child support and $1,000 monthly in maintenance. In 2003, Tonya began receiving Social Security disability benefits. In 2008, both parties filed motions to modify the decree. The trial court reduced Eric's maintenance obligation but increased his child support obligation and did not make the modified child support award retroactive to the date that Tonya served her motion to modify. Tonya appealed. At issue was whether the trial court erred in imputing income to Tonya from part-time employment while assuming the continued receipt of Social Security disability benefits. The Supreme Court held (1) the level of work and income imputed to Tonya would disqualify her from Social Security benefits and therefore the trial court erred in considering both the imputed income and Tanya's Social Security disability benefit as a basis for reducing Eric's maintenance obligation; and (2) because Tonya demonstrated the trial court abused its discretion in its modification of the child support award, that part of the judgment declining to make the increased child support obligation retroactive is reversed. Remanded.

Plaintiffs, a father and his children, brought various claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 asserting that a children's services caseworker entered their home unlawfully and effected an unconstitutional removal of the children into state custody. At issue was whether the district court properly concluded that the caseworker was entitled to qualified immunity with respect to all of the claims against him and granted summary judgment in his favor. The court held that the caseworker was not entitled to qualified immunity and vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for Fourth Amendment violations arising out of the allegedly unlawful search of plaintiffs' home; plaintiffs' claims for violations of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; the father's claim for violation of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; and the children's claim for unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant, director of a child development center on the Elmendorf Air Force Base, sued appellees alleging claims of discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16, and a claim of unlawful removal from employment pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7702. Appellant appealed from the district court's denial of summary judgment affirming a decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"), which in turn upheld a decision by the United States Air Force ("Agency"), to terminate her employment after she requested 120 days leave without pay pursuant to the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 5 U.S.C. 6382(a)(1)(D), and failed to provide the minimum information required by section 6383(b) of the FMLA. The court held that the MSPB's finding was supported by substantial evidence where appellant's WH-380 form and the two doctors' notes she submitted did not provide the minimum information required by section 6383(b). The court further held that, because appellant refused to submit the minimal mandated medical certification, she could not show any harm arising from the Agency's request for more documentation that was required by the FMLA. The court further held that the administrative law judge properly rejected appellant's argument that the Agency failed to give her adequate time to provide medical certification. The court finally held that substantial evidence supported the MSPB's finding and therefore, the Agency acted within its discretion in removing her from her position.

Plaintiff Pamela Casey filed a petition for divorce in 2003. The district court entered a decree of dissolution and divided the marital property. Defendant William Casey appealed, and the appellate court remanded the case and ordered the lower court to adjust the division of the marital property. The trial judge remembered hearing an earlier case involving Plaintiff when he worked at the Garvin County district attorneyâs office. In that case, Defendantâs new wife sought a protective order against Plaintiff. Plaintiff was charged with felony malicious injury to property. The judge recused himself from hearing that case. The charges were eventually dropped. The judge still felt strongly about the disposition of that earlier case, but he felt he could be objective enough to hear Plaintiffâs divorce case and divide the marital property as ordered by the appellate court. Plaintiffâs divorce counsel asked the judge to recuse himself again, and the judge refused. Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that the trial judge abused his discretion by refusing to step aside. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that âbased on the facts and circumstances in this case, and in fairness and justice to the Plaintiff, the trial judge was obligated to recuse.â The Court vacated the appellate courtâs decision, reversed the trial court, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

A social worker employed by the Department was the primary case worker for plaintiffâs son, who was removed from his motherâs custody by the Department. After boy was adjudicated neglected by the juvenile court, custody was granted to his maternal great aunt and uncle. Plaintiff, who wished to take custody, claimed that the social worker misrepresented his desire and ability to parent and impeded his ability to participate in custody proceedings. The district court denied the social worker's motion for summary judgment on claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the social worker is absolutely immune from suit for her participation in juvenile court proceedings, regardless of whether she conducted an inadequate investigation or knowingly made false statements. Because the social worker's conduct neither caused any deprivation of the plaintiff's interest in family integrity, nor interfered with the process, qualified immunity barred remaining claims. The juvenile court was responsible for the "deprivation" and the plaintiff had notice and an opportunity to be heard.

The Duchess County Department of Social Services ("DSS") filed neglect petitions pursuant to Family Court article 10 against respondents, a mother and a father, alleging that father neglected his children because he was an "untreated" sex offender whose crimes involved victims between 13 and 15 years-old and mother allegedly failed to protect the children from father. At issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that respondents' children were neglected pursuant to article 10 of the Family Court Act. The court affirmed the Appellate Division and held that the evidence presented was insufficient to prove neglect where DSS failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that father posed an imminent danger to his children and therefore, DSS necessarily failed to prove that mother neglected the children by allowing father to return home.