Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court's order changing the permanency plan for Mother and her two youngest children from family reunification to adoption, holding that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.On appeal, Mother argued that the juvenile court abused its discretion in determining that the Department of Family Services (DFS) made reasonable but ultimately unsuccessful efforts at reunification and that the permanency plan for the children should be changed to adoption. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding that the record adequately supported the court's determination that DFS met its burden to prove its efforts at reunifying Mother with her two children were reasonable but unsuccessful. View "NP v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition sought by the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources and others (collectively, DHHR) to prohibit the Honorable Louis Bloom, Judge of the Circuit Court of Kanawah County, from enforcing mandamus orders he issued against DHHR, holding that DHHR was entitled to a writ of prohibition.The circuit court established the underlying mandamus proceeding initiated by two Kanawha County Guardians ad Litem (the GALs) to compel the DHHR to address and remedy issues of employee staffing and training in the Kanawha County Child Protective Services Division Office. The circuit court subsequently granted the GALs' request to expand the scope of the initial writ of mandamus and added issues concerning statewide staff and child housing over the DHHR's objections. The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition, holding that the circuit court exceeded the scope of its agreed-upon order by impermissibly expanding the scope of the mandamus proceeding. View "State ex rel., W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Resources v. Honorable Bloom" on Justia Law

Petitioner Louis Lafasciano petitioned the New Hampshire Supreme Court for review of a decision of respondent, New Hampshire Retirement System Board of Trustees (Board), that rescinded a previously-granted termination of the survivorship benefit of his former spouse, intervenor Margaret Murray, in his state pension. At the time he retired, petitioner named intervenor, then his spouse, as his survivor beneficiary, thereby reducing the amount of the retirement benefit he received during his lifetime. Under the law then in effect, a retired member who designated his or her spouse as survivor beneficiary could terminate that designation during the spouse’s lifetime only if the parties divorced and the spouse remarried. Petitioner and intervenor divorced in 2014. In 2016, the New Hampshire legislature amended RSA 100-A:13 to provide an additional circumstance under which a retired member could terminate a previously-elected spousal survivorship benefit. In November 2016, petitioner requested that intervenor be removed as his primary death beneficiary, stating that the two had been “divorced for two years now, and since the change in state legislation this past August [he] believe[d] that [his] request [could] now be honored.” In July 2020, NHRS informed the petitioner that his 2016 request for termination of his survivor benefit option had been processed in error. It further informed him that NHRS would be “rescinding that termination and reinstituting the 100% joint and survivor option you originally selected for your former spouse” and would be “instituting recoupment proceedings to recover the cumulative pop-up amount that has been paid to you since December 2016.” Petitioner appealed the Board's decision. The Supreme Court found that petitioner did not have a unilateral right to revoke his election of a spousal survivorship benefit. "[A]bsent his former spouse’s remarriage, he may terminate such an election only if his divorce decree 'provides that the former spouse shall renounce any claim to a retirement allowance under RSA 100-A.'" Because the divorce decree here did not require intervenor to renounce her claim to a survivorship benefit, petitioner could not terminate the benefit under the statute. Judgment was thus affirmed. View "Petition of Louis Lafasciano" on Justia Law

Mother Jane Doe appealed a magistrate court's judgment granting a petition to terminate her parental rights to her two minor children, Jane Doe I and John Doe I (the children). The magistrate court determined that Mother had neglected the children as defined in Idaho Code section 16-2002(3)(b), and that termination was in the best interests of the children. On appeal, Mother argued the definition of “neglect” provided in section 16-2002(3)(b) violated the Idaho and the United States Constitutions, and she argues that the magistrate court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interests was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. After its review of the magistrate court record, the Idaho Supreme Court found the magistrate court found, by clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated. That decision was supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. It was therefore affirmed. View "IDHW v. Jane Doe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgments of the juvenile court granting permanent custody of three children to the Butler County Department of Job and Family Services - Children Services Division (the agency), holding that the current challenge to the juvenile court's jurisdiction was barred by res judicata.The dispositional hearing granting the agency temporary custody of the children in this case occurred more than ninety days after the filing of complaints for temporary custody. The juvenile court then granted permanent custody to the agency. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to grant permanent custody to the agency because the temporary-custody judgment was void. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) even if no motion to dismiss has been filed, under the plain language of former Ohio Rev. Code 2151.35(B)(1), the juvenile court is required to dismiss the complaint after ninety days; (2) a juvenile court's failure to dismiss the complaint is an error in the exercise of the court's jurisdiction, not one that deprives the court of jurisdiction; and (3) the judgments granting temporary custody of the children to the agency were valid, and the parents' challenge to the juvenile court's jurisdiction was barred by res judicata. View "In re K.K." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's tort action against the State of Nebraska, the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services (DCS) and its director, and the Nebraska State Patrol (NSP), holding that the State had not waived its its sovereign immunity with respect to Plaintiff's claim.Plaintiff filed this negligence action alleging "Negligent Disclosure and Review of Sealed Records" alleging that NSP negligently disclosed Plaintiff's sealed criminal history records to DCS in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-3523. The district court dismissed the complaint, in its entirety, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff failed to allege a tort claim as that term is defined in the State Tort Claims Act (STCA), Neb. Rev. Stat. 81-8,209 to 81-8,235; and (2) therefore, the State did not waive its sovereign immunity with respect to Plaintiff's claim. View "Doe v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court ordering the permanency plan for minor siblings BP and CS be changed from reunification to adoption, holding that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.The Department of Family Services (DFS) recommended changing the permanency plan for BP and CS to adoption. After a permanency hearing, the juvenile court issued an order changing the permanency plan to adoption and relieving DFS from further reunification efforts, finding that DFS established that it had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that DFS made reasonable efforts to reunify Mother with CS and BP and changed the permanency plan for reunification to adoption. View "NP v. State" on Justia Law

Two tribes claimed to be a child’s tribe for purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA): The Native Village of Wales claimed the child was a tribal member; the Native Village of Chignik Lagoon claims that the child is “eligible for tribal membership.” After the superior court terminated the biological parents’ parental rights, Wales moved to transfer subsequent proceedings, including potential adoption, to its tribal court. Chignik Lagoon intervened in the child in need of aid (CINA) case, arguing that the child was not a member of Wales under Wales’s constitution and that transfer of further proceedings to the Wales tribal court was not authorized under ICWA. The superior court found that the child was a member of Wales and that Wales was the child’s tribe for ICWA purposes, and therefore granted the transfer of jurisdiction. Chignik Lagoon appealed. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s determination that the child was a member of Wales and that Wales was appropriately designated as the child’s tribe for ICWA purposes. The Supreme Court also concluded that, given that ruling, Chignik Lagoon lacked standing to challenge the transfer of proceedings to the Wales tribal court. View "Native Village of Chignik Lagoon v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Soc. Svcs." on Justia Law

Mother challenged the denial of her request that a child-support order be made retroactive and that she be awarded the arrearage. A magistrate judge found that mother assigned her right to any past-due support to the Office of Child Support (OCS) as a condition of receiving benefits on behalf of her child and that the State waived any arrearages. The family division affirmed. Mother argued on appeal that she did not assign OCS her right to past-due support. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the family division. View "OCS/Dionne v. Anthony" on Justia Law

As relevant here, a trial court has reason to know that a child is an Indian child when “[a]ny participant in the proceeding, officer of the court involved in the proceeding, Indian Tribe, Indian organization, or agency informs the court that it has discovered information indicating that the child is an Indian child.” In this dependency and neglect case, the juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights with respect to E.A.M. Mother appealed, complaining that the court had failed to comply with Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) by not ensuring that the petitioning party, the Denver Human Services Department (“the Department”), had provided notice of the proceeding to the tribes that she and other relatives had identified as part of E.A.M.’s heritage. The Department and the child’s guardian ad litem responded that the assertions of Indian heritage by Mother and other relatives had not given the juvenile court reason to know that the child was an Indian child. Rather, they maintained, such assertions had merely triggered the due diligence requirement in section 19-1-126(3), and here, the Department had exercised due diligence. A division of the court of appeals agreed with Mother, vacated the termination judgment, and remanded with directions to ensure compliance with ICWA’s notice requirements. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, finding that "mere assertions" of a child's Indian heritage, without more, were not enough to give a juvenile court "reason to know" that the child was an Indian child. Here, the juvenile court correctly found that it didn’t have reason to know that E.A.M. is an Indian child. Accordingly, it properly directed the Department to exercise due diligence in gathering additional information that would assist in determining whether there was reason to know that E.A.M. is an Indian child. View "Colorado in interest of E.A.M. v. D.R.M." on Justia Law