Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Father appealed a circuit court order terminating his parental rights over his minor child, G.F., on the ground that he failed to correct, within twelve months, the conditions that led to the court’s finding under RSA chapter 169-C (2022) that G.F. was neglected by G.F.’s mother. In January 2020, father did not attend mother’s adjudicatory or dispositional hearings. Mother entered into a consent agreement acknowledging that neglect occurred due to her drug use. At the dispositional hearing, the circuit court adopted a case plan and dispositional orders, which also applied to father. Father was not served with these documents. At the three-month review hearing, father's counsel received the case plan, dispositional orders and related discovery. Two days after the six-month review hearing, father was arrested for felony second degree assault and other domestic violence charges involving his then girlfriend and her minor child. He pled guilty to at least two of the charges. In September 2020, a nine-month review hearing was held. In January 2021, the trial court held the first permanency hearing in the neglect case while father was incarcerated. The trial court found father was not in compliance with dispositional orders. The trial court changed the permanency plan from reunification to adoption and specified that “DCYF is no longer required to provide reasonable efforts to facilitate reunification between [G.F.] and mother [and] father, but shall make reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan.” In September 2021, the circuit court held a second permanency hearing; again the court found father was not in compliance with the dispositional orders and concluded G.F. could not be safely returned to his care. DCYF filed a new petition to terminate the father’s parental rights in October 2021. In December 2021, the father was released from incarceration. In February 2022, the circuit court granted DCYF’s petition to terminate the father’s parental rights. Assuming without deciding that, during the nine months in which DCYF was ordered by the court to make reasonable efforts to reunify G.F. with his father, those efforts were reasonable, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that DCYF failed to meet its burden because the court did not order DCYF to make such efforts for the remaining three months. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order terminating the father’s parental rights over G.F. View "In re G.F." on Justia Law

The Alaska Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took custody of a newborn child due to concerns about the parents’ drug use and the father’s history of sexual abuse. The mother later voluntarily relinquished her parental rights, and after a trial, the superior court terminated the father’s rights. The father appealed the termination order, arguing: (1) the order improperly relied on drug-treatment records that were not admitted at trial; and (2) in proposing a new process to govern a parent’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he established a prima facie case of ineffective assistance and the Alaska Supreme Court should remand the case to the superior court for an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court was not convinced by either argument, and affirmed the termination order because relying on the unadmitted drug-treatment records was harmless error and because the father did not show he received ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the Court took the opportunity to clarify its approach to ineffective assistance claims in child in need of aid (CINA) cases. View "Penn P. Jr. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Soc.Srvs" on Justia Law

C.K. (Father) and I.B. (Mother) appealed the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights to their infant child, D.B. They argued the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services failed to comply with its duty of initial inquiry into Father’s Indian ancestry under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, and related California law (ICWA), and thus the juvenile court erroneously found that ICWA did not apply. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed and found that the error was prejudicial. It therefore conditionally reversed and remanded to allow the Department to fully comply with ICWA. View "In re D.B." on Justia Law

N.L., Sr. appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights. A.H. and N.L., Sr. were the biological mother and father of N.L., Jr., born in 2015 and J.L., born in 2018. In August 2020, N.L. and J.L. were removed from their home after law enforcement performed a welfare check. N.L., Sr. argues the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to terminate his parental rights, the Grand Forks County Human Service Zone (GFCHSZ) lacked standing, and the court erred in finding GFCHSZ met the requirements for termination of parental rights under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-19. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the termination. View "Interest of N.L." on Justia Law

Petitioners W.M. (minor), and Amber G. (her prospective adoptive parent/de facto parent) sought an extraordinary writ from the juvenile court’s order removing W.M. from Amber’s care and placing her with out-of-state relatives she has never met. The California Legislature enacted a "complex scheme of placement preferences," and Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) conflated the considerations involved in the placement of a child with those involved in removing a child posttermination from a prospective adoptive parent’s home. "While placement with relatives is generally favored when the need arises, removal from any stable, permanent, loving home (with non-relatives or relatives), particularly after a child has been freed for adoption, is not. By failing to recognize its burden in recommending W.M.’s removal, SSA obscured the critical decision the juvenile court needed to make: Was removing W.M. from her current placement in her best interest?" After carefully reviewing the entire record, the Court of Appeal found SSA was obligated to do much more pursuant to the prospective adoptive parent (PAP) preference. The statute also required the court to hold a hearing and review all material evidence relating to SSA’s removal decision before approving or rejecting it. In this case, it appears the court focused on the reasons for the delay in placing W.M. with her relatives, and neglected to sufficiently consider Welfare & Institutions Code section 366.26(n)’s directive. Petitioners argued there was insufficient evidence that it would be in W.M.'s best interest to remove her from the only family she has ever known, and eliminate any chance she has of connecting with her siblings, for the opportunity to live with out-of-state blood relatives who are strangers to her. The Court of Appeal granted the petitions and vacated the juvenile court’s removal order. View "Amber G. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court's order changing the permanency plan for Mother and her two youngest children from family reunification to adoption, holding that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.On appeal, Mother argued that the juvenile court abused its discretion in determining that the Department of Family Services (DFS) made reasonable but ultimately unsuccessful efforts at reunification and that the permanency plan for the children should be changed to adoption. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding that the record adequately supported the court's determination that DFS met its burden to prove its efforts at reunifying Mother with her two children were reasonable but unsuccessful. View "NP v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition sought by the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources and others (collectively, DHHR) to prohibit the Honorable Louis Bloom, Judge of the Circuit Court of Kanawah County, from enforcing mandamus orders he issued against DHHR, holding that DHHR was entitled to a writ of prohibition.The circuit court established the underlying mandamus proceeding initiated by two Kanawha County Guardians ad Litem (the GALs) to compel the DHHR to address and remedy issues of employee staffing and training in the Kanawha County Child Protective Services Division Office. The circuit court subsequently granted the GALs' request to expand the scope of the initial writ of mandamus and added issues concerning statewide staff and child housing over the DHHR's objections. The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition, holding that the circuit court exceeded the scope of its agreed-upon order by impermissibly expanding the scope of the mandamus proceeding. View "State ex rel., W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Resources v. Honorable Bloom" on Justia Law

Petitioner Louis Lafasciano petitioned the New Hampshire Supreme Court for review of a decision of respondent, New Hampshire Retirement System Board of Trustees (Board), that rescinded a previously-granted termination of the survivorship benefit of his former spouse, intervenor Margaret Murray, in his state pension. At the time he retired, petitioner named intervenor, then his spouse, as his survivor beneficiary, thereby reducing the amount of the retirement benefit he received during his lifetime. Under the law then in effect, a retired member who designated his or her spouse as survivor beneficiary could terminate that designation during the spouse’s lifetime only if the parties divorced and the spouse remarried. Petitioner and intervenor divorced in 2014. In 2016, the New Hampshire legislature amended RSA 100-A:13 to provide an additional circumstance under which a retired member could terminate a previously-elected spousal survivorship benefit. In November 2016, petitioner requested that intervenor be removed as his primary death beneficiary, stating that the two had been “divorced for two years now, and since the change in state legislation this past August [he] believe[d] that [his] request [could] now be honored.” In July 2020, NHRS informed the petitioner that his 2016 request for termination of his survivor benefit option had been processed in error. It further informed him that NHRS would be “rescinding that termination and reinstituting the 100% joint and survivor option you originally selected for your former spouse” and would be “instituting recoupment proceedings to recover the cumulative pop-up amount that has been paid to you since December 2016.” Petitioner appealed the Board's decision. The Supreme Court found that petitioner did not have a unilateral right to revoke his election of a spousal survivorship benefit. "[A]bsent his former spouse’s remarriage, he may terminate such an election only if his divorce decree 'provides that the former spouse shall renounce any claim to a retirement allowance under RSA 100-A.'" Because the divorce decree here did not require intervenor to renounce her claim to a survivorship benefit, petitioner could not terminate the benefit under the statute. Judgment was thus affirmed. View "Petition of Louis Lafasciano" on Justia Law

Mother Jane Doe appealed a magistrate court's judgment granting a petition to terminate her parental rights to her two minor children, Jane Doe I and John Doe I (the children). The magistrate court determined that Mother had neglected the children as defined in Idaho Code section 16-2002(3)(b), and that termination was in the best interests of the children. On appeal, Mother argued the definition of “neglect” provided in section 16-2002(3)(b) violated the Idaho and the United States Constitutions, and she argues that the magistrate court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interests was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. After its review of the magistrate court record, the Idaho Supreme Court found the magistrate court found, by clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated. That decision was supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. It was therefore affirmed. View "IDHW v. Jane Doe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgments of the juvenile court granting permanent custody of three children to the Butler County Department of Job and Family Services - Children Services Division (the agency), holding that the current challenge to the juvenile court's jurisdiction was barred by res judicata.The dispositional hearing granting the agency temporary custody of the children in this case occurred more than ninety days after the filing of complaints for temporary custody. The juvenile court then granted permanent custody to the agency. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to grant permanent custody to the agency because the temporary-custody judgment was void. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) even if no motion to dismiss has been filed, under the plain language of former Ohio Rev. Code 2151.35(B)(1), the juvenile court is required to dismiss the complaint after ninety days; (2) a juvenile court's failure to dismiss the complaint is an error in the exercise of the court's jurisdiction, not one that deprives the court of jurisdiction; and (3) the judgments granting temporary custody of the children to the agency were valid, and the parents' challenge to the juvenile court's jurisdiction was barred by res judicata. View "In re K.K." on Justia Law