Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

After a traffic stop, Petitioner refused to submit to a blood-alcohol test. The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) suspended Petitioner’s driver license for one year. Petitioner sought review, and a hearing officer upheld the suspension. On certiorari review of the administrative decision, the circuit court invalidated the suspension, finding that the hearing officer’s refusal to permit Petitioner’s counsel to ask more than two questions of Petitioner’s witness denied Petitioner due process. The circuit court directed DHSMV to set aside the suspension and reinstate Petitioner’s driver’s license. On second-tier certiorari review of the circuit court’s decision, the Fifth District Court of Appeal agreed that the hearing officer violated Petitioner’s due process rights but ruled that the circuit court was required to remand the case back to DHSMV for another administrative hearing. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that the Fifth District inappropriately exercised its certiorari jurisdiction to review the circuit court order. Remanded for reinstatement of the circuit court’s decision. View "Futch v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

In 2010, the legislature amended state law to preempt regulation of red light cameras to the state. At issue in these consolidated cases was whether pre-2010 municipal ordinances imposing penalties for red light violations detected by camera devices were invalid because they were preempted by state law. The district courts in these cases reached contrary conclusions: the Third District Court of Appeal held that the City of Aventura’s ordinance was a valid exercise of municipal power, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal concluded that the City of Orland’s ordinance was invalid because it was in conflict with and was preempted by state law. The Supreme Court agreed with the Fifth District, holding that the ordinances at issue were invalid because they were expressly preempted by state law. View "Masone v. City of Aventura" on Justia Law

The South Florida Water Management District alleged that RLI, Live Oak, LLC, a land developer and owner of property that purportedly contained wetlands, participated in unauthorized dredging, construction activity, and filling of wetlands without first obtaining the District’s approval. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of the District and awarded the District $81,900 in civil penalties. The district court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in basing its findings on a preponderance of the evidence standard and not the clear and convincing evidence standard. On motion for rehearing or certification, the district court certified a question for a determination by the Supreme Court of the proper burden of proof. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where the Legislature statutorily authorizes a state governmental agency to recover a “civil penalty” in a “court of competent jurisdiction” but does not specify the agency’s burden of proof, the agency is not required to prove the alleged violation by clear and convincing evidence but, rather, by a preponderance of the evidence. View "S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. RLI Live Oak, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a territorial dispute between two utilities, Choctawhatchee Electric Cooperative, Inc. and Gulf Power Company, both of which sought the right to serve Freedom Walk, a proposed multi-purpose development. The Florida Public Service Commission resolved the dispute in favor of Gulf Power, concluding that because the multiple factors it considered were substantially equal, customer preference, which favored Gulf Power, would determine the outcome of the dispute. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s order granting Gulf Power the right to serve the Freedom Walk development, holding that the Commission’s findings and conclusions were supported by competent substantial evidence and were not clearly erroneous. View "Choctawhatchee Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Graham" on Justia Law

Child was born with birth-related neurological injuries. Child's parents (Petitioners) filed a claim for compensation under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan. The Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association agreed to pay parental compensation of $100,000 to both parents jointly under Fla. Stat. 766.31(1)(b)(1), which provides for an award not exceeding $100,000 to the parents or legal guardians of an infant found to have sustained a birth-related neurological injury. Petitioners reserved the right to have a hearing before an ALJ to raise the issue of the interpretation and constitutionality of section 766.31(1)(b)(1). The ALJ denied Petitioners' claim for an additional $100,000 as part of the parental award, finding that the Legislature clearly intended that the maximum award of $100,000 was for both parents, not for each parent. The district court upheld the ALJ's judgment and denied each of Petitioners' constitutional claims. The Supreme Court approved the district court's decision, holding that the parental award provision (1) unambiguously provides for only a single award of $100,000; (2) does not violate equal protection; and (3) neither is void for vagueness nor unconstitutionally limits the right of access to courts. View "Samples v. Fla. Birth Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n" on Justia Law

In this case the Supreme Court considered whether a municipal ordinance may validly establish superpriority status for municipal code enforcement liens. The court of appeal concluded that such an ordinance superpriority provision was invalid because it conflicted with a state statute and that the City's lien accordingly did not have priority over the lien of Wells Fargo's mortgage that was recorded before the City's lien was recorded. The City appealed, arguing that the ordinance superpriority provision within the "broad home rule powers" of the City. The Supreme Court accepted certification and concluded that the court of appeal correctly decided the ordinance superpriority provision was invalid because it conflicted with state law. View "City of Palm Bay v. Wells Fargo, N.A." on Justia Law

In 2008, the Florida Public Service Commission (PSC) granted the petitions for determination of need for new nuclear power plants proposed by Florida Power & Light company (FPL) and Progress Energy Florida (PEF). The PSC subsequently issued orders granting the utility companies' annual petitions for recovery of their associated preconstruction costs through customer rates. Southern Alliance for Clean Energy (SACE) opposed FPL and PEF's most recent cost recovery petitions, arguing that Fla. Stat. 366.93 unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority to the PSC and, alternatively, the PSC's order authorizing the utility companies to recover preconstruction costs was arbitrary and unsupported by competent, substantial evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that authorizing recovery of preconstruction costs through customer rates in order to promote utility company investment in new nuclear power plants, even though those plants might never be built, is a policy decision for the Legislature, not the Court. View "Alliance for Clean Energy v. Graham" on Justia Law

This case was before the court for review of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Snipes v. Telli, which held that the Florida Constitution permitted Broward County to impose term limits on the office of the county commissioner. Because the court receded from its decision in Cook v. City of Jacksonville, the court approved the Fourth District's decision and held that Broward County's term limits did not violate Florida's Constitution.

The North Port Road and Drainage District (NPRDD), a municipal dependent special district wholly contained within the City of North Port, levied non-ad valorem special assessments against nine parcels of real property owned by West Villages Improvement District, an independent special district of the State of Florida. The Second District held that NPRDD could not lawfully impose the special assessments on West Villages' real property without statutory authority. The court affirmed, but on the basis that NPRDD's home rule power under the Florida Constitution did not reach as far as it argued. Accordingly, because there was no way for West Villages to lawfully pay the special assessments, NPRDD's assessments fell within the limitations on home rule powers set forth in section 166.021(3), Florida Statutes.

In this case, the court considered an appeal from a final circuit court judgment validating revenue bonds proposed to be issued by the county to finance a beach restoration project. The court held that appellants erroneously contended that in adopting the Assessment Resolution, the county failed to comply with the requirements of its MSBU Ordinance, and as a result, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction; appellants contention, that the county failed to demonstrate that the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) would issue the permits at issue for the beach renourishment project and thus the circuit court erred in validating the bonds, was rejected; beach and shore preservation projects confronted a critical threat to the welfare of the people of the state and those special benefits that flow incidentally to certain properties because of the nature of the project did not diminish its predominately public nature; competent, substantial evidence supported the trial court's determination that the county's methodology was fair and reasonable; and regardless of how much sand was added outside the boundaries of the MSBU, the special benefits were nevertheless provided. Accordingly, the court affirmed the circuit court's final judgment of validation of the bonds.