Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in this case to decide whether the Court of Appeals erred in its determination that the public duty doctrine insulated the City of Doraville from liability arising from the response of a Doraville Police Department ("DPD") officer to a vehicle emergency on an interstate highway which culminated in a multi-vehicle accident injuring Kenyatta Stevenson. Stevenson sued the City and a DPD Officer, asserting that the officer was negligent in failing to redirect traffic away from Stevenson's disabled car and in causing traffic to move in Stevenson's direction by engaging his vehicle's blue emergency lights while stopped near the outer lane of the highway behind and to the right of Stevenson. The trial court granted summary judgment to both defendants, finding official immunity shielded the officer from liability and that the public duty doctrine precluded Stevenson's claims against the City. Stevenson appealed, arguing that the public duty doctrine did not apply to his case because he alleged affirmative acts of negligence and that, even if the doctrine did apply, he fell within the special relationship exception identified in "City of Rome v. Jordan," (426 SE2d 861) (1993)). The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding Stevenson's arguments lacked merit. Although it appeared that the appellate court based its rejection of Stevenson's first argument on a finding that "there [was] nothing in the record . . . showing any active negligence on the part of the officer," the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, but wrote to clarify the public duty doctrine. The doctrine "does not apply to limit liability where a claim of active negligence (misfeasance), rather than a mere failure to act (nonfeasance) is alleged." View "Stevenson v. City of Doraville" on Justia Law

Julian Rigby and other members of the Board of Directors of the Satilla Rural Electric Membership Corporation appealed a trial court's order granting a writ of mandamus to Jerry Boatright, acting individually and derivatively on behalf of the members of the Satilla Rural Electric Membership Corporation. Boatright was a member of the Satilla Rural Electric Membership Corporation. Boatright submitted to Satilla's Credentials and Elections Committee a petition that nominated him as a candidate for election to Satilla's Board of Directors for the seat that Rigby held. Rigby challenged Boatright's qualifications to be a member of the Board, based upon Boatright's financial interest in Pike Electric, LLC. Satilla's Credentials and Elections Committee formally ruled that Boatright was not qualified to serve on the Board, citing the financial interest provision of the bylaws. Boatright filed what the parties stipulate was a second petition for nomination as a candidate for a seat on the Board. The Credentials and Elections Committee declined to have a meeting to address this petition and considered its earlier decision regarding Boatright's qualifications based on the earlier petition to be final. Boatright then brought this action, naming Satilla, members of the Board of Directors, and members of the Credentials and Elections Committee as defendants. Boatright asked for a temporary restraining order, interlocutory and permanent injunctions preventing the election for the Board position from proceeding without Boatright's appearance on the ballot, and a writ of mandamus compelling the defendants to consider his second petition for nomination, determine that he was qualified to serve on the Board, and proceed accordingly with the election for Rigby's Board seat. The trial court concluded that the decision of the Credentials and Elections Committee was arbitrary and capricious, and granted Boatright a writ of mandamus. Rigby and other Board members then brought this appeal. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of mandamus relief: mandamus is not a remedy available to enforce the purely private right that Boatright was asserting. The right Boatright sought to enforce could be addressed by a court of equity. Boatright requested in his pleadings temporary and permanent injunctive relief, but the trial court's order did not rule upon these requests. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for consideration of Boatright's requests for injunctive relief. View "Rigby v. Boatright" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia certified questions to the Georgia Supreme Court about the constitutionality of OCGA 20-2-73, which enumerates the circumstances for the suspension and removal of members of local boards of education. Georgia law does not require that local school systems be accredited, but it permits school systems to seek accreditation from certain private accrediting agencies. The DeKalb County School District was accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools ("SACS"), a private accrediting agency. In December 2012, SACS placed the DeKalb School District on "accredited probation" for reasons related to the governance of the DeKalb County Board of Education, which endangered the DeKalb School District's accreditation. After hearings, members of the DeKalb Board who were serving at the time SACS put the DeKalb School District on probation were suspended, and six replacements were appointed. In the meantime, Dr. Eugene Walker, the chair of the DeKalb Board and one of the suspended members, filed suit in the federal district court, alleging OCGA 20-2-73 violated both the United States and Georgia Constitutions, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The District Court denied preliminary injunctive relief to Walker, finding that Walker had failed to show a substantial likelihood that he would prevail on his claim that the statute violated the United States Constitution. As to the Georgia Constitution, the District Court certified the question to the Georgia Supreme Court. The Georgia Court concluded that OCGA 20-2-73 did not violate the Georgia Constitution. Accordingly, the Court answered the District Court's questions in the negative. View "Dekalb Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Georgia State Bd. of Education" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in "Greenway v. Northside Hosp., Inc." (730 SE2d 742) (2012)), to determine if the appellate court erred in its evaluation of Deputy Sheriff Terry Roper's claim that he was entitled to official immunity from liability in connection with the euthanization of two dogs. Greenway was taken by ambulance from his home to a hospital; two dogs remained at the home. While Greenway was in the hospital's emergency department, and uncertain whether he would live, he was pressured to sign an “Owner Release Form” regarding his dogs; the form was given to him by Roper and authorized Forsyth County Animal Control to destroy the dogs. At the time he signed the form, Greenway was unable to read it without his eyeglasses and understood that his dogs were going to the Humane Society; the dogs were euthanized before Greenway was able to recover from his illness and take further action. Greenway sued Roper, the hospital, the Sheriff, and the County's animal shelter provider. The trial court granted summary judgment to all defendants, but the Court of Appeals reversed as to Roper, the hospital, and the animal shelter operator. As to Roper, the Court of Appeals found that the doctrine of official immunity insulated him from liability from his decision to ask Greenway to sign the form, but not from his execution of that decision. Finding that the Court of Appeals erred, the Supreme Court reversed that court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Roper v. Greenway" on Justia Law

This case concerned one of the exceptions to the Georgia Tort Claims Act known as the "discretionary function" exception. The guardians of two infant boys sued the Department of Human Services (DHS), alleging that the Clayton County Department of Family and Children Services (DFCS) was negligent in several respects in its investigation of a report that the boys were neglected by their parents. On motion of DHS, the trial court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that the “discretionary function” exception properly applied, but the Court of Appeals disagreed, and it reversed the dismissal. The Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to consider whether the "discretionary function" exception applied in this case, and concluding that it did, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Georgia Dep't. of Human Svcs. v. Spruill" on Justia Law

Kia Motors Manufacturing Georgia, Inc. instituted a "Quick Start Program" run in conjunction with the Technical College System of Georgia. Krystal Coleman, Sabrina Robinson Bolston, Tim Durden, and Darrell Strawbridge each submitted a request to the Technical College System pursuant to the Open Records Act, seeking to inspect certain records concerning Kia's hiring practices. The College System refused on several grounds to make the requested records available for inspection, and Coleman, Bolston, Durden, and Strawbridge filed suit to compel their production. In 2012, while the lawsuit was pending, the General Assembly amended the Open Records Act, and among other revisions, it added an exemption for certain records concerning the Quick Start program from public inspection. The Technical College System and Kia then moved to dismiss the lawsuit, asserting that exemption from the revised Act. Without deciding the extent to which paragraph of the revised Act applied to the requested records, the trial court denied the motions to dismiss, concluding that it would be unconstitutional in any event to apply the revision in a pending lawsuit. The Technical College System and Kia appealed, and after review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded in this case the applicable revised parts of the Act applied and that its application was constitutional. The trial court's decision was reversed, and on remand, the trial court was mandated to determine which of the pertinent records were subject to the revised Act. View "Deal v. Coleman" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, Maria Colon and Gwendolyn Warren filed separate lawsuits against their employer, Fulton County, pursuant to Georgia's whistleblower statute, OCGA 45-1-4. Colon and Warren alleged that they were retaliated against after they jointly disclosed to their supervisors and refused to cover up that County employees were violating laws, rules, and regulations, thereby wasting and abusing County funds and public money. The County moved to dismiss the actions based on sovereign immunity and moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the retaliation claims under the statute could not proceed against the County because the complaints did not relate to a "state program or operation." The trial court denied both motions. The Court of Appeals held that the cause of action set forth in OCGA 45-1-4 unambiguously expressed a specific waiver of sovereign immunity and the extent of such waiver, even though the statute does not expressly state that sovereign immunity is waived. Furthermore, the appellate court interpreted "state programs or operations" under the facts of this case and held that where an employer qualifies as a "public employer" under the statute only because it received funds from the state, the statute provides protection from retaliation only if the employee's complaints related to a "state-funded program or operation under the jurisdiction of the public employer." In Case No. S12G1905, Colon and Warren argued that the Court of Appeals erred in construing OCGA 45-1-4 such that employees of governmental entities may maintain an action under subsection (d) of the statute only if their complaints relate to "programs or operations" that are "funded at least in part by the state." In Case Nos. S12G1911 and S12G1912, Fulton County contended that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that OCGA 45-1-4 expressed a specific waiver of the County's sovereign immunity. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decisions in Case Nos. S12G1911 and S12G1912, but reversed in Case No. S12G1905. View "Colon v. Fulton County" on Justia Law

Appellee Steven Wilson is a licensed optometrist, providing eye care services in Lowndes County as Wilson Eye Center (“WEC”). Appellees Cynthia McMurray, Jodie E. Summers, and David Price are also licensed optometrists employed by WEC. Prior to 2010, Spectera, Inc. had entered provider contracts ("Patriot contracts") with Wilson and McMurray and they became members of Spectera's panel of eye care providers. Summers was already on Spectera's panel of eye care providers. Under the Patriot contract, Spectera would reimburse appellees for the materials Spectera insureds used from WEC's inventory by paying appellees a fee for their materials' costs and by having Spectera insureds remit a materials copayment to appellees. Spectera decided to terminate its Patriot contracts and replace them with independent participating provider (IPP) agreements. After the trial court temporarily enjoined Spectera from enforcing its IPP agreement, Spectera sought to remove appellees Wilson, Summers, and McMurray from its approved panel of providers. The trial court enjoined Spectera from taking such action. Although Price was not on Spectera's provider panel, he alleged Spectera violated Georgia law by denying him membership on its panel because of his refusal to sign the IPP agreement. Upon considering the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted issued a permanent injunction precluding Spectera from enforcing the restrictions contained in the IPP agreement as to "any other licensed eye care provider on [Spectera's] provider panel" or those who had applied for admittance to the panel. Spectera appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in part and reversed in part. Upon review of Spectera's appeal, the Supreme Court concluded a portion of the IPP agreement violated Georgia law, and therefore sustained the Court of Appeals in one respect. However, because the IPP agreement did create the type of impermissible discrimination between classes of licensed eye care providers contemplated by the applicable law, the Court of Appeals was incorrect in concluding that the IPP agreement violated that particular subsection of the applicable law. Furthermore, the termination of any outstanding contracts with appellees Wilson, McMurray, and Summers should have been based on the lawful terms stated in the contracts and not based on a permanent court injunction. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Spectera, Inc. v. Wilson" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from an effort by Mortgage Alliance Corporation (“MAC”) a residential subdivision called "Silverstone." In August 2008, MAC sued the county and various county officials alleging, among other things, that an August 2006 letter to MAC from the county's sole commissioner, which said that the county's position was that any proposal to develop MAC's property as a subdivision would need to comply with a recent amendment to the county's land use ordinances, resulted in a taking of MAC's property without just compensation. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that MAC's complaint was untimely. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted MAC's petition for certiorari. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that this case was resolved on the ground that the August 2006 Letter was not a “decision” within the meaning of the applicable statute, and the county never made a final decision on MAC's Silverstone proposal. Consequently, MAC's inverse condemnation claim never ripened for judicial review, and the trial court should have granted summary judgment to the defendants on this ground. Although the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding there was an appealable decision, they reached the right result, and therefore the Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment. View "Mortgage Alliance Corp. v. Pickens County" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether the appellate court in "Georgia Dept. of Revenue v. Moore," (730 SE2d 671 (2012)) correctly determined that, once the Georgia Department of Revenue settles a refund action with one responsible party against whom unpaid sales taxes were assessed, the Department was thereafter precluded by the voluntary payment doctrine from attempting collection of any amount still owing from a second responsible party. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals' reasoning in that case was incorrect, and therefore the Court remanded the case for further consideration. View "Georgia Dept. of Revenue v. Moore" on Justia Law