Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was the constitutionality of an ordinance adopted by the City of Dunwoody that imposed an occupational tax on attorneys who maintained an office and practice law in the city. Appellants argued the ordinance: (1) operated as an unconstitutional precondition on the practice of law, as well as an improper attempt to regulate the practice of law; and (2) violated equal protection requirements because it did not apply to attorneys practicing law outside the city limits. The trial court determined the ordinance was constitutional. Finding no error with the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Moss v. City of Dunwoody" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the constitutionality of the Local Option Sales Tax Act ("LOST"), OCGA 48-8-80 et seq., or a provision of it. This case represented the fourth time the matter has come before the Court. The parties to this appeal, and those that have filed amicus curiae briefs, have shown that problems have arisen when the governing entities cannot agree to changes in the distribution formula for purposes of renewing certificates pursuant to the Act. Appellant Turner County and appellees, who are the qualified municipalities within the special taxing district involved in this dispute, reached an impasse in their negotiations for renewing the LOST certificate that authorizes them to collect and distribute tax, which certificate was required to be filed no later than December 30, 2012. Pursuant to the 2010 amendment to the statute, appellee municipalities timely filed a petition with the Turner County Superior Court seeking resolution of the dispute. Turner County filed a motion to dismiss the petition in which it raised various constitutional challenges to the 2010 amendment and its process for submitting the distribution dispute for judicial resolution. The trial court denied Turner County's motion to dismiss and sustained the constitutionality of the 2010 amendment. The court also entered a final order adopting the final and best offer of the municipalities and finding that the municipalities' offer more closely comported with the requirements of the statute and the intent and criteria set forth in the Act. The Supreme Court granted Turner County's application for discretionary appeal to challenge the constitutionality of the 2010 amendment. Upon careful consideration of Turner County's claims of error, the Supreme Court found one dispositive issue: whether the procedure for judicial resolution set forth in OCGA 48-8-89 (d) (4) violated the separation of powers doctrine of the Georgia Constitution of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. III. The Court concluded this procedure did violate the separation of powers doctrine, and declared that portion of the statute to be void. View "Turner County v. City of Ashburn" on Justia Law

The Atlanta Independent School System (APS) and the Atlanta Board of Education deducted a $38.6 million unfunded pension liability expense before calculating the amount of local revenue funds to be distributed to start-up charter schools within APS. The stated purpose for the change in funding was APSÕs need to pay down a large, unfunded pension liability for current and former APS employees that has been accruing since the 1980s. In response, start-up charter schools filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel appellants4 to distribute local revenue to the start-up charter schools without any deduction for APSÕs unfunded pension liability. The trial court granted the requested mandamus relief, finding the statutory funding formula set out by statute did not authorize appellants to subtract the $38.6 million from its calculation of local revenue. Finding no error in the trial court's grant of mandamus relief, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Atlanta Independent School System v. Atlanta Neighborhood Charter School, Inc." on Justia Law

Babies Right Start, Inc. ("BRS") appealed a trial court's order denying its claims for mandamus, injunctive, and declaratory relief against BRS's one-year administrative disqualification from participation in a federal benefits program administered by the State. However, the disqualification period ended almost a year ago, rendering moot the relief that BRS requested; BRS did not seek an award of damages (other than attorney fees) in the trial court; and this case did not fall within the narrow exception to mootness for disputes that are capable of repetition, yet evade judicial review. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for dismissal. View "Babies Right Start, Inc. v. Georgia Dept. of Pub. Health" on Justia Law

George and Catherine Dickens appealed the City of Statesboro's Zoning Board of Appeals denial of their application to construct a 2,160-square-foot detached garage on their property. The Dickenses then filed a petition for mandamus and damages at superior court to compel the City to issue their building permit. The City moved for summary judgment, which the superior court summarily denied. The trial court issued a certificate of immediate review, and the City applied for interlocutory appeal. Because the Dickenses were required to seek judicial review at superior court by way of a petition for a writ of certiorari rather than a petition for mandamus, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case back to the trial court for dismissal. View "City of Statesboro v. Dickens" on Justia Law

Trip Network, Inc. and several other online travel companies appealed a superior court judgment dismissing their petition for a writ of mandamus. The companies were defendants in a civil suit filed by the City of Atlanta. The City sought to recover hotel-occupancy taxes, but the case was dismissed when the trial court concluded the City did not exhaust its administrative remedies. The City appealed and the Supreme Court reversed. Atlanta then sued the companies in superior court for back taxes and a permanent injunction to require the companies to collect hotel-occupancy taxes from hotel guests. In response to cross-motions for summary judgment, the superior court ordered the injunction and granted summary judgment to the companies on the back taxes issue. As part of the ruling, the Supreme Court found the trial court had not ruled on the City's claim for conversion. Following the issuance of the remittitur, the superior court ordered the parties to brief the court on whether any claims remained pending and how such claims should have been concluded. The companies argued that after the Supreme Court’s earlier ruling, the case was closed, and sought the writ of mandamus to effectively close the case. The Supreme Court concluded that mandamus was not the appropriate remedy for the travel companies to resolve this matter, and that the trial court properly dismissed their petition. View "Trip Network, Inc. v. Dempsey" on Justia Law

The Georgia Insurance Insolvency Pool (GIIP) brought a declaratory judgment action against two insureds who purchased workers compensation insurance from the Southern United States Insurance Company (SEUS) before SEUS became a member of GIIP. SEUS insureds whose claims predated June, 2006 were not covered by GIIP, and those insureds faced exposure when SEUS was liquidated in October, 2009. In 2010, the Georgia Legislature enacted a law to expand GIIP's "covered claims" to include certain insureds who obtained insurance from a captive insurer that later became insolvent. The effect of the 2010 amendment was to retroactively cover the previously excluded claims of SEUS insureds. GIIP claimed that extension of coverage would decrease GIIP's reserves and increase the assessments levied on member insurance companies. The defendants, whose claims would be covered only because of the 2010 amendment, filed a motion to dismiss, asserting GIIP lacked standing to bring suit. The trial court granted the motion and the appellate court affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the legislature gave GIIP the power to sue and be sued, and as such, had no standing to challenge the 2010 statutory amendment. View "Georgia Insurer's Insolvency Pool v. Hulsey Environmental Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Stephens County Board of Commissioners decided to abandon a 3,000-foot-long, dead-end county road that ran along the side of a mountain and served no existing homes or businesses. Owners of some undeveloped lots on the Road and others sued the Board, and the trial court set aside the decision. Based on that ruling, the court issued a writ of mandamus requiring the Board to repair and maintain the Road. The court also ordered the Board to pay attorney fees and later granted summary judgment against the Board on its counterclaims. The Board appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court failed to give proper deference to the Board's decision to abandon the Road and reversed the trial court's decisions. View "Scarborough v. Hunter" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether physicians employed as faculty members at the Medical College of Georgia ("MCG") were entitled to official immunity in treating a patient at MCG's Children's Medical Center. Plaintiffs-Appellees Kenneth Jones and Clara Ramon filed a medical malpractice action against Appellants Prem Singh Shekhawat, M.D. and Wayne Mathews, M.D., along with other defendants, arising from treatment rendered to Plaintiffs' child at the Center in 2003. The trial court granted summary judgment to both Appellants, concluding that they were entitled to official immunity under the Georgia Tort Claims Act. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Appellants, in treating Plaintiffs' child, were acting within the scope of their employment with the State, using the Supreme Court's holding in "Keenan v. Plouffe," (482 SE2d 253 (1997)). After further review, the Supreme Court concluded that "Keenan" should have been overruled, because it conflated the standard for official immunity with that for sovereign immunity. Utilizing the proper analysis, the Court held that Appellants were entitled to official immunity because they were acting within the scope of their state employment in rendering the medical care at issue. View "Shekhawat v. Jones " on Justia Law

DHS, on behalf of the minor child of Johnny Wright (father), filed a complaint against him, asking the superior court to order Father to pay child support and maintain accident and health insurance, and enforce the order through an income deduction order. During a hearing on the complaint, the trial court learned that Father was currently married to Monica Wright, the mother of the child, and that no divorce or separate maintenance action had been filed. The court concluded that without an order, neither parent is the "custodial parent," and concluded that DHS therefore had no authority to pursue an award of child support. The Supreme Court, after its review, reversed, finding that DHS could seek a child support award against one parent without a divorce action. View "Georgia Dept. of Human Services v. Wright" on Justia Law