Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants John Sherman and Christopher D. Eichler appealed a trial court’s judgment confirming and validating a bond issuance by the City of Atlanta. At the bond validation hearing, the City successfully disputed Appellants’ standing to become parties and raise objections in this case, because no competent evidence was admitted to show that either Appellant was a Georgia citizen and Atlanta resident, which were the prerequisites to becoming a party under the Revenue Bond Law. Appellants appealed, but the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sherman v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

The trial court in this case ruled that there was no conflict between the 2010 amendment to OCGA 48-5-2 (3) and a 1981 local constitutional amendment providing for the assessment of homestead property in Muscogee County for school and consolidated city-county government taxing purposes. The court further ruled that the 2010 amendment controlled the determination of the fair market value of appellee John Yeoman's recently-purchased homestead property. The Columbus Board of Tax Assessors appeals, but finding no error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Columbus Board of Tax Assessors v. Yeoman" on Justia Law

Appellant Dana Meade and Appellee Tim Williamson were the candidates on the ballot in a run-off election in the Democratic primary for Sheriff of Baker County. Meade was the incumbent in the race and was, at the time of the election, serving as Sheriff. Meade was declared the winner by a margin of 39 votes. Williamson contested the results of the election. After a bench trial, the trial court issued an order setting forth findings of fact and reaching the conclusion that sufficient irregularities in voting and in the election process were shown to cast doubt upon the election result. The election was declared invalid and a new election was ordered. The Supreme Court has set aside elections under two different circumstances: where the evidence showed that a sufficient number of electors voted illegally or were irregularly recorded in the contest being challenged to change or cast doubt upon the election; or where systemic irregularities in the process of the election were sufficiently egregious to cast doubt on the result. The evidence presented at trial met neither of these standards. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order invalidating the August 21, 2012 run-off election in the Democratic primary for Sheriff of Baker County. View "Meade v. Williamson" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case involved the use of local school taxes for general redevelopment purposes following the Supreme Court's February 2008 decision interpreting the Georgia Constitution's Educational Purpose Clause in "Woodham v. City of Atlanta," (657 SE2d 528 (2008)); the subsequent amendment to the Constitution's Redevelopment Powers Clause in November 2008; and the repeal and reenactment of the statutory Redevelopment Powers Law in April 2009. Appellant John S. Sherman argued that the Court's holding in "Woodham" violated the Educational Purpose clause, rendered the resolutions, redevelopment plans, and intergovernmental agreements approving the City's Perry-Bolton and BeltLine tax allocation districts ("TADs") unconstitutional in their entirety, void ab initio, and unamendable. Appellees the Atlanta Independent School System, City of Atlanta, and Atlanta Development Authority, argued that Woodham invalidated only a particular bond issuance for the BeltLine project and had no effect at all on the constitutional validity of the local government approvals for the BeltLine TAD, much less the Perry-Bolton TAD. Upon review of the arguments, the Supreme Court concluded Appellees were wrong. "It is clear that, under the law when we decided Woodham in February 2008, the local government approvals for the Perry-Bolton and BeltLine TADs would have been ruled unconstitutional to the same extent that this Court held that the proposed funding for the BeltLine bonds was unconstitutional; at that time, local school taxes could not be used for general redevelopment purposes. But Sherman is also wrong . . . because the subsequent constitutional amendment and revision of the statute governing TADs changed the applicable law, and those changes were expressly made retroactive with respect to the county, city, and local board of education approvals needed to use school taxes for redevelopment purposes. Thus, Sherman's constitutional challenges to the Perry-Bolton and BeltLine TADs lack merit." Sherman's other arguments, were also found meritless. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Appellees and its denial of partial summary judgment to Sherman. View "Sherman v. Atlanta Independent School System" on Justia Law

Woodard & Curran, Inc. ("W&C") sued the City of Baldwin seeking damages on claims of breach of contract and quantum meruit. After a trial, a jury awarded W&C $203,000 in a general verdict that did not specify the basis for the damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider two issues: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that quantum meruit was an available remedy against a municipality when the claim is based on a municipal contract that is ultra vires; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the jury was properly allowed to consider the breach of contract claim based on an agreement the parties entered in May 2009. Upon review, the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in both respects, and therefore reversed its judgment. View "City of Baldwin v. Woodard & Curran, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal ultimately concerned the constitutionality of OCGA 32-6-75.3. Although the Supreme Court originally found that a prior version of the statute violated the gratuities clause of the state constitution, the Court later found the statute to be constitutional after it was amended by the Legislature to indicate that "outdoor advertising provides a substantial service and benefit to Georgia and Georgia's citizens as well as the traveling public." In 2007, the City of Columbus, Gateways Foundation, Inc., and Trees Columbus, Inc. challenged applications for vegetation maintenance permits submitted by CBS Outdoor, Inc., to the Georgia Department of Transportation ("GDOT"). In 2011, the Legislature passed HB 179, which amended 32-6-75.3 by enlarging the "viewing zone" that an advertiser may clear around a billboard and altered the number and type of trees which may be removed. After the passage of HB 179, Columbus filed an amended petition, challenging the constitutionality of the revised statute and GDOT's Manual of Guidance ("MOG") which established the tree-valuation procedure to determine amounts to be paid to the State to allow removal of trees blocking the visibility of existing billboards. In January 2012, the Superior Court entered an interlocutory injunction enjoining GDOT from issuing any vegetation management permits throughout the State until a final adjudication of the pertinent issues. The parties then filed cross motions for summary judgment. The Superior Court rulings generated three appeals. In Case No. S13A0079, Columbus argued that the trial court erred by determining that OCGA 32-6-75.3 and the valuation methods employed in the MOG were constitutional. In Case No. S13A0080, CBS Outdoor and Outdoor Advertising Association of Georgia, Inc. ("OAAG"), an intervenor in these cases, challenged the trial court's decisions to continue a statewide injunction against the issuance of vegetation permits and to defer a ruling on Columbus's equal protection claim. In Case No. S13X0081, GDOT contended, among other things, that the trial court erred by determining that take-down credits extended under the statute violate the gratuities clause. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's rulings in Case No. S13A0079 and Case No. S13A0080, but, in Case No. S13X0081, the Court reversed the trial court's determination that the take-down credits violated the gratuities clause. View "City of Columbus v. Georgia Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

Defendants Pike County, its county manager, and members of its board of commissioners (collectively, "County") appealed a superior court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiff Marcia Callaway-Ingram, who was appointed Chief Magistrate of Pike County. Callaway-Ingram filed suit seeking, inter alia, a writ of mandamus and a permanent injunction in this dispute involving her salary and the funding and operation of the magistrate court. Finding no error in the superior court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pike County v. Callaway-Ingram" on Justia Law

In 1969, the Cities of Atlanta and College Park entered into an agreement for purposes of expanding Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport. One of the provisions of the granted Atlanta the exclusive right to collect and levy occupation taxes from businesses located at the Airport that were within the city limits of College Park. In 2007, after commissioning a study for the purpose of reassessing this relationship, College Park informed Atlanta and Airport businesses that it would no longer honor the 1969 Agreement and that it would seek to collect occupation taxes from the Airport businesses including Atlanta's proprietary business operations. Atlanta filed a declaratory action in seeking a judgment that the 1969 Agreement controlled the collection of occupation taxes from businesses operating at the Airport within College Park. Both Atlanta and College Park moved for partial summary judgment, and, in ruling on the cross motions, the trial court found that Atlanta and College Park's 1969 Agreement was unenforceable. The trial court further ruled that OCGA 48-13-13 (5), which prohibited local governments from levying an occupation tax on any "local authority," precluded College Park from levying an occupation tax on Atlanta's proprietary operations because Atlanta met the definition of a "local authority" under the statute. Both parties appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment invalidating the 1969 Agreement, but reversed the trial court's finding that the term "local authority" as used in OCGA 48-13-13 (5) included smunicipalities. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals was correct in its determination that the City of Atlanta was not a "local authority" as that term is used in the statute. View "City of Atlanta v. City of College Park" on Justia Law

Robert Mesteller brought suit to challenge Gwinnett County and its Board of Commissioners' (County) Solid Waste Ordinance. He appealed a superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the County. Relying upon the Home Rule provision of the Georgia Constitution (among others), the County adopted the Solid Waste Collection and Disposal Ordinance of 2010. Under the Ordinance, the County was divided into five zones, each to be serviced by a private waste management company. The County collected fees for the waste collection services through annual tax assessment notices, which it then remits to the five service providers, minus the service fee. Mesteller received a property tax bill that showed a fee for solid waste collection services. Acting pro se, he sued the County and the members of its Board of Commissioners, individually and as members of the Board, alleging the assessment and collection of the fee violated the Georgia Constitution. After notice and a hearing, the superior court granted the County's motion for summary judgment. Mesteller contended on appeal that the County was without authority to use the annual property tax bill to assess or collect fees for solid waste services because by contracting with private waste management companies to collect solid waste, the County was not, in fact, "provid[ing] solid waste collection services" within the meaning of OCGA 12-8-39.3 (a), and therefore not authorized to place the collection fee on the tax bill of a property owner or to enforce the collection of the fee as set forth in the statute. The Supreme Court concluded that Mestellar's argument "reveal[ed] a misunderstanding of the precedents of [the] Court." As such, the Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the County. View "Mestellar v. Gwinnett County" on Justia Law

In 1999, a jury awarded monetary damages and equitable relief to homeowner Kenneth Barngrover. The damages were paid to the trial court's registry shortly after entry of judgment on the verdict, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in favor of Barngrover in 2001. In its 1999 judgment, the trial court ordered the City of Columbus to abate all nuisances created, maintained and in existence on Barngrover's property, and directed the City to restore the property to its undamaged condition. The trial court expressly retained jurisdiction pursuant to its equitable power to ensure completion of this equitable remedy. A week later, the trial court issued an order clarifying the nuisances to be abated as only those identified by the jury in its verdict. After several years of entering various orders in an effort to provide the equitable relief required by the jury's verdict, the trial court appointed a special master in 2007 to enforce the 1999 judgment. In 2011, the special master concluded that the structures on Barngrover's property were beyond repair, and recommended new ones be built. Further, the special master recommended implementation of the last of the City's abatement plans. Barngrover filed objections to the special master's report and moved to replace the special master. Over his objections, the trial court adopted the special master's report. This appeal to the Supreme Court followed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error with the trial court's orders, and affirmed. View "Barngrover v. City of Columbus" on Justia Law