Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals held that the superior court improperly affirmed a damages award to Petitioner Valencia Scott on her workers' compensation claim because the ALJ erred in ruling Petitioner's deniability resulted from a fictional new accident as opposed to a change in condition, and that her claim for total temporary disability was thus not barred by the applicable statute of limitation. The Supreme Court granted review of the case to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a "fictional new accident" could not apply to situations where an employee who suffered a compensable injury and subsequently suffers a progressive worsening of that condition whereby she must cease working completely. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Petitioner sustained a foot injury and was awarded compensation. She subsequently returned to work in a new position that required no strenuous activity, but she developed knee and gait problems as a result of the wear and tear of ordinary life. This gradual worsening constituted a change of condition, not a new accident. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision.

The Supreme Court granted discretionary appeal to Haralson County to review a superior court's grant of the writ of mandamus. In 2008, Taylor Junkyard of Bremen, Inc. sought to purchase a piece of property in a residential area. Before doing so, it wanted confirmation that the property had a permitted nonconforming use, so Taylor Junkyard asked for, and was issued, a letter written by the County Zoning Administrator, which stated that the business operated by Trawick "falls under the grandfather clause." When Taylor Junkyard applied for a business license for the year 2009, Haralson County administratively rejected the application, with the stated reason that the business engaged in on the property had changed from the original nonconforming business of "used automobiles and parts" to "metal recycling and metal fabrication," and thus violated the County's zoning ordinance. Taylor Junkyard appealed to the County Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA), which, after a hearing, rejected the application for a business license, based upon found zoning violations. Taylor Junkyard then filed its petition for a writ of mandamus in superior court, which the court granted, finding that there was no evidence to support the ZBA's decision. The County contended on appeal to the Supreme Court that the superior court erred in addressing the petition for writ of mandamus, arguing that the County Zoning Ordinance provided a means for Taylor Junkyard to file an appeal from the adverse decision of the ZBA, and thus, mandamus was not an available remedy. "When local zoning ordinances do not establish a means by which an aggrieved party may gain judicial review of an adverse decision by a zoning appeal board, a petition to the appropriate superior court for a writ of mandamus is the proper remedy." Accordingly, as no provision of the Haralson County ordinances set forth an available means of judicial review, the superior court did not err in concluding that a petition for a writ of mandamus was the proper avenue for Taylor Junkyard to seek review of the ZBA's decision.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in "Glass v. Gates" to answer whether the definition of "any motor vehicle" in OCGA 33-24-51(a) continued to be the broader definition of the term provided for in prior case law, notwithstanding the 2002 passage of OCGA 36-92-1. As inmates at the Troup County Correctional facility, Jonathan Glass and Tony Smith were operating tractors when Smith's tractor got stuck in a ditch. Donrell Gates, Glass' detail supervisor, instructed the men to attach a chain to the tractors so Glass could use his tractor to pull Smith's from the ditch. As Glass did so, Smith engaged his tractor's bush hog, causing a rock to take flight and pierce Glass' throat. Glass bled profusely and died later that day. Plaintiffs, Glass' minor son and the executor of his estate, brought a wrongful death and survivor action against Troup County and Gates. The county sought summary judgment, claiming plaintiffs' claims were barred by sovereign immunity. The County asserted that by revising OCGA 33-24-51 (b) in 2002 (effective 2005), the legislature demonstrated its intent to apply the more narrow definition of "motor vehicle" found in OCGA 36-92-1 (6) in determining whether a local government waived sovereign immunity by purchasing liability insurance on a motor vehicle. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that the county did not waive sovereign immunity because neither a tractor nor a bush hog could be deemed a "motor vehicle" under OCGA 36-92-1. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the broader definition of "motor vehicle" should have been applied under 33-24-51, and that therefore, the County waived its sovereign immunity as long as it purchased insurance for the tractor and bush hog used by Smith. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals' reasoning, and affirmed by answering the appellate court's original question in the affirmative.

After appellant, the elected mayor of the City of Springfield, refused to resign after an ethics investigation, appellees petitioned the superior court for his removal pursuant to Section 45 of the city's charter. Appellant moved to dismiss the petition for removal pursuant to OCGA 9-11-12(b)(6), arguing that the petition did not state a claim for which relief could be granted and arguing a number of theories challenging the constitutionality of Section 45. After hearing the parties' arguments, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and denied appellant's request for a certificate of immediate review. Appellant subsequently contended on appeal that the trial court erred when it failed to dismiss the petition for removal pursuant to OCGA 9-11-12(b)(6). The court agreed with appellant, holding that the trial court erred when it denied appellant's motion and allowed the case to proceed with the petition as pled. The error was not harmless because throughout the proceedings appellant was forced to guess as to what charges he would be required to defend himself. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment was reversed.

Henry Cook appealed the trial court's ruling that he was not a resident of Randolph County and therefore not an elector qualified to vote in that county. The court granted Cook's application for discretionary appeal and directed the parties to address the court's jurisdiction over this appeal as well as the merits of the trial court's ruling. Because a determination of voter qualifications, not clearly linked to a particular election, did not bring an appeal within the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over "cases of election contest," and because no other basis for this court's jurisdiction appeared to exist, the court transferred the case to the Court of Appeals and did not reach the merits.

Pin Ups, an adult entertainment business, brought this appeal from an order of the trial court denying its petition for an interlocutory injunction against the Board's "Hours of sale and operation" ordinances. As Pin Ups alleged a violation of free speech rights under the Georgia Constitution, the trial court erred in applying the rational basis test. Such laws could be upheld only "if it furthers an important government interest; if the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of speech; and if the incidental restriction of speech is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Therefore, the court held that, inasmuch as the trial court made its ruling based upon an incorrect legal standard, the court must reserve its decision and the court remanded the case to that court for it to evaluate Pin Ups's request for injunctive relief using the correct legal standard.

EGL purchased 427 acres of land in Newton County, Georgia, for the purpose of constructing a landfill and the Board declined to issue a letter of zoning compliance based on its interpretation that a landfill was not a permitted use under the Newton County zoning ordinance. The court held that the trial court erred in holding that East Ga. Land and Development Co. v. Baker mooted any issue regarding the validity of the process used by the county to enact the original zoning ordinance. The court also held that the trial court erred by relying on parol evidence to provide a link between the original set of maps incorporated onto the 1985 zoning ordinance and the set that was currently located in the zoning office. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

Local residents filed a complaint with the governor against appellants, who were elected members of the WCBE, alleging that they had violated OCGA 45-10-3. Appellants subsequently appealed the order of the superior court denying their petition for judicial review under the Georgia Administrative Procedures Act. The court held that the appeal as to Appellant Roberts was moot and must be dismissed; the appeal as to Appellants Brown and Culver were not moot because their terms have not expired; and that appellants were required by section 45-10-4 to proceed under the Act, and no delay seen here warranted the imposition of the doctrine of laches. The court held that OCGA 20-2-50, et seq. did not create county boards of education and the court had previously stated that county school boards were creations of the Constitution. The court rejected appellees' assertion that the the term "boards, commissions, and authorities created by general statute" should be construed expansively to include any and all such entities created by the Constitution. The court also noted that the General Assembly was well aware of how to include members of county boards of education within the ambit of ethics legislation.

GSASC filed a complaint against appellants for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. GSASC requested a declaration that a 2009 annual survey issued by DCH to single-specialty, physician-owned ASCs sought information beyond the scope of OCGA 31-6-70. GSASC further requested interlocutory and permanent injunctive relief preventing DCH from requiring GSASC's members to respond to certain disputed requests in the 2009 survey. The Court of Appeals concluded that DCH did not have statutory authority to include the disputed requests in the 2009 survey and also rejected an alternative basis for affirmance when it determined that GSASC and its members were not required to exhaust administrative remedies because it would be futile and because GSASC was challenging DCH's authority and power to act. Because neither exception upon which the Court of Appeals relied to dispense with the exhaustion requirement was applicable, the court reversed its judgment and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings.

Johnnie Owens, acting City Clerk, and Darryl Williams, the acting Chief of Police, sued the City and the Mayor, in both is official and individual capacities, for wrongful termination and concomitant damages. The trial court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case because it presented a purely political question. In the alternative, the trial court granted the City's and the Mayor's motions for summary judgment, finding, among other things, that, despite the Mayor's actions, the terms of Owens and Williams had naturally expired in accordance with the City Charter. Owens and Williams appealed. Because the trial court had proper jurisdiction over the case, questions of material fact remained, and questions of law remained unreached by the trial court. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment.