Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant, pro se, brought an action in the trial court against the City, the City Council, and the City's Municipal Clerk (appellees) alleging violations of Georgia's Open Meetings Act, OCGA 50-14-1 et seq. Appellant alleged that the minutes of a Council meeting in February 2010 omitted certain information concerning the outcome of a non-roll-call vote in violation of subsection (e)(2), namely the names of council members who voted, in the minority, to amend rather than maintain certain Council rules. The court found that the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the Act, which must be broadly construed. Therefore, the court reversed in part and concluded that only that portion of appellant's complaint seeking to impose criminal liability upon the individual defendants was properly dismissed.

Plaintiffs brought suit against the Board, alleging that sections 2 and 3 of Ordinance No. 10-01, amending two sections of the Local Act, Ga. L. 1983, p. 4594 (sections 10 and 14), were unconstitutional and sought declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, as well as nominal damages and expenses of litigation, including attorney's fees. Section 14 prohibited members of the Board from transacting business with the county and section 10 provided that all bills shall be paid by check signed by the clerk and by the chairman or vice-chairman. Section 3 amended section 14 by adding a provision that section 14 would not apply where a majority of the Board approved the contract or transaction after establishing that the goods, services, or property could not be obtained for less and that the taxpayers' interests would be served. Section 2 amended section 10 by providing that all bills shall be paid by check signed by at least two officials among a list of officials. The court held that section 2 conferred only administrative rather than executive authority on the chair of the Board's finance committee and that it therefore did not violate Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. 1(c)(2) by affecting the composition or form of the Board; section 3 did not constitute an action affecting the elective office of commissioner in violation of Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I (c)(1); section 3 was not preempted by OCGA 36-1-14; and section 3 did not impair OCGA 16-10-6 but rather effectively augmented and strengthened it. Accordingly, the trial court erred in declaring sections 2 and 3 unconstitutional, in granting partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on their claims of declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, and in denying defendants' motion for summary judgment. The remaining enumeration of error regarding defendants' immunity defenses was moot.

The County appealed from the grant of a writ of mandamus ordering it to reinstate appellee to his former position as a fire captain and awarding him back pay and costs of litigation. The court held that because appellee had a clear legal right to reinstatement, a right violated by the County's steadfast refusal to abide by the order of the hearing officer, as affirmed by the Council on appeal, mandamus was properly granted. The court also approved the monetary award fashioned by the trial court to make appellee whole for the full amount of salary he was denied from the date of his wrongful termination. The court further held that the record showed that the County affirmatively waived its right to a hearing on the issue of attorney fees.

This case arose from an automobile collision in which a police officer employed by the City of Newman was driving a City police car when it was struck by a motor vehicle owned and operated by the insured, who had $25,000 of motor vehicle liability coverage. The City had a Member Coverage Agreement (Agreement) with the Georgia Interlocal Risk Management Agency (GIRMA), established under OCGA 36-85-1 et seq. The officer subsequently sued the insured in tort and served a copy of the complaint on GIRMA to notify GIRMA that it might be held responsible as an uninsured motorist carrier pursuant to OCGA 33-7-11. The court subsequently granted a writ of certiorari to the court of appeals to consider whether that court properly determined that a municipality's motor vehicle liability coverage secured through an interlocal risk management agency was not statutorily obligated to satisfy the requirements for uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage that were applied to commercial insurance policies and private self-insurance plans. The court held that the district court reached the correct conclusion when it determined that there was no authority for the conclusion that an interlocal risk management program such as that offered by GIRMA must include uninsured motorist coverage pursuant to OCGA 33-7-11. Therefore, the Agreement was limited to its express terms and did not include the underinsured motorist protection that the police officer sought. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

This appeal involved the manner in which a superior court could enforce the provisions of the Open Records Act (Act), OCGA 50-14-1, against a municipality. Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging an Open Records Act violation against the city and requested, among other things, an award of attorney fees and an injunction preventing the city from holding any future "secret" meetings. The city ultimately conceded that it had violated the Act but filed an appeal, arguing that the trial court's imposition of attorney fees was improper. The court held that OCGA 36-33-5 did not apply to plaintiffs' request for attorney fees and that the Act explicitly authorized the assessment of attorney fees. The court also held that the city's argument was defeated by the plain text of the Act. Therefore, based on this explicit grant of legislative authority, the trial court did not err. The court finally held that plaintiffs provided no evidence that the trial court abused its discretion by determining that the amount of attorney fees awarded to plaintiffs, not the amount for which they asked, was reasonable under the circumstances of the case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's award of attorney fees and expenses.

Appellant challenged his conviction for violating a county ordinance regulating the volume of noise from "mechanical sound-making devices." Appellant contended that the provision was facially invalid under the free speech clause of the Georgia Constitution. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. V. The court held that the county drew the challenged provision of its ordinance deliberately and in response to specific concerns, and the county had offered good reasons for rejecting appellant's proposed alternatives. The court also held that the provision advanced a substantial government interest in the least restrictive way. Furthermore, the provision was content neutral and left open ample alternatives for communication. Therefore, the ordinance was a reasonable, content-neutral time, place, and manner speech regulation and appellant's facial challenge to it was without merit.

Plaintiff filed a suit against two county police officers in their individual capacities, contending that the officers negligently operated their vehicles by causing plaintiff to lose control of his vehicle and crash. Plaintiff sustained bodily injuries and plaintiff's son was killed in the crash. At issue was whether OCGA 36-92-3 was unconstitutional because it was not part of the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA), OCGA 50-21-20 et seq. The court held that the trial court properly denied plaintiff's claim and properly granted summary judgment in favor of the officers where the Legislature was not limited to waiver of immunity solely in the GTCA and where the Legislature extended immunity to county employees like the officers in a section of the Georgia Code specifically applicable to counties, demonstrating that it had the constitutional authority to enact OCGA 36-92-3.

These related appeals concern the rights of certain sign companies to construct billboards in areas formerly located in unincorporated Fulton County that are now located in the recently created cities of Sandy Springs, Milton, and Johns Creek and a recently annexed portion of the city of Alpharetta (collectively, "cities"). At issue was whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the sign companies based on its determination that the companies had a vested right to erect the billboards as of the date of their applications were filed. The court rejected the county and cities' arguments and held that the sign companies had vested rights to construct the billboards at issue where there were no valid ordinances regulating the construction of billboards at the time the applications were filed and the sign companies were entitled to construct, maintain, and operate all signs for which they submitted applications. Accordingly, the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the sign companies was affirmed.

Plaintiff, who was employed as the City of McDonough's ("city") chief building inspector, brought suit against the city when the city refused to pay him severance under an employment agreement contract. At issue was whether the contract was binding to a successor municipal council in violation of OCGA 36-30-3(a). The court held that the contract was ultra vires and void because the contract was renewed automatically and the severance package required the city to pay plaintiff his salary and benefits for an entire year after the year in which the contract was terminated.

This appeal involved a constitutional challenge to the 2008 Georgia Charter Schools Commission Act ("Act"), OCGA 20-2-2081 et seq. Appellants, local school systems whose 2009 and 2010 complaints were consolidated by the trial court, contended, inter alia, that the Act was unconstitutional because it violated the "special schools" provision in the Georgia Constitution of 1983. The court held that the Act was unconstitutional where the constitution embodied the fundamental principle of exclusive local control of general primary and secondary public education ("K-12") and where the Act clearly and palpably violated Art. VIII, Sec. V, Par. VII(a) by authorizing a state commission to establish competing state-created general K-12 schools under the guise of being "special schools." The court's holding rendered it unnecessary to address appellants' remaining constitutional challenges to the Act.