Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A federal employee working at a Veterans Affairs healthcare facility discovered that a nurse practitioner was improperly receiving overtime pay that was not actually earned and not related to COVID, contrary to requirements. The employee’s supervisors allegedly created and signed a false waiver to justify these payments, resulting in significant unearned compensation. When the employee refused to participate in the scheme and reported the conduct to the VA Office of Inspector General, he claimed to have been subjected to workplace retaliation, including a reprimand and demotion.The employee filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, asserting a qui tam false claims action against his supervisors and a retaliation claim under the False Claims Act (FCA) against the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs, in his official capacity. The government intervened and successfully moved to dismiss the false claims and conspiracy counts against the supervisors. The government also sought dismissal of the retaliation claim, arguing that the employee’s exclusive remedies lay under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), not the FCA. The district court, however, dismissed the retaliation claim on the ground that the FCA does not contain an express waiver of the federal government’s sovereign immunity for such claims, and thus federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that Congress has not expressly waived the federal government’s sovereign immunity to permit retaliation suits against federal employers under Section 3730(h) of the FCA. The court found that neither the FCA’s text nor its structure provided the required clear waiver of sovereign immunity, distinguishing such waivers present in other statutes. Accordingly, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "US ex rel. Sargent v. Collins" on Justia Law

A licensed sidewalk vendor who had operated outside Petco Park in San Diego since 2009 was cited multiple times in mid-2024 under newly enacted city ordinances regulating sidewalk vending. On two occasions, city officials also impounded his merchandise and, in one instance, his sales proceeds. The vendor, who holds a valid city vending permit, alleged that the new ordinances, particularly those related to impoundment and restrictions on vending during certain hours and events, conflicted with state law enacted in 2018 designed to protect the rights of sidewalk vendors. He sought a writ of mandate, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of these local provisions.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied the vendor’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court acknowledged the negative impact on the vendor’s livelihood but found there was a minimal probability of success on the merits, reasoning that the city’s restrictions were permissible under the state law’s allowance for regulations related to health, safety, or welfare. The court concluded that the balance of harms favored the city, given public interest considerations, and thus refused to enjoin enforcement of the challenged ordinances.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, examined both the factual record and the legal questions concerning the interplay between the municipal code and state law. The appellate court held that the city’s ordinances authorizing impoundment of vending equipment and restricting vending hours in nonresidential areas more stringently than for other businesses are in direct conflict with state law. The court found the trial court erred by not adequately considering these conflicts. The appellate court reversed the denial of the preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to apply the correct legal standards and further develop the record as needed. View "Mustaqeem v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

A worker was severely injured while operating a bulldozer during a nighttime firefighting operation on a fire line managed by the Oregon Department of Forestry. At the time, he was employed by a private company under contract with the state and received workers’ compensation benefits for his injuries. He also filed a lawsuit alleging that two state employees supervising the site had negligently directed operations, resulting in his injuries. The complaint sought damages from the employees and the State of Oregon, which was alleged to be vicariously liable.The Jackson County Circuit Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against the individual state employees based on a provision of the Oregon Tort Claims Act, ORS 30.265(3), making the state the sole defendant. The court also dismissed the claims against the state under ORS 30.265(6)(a), which grants immunity to public bodies and their employees against tort claims when the injured party is covered by workers’ compensation. However, the court allowed the plaintiff’s wife’s loss of consortium claim to proceed. On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the statutory immunity barred the plaintiff’s claims and did not violate the remedy clause of the Oregon Constitution.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case and reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court. The court held that the statutory immunity provision in ORS 30.265(6)(a), which entirely bars a common-law negligence action by a privately employed worker injured by a negligent state employee, exceeds the limits imposed by Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution. The court concluded that this statutory immunity unconstitutionally denies such injured persons a substantive right to a remedy by due course of law and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Crandall v. State of Oregon" on Justia Law

A federally recognized tribe, which operates casinos under a tribal-state compact allowing video games of chance, objected when the Minnesota Racing Commission approved a 2023 amendment to a racetrack’s card club plan. This amendment allowed Running Aces Casino, Hotel & Racetrack to add an additional dealer table and 11 player stations featuring electronic table games. These electronic games use a live dealer and transmit images of physical cards to player stations, where patrons interact via video screens. Minnesota law limits commercial operation of such gambling devices and video games of chance to tribes and restricts the number of card tables at racetrack card clubs. The tribe argued that the Commission’s approval constituted an unlawful expansion of gambling, infringing upon its statutorily protected competitive environment.After the Racing Commission approved Running Aces’s request, the tribe petitioned the Minnesota Court of Appeals for review. The tribe contended that the Commission erred by permitting racetracks to operate devices reserved for tribes, by exceeding the statutory table limit, and by applying an unpromulgated rule. The Racing Commission and Running Aces challenged the tribe’s standing. The Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that the tribe had standing due to its legally protected market-restricted interest, but rejected its arguments on the merits, affirming the Commission’s decision.On further appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the issue of standing de novo and held that the tribe does have standing to challenge the Commission’s decision, as the statutory scheme creates a competition-restricted environment protecting the tribe’s interest in operating video games of chance. However, because the Supreme Court was evenly divided on the merits of the tribe’s challenge to the Commission’s decision, it affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision without expressing an opinion on those merits. View "In the Matter of the Minnesota Racing Commission's Approval of Running Aces Casino, Hotel & Racetrack's Request to Amend its Plan of Operation" on Justia Law

Several nonprofit organizations and local governments received federal grants from agencies including the Department of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Agriculture, and Department of Transportation. These grants were funded under statutes such as the Inflation Reduction Act, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, and the American Rescue Plan Act. In early 2025, President Donald Trump issued executive orders directing federal agencies to pause, review, and terminate certain grant programs—including those related to environmental justice, equity, and efficiency—based on new administration priorities. Agencies subsequently suspended or terminated various grants, prompting the plaintiffs to file suit.The U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina reviewed the case. It held that it had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and issued a permanent injunction requiring the government to restore funding for 32 of the grants. The court also granted a preliminary injunction on the plaintiffs’ separation of powers and ultra vires claims, enjoining the government from further freezing or terminating those grants. The government appealed, and the Fourth Circuit stayed the injunctions pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that the district court abused its discretion in issuing both injunctions. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the APA claims because they were essentially contractual, and thus subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act. With respect to the nonstatutory review claims, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs’ constitutional arguments were in substance statutory and failed to meet the strict standards for ultra vires review, since no specific statute prohibited the government’s actions. The court vacated the district court’s orders and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "The Sustainability Institute v. Trump" on Justia Law

The dispute centers around an attempted annexation by the City of North Charleston of a one-acre parcel located near Highway 61 and the Ashley River. This parcel, purchased by North Charleston in 2017, is situated on the southwest side of Highway 61 and separated from both the highway and North Charleston’s existing city limits by a narrow strip of land owned by the National Trust for Historic Preservation. That narrow strip has been part of the City of Charleston since its annexation in 2005. The annexation ordinance at issue included 62 square feet of the National Trust’s strip—land within Charleston’s city limits—in its property description.The National Trust and the City of Charleston challenged the validity of North Charleston’s annexation ordinance, arguing that the parcel was not “adjacent” to North Charleston’s existing city limits as required by section 5-3-100 of the South Carolina Code. The Circuit Court for Charleston County dismissed the lawsuit, holding that neither the National Trust nor Charleston had standing to contest the annexation, but also found in the alternative that, if standing existed, the annexation was invalid because the parcel was not adjacent to North Charleston’s city limits. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing and declined to reach the merits of the annexation’s validity.The Supreme Court of South Carolina granted review and held that both the National Trust and the City of Charleston had standing to challenge the annexation. The Court further affirmed the circuit court’s alternative ruling that North Charleston’s annexation was invalid because the parcel was not “adjacent” to its city limits, as required under state law. Thus, the decision of the court of appeals was reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "National Trust for Historic Preservation v. City of North Charleston" on Justia Law

A water authority was originally created by a single municipality to serve local water needs but over time expanded its service area to include numerous communities in two counties. The authority’s board was initially appointed solely by the founding municipality. In response to changes in the demographics of its customer base, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted a statutory amendment requiring equal board representation for the founding municipality and the two counties served. After the restructured board rejected a purchase offer from a private company, the authority attempted to transfer its assets into a trust. The founding municipality and the private bidder objected, asserting the municipality retained sole statutory power to convey the authority’s assets.The Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Orphans’ Division, denied motions by the municipality and the private bidder for judgment on the pleadings in both the trust and declaratory judgment actions. The court held that any conveyance of the authority’s assets under the Municipality Authorities Act required the unanimous consent of the governing bodies now represented on the authority’s board. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court reversed, finding that the statutory change to board composition did not alter the founding municipality’s unilateral power to convey assets under the Act.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the Commonwealth Court’s decision. It held that the plain text of the relevant statute does not grant perpetual unilateral conveyance authority to the founding municipality, especially after legislative restructuring of the board. The court found that the right to effect a conveyance now rests collectively with the three municipalities represented on the board. The Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "In Re: Chester Water Authority Trust" on Justia Law

This case concerns the Transportation Security Administration’s issuance of an emergency amendment that required certain airport operators to incorporate specific cybersecurity measures and controls into their airport security programs. The amendment, issued in March 2023, responded to increasing cyber threats to the aviation sector, including ransomware and foreign cyberattacks. Under the amendment, airports were required to identify critical systems, submit a cybersecurity implementation plan, and assess their effectiveness annually. The Spokane Airport Board, which operates Spokane International Airport, objected to the amendment on both procedural and substantive grounds.After the amendment was issued, the Spokane Airport Board petitioned the TSA for reconsideration, raising various objections. The TSA denied these petitions, upholding the emergency amendment. Spokane then filed a timely petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, as provided by statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the TSA’s order under the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act, specifically considering whether it was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review arguments not properly raised before the TSA, as required by statute. The court found that the objections Spokane did properly exhaust were meritless. It concluded that the TSA possesses broad statutory authority to regulate aviation security—including cybersecurity—in response to threats. The court also found that the emergency amendment was consistent with TSA regulations and was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the court denied Spokane’s petition for review, leaving the TSA’s emergency cybersecurity amendment in effect. View "Spokane Airport Board v. TSA" on Justia Law

More than a decade ago, Peconic Bay Medical Center submitted an Adverse Action Report (AAR) to the National Practitioner Data Bank regarding Dr. John Doe. Dr. Doe made repeated efforts to have the AAR removed, including seeking review from the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and filing federal lawsuits in Washington, D.C. These lawsuits were unsuccessful, with courts such as the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejecting his claims. During the course of litigation, Dr. Doe obtained documents in discovery that he believed supported his renewed request for reconsideration to HHS regarding the AAR.HHS denied Dr. Doe’s request for reconsideration, stating that he was “not eligible for additional administrative review of the Report.” Dr. Doe then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, alleging, among other things, that HHS’s denial violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court dismissed Dr. Doe’s APA claim, concluding that the denial of reconsideration was unreviewable because Dr. Doe had not presented new evidence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that HHS violated the Chenery principle by changing its rationale for denying reconsideration during the litigation. The Fifth Circuit held that judicial review of agency action must be based solely on the grounds set forth by the agency at the time of its decision. Because HHS’s stated reason was incorrect—Dr. Doe was eligible for reconsideration under department guidance—the appellate court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Dr. Doe’s APA claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Doe v. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case are the sons of Roberto Clemente, a renowned Puerto Rican baseball player, and two corporations they control. The dispute centers on the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s use of Clemente’s name and image on commemorative license plates and vehicle registration tags. Proceeds from these items were designated to fund a new “Roberto Clemente Sports District,” a public project that would replace an earlier initiative, Ciudad Deportiva, originally founded by Clemente. The plaintiffs allege that they hold trademark rights in Clemente’s name and that the Commonwealth’s actions were unauthorized and caused public confusion, with many mistakenly believing the Clemente family benefited financially from the program.The plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico against the Commonwealth, several high-ranking officials, and the Puerto Rico Convention Center District Authority. Their claims included trademark infringement, false association, false advertising, and trademark dilution under the Lanham Act, as well as a takings claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Commonwealth and the Authority moved to dismiss, arguing sovereign and qualified immunity and failure to state a claim. The district court granted both motions, dismissing all federal claims on immunity and merits grounds, and declined to exercise jurisdiction over non-federal claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court affirmed the dismissal of all claims against the Authority and all claims against the Commonwealth and its officials in their official capacities. It also affirmed dismissal of the false advertising and takings claims. However, the court vacated the dismissal of the Lanham Act claims for trademark infringement, false endorsement, and dilution against the Commonwealth officials in their personal capacities, holding those claims were plausibly alleged and not barred by qualified immunity at this stage, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Clemente Properties, Inc. v. Pierluisi-Urrutia" on Justia Law