Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

After the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization returned abortion regulation to the states, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) changed its rules to allow the abortion drug mifepristone to be prescribed online and sent by mail, eliminating the prior requirement for in-person doctor visits. The State of Louisiana, joined by an individual plaintiff, challenged this 2023 regulation (the “2023 REMS”) under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), arguing that the FDA’s decision was not supported by sufficient data and resulted in illegal abortions and increased Medicaid costs within the state.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana found that Louisiana had standing, was likely to succeed on the merits, and was suffering irreparable harm. However, the district court declined to stay the regulation, reasoning that the balance of equities and public interest favored denying immediate relief. Instead, the district court stayed the litigation to allow the FDA to complete its ongoing review of mifepristone’s safety protocols, which the FDA admitted had previously lacked adequate consideration.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether a stay of the 2023 REMS pending appeal was warranted under 5 U.S.C. § 705. The Fifth Circuit concluded that Louisiana was strongly likely to succeed on the merits because the FDA’s removal of the in-person dispensing requirement was arbitrary and capricious, relied on insufficient data, and was inadequately explained. The court further found that Louisiana faced ongoing irreparable harm to its sovereign interests and financial losses. The appellate court determined that neither the FDA’s nor the manufacturers’ interests outweighed Louisiana’s injuries or the public interest, and that a stay of the regulation was appropriate. The court therefore granted Louisiana’s motion for a stay pending appeal. View "Louisiana v. FDA" on Justia Law

A business in Connecticut was assessed personal property taxes from 2008 to 2016. The defendant, who had moved to California years earlier and claimed to have left the business by 2007, was never notified of these tax assessments at her California address, despite having provided it to the tax collector in 2011 and 2016. Over the years, the city’s tax collector took funds from the defendant’s bank accounts multiple times via bank executions to satisfy the tax debt, without ever sending her a tax bill or notice at her actual residence.In 2021, the tax collector initiated another bank execution against the defendant. The defendant challenged this action, arguing she had not received due process or required statutory notice. The Superior Court for the judicial district of Litchfield held an evidentiary hearing and agreed with the defendant, finding the tax collector failed to provide required notice under General Statutes § 12-155 (a) and that the lack of notice deprived her of the opportunity to challenge the tax assessment. The court granted the defendant’s exemption motion, rendering the execution “of no effect.” The tax collector initially appealed but then withdrew the appeal. After sending a written demand to the defendant’s California address, the tax collector initiated a new bank execution, again without providing a new tax bill or an opportunity to challenge it.The trial court found the new action was a collateral attack on the earlier judgment and barred by collateral estoppel. The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding the issue of notice and opportunity to challenge had been actually litigated and necessarily determined in the 2021 action.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment. It held that, under Connecticut law, collateral estoppel applies to all independent, alternative grounds actually litigated and determined in a prior judgment, making them preclusive in subsequent actions. Thus, the tax collector was barred from relitigating the notice and due process issues already decided. The Court declined to recognize a public policy exception for municipal tax collection cases. View "Torrington Tax Collector, LLC v. Riley" on Justia Law

An individual disclosed information about significant misconduct at a large company to the news media. Following these disclosures, both Congress and staff from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) contacted the individual for interviews and further information, which he provided. The SEC subsequently initiated an enforcement action against the company, relying on the information provided, resulting in substantial monetary sanctions. The individual then applied to the SEC for a whistleblower award under the Securities Exchange Act, which provides monetary awards to those who “voluntarily” provide “original information” leading to successful enforcement actions.The SEC denied the whistleblower award application, finding that the individual’s submission was not “voluntary” because it occurred only after the SEC and other authorities had contacted him. Additionally, the SEC found his submission was untimely and summarily denied his request for exemptions from these requirements. The individual challenged these determinations, arguing that the SEC’s interpretation of “voluntarily” conflicted with the statute's purpose and plain meaning, that his submission was timely, and that the denial of his request for exemptions was insufficiently explained and inconsistent with SEC precedent. He also raised First Amendment concerns, suggesting the SEC’s approach penalized whistleblowers for speaking to the press.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the SEC’s order. The court held that the SEC’s interpretation of “voluntarily” was reasonable and consistent with statutory text and purpose, and rejected the First Amendment argument, finding it was based on a mistaken premise. However, the court found that the SEC abused its discretion by inadequately explaining its denial of the request for an exemption from the voluntariness requirement. The court thus denied the petition in part, granted it in part, vacated the denial of the exemption request, and remanded to the SEC for further consideration. View "Doe v. SEC" on Justia Law

A group of businesses and consumers involved in the sale and manufacture of consumable hemp products containing manufactured delta-8 THC challenged actions taken by the Texas Department of State Health Services and its commissioner. Following federal and state legislative changes in 2018 and 2019 that removed “hemp” and certain tetrahydrocannabinols (THC) in hemp from the definition of controlled substances, the Texas commissioner objected to a federal rule that would have further decontrolled hemp-derived extracts, including delta-8 THC. The commissioner then amended the state schedules to clarify that manufactured delta-8 THC remained a Schedule I controlled substance, leading to substantial business disruption for the vendors who had entered the delta-8 market.The vendors sued in district court, arguing that the commissioner exceeded her authority both procedurally and substantively under Texas law by modifying the schedules in a way that contradicted the Texas Farm Bill, and that the Department’s website statement about delta-8 THC was an invalid rule under the Texas Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The trial court denied the Department’s plea to the jurisdiction (challenging standing and sovereign immunity) and issued a temporary injunction against enforcement of the amended schedules and the website statement. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed, concluding that the vendors had standing, the claims were justiciable, and a temporary injunction was appropriate.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the vendors had standing and their claims were ripe for review. However, it concluded that the commissioner acted within her broad statutory discretion and followed proper procedures under Health & Safety Code § 481.034(g) in objecting to the federal rule and amending the schedules. The court also held that the website statement was not an APA “rule.” Accordingly, it reversed the injunction and rendered judgment for the Department, with the only affirmed portion being the finding of standing. View "TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES v. SKY MARKETING CORP." on Justia Law

A sheriff in Jefferson County was placed on the local prosecutor’s Brady-Giglio list after a series of events involving a use-of-force incident and subsequent interactions about the department’s response. The prosecutor believed the sheriff’s conduct during the internal investigation, including delays in communication and reluctance to provide details about disciplinary actions, raised concerns about the sheriff’s credibility and truthfulness. After being placed on the list, which could affect his ability to testify in court and threaten his law enforcement career, the sheriff sought reconsideration but was unsuccessful. He then petitioned for judicial review under an Iowa statute that permits officers to challenge their placement on a Brady-Giglio list.The Iowa District Court for Jefferson County conducted an in camera review and found that while the sheriff’s actions were not fully transparent, they did not amount to deceit or dishonesty. The court ordered the sheriff’s removal from the Brady-Giglio list and rejected the county attorney’s arguments that the underlying statute was unconstitutional on due process and separation-of-powers grounds. The county attorney appealed, raising constitutional challenges to the statute rather than contesting the district court’s factual findings.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case and affirmed the district court. It held that the statutory scheme allowing judicial review of Brady-Giglio list placements does not interfere with a prosecutor’s due process obligations to defendants, since it does not prevent disclosure of exculpatory or impeachment material in individual cases. The court also concluded that the statute does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine, since it does not invade core prosecutorial functions such as charging decisions or trial strategy. The court declined to address a void-for-vagueness challenge, finding it was not preserved. The judgment ordering the sheriff’s removal from the Brady-Giglio list was affirmed. View "Richmond v. Jefferson County Attorney" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between a regional fishermen’s association and the federal government concerning changes to catch limits for several fish species in the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan. The association, representing commercial fishermen allegedly harmed by reduced catch limits, challenged the legality of the Framework Adjustment 65 Final Rule and its implementing regulations. At the core of the association’s argument was the claim that the involvement of the New England Fishery Management Council in the development of these rules violated the U.S. Constitution’s Appointments Clause. The association argued that the Council exercised significant authority in the regulatory process but its members were not properly appointed as federal officers.The United States District Court for the District of Maine reviewed the case. It concluded that the association had standing due to the economic injury suffered by its members. The district court rejected the primary constitutional claim, holding that the Council’s role was advisory and final binding authority rested solely with the Secretary of Commerce, who promulgated the regulations. The court did, however, agree with the association in part, finding certain unrelated statutory provisions unconstitutional, but determined that this did not entitle the association to its requested relief. The district court severed those statutory provisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit heard the appeal. After reviewing the statutory framework and the specific facts, the court held that the Council’s role was advisory and did not amount to the exercise of significant federal authority under the Appointments Clause. The harm to the association’s members derived from the Secretary’s independent decision to promulgate the binding regulations, not from the Council’s recommendations. The First Circuit affirmed the denial of injunctive and declaratory relief and reversed the district court’s severance of the unrelated statutory provisions. View "New England Fishermen's Stewardship Association v. Lutnick" on Justia Law

A municipality enacted an ordinance imposing a “stormwater charge” on owners of developed properties within its jurisdiction. The amount of this charge was based on the impervious surface area of each property, justified as covering the cost of constructing, operating, and maintaining the municipal stormwater system, as well as ensuring compliance with federal and state environmental mandates. The funds collected were deposited into a dedicated account for stormwater management purposes. The university system, which owns several properties within the municipality, refused to pay the charge, arguing that it constituted a tax from which it was immune under Pennsylvania law.The municipality initiated litigation in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, seeking a declaration that the stormwater charge was a fee for service rather than a tax, and therefore enforceable against the university system. The university system responded with a preliminary objection and later an application for summary relief, maintaining the charge was a tax or, alternatively, a special assessment, both of which would render it immune from payment. The Commonwealth Court, after reviewing cross-motions for summary relief, ruled in favor of the university system. It concluded the stormwater charge was a tax because it funded projects that delivered general public benefits rather than discrete, individualized services for payors, and there was no voluntary, contractual relationship between the parties. The court also found the charge was not a special assessment.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s judgment. It held that the stormwater charge is a tax because the municipality provided stormwater management services as a public duty, for the general benefit of the community, and not within a voluntary or contractual fee-for-service framework. The court emphasized that, absent a quasiprivate relationship or proportional fee for individualized service, such charges are properly characterized as taxes, from which the university system is immune. View "The Boro of W. Chester v. PASSHE" on Justia Law

An environmental organization sought judicial review of the Department of Pesticide Regulation’s decisions to renew and not reevaluate registrations for several rodenticides, contending the Department violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and its own regulations. The organization argued these pesticides posed significant risks to wildlife. Trade associations representing pesticide manufacturers and distributors intervened in the case, stating both representational and direct economic interests in defending the Department’s actions, as their members produced and sold the challenged products.The Superior Court of Alameda County initially ruled in favor of the Department, denying the environmental group’s petition. The organization appealed, and the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reversed and remanded, instructing the Department to reconsider its decision regarding reevaluation of diphacinone, a rodenticide, focusing on its unique environmental impacts. Following remand, the Department agreed to reevaluate diphacinone, and the Legislature enacted a moratorium on its use during the reevaluation process. The environmental organization then sought attorney fees under the private attorney general statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5).The Superior Court found the organization was a successful party, having achieved its litigation objectives and conferred a significant public benefit. The court awarded attorney fees and costs of about $857,000, holding the Department, real parties in interest, and intervening trade associations jointly and severally liable. The trade associations appealed, arguing they were not “opposing parties” under the statute and lacked the requisite direct interest. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that intervenors with a direct pecuniary interest and active participation in the litigation qualify as “opposing parties” for purposes of fee liability under section 1021.5, even if they were not responsible for enacting or enforcing the challenged government actions. View "Raptors Are the Solution v. Croplife America" on Justia Law

In 2007, the plaintiff was convicted by a jury of first degree murder, robbery, and burglary after he drove accomplices to a location where a planned marijuana theft resulted in the victim’s death. The evidence showed he participated in planning and facilitating the crime, and the jury found him guilty under both aiding and abetting and conspiracy theories. The conviction and sentence of 26 years to life were affirmed by the California Court of Appeal. Later, in an uncontested habeas proceeding, the murder conviction was reduced to second degree and the sentence reduced accordingly.Following legislative changes in 2018 that redefined murder under Senate Bill No. 1437 and created a process for retroactive relief, the trial court vacated the plaintiff’s murder conviction under Penal Code section 1172.6 and resentenced him on the remaining charges. Having served more time than the revised sentence required, he was released. The plaintiff then applied to the California Victim Compensation Board, seeking compensation under Penal Code section 4900 for time served beyond his new sentence, arguing he was “innocent” under the current definition of murder.The Board denied his application, finding he did not allege innocence under the law as it stood at the time of his conviction and that his claim did not state a cognizable basis for relief. The Board also relied on a regulation allowing dismissal of such claims without a hearing. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied his writ petition challenging both the Board’s decision and the validity of the regulation.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed. It held that compensation under section 4900 requires an “erroneous conviction,” and a conviction valid when rendered does not become erroneous due to subsequent legislative changes. The court also upheld the Board’s regulation as consistent with its statutory authority. View "Gardner v. Cal. Victim Comp. Bd." on Justia Law

Metro Treatment of New Hampshire, L.P. operates outpatient opioid treatment clinics licensed by the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). AmeriHealth Caritas New Hampshire is a Medicaid Managed Care Organization (MCO) responsible for arranging healthcare services for Medicaid-eligible patients, including some treated by Metro. The parties’ relationship was governed by an ancillary services agreement. Following an audit of Metro’s patient records, AmeriHealth determined that Metro had violated certain state administrative rules and sought to recoup $36,722.27 in alleged Medicaid overpayments. After Metro appealed through the contractual process, AmeriHealth reduced the recoupment amount and advised Metro it could seek further review through a State Fair Hearing as provided by statute.Metro then filed an appeal with the Administrative Appeals Unit (AAU) of DHHS, but argued that the AAU lacked jurisdiction over payment disputes between MCOs and providers. The AAU issued a written decision concluding that it has subject matter jurisdiction under RSA 126-A:5, VIII to hear appeals arising from determinations that Medicaid payments were inappropriately made and should be recouped. The AAU denied Metro’s motion for reconsideration and stayed further proceedings pending Metro’s petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the AAU has jurisdiction in this dispute. The court held that the AAU does possess jurisdiction under RSA 126-A:5, VIII because Metro is a provider licensed by DHHS and the statute provides for appeals by such providers. The court rejected Metro’s argument that the statute or administrative rules limited jurisdiction only to disputes involving direct departmental actions. The decision of the AAU was affirmed and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Petition of Metro Treatment of N.H." on Justia Law