Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff K.C. alleged that she was sexually abused while in foster care under the custody of the County of Merced. The abuse occurred in two separate foster homes between 1971 and 1977. K.C. claimed that she reported the abuse to her social worker, but no corrective action was taken, resulting in continued abuse. She filed a complaint citing negligent acts and omissions by the County and its employees, which she argued proximately caused her injuries.The Superior Court of Merced County sustained the County's demurrer without leave to amend, leading to the dismissal of K.C.'s complaint with prejudice. The court found that the County and its employees were protected by discretionary immunity under Government Code sections 815.2 and 820.2, which shield public employees and entities from liability for discretionary acts.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court held that the social workers' decisions regarding the investigation of child abuse and the continuation of foster home placements were discretionary acts protected by immunity. The court emphasized that these decisions involved the exercise of judgment and policy considerations, which are shielded from liability to ensure that public employees can perform their duties without fear of civil suits. Consequently, the County was also immune from liability under the derivative immunity provided by Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (b). View "K.C. v. County of Merced" on Justia Law

Philip Sanders filed a petition in the District Court for Creek County, alleging that Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC caused the wrongful death of his wife, Brenda Jean Sanders, during her confinement in the Creek County Jail. Brenda Sanders was booked into the jail on October 17, 2016, and her health deteriorated over four weeks. She was transported to a hospital on November 20, 2016, diagnosed with severe sepsis and other conditions, and died the next day.The District Court granted Turn Key's motion to dismiss Sanders' petition, citing immunity under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act, and allowed Sanders thirty days to amend his petition. Sanders did not amend and appealed the dismissal. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the District Court's order, but Turn Key filed a petition for certiorari to review the appellate court's decision. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma granted certiorari.The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that Sanders' appeal was premature as it challenged an interlocutory order, and appellate jurisdiction was absent. The Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals and withdrew it from publication. The Court recast Sanders' petition in error as an application to assume original jurisdiction and a petition for prohibition. The Court concluded that the Governmental Tort Claims Act makes licensed medical professionals "employees" of the state when under contract with city, county, or state entities and providing medical care to inmates or detainees. The Court assumed original jurisdiction and denied the petition for a writ of prohibition. View "Sanders v. Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC" on Justia Law

Peyman Roshan, a lawyer and real estate broker, had his law license suspended by the California Supreme Court in 2021 for misconduct. Following this, the California Department of Real Estate (DRE) initiated a reciprocal disciplinary proceeding against his real estate license. Roshan filed a federal lawsuit against the DRE, alleging constitutional violations and seeking to enjoin the DRE's disciplinary action.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Roshan's lawsuit, citing the Younger abstention doctrine, which prevents federal courts from interfering with certain ongoing state proceedings. The district court held that the DRE's disciplinary proceeding was quasi-criminal in nature and that Roshan could raise his federal claims during the judicial review of the DRE action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court correctly applied the Younger abstention doctrine. The court noted that the state proceedings were ongoing, involved important state interests, and allowed Roshan to raise his federal claims. The court also determined that the DRE proceeding was quasi-criminal because it was initiated by a state agency following an investigation, involved formal charges, and aimed to determine whether Roshan should be sanctioned by suspending or revoking his real estate license.The Ninth Circuit concluded that all the requirements for Younger abstention were met and that Roshan had not demonstrated any bad faith, harassment, or extraordinary circumstances that would make abstention inappropriate. Therefore, the district court's decision to abstain from hearing the case was proper, and the dismissal of Roshan's lawsuit was affirmed. View "ROSHAN V. MCCAULEY" on Justia Law

Several skilled nursing facilities challenged the State Department of Health Care Services and its director, Michelle Baass, over the formula used to calculate Medi-Cal reimbursement overpayments. The plaintiffs argued that the Department's method, which was based on the amount Medicare paid for ancillary services rather than the amount Medi-Cal overpaid, violated a ministerial duty and constituted an underground regulation.The trial court sustained the Department's demurrer without leave to amend, concluding that the plaintiffs' claim was not cognizable in a traditional writ of mandate proceeding. The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim that the Department violated a ministerial duty or adopted an underground regulation. Additionally, the trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery of certain documents, deeming them privileged.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court determined that some of the plaintiffs' claims were indeed cognizable in a traditional writ of mandate proceeding and that the petition stated a claim for relief regarding the Department's use of an underground regulation when calculating Medi-Cal reimbursement overpayments. However, the court found that the plaintiffs did not provide an adequate record to review whether the trial court erred in denying their motion to compel discovery.The appellate court reversed the judgment of dismissal and affirmed the trial court's order denying the plaintiffs' motion to compel. The case was remanded to the trial court with instructions to vacate its order sustaining the Department's demurrer without leave to amend and to enter a new order overruling the demurrer. The plaintiffs were awarded their costs on appeal. View "California Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center v. Baass" on Justia Law

Misty Coleman alleges that she fell and broke her ankle after slipping on a wet shower floor in a county jail. She pursued constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and negligence claims under Ohio law against the county, corrections officers, and medical personnel. Coleman claimed that the slippery shower violated the Due Process Clause and that a county policy or custom was behind her poor medical care. She also questioned whether the county could invoke state-law immunity from her negligence claim at the pleading stage.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed all claims against all parties. The court found that Coleman failed to allege a plausible constitutional violation regarding the slippery shower and did not connect the inadequate medical care to a county policy or custom. The court also held that Ohio law granted immunity to Hamilton County on the negligence claim. The court allowed Coleman to conduct limited discovery to identify unnamed officers and nurses, but her subsequent amended complaint was dismissed as it was filed outside the statute of limitations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court's dismissal, holding that Coleman’s claims accrued on the date of her accident and that her amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. The court also found that Coleman did not meet the requirements for equitable tolling, as she did not allege facts showing that she was intentionally misled or tricked into missing the deadline. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Coleman’s complaint. View "Coleman v. Hamilton County Bd. of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

Maryland and South Carolina filed lawsuits in state courts against 3M Company and other chemical manufacturers, alleging contamination of their waterways with per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). The states filed separate complaints for PFAS contamination from aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF) and non-AFFF products, explicitly disclaiming any connection between the two in their non-AFFF complaints.In the District of Maryland, 3M removed Maryland's non-AFFF complaint to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, arguing that PFAS from its Military AFFF production was indistinguishably commingled with PFAS from its non-AFFF products. The district court remanded the case, giving dispositive effect to Maryland's disclaimer and concluding that 3M's federal work was not implicated. Similarly, in the District of South Carolina, 3M removed South Carolina's non-AFFF complaint, but the district court also remanded, crediting the state's disclaimer and finding no connection to 3M's federal work.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the consolidated appeals. The court held that the states' disclaimers were not dispositive in determining the connection between 3M's federal work and the charged conduct. The court concluded that 3M plausibly alleged that PFAS contamination from its Military AFFF production was related to the states' claims, satisfying the nexus requirement for federal officer removal. The court vacated the district courts' decisions and remanded for further consideration of whether 3M met the other elements for federal officer removal, including acting under a federal officer and having a colorable federal defense. View "State of Maryland v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

Richard Hightower, a pretrial detainee, was attacked by his cellmate, Anthony Tyler, in a Philadelphia jail, resulting in Hightower's paralysis. Hightower was classified as a low-security risk, while Tyler was classified as a high-security risk with a history of violent behavior. Due to a mistake by a prison health services company, Tyler was placed in Hightower's intake cell instead of being transferred to a permanent cell. Tyler's aggressive behavior escalated, culminating in a violent attack on Hightower.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Philadelphia and the guards. Hightower did not appeal the judgment for the guard but did appeal the judgment for the city.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Hightower failed to prove that the city caused any constitutional violation. To succeed in his Monell claim, Hightower needed to show that the city had an unconstitutional policy or custom or was deliberately indifferent to inmates' rights. The court found that the city had no policy of not separating inmates by security-risk level during intake and that the lack of a policy is not a policy. Additionally, Hightower could not show a custom that violated his rights or that the city acted with deliberate indifference. The court concluded that the risk to Hightower was not so obvious that the city could be held liable without a pattern of similar violations.The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's summary judgment in favor of the City of Philadelphia. View "Hightower v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

John Hudnall, a former financial advisor, applied for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, claiming he had been unable to work since May 1, 2015, due to major depressive disorder, anxiety, and insomnia. His application included a function report from his wife, Miyuki Sato, detailing his limitations in daily activities and self-care. Despite this, the Social Security Administration denied his application and request for reconsideration. Hudnall then sought a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who also denied his claim, finding him not disabled based on medical evidence and Hudnall's self-reported activities, without explicitly addressing Sato's lay evidence.Hudnall appealed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, which granted summary judgment in favor of the Social Security Administration. Hudnall then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that under the Social Security Administration's new regulations, effective March 27, 2017, ALJs are no longer required to provide germane reasons for discounting lay witness testimony. The court found that these regulations, which state that ALJs are not required to articulate how they considered evidence from nonmedical sources, are within the Commissioner of Social Security's broad authority and are not arbitrary and capricious. Consequently, the ALJ did not err in discounting Sato's evidence without explanation. The court resolved all other issues in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. View "HUDNALL V. DUDEK" on Justia Law

Gray Television, a broadcaster in Alaska, sought review of a final forfeiture order by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The FCC had imposed the maximum forfeiture penalty on Gray for violating the prohibition on owning two top-four stations in a single designated market area (DMA). Gray acquired the CBS network affiliation of KTVA-TV for its own station, KYES-TV, which resulted in Gray owning two top-four stations in the Anchorage DMA. Gray did not seek a waiver from the FCC for this transaction.The FCC issued a Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture (NAL) against Gray, proposing a penalty of $518,283, the statutory maximum. Gray responded, arguing that the transaction did not violate the rule because KYES was already a top-four station according to Comscore ratings data. Gray also contended that the FCC failed to provide fair notice of its interpretation of the rule and that the enforcement action violated the First Amendment and the Communications Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the FCC's determination that Gray violated the rule, finding that the FCC reasonably relied on Nielsen ratings data, which showed that KYES was not a top-four station at the time of the transaction. The court also held that the FCC's interpretation of the rule was reasonable and that Gray had fair notice of the rule's application to its transaction.However, the court vacated the forfeiture penalty and remanded for further proceedings. The court found that the FCC failed to provide adequate notice to Gray that the proposed penalty was based on a finding of egregiousness, which violated due process. Additionally, the court held that the FCC did not adequately explain its consideration of Gray's good faith in determining the penalty amount. View "Gray Television, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

Vandewater International Inc. requested a scope ruling from the U.S. Department of Commerce to determine if its steel branch outlets were subject to an antidumping duty order on "butt-weld pipe fittings" from China. Vandewater argued that its products did not meet the definition of "butt-weld pipe fittings" as they had contoured ends and were used differently. Commerce determined that Vandewater's products were within the scope of the order, leading to an appeal.The U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) reviewed the case and initially found that the term "butt-weld pipe fittings" was ambiguous, requiring further analysis. The CIT remanded the case to Commerce to conduct a full scope inquiry using the (k)(2) criteria, which include physical characteristics, expectations of purchasers, ultimate use, channels of trade, and manner of advertisement. Commerce reaffirmed its decision that Vandewater's products were within the scope of the order based on these criteria.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the CIT's decision. The court held that the term "butt-weld pipe fittings" was ambiguous and that Commerce's determination using the (k)(2) criteria was supported by substantial evidence. The court also found that the (k)(1) sources were not dispositive in determining whether Vandewater's products were within the scope of the order. Additionally, the court dismissed SCI's challenge to Commerce's suspension of liquidation instructions as moot, as there were no unliquidated entries of Vandewater's products before the relevant date. View "Vandewater International Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law