Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
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The case involves a challenge to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program by several states, led by Texas. DACA, established in 2012, allows certain undocumented immigrants who arrived as children to receive a renewable two-year period of deferred action from deportation and eligibility for work authorization. The plaintiffs argue that DACA is procedurally and substantively unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas initially ruled in 2021 that Texas had standing to challenge DACA and that the program was unlawful. The court vacated the program but stayed the vacatur for existing DACA recipients. In 2022, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and remanded the case, noting that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had issued a Final Rule to address procedural defects. On remand, the district court found the Final Rule substantively unlawful and vacated it, maintaining the stay for existing recipients.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Texas has standing to challenge DACA based on the financial burden imposed by the presence of DACA recipients. The court also found that the Final Rule is substantively unlawful as it conflicts with the INA. The court affirmed the district court's judgment but modified the remedial order to limit the injunction to Texas and to sever the forbearance provisions from the work authorization provisions of the Final Rule. The court also maintained the stay for existing DACA recipients pending further appeal. View "Texas v. United States" on Justia Law

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Dayton Power & Light Company, along with other utilities, sought an RTO adder from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) as an incentive for joining a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO). Ohio law mandates that utilities join an RTO, which led FERC to deny Dayton Power's application, arguing that the adder is meant to incentivize voluntary actions, not those required by law. The Ohio Consumers’ Counsel (OCC) challenged the existing RTO adders for other Ohio utilities, leading FERC to remove the adder for AEP but not for Duke and FirstEnergy, citing the latter's comprehensive settlement agreements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court first addressed whether the utilities could challenge the voluntariness requirement of Order 679, concluding that they could because FERC's past practices did not clearly indicate a strict voluntariness requirement. The court then interpreted Section 219(c) of the Federal Power Act, agreeing with FERC that the best reading of the statute supports the requirement that RTO membership must be voluntary to qualify for the adder.The court also considered the utilities' preemption argument, which claimed that federal law should override Ohio's mandate for RTO membership. The court held that the Federal Power Act does not preempt Ohio law, as Congress did not intend to prevent states from mandating RTO participation, especially when such mandates align with federal goals of increasing RTO membership.Finally, the court found FERC's differential treatment of AEP, Duke, and FirstEnergy to be arbitrary and capricious. It noted that all three utilities' rates included a 50-basis-point RTO adder, whether explicitly approved or impliedly included in settlements. The court affirmed FERC's denial of Dayton Power's application and the removal of AEP's adder but reversed the decision to retain the adders for Duke and FirstEnergy, remanding for further proceedings. View "Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

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A Montana State Representative, William W. Mercer, requested access to certain child abuse and neglect case records from the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS) under a statute that allows legislators to review such records. The DPHHS provided some records but withheld others, including emails, text messages, and attorney-client privileged materials. Mercer filed a petition for a writ of mandamus and for declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the DPHHS to release the additional records.The First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County granted a mandatory preliminary injunction requiring the DPHHS to provide the requested records, including those claimed to be attorney-client privileged, but imposed additional confidentiality protections. The DPHHS appealed, arguing that the District Court misinterpreted the statute and that the attorney-client privilege should exempt certain records from disclosure.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the plain language of the statute required the disclosure of the records to the legislator, subject to confidentiality protections. The court found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction, as Mercer demonstrated a clear likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm without the injunction, that the balance of equities tipped in his favor, and that the injunction was in the public interest. The court emphasized that the preliminary injunction did not resolve the ultimate merits of the case, which would be determined in further proceedings. View "Mercer v. Department of Public Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

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In July 2019, Brent Bartlett, an off-duty police officer with the Juneau Police Department (JPD), rear-ended Arlene Tripp’s vehicle while driving his personal car under the influence of alcohol, resulting in her injury. Bartlett, who had a history of alcohol abuse and PTSD, was found to have a blood alcohol content of 0.239. Bartlett’s partner, also a JPD officer, was aware of his issues but did not report them. The Tripps sued the City and Borough of Juneau (CBJ), JPD, and the police chief, alleging negligent training and supervision of Bartlett.The Superior Court of Alaska, First Judicial District, dismissed the case, ruling that JPD did not owe a duty of care to the public to protect them from harm caused by officers’ off-duty alcohol consumption. The court found no statutory duty under AS 18.65.130 or CBJ’s Drug-Free Workplace policy and JPD Conduct Rule 114. It also determined that existing precedent did not impose such a duty and that public policy considerations did not support recognizing a duty of care in these circumstances.The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. The court held that neither statutes nor precedent imposed a duty of care on JPD to train officers against excessive off-duty alcohol consumption. It also concluded that public policy did not favor imposing such a duty, as it was not foreseeable that training officers on alcohol consumption would reduce the likelihood of them driving under the influence while off duty. The court emphasized that the connection between JPD’s conduct and the Tripps’ injuries was too remote and that the moral blame lay with Bartlett’s criminal conduct. Therefore, the dismissal of the lawsuit was upheld. View "Tripp v. City and Borough of Juneau" on Justia Law

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Several environmental protection organizations challenged the policies governing oil and gas lease sales conducted by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) on protected sage-grouse habitat. In 2015, BLM amended its land use management plans to prioritize oil and gas leasing outside of sage-grouse habitat. In 2018, BLM revised its guidance documents, limiting the prioritization requirement to situations with a backlog of expressions of interest and shortening public comment periods.The District Court for the District of Montana found that the 2018 Instruction Memorandum (IM) violated the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) and vacated the June 2018 Wyoming lease sale. The District Court for the District of Idaho found that the lease sales violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and FLPMA due to inadequate public participation and vacated the lease sales.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the cases. It held that the Montana district court's vacatur of the 2018 IM was not injunctive and thus not appealable, but the vacatur of the lease sales was injunctive and appealable. The court affirmed that the 2018 IM was inconsistent with the 2015 Plan and that the June 2018 Wyoming lease sale violated FLPMA. The court also affirmed that the Idaho lease sales violated NEPA and FLPMA due to insufficient public participation.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Montana district court did not abuse its discretion in vacating the lease sales. However, it found that the Idaho district court abused its discretion in vacating the lease sales and remanded the case, directing the BLM to reconsider the leasing decisions with proper public participation while enjoining surface-disturbing activities in the interim. The court also held that neither district court violated the due process rights of intervenors by vacating the leases. View "MONTANA WILDLIFE FEDERATION V. HAALAND" on Justia Law

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The case involves a challenge to a rule promulgated by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) in 2020, which authorized the transportation of liquefied natural gas (LNG) by rail in newly designed tank cars without requiring a permit. LNG is a hazardous material that poses significant risks if released, including explosions, fires, and the formation of ultra-cold gas clouds. The rule did not limit the number of LNG tank cars per train or set a mandatory speed limit, raising safety concerns among various stakeholders.The rule was challenged by a coalition of environmental nonprofits, several states, and the Puyallup Tribe of Indians. They argued that PHMSA did not adequately consider the safety risks and that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) required the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The petitioners contended that the decision not to prepare an EIS was arbitrary and capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that PHMSA's decision not to prepare an EIS was indeed arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that transporting LNG by rail poses a low-probability but high-consequence risk of derailment, which could result in catastrophic environmental impacts. The court emphasized that PHMSA failed to adequately consider the probability and potential consequences of such accidents and did not impose sufficient safety measures, such as a mandatory speed limit or a cap on the number of LNG tank cars per train.The court held that PHMSA's failure to prepare an EIS violated NEPA and vacated the LNG Rule, remanding the case to PHMSA for further proceedings. The court's decision underscores the importance of thoroughly assessing environmental risks and adhering to NEPA's requirements in rulemaking processes. View "Sierra Club v. DOT" on Justia Law

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Dr. Neena Biswas, a physician at the VA’s Dallas facility, alleged that the VA retaliated against her for whistleblowing by converting her appointment from permanent to temporary and subsequently terminating her employment. Dr. Biswas had made disclosures regarding the hiring process for the Chief of the Hospitalist Section, which she believed violated statutory requirements prioritizing U.S. citizens.The Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) found that Dr. Biswas’s disclosures were protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act and contributed to the VA’s actions. However, the Board denied her request for corrective action, concluding that the VA would have taken the same actions regardless of her disclosures. The Board determined that the VA had strong evidence supporting its personnel actions, including Dr. Biswas’s unprofessional and disruptive conduct, and that other similarly situated employees were treated similarly.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the Board’s decision, agreeing that the VA had clear and convincing evidence to support its actions. The court noted that Dr. Biswas’s conduct, including refusing patient assignments and sending inflammatory emails, justified the VA’s actions. The court also found that the Board’s error in considering Dr. Biswas’s emails to the VA Secretary as insubordination was harmless, as the decision was supported by other substantial evidence of her misconduct. The court concluded that the VA met its burden of proving it would have taken the same actions absent the whistleblowing. View "BISWAS v. DVA " on Justia Law

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The Wisconsin Voter Alliance filed identical petitions for writ of mandamus against the registers in probate for 13 circuit courts in Wisconsin, seeking access to Notice of Voting Eligibility (NVE) forms under Wisconsin’s public records law. These forms document when a court finds an individual incompetent to vote. The Alliance argued that they needed this information to ensure the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) was updating voter records accurately.The Walworth County Circuit Court dismissed the Alliance’s petition, agreeing with the register in probate, Kristina Secord, that the NVE forms were exempt from disclosure under Wisconsin Statute § 54.75. The Alliance appealed to the Court of Appeals, District II. Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals, District IV, had already ruled in a similar case (Reynolds) that NVE forms were exempt from disclosure under the same statute, affirming the Juneau County Circuit Court’s dismissal of the Alliance’s petition.In the current case, the Court of Appeals, District II, issued a split opinion. The majority held that the Alliance was entitled to the NVE forms, possibly with redactions, and reversed the circuit court’s dismissal. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that District II violated the precedent set by Cook v. Cook, which mandates that the Court of Appeals must follow prior published opinions unless overruled by the Supreme Court.The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that District II was bound by the Reynolds decision and should have either certified the appeal to the Supreme Court or adhered to the prior opinion while expressing its disagreement. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, District II, and remanded the case with instructions to follow the precedent established in Reynolds. View "Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Secord" on Justia Law

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Judge Carlos Moore, a municipal court judge for the cities of Clarksdale and Grenada, faced allegations of misconduct related to his social media posts and public comments. The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance (the Commission) claimed that Moore's actions violated the Mississippi Constitution, the Code of Judicial Conduct, and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Commission and Moore. The Commission's allegations stemmed from Moore's social media activity in 2021 and 2022, where he posted content that could be perceived as advertising his law practice and making racially charged comments.The Commission had previously warned Moore in 2019 about posting information on social media regarding cases he heard in court. In 2020, Moore and the Commission entered into an MOU, where Moore agreed to limit his social media posts to court-related information and not use his judicial title for personal or political purposes. Despite this agreement, Moore continued to post under the name "Judge Carlos Moore" and made public comments that the Commission deemed inappropriate.The Commission filed a Formal Complaint against Moore in July 2022, alleging violations of the Mississippi Constitution and the Code of Judicial Conduct. Moore did not respond to the complaint or participate in the Commission's proceedings. The Commission recommended Moore's removal from office, a six-year suspension, and a $5,000 fine.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and found that Moore's actions constituted willful misconduct and were prejudicial to the administration of justice. The Court held that Moore's comments on social media and television violated the judicial-conduct canons and the MOU. The Court ordered Moore's removal from the bench, a $3,000 fine, and assessed all costs. The Court emphasized that Moore's actions undermined public confidence in the judiciary and warranted a harsh sanction. View "Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Moore" on Justia Law

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The case involves Michigan's electricity market regulations, specifically the Individual Local Clearing Requirement (ILCR), which mandates that electricity retailers in Michigan's lower peninsula procure a certain percentage of their capacity from within that region. Plaintiffs, including Energy Michigan and the Association of Businesses Advocating Tariff Equity (ABATE), challenged the ILCR on the grounds that it violates the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan initially dismissed the Michigan Public Service Commission (MPSC) on Eleventh Amendment grounds but allowed the case to proceed against individual commissioners. The court denied summary judgment motions from both sides, finding that there were factual disputes regarding whether the ILCR discriminated against interstate commerce. After a three-day bench trial, the district court concluded that the ILCR did not violate the Commerce Clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the ILCR is facially discriminatory because it requires electricity to be generated within a specific geographic region, effectively favoring in-state over out-of-state electricity. The court held that this discrimination necessitates strict scrutiny, which the district court did not properly apply. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if the ILCR can survive strict scrutiny by proving it is the only means to achieve the state's goal of ensuring a reliable energy supply. View "Energy Michigan, Inc. v. Public Service Commission" on Justia Law