Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A motorist was stopped by law enforcement after driving the wrong way on a one-way street. The officer who made the stop observed signs of intoxication, including slurred speech and the odor of alcohol. The driver admitted to consuming alcohol and performed poorly on field sobriety tests. Preliminary breath tests conducted at the scene showed blood-alcohol concentrations (BAC) of 0.160 and 0.162 percent. The driver was arrested, and later, two chemical breath tests at the police station indicated BAC levels of 0.15 and 0.16 percent. The officer certified compliance with the requirement to observe the motorist continuously for 15 minutes before the chemical breath test, as mandated by California regulations.The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended the driver’s license, and after an administrative per se (APS) hearing, the administrative hearing officer upheld the suspension. The driver challenged this decision by filing a petition for a writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Kern County. The trial court reviewed body-worn camera footage and determined that the arresting officer had not continuously observed the driver for the required 15-minute period prior to the breath test. The trial court found that this regulatory violation called the reliability of the test results into question. The court excluded the chemical breath test results and granted the writ of mandate, setting aside the DMV’s order of suspension.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the officer had not complied with the observation requirement. The appellate court held that the presumption of reliability for the chemical breath test results was rebutted by the video evidence and that the DMV failed to establish the reliability of the tests despite the regulatory violation. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court’s order setting aside the suspension of the driver’s license. View "Myers v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

A federally recognized tribe in southern California operated a wholesale tobacco distribution business, selling cigarettes exclusively to other California tribes. These tribal businesses, in turn, sold the cigarettes to individual consumers on their respective reservations. Neither the distributing tribe nor its customers held state licenses to distribute or sell cigarettes, and no state cigarette taxes were collected at any point in the distribution chain. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) placed the tribe on the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking (PACT) Act’s noncompliant list, which restricts delivery of cigarettes by common carriers, due to violations of California’s cigarette tax and licensing laws.After the California Department of Justice notified the tribe of noncompliance, the state asked ATF to add the tribe to the noncompliant list. The tribe responded by arguing the PACT Act did not apply to its sales, but continued to make sales without appropriate licenses or tax payments. ATF issued notices of violations and, after considering the tribe’s responses, confirmed its decision to list the tribe. The tribe then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, challenging ATF’s actions as contrary to law and procedurally deficient. The district court granted summary judgment to ATF, finding that the agency’s decision was adequately reasoned and procedurally proper.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the tribe’s remote cigarette sales to other tribes constituted “off-reservation” activity subject to California’s licensing and tax laws. The court found that the tribe’s customers were “consumers” under the PACT Act, rendering the tribe a “delivery seller” required to comply with state law. The court also held that ATF did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act’s procedural requirements. The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "TWENTY-NINE PALMS BAND OF MISSION INDIANS V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

Congress passed the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, which included the Digital Equity Act of 2021, allocating $65 billion to expand affordable, high-speed broadband access across the United States, especially in underserved areas. The Act directed the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to adopt rules to “facilitate equal access to broadband” and prevent “digital discrimination of access” based on characteristics such as income, race, and national origin. In response, the FCC adopted a final rule that prohibited both intentional discrimination (disparate treatment) and unintentional discrimination with disproportionate effects (disparate impact), applied to a broad range of entities influencing broadband access—not just internet service providers.Numerous telecommunications and broadband industry groups challenged this rule in several federal appellate courts. These cases were consolidated in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The industry petitioners argued that the statute did not authorize the FCC to impose liability based on disparate impact, nor to regulate entities beyond broadband providers. Public interest groups intervened to defend the rule, but also argued it did not go far enough.The Eighth Circuit reviewed the FCC’s rule under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court applied the Supreme Court’s most recent guidance on agency deference and statutory interpretation, emphasizing that courts must independently interpret statutes. It found that the statutory text did not authorize disparate impact liability and that the FCC exceeded its authority by applying the rule to entities other than broadband providers. As a result, the court held that the FCC’s rule was not in accordance with law and vacated the rule in its entirety. The court granted in part the industry petitioners’ request, denied the public interest groups’ petition, and left the FCC with the ongoing obligation to adopt lawful rules facilitating equal broadband access. View "Minnesota Telecom Alliance v. FCC" on Justia Law

A volunteer affiliated with a nonprofit focused on innovation requested documents under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). The request sought information related to an adversary proceeding before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), particularly concerning the panel of judges assigned, changes to the panel, and drafts of the written decision. The proceeding involved a motion for recusal due to a judge’s stock ownership and subsequent reassignment of panel members. The FOIA request specifically targeted documents reflecting the identities and opinions of involved judges, membership of the Circulation Judge Pool, legal bases for judge participation, and information about stock holdings.The PTO produced about 1,500 pages of documents but withheld drafts of decisions and related communications, citing FOIA Exemption 5, which covers predecisional and deliberative documents. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment and ruled in favor of the PTO, finding that the withheld documents were both predecisional and deliberative. The court rejected arguments that the communications constituted unlawful ex parte communications or government misconduct, determining there was no basis under FOIA to compel disclosure. The court also concluded that the plaintiff’s broader claims were not appropriately raised in a FOIA action.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the PTO properly withheld the drafts and related communications under Exemption 5, finding them categorically predecisional and deliberative. The court further determined that intra-agency circulation of draft opinions among judges did not constitute ex parte communications and that FOIA does not provide a government misconduct exception for Exemption 5. View "Malone v. United States Patent & Trademark Office" on Justia Law

A per diem judge had been credited with retirement service by the Employee Retirement System (ERS) for years under a 1990 memorandum that set eligibility criteria. In 2017, the ERS discovered that the Judiciary had not updated personnel forms as the memorandum appeared to require. Without notice or a hearing, ERS issued a new memorandum rescinding the 1990 policy and retroactively stripped the judge’s retirement credits for service after October 1, 2017. The ERS did not follow rulemaking procedures required by Hawaii’s Administrative Procedure Act.The judge administratively challenged the ERS decision. A hearing officer partially sided with her, but the Board of Trustees of the ERS overruled that recommendation and dismissed all claims. The judge appealed to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, which reversed the ERS Board, finding that both the 1990 and 2017 memoranda were rules under HRS § 91-1 and invalid because they had not been properly promulgated. On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) reversed, agreeing that the memoranda were improperly issued but holding that the circuit court’s reasoning did not support the relief granted.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case. It held that both the 1990 and 2017 memoranda were rules affecting private rights, not mere internal management or intra-agency communications, and thus subject to statutory rulemaking procedures. The 2017 memorandum and its implementing letter were void as to the judge because they were not lawfully adopted and she had timely challenged them. However, because no timely challenge was made to the 1990 memorandum, it remained valid and controlled her eligibility. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s decision, reinstated the circuit court’s judgment, and ordered the ERS to credit the judge for eligible service. View "Martel v. Employee Retirement System" on Justia Law

After the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization returned abortion regulation to the states, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) changed its rules to allow the abortion drug mifepristone to be prescribed online and sent by mail, eliminating the prior requirement for in-person doctor visits. The State of Louisiana, joined by an individual plaintiff, challenged this 2023 regulation (the “2023 REMS”) under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), arguing that the FDA’s decision was not supported by sufficient data and resulted in illegal abortions and increased Medicaid costs within the state.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana found that Louisiana had standing, was likely to succeed on the merits, and was suffering irreparable harm. However, the district court declined to stay the regulation, reasoning that the balance of equities and public interest favored denying immediate relief. Instead, the district court stayed the litigation to allow the FDA to complete its ongoing review of mifepristone’s safety protocols, which the FDA admitted had previously lacked adequate consideration.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether a stay of the 2023 REMS pending appeal was warranted under 5 U.S.C. § 705. The Fifth Circuit concluded that Louisiana was strongly likely to succeed on the merits because the FDA’s removal of the in-person dispensing requirement was arbitrary and capricious, relied on insufficient data, and was inadequately explained. The court further found that Louisiana faced ongoing irreparable harm to its sovereign interests and financial losses. The appellate court determined that neither the FDA’s nor the manufacturers’ interests outweighed Louisiana’s injuries or the public interest, and that a stay of the regulation was appropriate. The court therefore granted Louisiana’s motion for a stay pending appeal. View "Louisiana v. FDA" on Justia Law

A business in Connecticut was assessed personal property taxes from 2008 to 2016. The defendant, who had moved to California years earlier and claimed to have left the business by 2007, was never notified of these tax assessments at her California address, despite having provided it to the tax collector in 2011 and 2016. Over the years, the city’s tax collector took funds from the defendant’s bank accounts multiple times via bank executions to satisfy the tax debt, without ever sending her a tax bill or notice at her actual residence.In 2021, the tax collector initiated another bank execution against the defendant. The defendant challenged this action, arguing she had not received due process or required statutory notice. The Superior Court for the judicial district of Litchfield held an evidentiary hearing and agreed with the defendant, finding the tax collector failed to provide required notice under General Statutes § 12-155 (a) and that the lack of notice deprived her of the opportunity to challenge the tax assessment. The court granted the defendant’s exemption motion, rendering the execution “of no effect.” The tax collector initially appealed but then withdrew the appeal. After sending a written demand to the defendant’s California address, the tax collector initiated a new bank execution, again without providing a new tax bill or an opportunity to challenge it.The trial court found the new action was a collateral attack on the earlier judgment and barred by collateral estoppel. The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding the issue of notice and opportunity to challenge had been actually litigated and necessarily determined in the 2021 action.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment. It held that, under Connecticut law, collateral estoppel applies to all independent, alternative grounds actually litigated and determined in a prior judgment, making them preclusive in subsequent actions. Thus, the tax collector was barred from relitigating the notice and due process issues already decided. The Court declined to recognize a public policy exception for municipal tax collection cases. View "Torrington Tax Collector, LLC v. Riley" on Justia Law

An individual disclosed information about significant misconduct at a large company to the news media. Following these disclosures, both Congress and staff from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) contacted the individual for interviews and further information, which he provided. The SEC subsequently initiated an enforcement action against the company, relying on the information provided, resulting in substantial monetary sanctions. The individual then applied to the SEC for a whistleblower award under the Securities Exchange Act, which provides monetary awards to those who “voluntarily” provide “original information” leading to successful enforcement actions.The SEC denied the whistleblower award application, finding that the individual’s submission was not “voluntary” because it occurred only after the SEC and other authorities had contacted him. Additionally, the SEC found his submission was untimely and summarily denied his request for exemptions from these requirements. The individual challenged these determinations, arguing that the SEC’s interpretation of “voluntarily” conflicted with the statute's purpose and plain meaning, that his submission was timely, and that the denial of his request for exemptions was insufficiently explained and inconsistent with SEC precedent. He also raised First Amendment concerns, suggesting the SEC’s approach penalized whistleblowers for speaking to the press.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the SEC’s order. The court held that the SEC’s interpretation of “voluntarily” was reasonable and consistent with statutory text and purpose, and rejected the First Amendment argument, finding it was based on a mistaken premise. However, the court found that the SEC abused its discretion by inadequately explaining its denial of the request for an exemption from the voluntariness requirement. The court thus denied the petition in part, granted it in part, vacated the denial of the exemption request, and remanded to the SEC for further consideration. View "Doe v. SEC" on Justia Law

A group of businesses and consumers involved in the sale and manufacture of consumable hemp products containing manufactured delta-8 THC challenged actions taken by the Texas Department of State Health Services and its commissioner. Following federal and state legislative changes in 2018 and 2019 that removed “hemp” and certain tetrahydrocannabinols (THC) in hemp from the definition of controlled substances, the Texas commissioner objected to a federal rule that would have further decontrolled hemp-derived extracts, including delta-8 THC. The commissioner then amended the state schedules to clarify that manufactured delta-8 THC remained a Schedule I controlled substance, leading to substantial business disruption for the vendors who had entered the delta-8 market.The vendors sued in district court, arguing that the commissioner exceeded her authority both procedurally and substantively under Texas law by modifying the schedules in a way that contradicted the Texas Farm Bill, and that the Department’s website statement about delta-8 THC was an invalid rule under the Texas Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The trial court denied the Department’s plea to the jurisdiction (challenging standing and sovereign immunity) and issued a temporary injunction against enforcement of the amended schedules and the website statement. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed, concluding that the vendors had standing, the claims were justiciable, and a temporary injunction was appropriate.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the vendors had standing and their claims were ripe for review. However, it concluded that the commissioner acted within her broad statutory discretion and followed proper procedures under Health & Safety Code § 481.034(g) in objecting to the federal rule and amending the schedules. The court also held that the website statement was not an APA “rule.” Accordingly, it reversed the injunction and rendered judgment for the Department, with the only affirmed portion being the finding of standing. View "TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES v. SKY MARKETING CORP." on Justia Law

A sheriff in Jefferson County was placed on the local prosecutor’s Brady-Giglio list after a series of events involving a use-of-force incident and subsequent interactions about the department’s response. The prosecutor believed the sheriff’s conduct during the internal investigation, including delays in communication and reluctance to provide details about disciplinary actions, raised concerns about the sheriff’s credibility and truthfulness. After being placed on the list, which could affect his ability to testify in court and threaten his law enforcement career, the sheriff sought reconsideration but was unsuccessful. He then petitioned for judicial review under an Iowa statute that permits officers to challenge their placement on a Brady-Giglio list.The Iowa District Court for Jefferson County conducted an in camera review and found that while the sheriff’s actions were not fully transparent, they did not amount to deceit or dishonesty. The court ordered the sheriff’s removal from the Brady-Giglio list and rejected the county attorney’s arguments that the underlying statute was unconstitutional on due process and separation-of-powers grounds. The county attorney appealed, raising constitutional challenges to the statute rather than contesting the district court’s factual findings.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case and affirmed the district court. It held that the statutory scheme allowing judicial review of Brady-Giglio list placements does not interfere with a prosecutor’s due process obligations to defendants, since it does not prevent disclosure of exculpatory or impeachment material in individual cases. The court also concluded that the statute does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine, since it does not invade core prosecutorial functions such as charging decisions or trial strategy. The court declined to address a void-for-vagueness challenge, finding it was not preserved. The judgment ordering the sheriff’s removal from the Brady-Giglio list was affirmed. View "Richmond v. Jefferson County Attorney" on Justia Law