Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Lake County sought reimbursement from the State of Montana for costs incurred in enforcing state criminal jurisdiction on the Flathead Indian Reservation under Public Law 280 (P.L. 280). The County argued that the State was obligated to cover these costs, citing financial strain and the diversion of resources from other services.The District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District dismissed Lake County’s claims for unfunded mandate and unjust enrichment, ruling that the statutes of limitations had expired. The court determined that the claims accrued in January 2017, when the County expressed its inability to continue bearing the financial burden of P.L. 280. The court also ruled that the continuing tort and equitable tolling doctrines did not apply to toll the statutes of limitations. The court denied the State’s motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment claim but later granted summary judgment in favor of the State, ruling that the State was not obligated to appropriate any specific amount to reimburse the County.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s rulings. It held that Lake County’s claims were justiciable but that the continuing tort doctrine did not apply because the County sought monetary damages, not abatement. The Court also ruled that the equitable tolling doctrine did not apply as the County did not pursue a legal remedy within the doctrine’s scope. Finally, the Court held that § 2-1-301(2), MCA, only required the State to reimburse the County to the extent funds were appropriated by the Legislature, which retained discretion over such appropriations. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the unfunded mandate and unjust enrichment claims and the summary judgment on the declaratory judgment claim. View "Lake County v. State" on Justia Law

R.L., a sheriff’s deputy, was charged with driving while intoxicated, but the charges were later dropped. The Indiana Law Enforcement Training Board initiated proceedings to revoke R.L.'s basic-training certificate, which is necessary for his employment as an officer. R.L. sought and obtained a court declaration and injunction preventing the board from disciplining him before the board issued a final decision.The Martin Circuit Court granted R.L.'s request for declaratory and injunctive relief, barring the board from using facts from R.L.'s expunged arrest to revoke his certificate. The board intervened and moved to vacate the order, arguing procedural errors and lack of merit. The trial court vacated its initial order but issued a second similar order. The board appealed, and the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, allowing the board to consider independent evidence of the facts underlying the expunged arrest records.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred in granting R.L.'s request for declaratory and injunctive relief. The court emphasized that R.L. must follow the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act (AOPA) to challenge the board's decisions and that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss R.L.'s declaratory-judgment action, reinforcing the necessity of exhausting administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. View "Indiana Law Enforcement Training Board v. R L" on Justia Law

King County, Washington, issued Executive Order PFC-7-1-EO, which directed county officials to ensure that future leases at Boeing Field prohibit fixed base operators (FBOs) from servicing U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) charter flights. This order was based on the county's disagreement with federal immigration policies. Following the issuance of the order, all three FBOs at Boeing Field ceased servicing ICE flights, forcing ICE to relocate its operations to Yakima Air Terminal, which increased operational costs and security concerns.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment for the United States, finding that the Executive Order violated both the Supremacy Clause’s intergovernmental immunity doctrine and a World War II-era contract reconveying Boeing Field to King County. The district court concluded that the Executive Order discriminated against the federal government and its contractors and breached the Instrument of Transfer, which required King County to allow the United States nonexclusive use of the landing area at Boeing Field.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the United States had Article III standing to bring the suit, as it had suffered concrete and particularized injuries due to the increased operational costs and imminent risk of future injury from the Executive Order. The court also found that the United States’ claims were ripe for adjudication.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Executive Order violated the Instrument of Transfer by preventing ICE from using Boeing Field, thus breaching the contractual right of the United States to use the airport. Additionally, the court held that the Executive Order violated the intergovernmental immunity doctrine by improperly regulating federal operations and discriminating against the federal government and its contractors. The court rejected King County’s defenses, including the anti-commandeering and market participant doctrines. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA V. KING COUNTY" on Justia Law

The State of Texas placed a concertina wire fence along part of the border with Mexico in the Eagle Pass area to deter illegal crossings. The United States Border Patrol agents cut the wire multiple times, claiming it was necessary to fulfill their duty of patrolling the border to prevent illegal entry. Texas sued for an injunction, arguing that the Border Patrol was needlessly cutting the wire. The district court found that the Border Patrol was not hampered by the wire and had breached it numerous times without apparent purpose other than to allow migrants easier entrance. However, the court denied the injunction, citing the United States' sovereign immunity against Texas's claims.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially denied Texas's request for a preliminary injunction, despite agreeing with Texas on the facts. The court believed that the United States retained sovereign immunity. A motions panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed and granted a temporary injunction pending appeal. The United States sought relief in the Supreme Court, which vacated the injunction without providing reasons. The case was remanded to the district court to investigate events in Shelby Park, where Texas's actions were alleged to have obstructed Border Patrol operations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that Texas is entitled to a preliminary injunction. The court held that the United States waived sovereign immunity as to Texas's state law claims under § 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court also rejected the United States' arguments that the injunction was barred by intergovernmental immunity and the Immigration and Nationality Act. The court found that Texas satisfied the injunction factors from Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and granted Texas's request for a preliminary injunction, with modifications based on the district court's supplemental fact findings. View "Texas v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Mohamed Lamine Kouyate, a 36-year-old native and citizen of Guinea, entered the United States on a tourist visa in 2014 due to concerns about political unrest in Guinea. He overstayed his visa and was later convicted in Maryland for identity fraud involving over $100,000, resulting in a 15-year prison sentence. Following his release on parole, the Department of Homeland Security charged him with removability for overstaying his visa. Kouyate applied for asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming he would be persecuted or tortured if returned to Guinea due to his father's political notoriety.An immigration judge (IJ) denied Kouyate's applications, ruling that his identity fraud conviction constituted a "particularly serious crime," making him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal under the INA and CAT. The IJ also denied his application for deferral of removal under the CAT, finding insufficient evidence that he would likely be tortured if returned to Guinea. The IJ noted that the political climate in Guinea had changed, and Kouyate's fears were speculative and based on generalized concerns of violence.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Kouyate's appeal, deeming his challenge to the IJ's particularly serious crime ruling waived and affirming the IJ's denial of deferral of removal under the CAT. The BIA agreed with the IJ's assessment that Kouyate's fears were speculative and not supported by sufficient evidence of a particularized risk of torture.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed both the IJ's and BIA's decisions, finding no reversible error. The court upheld the BIA's determination that Kouyate had not exhausted his administrative remedies regarding the particularly serious crime ruling and affirmed the denial of deferral of removal under the CAT, concluding that substantial evidence supported the BIA's decision. The petition for review was denied. View "Kouyate v. Garland" on Justia Law

Dr. Fares Jeries Rabadi, a licensed physician in California, had his certificate of registration to dispense controlled substances revoked by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The DEA initiated an investigation into Rabadi in April 2018 due to his high-risk prescribing practices. In March 2020, the DEA issued an Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension of Registration, alleging that Rabadi issued numerous prescriptions for controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose to seven individuals. Rabadi requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), which took place in September 2020. The ALJ found Rabadi's testimony not credible and recommended revoking his registration. The DEA Administrator adopted the ALJ's recommendations with minor modifications and revoked Rabadi's registration.Rabadi petitioned for review, arguing that the DEA's revocation was invalid because DEA ALJs are unconstitutionally insulated from removal by two layers of "for-cause" protections. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Rabadi's argument failed under Decker Coal Co. v. Pehringer, which found similar ALJ removal protections constitutional. The court noted that DEA ALJs perform purely adjudicatory functions, Congress does not mandate the use of ALJs for DEA hearings, and DEA ALJ decisions are reviewed de novo by the DEA Administrator, who is removable at will by the President.Rabadi also argued that the DEA Administrator's order was arbitrary and capricious. The court rejected this argument, finding that the Administrator properly ignored Rabadi's unsupported defense regarding high dosages of prescribed drugs and appropriately analyzed the public interest factors, including Rabadi's lack of a conviction record. The Ninth Circuit denied Rabadi's petition for review, upholding the DEA Administrator's order. View "RABADI V. USDEA" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Walter L. Bronhard, doing business as Walter L. Bronhard Real Estate, filed a lawsuit against the Thayer Street District Management Authority (TSDMA). The dispute arose after TSDMA allegedly sent an email to one of Bronhard's employees regarding the illegal dumping of boxes in Fones Alley. Bronhard's counsel claimed that TSDMA had been operating without legal authority since 2009 because it failed to file the required continuation petition within the statutory deadline, thus automatically dissolving as per the District Management Authorities Act.The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of TSDMA. The court found that although TSDMA did not file the continuation petition within the statutory deadline, the time constraint was directory rather than mandatory. The court applied the factors from West v. McDonald, determining that the statute did not contain a sanction for late filing, the time limitation was not the essence of the statute, and the deadline was directed at public officers. Consequently, the court concluded that TSDMA did not automatically dissolve and had been operating lawfully.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Supreme Court agreed that the time constraint in the statute was directory and not mandatory. The court held that the essence of the statute was to ensure active DMAs serve their communities, and TSDMA had substantially complied with the statute's purpose. Therefore, TSDMA's failure to meet the filing deadline did not result in its automatic dissolution. View "Bronhard v. Thayer Street District Management Authority" on Justia Law

Innovative Institute, Inc., a postsecondary institution offering nursing assistant and home-health training programs, sought renewal of its temporary operating license from the District of Columbia Higher Education Licensure Commission. Innovative submitted a license renewal application and supplemental documents over several months. After an evidentiary hearing, the Commission denied the application, citing deficiencies such as failure to pay all applicable fees, provide updated curriculum and course syllabi, and maintain adequate student records, including immunization documentation and grade reports. Innovative had not been in good standing with the Commission for five consecutive years.The Commission's decision was reviewed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. The court found that substantial evidence supported the Commission's decision. The court noted that Innovative's application was incomplete because it failed to include a $500 late fee, as required by 5A D.C.M.R. § 8122.2(d). Additionally, the court found that Innovative failed to maintain adequate student records, including grade reports and immunization documentation, as required by 5A D.C.M.R. §§ 8111 and 8117. The court also found that Innovative failed to include updated curriculum and course syllabi in its application, as required by 5A D.C.M.R. §§ 8110 and 8116.1(l).The court rejected Innovative's arguments that the Commission's decision was not supported by substantial evidence, that the Hearing Officer improperly excluded admissible evidence, that Innovative had deficient notice of the second ground for denial, and that the Commission's control over the selection of the Hearing Officer conflicted with the federal Administrative Procedure Act. The court affirmed the Commission's decision and order denying Innovative's license renewal application. View "Innovative Institute v. DC Office of State Superintendent of Education" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, an electric distribution company, appealed from the trial court's dismissal of its consolidated administrative appeals from two final decisions by the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA). PURA had found the plaintiff violated statutory obligations related to emergency planning and storm recovery during an August 2020 tropical storm, intending to reduce the plaintiff's authorized return on equity (ROE) by fifteen basis points. Additionally, PURA imposed over $1.2 million in fines for violating storm performance standards and $61,000 in civil penalties for late reporting of minor accidents.The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's appeals, upholding PURA's decisions. The plaintiff then appealed to the higher court, challenging the ROE reduction, the fines for storm performance violations, and the penalties for late accident reporting. During the appeal, PURA decided not to implement the ROE reduction, rendering the issue moot. The court determined that neither the voluntary cessation nor the collateral consequences exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied. The court directed the vacatur of the portion of PURA's order authorizing the ROE reduction and the corresponding part of the trial court's judgment.Regarding the fines for late reporting of minor accidents, the court concluded that the failure to report a minor accident did not qualify as a "continued violation" under the statute. Instead, each monthly failure to report constituted a single, distinct violation. The case was remanded to the trial court to order PURA to recalculate the penalties accordingly.The court found sufficient evidence to support PURA's findings that the plaintiff violated storm performance standards by failing to provide a dedicated make safe crew for Bridgeport and inadequately communicating with city officials. The court affirmed the trial court's judgments in all other respects. View "United Illuminating Co. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

The case involves six plaintiffs who are users of Tornado Cash, a cryptocurrency mixing service that uses immutable smart contracts to anonymize transactions. Tornado Cash was sanctioned by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) for allegedly facilitating money laundering for malicious actors, including North Korea. The plaintiffs argued that OFAC exceeded its statutory authority by designating Tornado Cash as a Specially Designated National (SDN) and blocking its smart contracts.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the Department of the Treasury, finding that Tornado Cash is an entity that can be sanctioned, that its smart contracts constitute property, and that the Tornado Cash DAO has an interest in these smart contracts. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and focused on whether the immutable smart contracts could be considered "property" under IEEPA. The court concluded that these smart contracts are not property because they are not capable of being owned, controlled, or altered by anyone, including their creators. The court emphasized that property, by definition, must be ownable, and the immutable smart contracts do not meet this criterion. Consequently, the court held that OFAC exceeded its statutory authority by sanctioning Tornado Cash's immutable smart contracts.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to grant the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment based on the Administrative Procedure Act. The court did not address whether Tornado Cash qualifies as an entity or whether it has an interest in the smart contracts, as the determination that the smart contracts are not property was dispositive. View "Van Loon v. Department of the Treasury" on Justia Law