Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. Department of Education suspended federal student-loan payments and froze interest accrual for borrowers from 2020 through 2023. For participants in loan-forgiveness programs, the Department counted these months of nonpayment toward the forgiveness requirements. After the Supreme Court invalidated a broader debt cancellation program, the Department also instituted a twelve-month “on-ramp” to repayment, during which borrowers would not be penalized for missed payments, though interest would accrue but not capitalize. The plaintiff, a nonprofit public service employer, asserted that these actions diminished statutory incentives meant to help such employers attract and retain college-educated workers, thereby causing it economic harm and unfairly increasing competition from private sector employers.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan reviewed the case after the nonprofit sued the Department of Education and associated officials. The complaint alleged violations of the Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act. The Department moved to dismiss on the ground that the nonprofit lacked Article III standing. The district court agreed, finding that the plaintiff failed to allege a concrete injury and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Sixth Circuit held that the nonprofit’s allegations were speculative and lacked specific facts showing direct economic injury or increased competition traceable to the Department’s actions. The court explained that the plaintiff did not sufficiently allege lost revenue, recruitment difficulties, or concrete competitive harm. Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish the injury in fact required for Article III standing, and affirmed the dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Mackinac Center for Pub. Policy v. Dep't of Education" on Justia Law

A public interest organization sought documents from a federally owned corporation under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The documents concerned communications with two industry groups and a contract with an insurance provider. The agency produced some documents, redacted or withheld others, and justified these actions under FOIA Exemptions Four (confidential commercial information), Five (privileged inter- or intra-agency memoranda), and Six (personal privacy). The organization administratively appealed and, after the appeals were denied, filed suit in federal district court. During litigation, the agency released additional documents following new representations from a third-party law firm involved in the disputed communications.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee granted summary judgment to the agency, finding its withholdings and redactions justified under FOIA’s exemptions, based on the agency’s Vaughn index and supporting affidavits. The court also denied the organization’s motion for attorneys’ fees, holding that the additional disclosures during litigation were not voluntary or unilateral actions by the agency but instead resulted from the third party’s change in position.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo and reversed in part. The Sixth Circuit held that certain withholdings and redactions were not justified under Exemption Four, specifically some logistical information, the name of the insurance representative, and, to the extent already public, names of current industry group members. The court also held that Exemption Six did not justify withholding company names or business email domain names. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees eligibility, clarifying that the agency’s voluntary mid-litigation disclosures could render the plaintiff eligible for fees, and remanded for further factual findings regarding causation and entitlement. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "Energy & Policy Inst. v. TVA" on Justia Law

A company providing paratransit and microtransit services under contract with a regional public transportation authority subcontracted another company to supply vehicles and drivers. After several months, the subcontractor terminated the agreement and brought suit against the transportation company and the authority, asserting claims including breach of contract, quantum meruit, tortious interference, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. The fraud claim centered on alleged false representations made to induce the subcontract.The trial court (Texas District Court) ruled on a motion to dismiss under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, which allows dismissal if pleadings show no legal or factual basis for relief. The court dismissed the fraud and other tort claims against all defendants, as well as the breach of contract claim against the transportation authority and its primary contractor. It limited potential contract damages as to the contractor’s subsidiary and severed and abated remaining claims. The subcontractor appealed the dismissal of its claims against the main transportation company.The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas reversed in part, finding that the breach of contract and fraud claims against the main transportation company had a basis in law and that its statutory immunity under Texas Transportation Code § 452.056(d) was not conclusively established. The Supreme Court of Texas, reviewing only the fraud claim, held that the statutory immunity did apply. Because the pleadings showed the transportation company was contractually performing the authority’s function, and the authority itself would be immune from a fraud claim (an intentional tort), the company was likewise immune from liability for fraud. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and reinstated the trial court’s dismissal of the fraud claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings on any remaining claims. View "MV TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. GDS TRANSPORT, LLC" on Justia Law

The case centers on an economic development agreement between a city and county in Texas and a private foundation, aimed at fostering the construction of a retail shopping center anchored by a Gander Mountain store. The city and county pledged portions of future sales-tax revenues to the foundation, which used the funds to secure a construction loan for the facility. The agreements required that the tax proceeds be used solely to repay the construction debt. Gander Mountain operated for eleven years before closing its store, but the shopping center continued to generate significant economic activity and tax revenue, with the former anchor tenant’s space later occupied by another retailer.After Gander Mountain’s closure in 2015, the city and county ceased payments, claiming the public purpose of the grants had ended. They sought declaratory relief in the District Court of Navarro County, arguing that continued payments would be unconstitutional under the Texas Constitution’s Gift Clauses. The district court granted summary judgment to the city and county, ruling that the closure ended the public purpose and that the agreements lacked sufficient controls to ensure public purposes were met. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth District of Texas affirmed, holding that the economic development grants remained subject to the Gift Clauses and that the agreements failed to satisfy their requirements.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that economic-development grants authorized by article III, section 52-a of the Texas Constitution remain subject to the Gift Clauses. The Court determined that the lower courts erred by focusing narrowly on the operation of a specific store rather than the broader public purpose of economic development. It held that the agreements likely satisfied the constitutional requirements of public purpose, consideration, and adequate controls, and that summary judgment was improper. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the lower courts’ judgments and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. v. CITY OF CORSICANA AND NAVARRO COUNTY" on Justia Law

A woman sued a North Carolina town, alleging that a police officer employed by the town had sexually assaulted her while on duty. She claimed that the officer coerced her into sexual acts during visits to her home, sometimes in exchange for leniency regarding traffic violations. The officer had previously passed a background check, though some concerns were raised about his temperament and integrity, and a domestic violence complaint had been filed against him but was dismissed. The police department had no specific written policy prohibiting sexual misconduct, but did have general rules regarding officer conduct. During the officer’s employment, he was disciplined for minor infractions, but no complaints of sexual misconduct were received. The plaintiff reported the alleged assault more than a year after the officer resigned.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina granted summary judgment to the town. The court found there was insufficient evidence to show that the town’s police department was deliberately indifferent to the risk of sexual assault by its officers, or that any failure in its policies, training, or supervision caused the plaintiff’s injuries. The court also granted summary judgment on state law claims for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, concluding there was no evidence that the town knew or should have known that the officer was unfit for employment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to establish municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because there was no evidence of a pattern of similar constitutional violations or deliberate indifference by policymakers. The court also affirmed the dismissal of state law claims, finding no evidence that the town was negligent in hiring, supervising, or retaining the officer. View "Mullen v. Town of Sunset Beach" on Justia Law

A group of retailers who sell tobacco and nicotine products in Washington County, Oregon, challenged a county ordinance that banned the sale of flavored tobacco and flavored synthetic nicotine products to anyone in the county, regardless of age. The retailers argued that the county ordinance was preempted by a statewide law—Senate Bill 587 (2021), codified at ORS 431A.190 to 431A.220—which created a statewide tobacco retail licensing scheme and regulated the retail sale of tobacco products in Oregon.After the ordinance was enacted, the retailers filed suit in the Washington County Circuit Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of the ban. The circuit court agreed with the retailers and concluded that the state law preempted the county’s ordinance, issuing a permanent injunction against its enforcement. Washington County appealed to the Oregon Court of Appeals, arguing that the ordinance was a valid exercise of its home rule authority and was not preempted by state law. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, holding that the statewide licensing law did not preempt the county’s flavored tobacco ban.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon granted review. The court held that the state law did not expressly or implicitly preempt the county’s ordinance. It found that the statutory language did not unambiguously demonstrate legislative intent to bar local regulation of this kind, and that the county’s ordinance could operate concurrently with the state licensing law. The court concluded that the ordinance was a permissible “standard for regulating the retail sale of tobacco products and inhalant delivery systems for purposes related to public health and safety” under the state statute. The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversed the circuit court’s judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Schwartz v. Washington County" on Justia Law

An employee of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), serving as an Associate Director, was removed from his position following allegations of inappropriate conduct, including harassment and creating a hostile work environment. After the agency conducted an investigation and found lapses in professionalism, the acting director proposed removal based on these findings. The employee, who had previously raised concerns about personnel decisions and filed whistleblower complaints, alleged that his removal was in retaliation for his protected disclosures and challenged the process as procedurally flawed.The initial challenge was reviewed by an administrative judge of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), who sustained the charge of inappropriate conduct, finding that the VA had proved its case by a preponderance of the evidence. The administrative judge also found that, although the employee engaged in protected whistleblower activity, the VA demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that it would have removed him regardless of his disclosures. Additionally, the administrative judge found no harmful procedural error in the agency’s investigation and removal process. The full MSPB denied the employee’s petition for review, adopting the administrative judge’s findings and affirming the removal.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the MSPB’s decision. The court applied the appropriate standards of review, considering whether the agency’s actions were supported by substantial evidence and adhered to proper legal procedures. The court held that substantial evidence supported the findings that the VA would have removed the employee independent of his whistleblower activity and that there was no harmful procedural error in the removal process. The Federal Circuit affirmed the MSPB’s decision, upholding the removal. View "OLIVA v. DVA " on Justia Law

A driver received a ticket after an automated camera in the District of Columbia recorded his vehicle traveling at 61 mph in a 50 mph zone, resulting in a charge for speeding 11 to 15 mph over the limit. The camera’s deployment log, which was available for review, showed that the device was calibrated to be accurate within a margin of error of plus or minus one mile per hour. The driver challenged the ticket, arguing that, due to this margin of error, the evidence only established that he was traveling between 60 and 62 mph, making it equally likely that he was not traveling at least 11 mph over the limit.A hearing examiner in the Department of Motor Vehicles rejected the driver’s argument and upheld the ticket, reasoning that the equipment was properly calibrated and that the driver had not provided affirmative evidence of error. The Traffic Adjudication Appeals Board affirmed, interpreting District regulations to mean that once a camera is properly calibrated, its measurement is treated as fully accurate for legal purposes. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially vacated the Board’s decision but, on reconsideration, upheld it, reasoning that the calibration log supported the accuracy of the speed reading.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the administrative decision directly, as is customary in agency appeals. The court held that the District did not carry its statutory burden to prove the infraction by clear and convincing evidence. The court concluded that, given the camera’s margin of error and the driver being cited at the bottom of the penalty range, the evidence was in equipoise as to whether the driver was traveling at or above the threshold speed, which is insufficient under the applicable standard. The court reversed the Superior Court’s order and directed dismissal of the ticket. View "Ricciardi v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

A motorist was stopped by law enforcement after driving the wrong way on a one-way street. The officer who made the stop observed signs of intoxication, including slurred speech and the odor of alcohol. The driver admitted to consuming alcohol and performed poorly on field sobriety tests. Preliminary breath tests conducted at the scene showed blood-alcohol concentrations (BAC) of 0.160 and 0.162 percent. The driver was arrested, and later, two chemical breath tests at the police station indicated BAC levels of 0.15 and 0.16 percent. The officer certified compliance with the requirement to observe the motorist continuously for 15 minutes before the chemical breath test, as mandated by California regulations.The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended the driver’s license, and after an administrative per se (APS) hearing, the administrative hearing officer upheld the suspension. The driver challenged this decision by filing a petition for a writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Kern County. The trial court reviewed body-worn camera footage and determined that the arresting officer had not continuously observed the driver for the required 15-minute period prior to the breath test. The trial court found that this regulatory violation called the reliability of the test results into question. The court excluded the chemical breath test results and granted the writ of mandate, setting aside the DMV’s order of suspension.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the officer had not complied with the observation requirement. The appellate court held that the presumption of reliability for the chemical breath test results was rebutted by the video evidence and that the DMV failed to establish the reliability of the tests despite the regulatory violation. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court’s order setting aside the suspension of the driver’s license. View "Myers v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

A federally recognized tribe in southern California operated a wholesale tobacco distribution business, selling cigarettes exclusively to other California tribes. These tribal businesses, in turn, sold the cigarettes to individual consumers on their respective reservations. Neither the distributing tribe nor its customers held state licenses to distribute or sell cigarettes, and no state cigarette taxes were collected at any point in the distribution chain. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) placed the tribe on the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking (PACT) Act’s noncompliant list, which restricts delivery of cigarettes by common carriers, due to violations of California’s cigarette tax and licensing laws.After the California Department of Justice notified the tribe of noncompliance, the state asked ATF to add the tribe to the noncompliant list. The tribe responded by arguing the PACT Act did not apply to its sales, but continued to make sales without appropriate licenses or tax payments. ATF issued notices of violations and, after considering the tribe’s responses, confirmed its decision to list the tribe. The tribe then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, challenging ATF’s actions as contrary to law and procedurally deficient. The district court granted summary judgment to ATF, finding that the agency’s decision was adequately reasoned and procedurally proper.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the tribe’s remote cigarette sales to other tribes constituted “off-reservation” activity subject to California’s licensing and tax laws. The court found that the tribe’s customers were “consumers” under the PACT Act, rendering the tribe a “delivery seller” required to comply with state law. The court also held that ATF did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act’s procedural requirements. The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "TWENTY-NINE PALMS BAND OF MISSION INDIANS V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law