Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Tesoro, a company operating an oil refinery in the City of Carson, was assessed for underpayment of the City’s oil industry business license tax following an audit. Tesoro paid the assessed deficiency under protest and filed a claim for a tax refund with the City clerk, using the form prescribed under the California Government Claims Act (GCA). The City denied this claim. Tesoro then filed a lawsuit seeking a refund, arguing that the City was barred from seeking the payment due to expiration of the limitations period and because the City’s method for calculating the tax was unlawful.In the Los Angeles County Superior Court, the City demurred, contending that Tesoro failed to exhaust the City’s local administrative remedies—specifically, the procedures in the Carson Municipal Code requiring a taxpayer to seek a refund first from the finance director and then, if necessary, to appeal to the city manager—before filing a claim under the GCA. The trial court sustained the demurrer. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, affirmed, holding that Tesoro had not demonstrated that the GCA preempted the City’s local administrative review process.The Supreme Court of California granted review to determine whether a local government may require a taxpayer seeking a refund to comply with local administrative procedures before submitting a claim under the GCA, or whether the GCA preempts such requirements. The Supreme Court held that the GCA occupies the entire field of presentation requirements for claims for money or damages against local public entities, including claims for local tax refunds. The Court concluded that the sections of the Carson Municipal Code imposing additional administrative prerequisites are preempted by state law and may not be enforced. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed. View "Tesoro Refining & Marketing Co. LLC v. City of Carson" on Justia Law

A company that manufactures flavored e-liquids for use in electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS), including fruit and candy flavors, submitted premarket applications to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) seeking authorization to sell 64 such products. The FDA’s regulatory authority under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA) requires that new tobacco products be shown to be “appropriate for the protection of the public health” before they can be marketed. The FDA denied the company’s applications, citing the failure to provide robust comparative evidence demonstrating that its flavored products offer a public health benefit for adult smokers that outweighs the risks to youth, compared to tobacco-flavored ENDS.Following the FDA’s marketing denial order, the company petitioned for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The company argued that the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by requiring comparative efficacy evidence, failed to adequately consider its marketing and sales restriction plans, and improperly denied authorization for “zero nicotine” products. It also argued that the FDA could only impose a comparative efficacy requirement through notice-and-comment rulemaking under the TCA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that the FDA’s denial based on the absence of comparative efficacy evidence was neither arbitrary nor capricious, especially since the applicant offered no evidence distinguishing its products’ youth risks from those of other flavored ENDS. The court also found that any error in declining to consider marketing or access restriction plans was harmless. Additionally, the court ruled that the FDA was not required to undertake notice-and-comment rulemaking before applying the comparative efficacy requirement, and the inclusion of “zero nicotine” products in the denial order was proper based on the company’s own representations. View "DRIP MORE LLC V. FDA" on Justia Law

A student enrolled in a respiratory therapy program at a public university in Georgia was disciplined following an incident during his clinical externship, where he was found responsible for endangering the health or safety of a patient. As a result, the university assigned him a failing grade in his clinical class. The student, who has attention deficit disorder, anxiety, and depression, alleged that university personnel were aware of his conditions. He claimed that prior to the disciplinary hearing, he was denied access to evidence and that the hearing procedures did not comply with the university’s written policies.After exhausting internal university appeals, the student filed a lawsuit in Georgia state court against the Board of Regents and several employees, asserting breach of contract and disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, among other claims. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. The district court dismissed the breach of contract claim on the basis of state sovereign immunity, finding no enforceable written contract that would waive immunity. The court also dismissed the disability discrimination claims for failure to state a claim, holding that the complaint did not plausibly allege adverse action taken because of the student’s disability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that neither the admission letter nor the student handbook, alone or together, constituted a written contract sufficient to waive Georgia’s sovereign immunity, as neither document set forth all essential terms, especially as to consideration. The court further held that the student’s complaint failed to plausibly allege that the university’s actions were taken because of his disabilities. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the student’s breach of contract and disability discrimination claims. View "Waller v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia" on Justia Law

In 2004, a fourteen-year-old girl was sexually assaulted in Anoka County, Minnesota. She provided evidence for a rape kit, which was submitted to the Anoka County Sheriff’s Office. Detective Johnson was assigned to her case and assured her mother that no DNA was obtained, though in reality the kit was never tested. The suspect was charged but not convicted. In 2015, it was discovered that the Sheriff’s Office had hundreds of untested rape kits, including hers. Sixteen years after the assault, her kit was finally tested, revealing DNA evidence implicating the original suspect, and criminal charges were pursued again.After these events, she brought suit against Anoka County, Sheriff Stuart, and Detective Johnson in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. She asserted claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Minnesota Constitution for equal protection violations, a claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, a “failure to train” claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state tort claims for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The district court dismissed her MHRA and negligence claims but allowed the other claims to proceed, finding she had standing in light of Eighth Circuit precedent.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring her federal constitutional claims for alleged failures to investigate or train, following Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent holding that crime victims generally lack standing to challenge law enforcement or prosecutorial discretion in investigating crimes, even when alleging class-based discrimination. The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment on the federal claims and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims for lack of standing. The court remanded the IIED claim for the district court to determine whether standing existed for that state-law claim. View "Doe v. Anoka County" on Justia Law

A former President and CEO of the Roosevelt Island Operating Corporation (RIOC), a public benefit corporation in New York, was terminated in June 2020 after an internal investigation into complaints of offensive remarks. On the same day as her termination, a senior adviser to the New York Governor’s Office provided statements to the press alleging that she was dismissed for making racially and sexually offensive comments. The former executive denied these allegations and asserted that her firing was actually retaliation for her complaints about public safety risks on Roosevelt Island and that state officials deliberately spread false allegations about her.After her termination, the former executive initiated two separate proceedings in New York State courts. First, she brought a CPLR Article 78 proceeding in New York Supreme Court, challenging her dismissal as arbitrary and capricious and seeking reinstatement and back pay. The court dismissed her petition, finding a rational basis for her termination and noting that more extensive factual disputes belonged in a plenary action, not an expedited Article 78 proceeding. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed. While the Article 78 proceeding was pending, she also commenced a plenary action in New York Supreme Court, raising discrimination, defamation, whistleblower, and federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court dismissed her discrimination claims with prejudice as precluded by the Article 78 judgment, but dismissed her § 1983 and other non-discrimination claims without prejudice, inviting her to refile them in an appropriate forum.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed whether the doctrine of res judicata barred her federal § 1983 claim. The court held that under New York law, res judicata does not preclude a claim dismissed without prejudice and with express leave to refile, even if other claims from the same transaction were dismissed on the merits. Therefore, the district court’s dismissal on res judicata grounds was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Rosenthal v. Roosevelt Island Operating Corporation" on Justia Law

A municipality sought to acquire a hotel property through eminent domain, passing a resolution and subsequently an ordinance authorizing the acquisition. The ordinance cited general reasons such as promoting the health, safety, and welfare of residents and stated the taking was for a public use and purpose, but it did not specify the particular public use intended for the property. The property owner questioned the asserted public use and claimed inadequate notice of the appraisal and negotiations. After correspondence between the parties, the municipality filed a condemnation complaint.The Superior Court, Law Division, dismissed the initial complaint without prejudice, finding that the ordinance’s failure to specify a particular public use rendered the procedure deficient. The municipality then filed an amended complaint that explicitly identified the intended use as a public parking lot with electric vehicle charging infrastructure. The trial court denied the property owner’s renewed motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that neither the Eminent Domain Act nor the Local Lands and Buildings Law required the ordinance itself to specify the public use, and that the municipality’s process satisfied statutory and constitutional requirements.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case to address whether a municipal ordinance authorizing condemnation must specify the particular public use intended for the property. The Court held that neither statute nor existing case law imposes such a requirement; municipalities are not legally obligated to set forth the intended public use within the text of the ordinance. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment, but emphasized that municipalities should, as a best practice, identify the intended public use as early as practicable to ensure transparency and facilitate meaningful participation by affected owners. View "Borough of Seaside Park v. Shree Jyoti, LLC" on Justia Law

Several nonprofit organizations filed suit after President Trump issued an executive order and subsequent memorandum directing federal agencies to pause the disbursement of funds appropriated under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). The nonprofits, which had been awarded grants under these statutes, alleged that the “freeze” on funding had resulted in denial of financial assistance and disruption of their operations. The complaint named several federal agencies and officials, alleging violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island found that the plaintiffs had Article III standing and rejected the government’s arguments regarding prior pending actions in other courts and the nature of the claims as contract disputes. The District Court determined that the challenged agency actions were not committed to agency discretion, likely constituted final agency actions, and were likely arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The court granted a preliminary injunction, ordering agencies to resume processing and payment of already-awarded funds and prohibiting further implementation of the funding freeze directives.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed much of the District Court’s order, finding that the nonprofits demonstrated standing and were likely to succeed on the merits of their APA claims. The Court held that the categorical funding freezes constituted final agency actions and that agencies failed to consider reliance interests, rendering their actions likely arbitrary and capricious. However, the Court vacated the portion of the order that directly compelled agencies to make monetary payments under contractual grants, finding it exceeded the District Court’s authority under the APA. The remainder of the injunctive relief was affirmed. View "Woonasquatucket River Watershed Council v. USDA" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case are residents of Hillman Ridge Road in Brown County, Ohio. They experienced a cessation of direct mail delivery to their homes after 2017, following an incident involving a neighbor and a mail carrier. As a result, they were required to retrieve their mail from a distant location and travel to a nearby town for parcels. Other delivery services continued to serve their properties, and the Postal Service continued direct delivery on similar roads in the area. The plaintiffs argued that the Postal Service’s refusal to deliver directly to their homes constituted unconstitutional, unreasonable discrimination.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, naming the United States Postal Service and two officials as defendants. They asserted a “class of one” equal protection claim, alleging that the Postal Service’s actions violated their constitutional rights. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court held that the plaintiffs’ dispute belonged exclusively before the Postal Regulatory Commission, not in federal district court, and granted the dismissal. Plaintiffs then appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. It held that Congress intended for claims concerning unreasonable discrimination in mail service—such as those under 39 U.S.C. § 403(c)—to be addressed first by the Postal Regulatory Commission under the administrative procedures of the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act. The court found that the statutory scheme precludes district court jurisdiction over such claims, even those framed as constitutional issues. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that plaintiffs must pursue their claim through the Commission before seeking judicial review. View "Klein v. USPS" on Justia Law

A nonprofit healthcare organization based in the Bering Strait region owns a seven-unit apartment building in Nome, Alaska, located near its hospital. The building’s primary use is to house doctors, nurses, and newly hired hospital employees, most of whom are recruited from outside the region. The organization provides this housing to ensure that medical staff are available to quickly respond to emergencies, especially given the acute shortage of short-term housing in Nome. While the majority of occupants are hospital staff, a small percentage of the units are temporarily used by new hires, who receive free rent for the first 30 days and are then charged a nominal amount.The City of Nome denied a property tax exemption for the apartment building, reasoning that it was not used exclusively for hospital purposes. The matter was reviewed by the City of Nome Board of Equalization, which upheld the denial. The Board found that although the building housed hospital staff, it was also used for private residential purposes and that such use was not “vitally necessary” to the provision of medical care. The Board also rejected arguments based on federal preemption. On appeal, the Superior Court of Alaska reversed the Board’s decision, holding that the apartment building qualified for a hospital purposes exemption.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s judgment. The court held that while the apartment building is not used exclusively for hospital purposes because it also serves private residential needs, it is exempt from taxation because its use is directly incidental to and vitally necessary for hospital operations. The court found that, given the lack of local housing and the requirement for on-call staff, the apartment building meets the requirements for exempt use. The court also concluded that nominal rent charged to some tenants did not disqualify the property from exemption, as the issue was not properly raised or developed in the lower proceedings. View "City of Nome Equalization Board v. Norton Sound Health Corp." on Justia Law

A town administrator in Grand Chute, Wisconsin, was terminated by a newly elected faction on the town’s Board of Supervisors. The administrator, who had served since 2008, claimed his firing was retaliation for cooperating with a state Department of Justice investigation into alleged corruption by a newly elected supervisor. That supervisor had previously been involved in litigation against the town and was later indicted, though ultimately acquitted, on unrelated corruption charges. The administrator’s relationship with the new board members deteriorated, and he was perceived as politically aligned with their rivals and critical of their policies.The administrator sued the Town and individual supervisors in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting First Amendment retaliation. The supervisor also filed a counterclaim alleging the administrator had set him up for prosecution. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in both actions, finding the administrator’s termination did not violate the First Amendment and that qualified immunity applied due to unclear precedent regarding the firing of policymaking officials for political speech. The court also rejected the supervisor’s counterclaim, finding no evidence of state action or differential treatment required for an equal protection class-of-one claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because existing precedent did not clearly establish that firing a policymaking official under these circumstances violated the First Amendment. The court also affirmed dismissal of the counterclaim, finding neither a viable First Amendment retaliation nor an equal protection claim. View "March v. Wolff" on Justia Law