Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
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Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc. (SPU) provides water and sewer services to commercial properties in Bonneville County, Idaho. Donald Sorrells, the owner of a lot in the Sunnyside Industrial & Professional Park, received a "Will Serve" letter from SPU in 2018, agreeing to provide water and sewer services based on his representation that he would install only two restrooms. However, Sorrells installed additional unauthorized water and sewer connections, leading to repeated excessive discharges into SPU's septic system. Despite multiple notices and requests for remediation from SPU, Sorrells failed to address the issues adequately, resulting in SPU seeking a declaratory judgment against him.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho found that Sorrells was a persistent violator of SPU's Sewer Rules and Regulations but determined that the Idaho Public Utilities Commission (IPUC) retained original jurisdiction over SPU's water system. The court denied SPU's requests for costs and attorney fees, leading to appeals from both parties.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the district court did not err in granting a declaratory judgment to SPU regarding Sorrells' violations of the sewer rules. However, it also upheld the district court's determination that the IPUC initially had jurisdiction over SPU's water system, as SPU had not established its nonprofit status at the time of filing. The court further affirmed the denial of attorney fees and costs to SPU, concluding that the Rules and Regulations did not expressly provide for such fees.On appeal, the Supreme Court declined to consider the merits of Sorrells' arguments due to his failure to comply with the Idaho Appellate Rules. The court also denied SPU's request for attorney fees and costs on appeal, as SPU did not prevail on its cross-appeal. View "Sunnyside Park Utilities, LLC v. Sorrells" on Justia Law

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California collects a fee from in-state hospitals and uses the revenue, along with federal Medicaid funds, to provide subsidies to California hospitals serving Medicaid beneficiaries. Out-of-state hospitals near the California border, which sometimes serve California Medicaid beneficiaries but do not pay the fee, sought access to these subsidies. They argued that their exclusion violated the dormant Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and federal Medicaid regulations.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the out-of-state hospitals' arguments and granted summary judgment in favor of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). The hospitals appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the QAF program does not discriminate against interstate commerce because it does not tax out-of-state hospitals, and the supplemental payments are based on in-state provision of medical care. The court also found that the program does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, as California could rationally decide to target subsidies to in-state hospitals serving a disproportionate share of Medi-Cal beneficiaries. Lastly, the court concluded that the QAF program does not violate federal Medicaid regulations, as the regulation in question pertains to base payments for specific services rendered to beneficiaries, not supplemental subsidies like the QAF payments. View "Asante v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

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Sara Pearl Fahrmann filed a complaint against the City of Orange Beach and D.R. Horton, Inc., alleging that the City failed to ensure that Horton's construction of the Cypress Village subdivision complied with the City's zoning ordinance and the approved Planned Unit Development (PUD). Fahrmann claimed that this failure led to inadequate parking, which obstructed emergency services and delayed treatment for her husband, resulting in his death. She asserted wrongful-death claims based on wantonness and negligence.The Baldwin Circuit Court denied the City's motion for summary judgment, which argued that the City was entitled to substantive immunity from Fahrmann's claims. The City then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to grant its motion for summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and held that the City was immune from Fahrmann's wrongful-death claim alleging wantonness under § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, which limits municipal liability to injuries caused by neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness, and does not include wanton conduct. The Court also held that the City was entitled to substantive immunity from the negligence claim, as the City's failure to enforce its zoning ordinance did not create a legal duty to individual plaintiffs. The Court granted the City's petition and issued a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to grant summary judgment in favor of the City. View "Ex parte City of Orange Beach" on Justia Law

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In the summer of 2023, Sharonda Smith's minor child, K.S., participated in a summer program at a school operated by the Jefferson County Board of Education. On June 5, 2023, K.S. fell asleep on a bus driven by "Mr. Josh" and suffered significant emotional distress, dehydration, and other personal injuries. Smith filed a lawsuit on May 10, 2024, against the Board, "Mr. Josh," and 10 fictitiously named defendants. The Board moved to dismiss the claims against it, citing State immunity.The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed the claims against the Board on August 1, 2024, but allowed Smith additional time to identify and serve "Mr. Josh." Smith issued subpoenas to the Board for records related to the incident, which the Board moved to quash, arguing the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The court denied the motion and ordered the Board to comply with the subpoenas. Smith later identified "Mr. Josh" as Joshua Dunn and added his estate as a defendant. The Board petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to vacate the discovery orders and dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the only named defendant in the initial complaint, the Board, was entitled to State immunity, and "Mr. Josh" was a fictitiously named defendant. The court granted the Board's petition in part, directing the circuit court to vacate its discovery orders and refrain from issuing further orders against the Board. However, the court denied the Board's request to dismiss the entire action, as the Board, a nonparty, did not demonstrate a clear legal right to such relief. View "Ex parte Jefferson County Board of Education" on Justia Law

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An eight-year-old student, J.S., was sexually assaulted by her bus driver, Sergio Sandoval, multiple times over a month. J.S.'s parents filed a lawsuit against the Ocean Springs School District under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, alleging negligence, negligent hiring, retention, supervision, and training, failure to adopt and follow policies, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and civil assault, battery, and false imprisonment. The Jackson County Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of the District, finding it was entitled to discretionary-function immunity and that Sandoval’s actions were not reasonably foreseeable.The plaintiff appealed the decision. The Mississippi Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that while the District was protected by discretionary-function immunity regarding the failure to adopt sufficient policies and procedures, the claims related to negligent hiring, supervision, and training were not barred by this immunity. The court found that these claims involved simple negligence and did not involve policy decisions.The court also held that the plaintiff had demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact regarding the foreseeability of the injuries. The court noted that the District’s own measures to screen and monitor its bus drivers indicated that a person of ordinary intelligence could anticipate that failure to properly do so could lead to the type of injury sustained by J.S.The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its findings. View "J.S. v. Ocean Springs School District" on Justia Law

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Quintin Grillone resigned from his position as a police officer in 2014 while under investigation for providing false information to a prosecutor regarding a traffic citation against his mother. The Peace Officer Standards and Training Division (POST) did not learn of the incident until 2019 when Grillone disclosed it in his application to join a new police department. Following an investigation, POST initiated disciplinary proceedings, and an administrative law judge found that Grillone's conduct constituted obstruction of justice. The POST Council then retroactively suspended Grillone’s certification for three years.Grillone sought judicial review by the Utah Court of Appeals, arguing that the disciplinary proceedings were time-barred by the four-year catch-all statute of limitations for civil actions under Utah Code § 78B-2-307(4). He contended that the statute governing POST disciplinary proceedings referred to them as “civil actions,” thus subjecting them to the civil statute of limitations. The court of appeals, however, held that civil statutes of limitation do not apply to administrative disciplinary proceedings absent specific legislative authority and found that the POST statute did not incorporate the civil statute of limitations.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the court of appeals' decision. The Supreme Court agreed that civil statutes of limitation are generally inapplicable to administrative disciplinary proceedings unless the legislature indicates otherwise. The Court concluded that the POST statute’s reference to “civil actions” was intended to distinguish POST proceedings from criminal actions, not to incorporate the civil statutes of limitation. Therefore, the disciplinary proceedings against Grillone were not time-barred, and the POST Council’s three-year suspension of his certification was upheld. View "Grillone v. Peace Officer Standards" on Justia Law

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Former employees of Shriners Hospitals for Children were terminated for refusing to get a COVID-19 vaccination. They sued their employer, its agents, and the Executive Commissioner of Texas Health and Human Services, alleging violations of their right to refuse the vaccine under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) Statute, and various Texas state laws.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed all claims. It found no personal jurisdiction over the agents due to the fiduciary shield doctrine, determined that Shriners was not a state actor when it implemented the vaccination policy, and ruled that the EUA Statute did not apply. The court also dismissed the claims against the Commissioner, concluding she was not liable for failing to stop Shriners from enforcing the policy. The state-law claims were dismissed for lack of supplemental jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. It agreed that there was no personal jurisdiction over the agents and that Shriners was not a state actor when it adopted the vaccination policy. The court also held that the EUA Statute did not apply to Shriners in its capacity as an employer and that the Commissioner was entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a clearly established right requiring her intervention. The appellate court modified the dismissal of the state-law claims to be without prejudice and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "Pearson v. Shriners Hospitals" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) denying authorization for respondents to market certain flavored e-cigarette products. The FDA's decision was based on the lack of sufficient scientific evidence demonstrating that these products would be appropriate for the protection of public health. The FDA emphasized the need for evidence from randomized controlled trials or longitudinal cohort studies, which the respondents did not provide. Instead, respondents submitted literature reviews and cross-sectional surveys, which the FDA found inadequate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, reviewed the FDA's denial orders. The court found that the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by applying different standards than those articulated in its predecisional guidance. The court was particularly concerned with the FDA's failure to review marketing plans, which it had previously deemed critical. The Fifth Circuit rejected the FDA's argument that any errors were harmless and remanded the case to the FDA.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and vacated the Fifth Circuit's decision. The Court held that the FDA's denial orders were consistent with its predecisional guidance regarding scientific evidence, comparative efficacy, and device type, and thus did not violate the change-in-position doctrine. However, the Court agreed with the FDA that the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of harmless error was overly broad. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit to reconsider the harmless-error question without relying on its expansive reading of Calcutt v. FDIC. View "FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, LLC" on Justia Law

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United Water Conservation District (United) filed a lawsuit against the United States, seeking just compensation for an alleged taking under the Fifth Amendment. United claimed that the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) required it to increase the amount of water bypassing its diversion dam to protect an endangered species of trout, resulting in a loss of water that United could otherwise use for beneficial purposes.The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed United's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, determining that the claim should be evaluated as a regulatory taking. The court reasoned that United had not yet exhausted its administrative remedies by applying for and being denied an incidental-take permit under the Endangered Species Act, making the claim not ripe for adjudication.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court agreed that United's claim was regulatory in nature, as the NMFS's actions did not constitute a physical appropriation of water already diverted by United. Instead, the actions required more water to remain in the river, representing a regulatory restriction on United's use of the water. The court held that United's claim was not ripe because it had not yet obtained a final agency action by applying for and being denied an incidental-take permit. Therefore, the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was appropriate. View "UNITED WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT v. US " on Justia Law

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During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Board of Trustees of the California State University (CSU) mandated remote instruction. Patrick Krug, a biology professor at California State University Los Angeles, incurred expenses for necessary equipment to comply with this directive, which CSU refused to reimburse. Krug filed a lawsuit on behalf of himself and similarly situated faculty, claiming that Labor Code section 2802 required CSU to reimburse these work-related expenses. CSU argued that as a state department, it was exempt from such Labor Code provisions.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained CSU’s demurrer without leave to amend, leading to a judgment of dismissal. The court reasoned that CSU, as a governmental agency, was exempt from section 2802 because the section did not explicitly apply to public employers. Krug appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court held that Labor Code section 2802 did not obligate CSU to reimburse employees for work-related expenses. The court found no express language or positive indicia in the statute or its legislative history indicating that it applied to public employers. The court also noted that applying section 2802 to CSU would infringe on its sovereign powers, as CSU has broad discretion under the Education Code to set its own equipment reimbursement policies.The California Supreme Court granted review and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Stone v. Alameda Health System. Upon reconsideration, the appellate court again affirmed the judgment, maintaining that section 2802 does not apply to public employers like CSU. View "Krug v. Board of Trustees of the California State University" on Justia Law