Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In September 2021, the San Diego Unified School District (District) proposed a "Vaccination Roadmap" requiring students to be vaccinated against COVID-19 to attend in-person classes and participate in extracurricular activities. Plaintiffs, including an organization and an individual parent, challenged the District's authority to impose this requirement, arguing that such decisions must be made at the state level. The trial court agreed, ruling that the Roadmap was preempted by state law, and judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs.The District appealed, and the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the local vaccination requirement conflicted with state law and that the state had fully occupied the field of school vaccination mandates. Following this decision, the plaintiffs sought attorney’s fees under California's private attorney general statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The trial court denied the motions, reasoning that the litigation did not enforce an important right affecting the public and that the District's actions were commendable and did not adversely affect the public interest.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reversed the trial court's denial of attorney’s fees. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs' lawsuit enforced an important public right by ensuring that the District complied with state law regarding school vaccination requirements. The court emphasized that the litigation conferred a significant benefit on the general public by upholding the state's comprehensive immunization policy. The court also rejected the trial court's rationale that the District's good intentions precluded an award of attorney’s fees, clarifying that the focus should be on the enforcement of public rights, not the subjective merits of the District's actions. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the appropriate amount of attorney’s fees. View "Let Them Choose v. San Diego Unified School District" on Justia Law

The case involves the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) developing a rulemaking package to join the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), aimed at reducing CO2 emissions from power plants. The RGGI Regulation faced opposition from the Pennsylvania Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB) and other state officials, leading to litigation. Three nonprofit environmental organizations (Nonprofits) sought to intervene in the litigation to defend the RGGI Regulation, citing environmental and health concerns.The Commonwealth Court initially denied the Nonprofits' application to intervene, ruling that their interests were adequately represented by DEP. The court also granted a preliminary injunction against the RGGI Regulation. Nonprofits appealed both the denial of intervention and the preliminary injunction.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case. It found that the Nonprofits had established a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation, based on the testimony of their members regarding the adverse health and environmental impacts of CO2 emissions. The court determined that DEP did not adequately represent the Nonprofits' interests, particularly because DEP had not invoked the Environmental Rights Amendment (ERA) in its defense of the RGGI Regulation.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision denying the Nonprofits' application to intervene, allowing them to participate as parties in the ongoing litigation. However, the appeal from the preliminary injunction was dismissed as moot because the Commonwealth Court had already issued a permanent injunction against the RGGI Regulation, superseding the preliminary injunction. View "Shirley v. PA Legislative Reference Bureau" on Justia Law

Vincent Bell, a pretrial detainee with an amputated right leg, alleged that deputies used excessive force during a cell extraction and transfer at the San Francisco Jail. Bell claimed that Sergeant Yvette Williams did not provide him with a wheelchair or other mobility device, forcing him to hop on one leg until he fell. Deputies then carried him by his arms and leg, causing him pain and minor injuries. Bell sued under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California held a jury trial. The jury found in favor of Bell on his excessive force claim against Williams and his ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against the City and County of San Francisco. However, the jury did not find that Williams caused Bell physical or emotional harm. The jury awarded Bell $504,000 in compensatory damages against the City but not against Williams. The district court denied the defendants' post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the jury's verdict on Bell's Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim and his ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, finding substantial evidence supported these claims. However, the court reversed the district court's decision on Bell's Monell theory of liability, concluding that Bell did not present substantial evidence showing that the City's training was the product of deliberate indifference to a known risk. The court also vacated the jury's compensatory damages award, deeming it grossly excessive, and remanded for a remittitur or a new trial on damages. View "BELL V. WILLIAMS" on Justia Law

The case involves several companies that post immigration surety bonds challenging a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) rule. The rule, promulgated by Acting Secretary Chad Wolf in 2020, allowed DHS to refuse business from certain surety firms. The plaintiffs argued that Wolf was not duly appointed and thus lacked the authority to issue the rule. In 2021, Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas, who was duly appointed, ratified the rule.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The court found that Wolf was not properly serving as Acting Secretary when he promulgated the rule and that Mayorkas's ratification was barred by the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA). The district court vacated the rule, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the rule was improperly promulgated.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the FVRA did not bar Mayorkas from ratifying the rule and that the ratification cured any defects in the rule’s promulgation. The court explained that the Ratification Bar in the FVRA applies only to nondelegable functions or duties, which are those required by statute or regulation to be performed by the applicable officer and only that officer. Since the promulgation of the rule was a delegable duty, the ratification by Mayorkas was valid.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and remanded the case for further proceedings. The main holding was that the ratification by a duly appointed Secretary cured any defects in the rule’s initial promulgation by an improperly appointed Acting Secretary. View "GONZALES & GONZALES BONDS & INSURANCE AGENCY, INC." on Justia Law

Linzi Labrum, the petitioner, sought a waiver of rules 14-704(c)(2) and 14-704(c)(3) of the Utah Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice. These rules require graduates of non-ABA-accredited law schools to practice law in another state for ten years before becoming eligible to take the Utah bar exam. Labrum graduated from Concord Law School, an online, non-ABA-accredited institution, and was admitted to practice law in California in 2021. She has since worked in Utah as a law clerk, mediator, and supervised pro bono attorney.The Utah State Bar denied Labrum's application to take the Utah bar exam, citing her insufficient years of practice. Labrum petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for a waiver, arguing that her education and experience met the rules' purposes and that her circumstances were extraordinary.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Labrum satisfied the burden of proof established in Kelly v. Utah State Bar. The court found that Concord's education, while not on par with ABA-accredited schools, was sufficient when combined with Labrum's practical experience. Her work in Utah, including her roles as a law clerk, mediator, and pro bono attorney, demonstrated her competence and ethical standards. The court also noted the significant changes in the accreditation of online law schools and the strong recommendations from Utah legal practitioners who supervised her work.The court concluded that Labrum's case was extraordinary due to the unique challenges she faced, her commitment to serving an underserved area in Utah, and the substantial support from the legal community. The Utah Supreme Court granted her petition for waiver, allowing her to take the Utah bar exam. View "Labrum v. Utah State Bar" on Justia Law

Sean Ravin, an attorney, sought fees for representing Curtis D. Skogsbergh, a veteran claiming disability benefits. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) initially granted Skogsbergh a 10% disability rating, later increased to 20%. Skogsbergh, acting pro se, appealed for a higher rating and submitted a claim for total disability based on individual unemployability (TDIU). The VA denied TDIU, and the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) did not address it in their decision. Skogsbergh retained Ravin, who represented him in an appeal to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court), which vacated the Board’s decision for not addressing TDIU.The Board later remanded the TDIU claim, and the VA granted TDIU with past-due benefits. However, the VA denied Ravin’s attorney fees, leading him to appeal to the Board, which found the fee agreement valid but denied fees, stating the Board’s decision was not final. Ravin appealed to the Veterans Court, which vacated the Board’s decision, finding the Board’s interpretation of finality incorrect but remanding for clarification on whether all fee award requirements were met.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the Veterans Court’s decision was non-final, as it remanded the case for further proceedings. The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that the remand did not meet the criteria for a final decision and that the Veterans Court was within its authority to remand for clarification. View "RAVIN v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

The relator, Jumaane Scott, filed an action requesting a writ of mandamus to compel the Toledo Correctional Institution (TCI) to produce public records. Scott claimed that between April and July 2023, he made four separate requests for public records, including body-camera footage from three different correction officers and a vegetarian diet menu. He alleged that TCI staff denied his requests or failed to respond. Scott sought the production of these records, statutory damages, and court costs.The case was initially reviewed by the Supreme Court of Ohio. TCI filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied, leading to the issuance of an alternative writ. TCI conceded most of Scott’s factual allegations but argued that the requested body-camera footage did not exist. TCI’s evidence included an affidavit from Derek Burkhart, the warden’s assistant, stating that the footage was not saved and therefore did not exist. Scott did not provide contrary evidence to rebut this claim.The Supreme Court of Ohio denied Scott’s request for a writ of mandamus, finding that the body-camera footage did not exist and that TCI had no obligation to produce nonexistent records. The court also denied Scott’s request for the vegetarian diet menu because his petition did not explicitly seek relief for that request. Additionally, the court denied Scott’s requests for statutory damages and court costs, concluding that Scott failed to demonstrate that TCI did not meet its obligations under the Public Records Act or acted in bad faith.In summary, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that TCI had no duty to produce nonexistent records and that Scott was not entitled to statutory damages or court costs. The court denied the writ of mandamus and all associated requests for relief. View "State ex rel. Scott v. Toledo Corr. Inst." on Justia Law

The Stark County Board of Elections considered and voted to purchase Dominion Voting Systems equipment during four meetings. These discussions and decisions occurred in executive sessions, which are closed to the public. Look Ahead America and Merry Lynne Rini filed a complaint alleging that the board violated Ohio’s Open Meetings Act by not limiting its executive-session discussions to matters where premature disclosure would give an unfair competitive or bargaining advantage.The Stark County Court of Common Pleas upheld the board’s actions, interpreting R.C. 121.22(G)(2) to mean that the premature-disclosure clause applied only to the last-listed reason for entering executive session, not to the purchase of property. The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, agreeing with the trial court’s interpretation.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and disagreed with the lower courts. The court held that the premature-disclosure clause in R.C. 121.22(G)(2) applies to all the permissible reasons listed for entering executive session, not just the last one. The court reversed the Fifth District’s judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial applying this interpretation. View "Look Ahead Am. v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The case involves the restructuring of Puerto Rico's public debts under Title VI of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA). The dispute centers on whether the final transaction documents or the preliminary documents control the terms of the debt restructuring. The preliminary documents included a Valid Claim Requirement, which stipulated that new bonds would only be issued if valid claims were made. However, the final transaction documents did not include this requirement.The U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially approved the restructuring plan, which included the terms set forth in the preliminary documents. However, the court also noted that the final terms would be subject to the execution and delivery of definitive documents. When the final documents were executed, they did not include the Valid Claim Requirement. The district court later ruled that the final documents, not the preliminary ones, governed the transaction, and overruled objections based on the omission of the Valid Claim Requirement.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the final transaction documents control the terms of the debt restructuring. The court emphasized that the preliminary documents were explicitly provisional and subject to final documentation. The final documents, which did not include the Valid Claim Requirement, were deemed to be the definitive terms of the restructuring. The court also noted that the Requisite Bondholders had approval rights over the final documents and did not object to the absence of the Valid Claim Requirement.Thus, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, concluding that the final transaction documents govern the debt restructuring, and the Valid Claim Requirement from the preliminary documents does not apply. View "FOMB v. AmeriNational Community Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Stadium Casino RE, LLC ("Stadium") contested the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board's ("Board") decision to award a Category 4 slot machine license to SC Gaming OpCo, LLC and Ira Lubert (collectively "SC Gaming"). Stadium argued that Lubert's bid was invalid because it was funded by individuals not authorized to participate in the auction, and that the Board should have awarded the right to apply for the license to Stadium as the second-highest bidder or conducted another auction.The Commonwealth Court initially reviewed the case, where Stadium sought declarations that Lubert's bid was invalid and that the Board lacked authority to consider SC Gaming's application. Stadium also sought an injunction to stop the Board from considering SC Gaming's application and requested a mandamus order to allow Stadium to apply for the license or to conduct another auction. The Board and SC Gaming filed preliminary objections, which the Commonwealth Court overruled, ordering them to file answers. Meanwhile, the Board proceeded with SC Gaming's licensing application, allowing Stadium to intervene but denying its discovery requests. The Board ultimately granted SC Gaming's application and issued an adjudication supporting its decision.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case, focusing on whether the Board exceeded its statutory authority and failed to comply with mandatory directives in the Gaming Act. The Court found that the Board had the authority to conduct the auction and licensing proceedings and that Section 1305.2(c) of the Gaming Act did not impose jurisdictional limitations on the Board's ability to act. The Court held that the Board's procedures and findings, including the determination that SC Gaming was wholly owned by Lubert, were within its discretion and supported by the evidence. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Board's decision to award the license to SC Gaming and dismissed the action pending in the Commonwealth Court as moot. View "Stadium Casino RE, LLC v. Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board" on Justia Law