Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

AUUE, Inc. applied for a zoning permit to develop a medical center, including a hospital, medical clinic, and professional offices, on five parcels of land in Jefferson Hills Borough. The Borough's Zoning Officer issued a use permit, recognizing that the proposed use was allowed by right in the Office Park District (O-P District), but conditioned the permit on AUUE obtaining further approvals before any development could commence. Residents of Jefferson Hills appealed, arguing that the application violated several provisions of the Borough’s Zoning Ordinance.The Zoning Hearing Board (ZHB) overturned the Zoning Officer’s decision, concluding that the proposed medical center was not permitted by right in the O-P District and that the Zoning Officer exceeded his authority by issuing a permit without ensuring full compliance with the Ordinance. The ZHB identified several violations in the application, including improper use of accessory parking lots and lack of direct access to a collector or arterial road.The Commonwealth Court reversed the ZHB’s decision, holding that the Zoning Officer had the authority to issue a use permit recognizing the proposed use as allowed by right in the O-P District. The court found that the ZHB should have limited its review to whether the proposed use was permitted by right, rather than considering overall compliance with the Ordinance.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s decision. It held that the Zoning Officer had the authority to issue a use permit for the limited purpose of recognizing that the proposed use was allowed by right in the O-P District. The ZHB was required to limit its review to this issue and was not permitted to overturn the Zoning Officer’s decision based on other potential violations of the Ordinance. View "AUUE, Inc. v. Borough of Jefferson Hills" on Justia Law

Marc D. Curtis, an inmate at the North Central Correctional Complex, requested records from the Cleveland Municipal Court Clerk, Earle B. Turner, related to his criminal case. Curtis sought documents including arrest warrants, DNA search warrants, and cellphone search warrants. The clerk provided some documents but withheld others, citing that Curtis, as an inmate, could not access certain records without a judge's approval per R.C. 149.43(B)(8). Curtis filed a mandamus complaint to compel the clerk to produce the remaining records or confirm their nonexistence.The Eighth District Court of Appeals denied Curtis's writ of mandamus. The court relied on an affidavit from Ronald Tabor, the clerk’s assistant director, who stated that the clerk did not possess the requested records. The court found this affidavit sufficient to establish that the records were not in the clerk’s possession and noted that respondents are not required to create or provide access to nonexistent records.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Eighth District's judgment. The court held that Curtis failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that the clerk possessed the requested records. The court also denied Curtis's motion to take judicial notice of new documents and granted the clerk's motion to strike certain personal information from the record. The court concluded that the clerk had adequately demonstrated that the requested records were not in his possession, and Curtis did not rebut this evidence. View "State ex rel. Curtis v. Turner" on Justia Law

In April 2012, Arnold Black was arrested during a traffic stop by East Cleveland police officers without any legitimate reason. Detective Randy Hicks violently assaulted Black and detained him in a storage room for four days. Black sued Hicks, Chief Ralph Spotts, and the City of East Cleveland for his injuries. In August 2019, a jury awarded Black $20 million in compensatory damages and $15 million in punitive damages against Hicks and Spotts each. The trial court also awarded Black $5.2 million in prejudgment interest.The City of East Cleveland and Spotts appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Ohio Supreme Court declined jurisdiction over their discretionary appeal, and the United States Supreme Court denied the city’s petition for a writ of certiorari. Despite these rulings, the city failed to satisfy the judgment or take steps to appropriate the necessary funds.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and granted Black’s request for a writ of mandamus. The court held that Black had a clear legal right to enforcement of the civil judgment and that the city had a legal duty to pay the judgment, including pre- and postjudgment interest. The court ordered the city to satisfy the judgment or take the necessary steps to appropriate the funds as described in R.C. 2744.06(A). The court rejected the city’s argument that a pending trial-court motion could reduce the amount owed, noting that Black had established the exact amount of money owed with sufficient evidence. View "State ex rel. Black v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

Brian M. Ames sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Three Rivers Local School District Records Commission to produce records in response to his public-records request. Ames requested meeting notification rules, meeting minutes, meeting notices, and records retention schedules for the years 2021, 2022, and 2023. The commission provided some documents but not all, leading Ames to file this action.The commission initially provided Ames with a 2023 meeting-notification policy and unsigned meeting minutes via a website link. After Ames filed his complaint, the commission provided additional documents, including a policy effective in 2021 and 2022, signed minutes for 2022, and records retention schedules for 2021 and 2022. The commission stated that no separate meeting-notification rules for the commission existed, no minutes for 2021 existed, and the 2023 meeting had not yet occurred at the time of the request.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and found that the commission had produced all documents in its possession responsive to Ames’s request. The court denied the writ of mandamus as moot, as Ames did not provide evidence to refute the commission’s claims. The court also denied Ames’s requests for statutory damages, attorney fees, and court costs. The court noted that Ames, as a pro se litigant, was not entitled to attorney fees and that he waived his request for court costs by not arguing for them in his merit brief. The court also denied Ames’s motion to strike certain exhibits submitted by the commission. View "State ex rel. Ames v. Three Rivers Local School Dist. Records Comm." on Justia Law

The case involves the estate of Bud Conyers seeking a relator’s share of the proceeds from a settlement between the United States and military contractor Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) under the False Claims Act (FCA). Conyers, a former KBR truck driver, had filed a qui tam suit alleging various fraudulent activities by KBR, including the use of mortuary trailers for supplies, kickbacks for defective trucks, and billing for prostitutes. The government later intervened in Conyers’s suit but pursued different claims involving KBR employees Mazon, Seamans, and Martin, who were involved in separate kickback schemes.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas awarded Conyers’s estate approximately $1.1 million, finding a “factual overlap” between Conyers’s allegations and the settled claims, particularly with Martin’s kickback scheme involving trucks. The court reasoned that Conyers’s allegations had put the government on notice of fraud in trucking contracts, which arguably led to the investigation of Martin. The district court also ordered the government to pay Conyers’s attorney’s fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that under the FCA, a relator is entitled to a share only of the settlement of the claim he brought, not additional claims added by the government. The court found no relevant factual overlap between Conyers’s claims and the settled claims involving Mazon, Seamans, and Martin. The court also rejected the district court’s reasoning that Conyers’s allegations spurred the investigation into Martin’s misconduct, noting that the FCA does not entitle a relator to recover from new claims discovered by the government. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Conyers’s estate was not entitled to any share of the settlement proceeds and reversed the award of attorney’s fees. View "USA v. Conyers" on Justia Law

Dobbin Plantersville Water Supply Corporation (Dobbin) held a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity (CCN) to provide water service in certain areas of Texas. Dobbin, a recipient of federal loans under 7 U.S.C. § 1926, which grants monopoly protection to loan recipients, faced decertification petitions from developers SIG Magnolia L.P. and Redbird Development L.L.C. The Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUC) granted these petitions, finding that Dobbin was not providing actual water service to the developers' properties. Dobbin then filed a lawsuit in federal court, arguing that the Texas Water Code section allowing decertification was preempted by federal law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed Dobbin's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the PUC officials, concluding they were not appropriate defendants under § 1983. At the summary judgment stage, the district court dismissed Dobbin's remaining claims with prejudice, primarily on jurisdictional grounds. The court found that Dobbin lacked a cause of action against the developers and that an injunction against the PUC would not redress Dobbin's injuries.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Dobbin lacked standing to seek an injunction against the PUC officials because such relief would not redress its injuries. The court also upheld the dismissal of Dobbin's § 1983 claim against the PUC officials, reiterating that state officials in their official capacities are not "persons" under § 1983. Lastly, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to dismiss Dobbin's claims against the developers with prejudice, as Dobbin lacked a viable cause of action against them. View "Dobbin Plantersville Water Supply Corporation v. Lake" on Justia Law

David Lesh, a social media content creator and owner of an outdoor apparel brand, posted photos on Instagram of himself snowmobiling at Keystone Resort, Colorado, during its closure due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The United States charged him with using an over-snow vehicle on National Forest Service (NFS) land off a designated route and conducting unauthorized work activity on NFS land. A magistrate judge convicted him of both counts after a bench trial.The magistrate judge found Lesh guilty of using an over-snow vehicle on NFS land off a designated route, taking judicial notice of a publicly available map indicating that Keystone Resort was not designated for snowmobile use. Lesh's argument that the map's undated nature failed to provide sufficient notice was not preserved for appeal. The district court affirmed the magistrate judge's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Lesh's conviction for using an over-snow vehicle on NFS land off a designated route, finding that Lesh had waived his challenge to the judicial notice of the map. However, the court reversed his conviction for unauthorized work activity under 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(c). The court held that the regulation was impermissibly vague as applied to Lesh's conduct, as it did not provide fair warning that posting images on social media could constitute a federal crime. The court also found insufficient evidence to prove that Lesh's primary purpose in posting the photos was to sell goods or services, as required by the regulation. The court concluded that Lesh was not deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as the maximum penalty he faced did not exceed six months of imprisonment. View "United States v. Lesh" on Justia Law

In late 2003, Wye Oak Technology, Inc., a small American company, entered into a contract with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense to rebuild Iraq’s military. Wye Oak performed under the contract for nearly five months, but Iraq refused to pay and instead gave the money to another party. When Wye Oak’s owner traveled to Iraq to resolve the payment issue, he was killed by unidentified assailants. Wye Oak eventually ceased operations in Iraq and later sued Iraq in a U.S. federal district court for breach of contract.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia found Iraq liable after a bench trial and awarded Wye Oak over $120 million in damages. The court initially held that it had jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) based on the commercial exception’s second clause. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated this judgment, ruling that the second clause did not apply and remanded the case to determine if the third clause of the commercial exception applied. On remand, the district court found that Iraq’s breach had direct effects in the United States, thus reentering its damages order.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Iraq’s breach did not cause a direct effect in the United States as required by the FSIA’s commercial exception. The court noted that the contract and its breach were centered in Iraq, and any effects in the United States were too attenuated or involved intervening elements. Consequently, the court held that Iraq was immune from suit, vacated the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss. View "Wye Oak Technology, Inc. v. Republic of Iraq" on Justia Law

Healthy Gulf and other environmental groups challenged the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) decision to authorize the construction and operation of liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities in southwestern Louisiana. They argued that FERC did not properly address certain requirements under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Natural Gas Act (NGA). Specifically, they contended that FERC inadequately explained its failure to determine the environmental significance of the project's greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and failed to adequately assess the cumulative effects of the project's nitrogen dioxide (NO2) emissions. However, they acknowledged that FERC did consider alternatives to the project.The Commission had issued a final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) and authorized the project, finding it environmentally acceptable and consistent with the public interest. Petitioners requested a rehearing, which was deemed denied by operation of law when FERC did not respond timely. They then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that FERC inadequately explained its failure to determine the significance of the project's GHG emissions and failed to properly assess the cumulative effects of the project's NO2 emissions. The court noted that FERC's reliance on the Significant Impact Levels (SILs) to assess cumulative effects was insufficient and that FERC did not adequately consider the significance of GHG emissions using available methodologies. However, the court upheld FERC's consideration of alternatives to the project, finding that FERC had provided sufficient reasoning for rejecting the proposed alternatives.The court granted the petitions in part, denied them in part, and remanded the case to FERC for further consideration without vacating the authorization order. The court instructed FERC to provide a more thorough explanation of its GHG emissions analysis and to properly assess the cumulative effects of NO2 emissions. View "Healthy Gulf v. FERC" on Justia Law

Barbara Kowal, a paralegal for a federal public defender, filed FOIA requests with the ATF, FBI, and DEA seeking records related to Daniel Troya, who was sentenced to death for a gang-related murder. The agencies conducted searches and produced some documents but withheld others, citing various FOIA exemptions. Dissatisfied, Kowal filed two lawsuits claiming the searches were inadequate and the records were wrongfully withheld.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the agencies in both cases. The court found that the agencies conducted adequate searches and properly invoked FOIA exemptions to withhold certain records. Kowal appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's rulings. The appellate court held that the agencies' searches were reasonable and tailored to Kowal's specific requests. The court also found that the agencies properly justified their withholdings under FOIA Exemptions 3, 6, 7(C), 7(D), and 7(E). The court noted that the agencies provided sufficient affidavits explaining the applicability of these exemptions and that Kowal failed to demonstrate any significant public interest that would outweigh the privacy and security concerns protected by the exemptions.In conclusion, the appellate court affirmed the district court's grants of summary judgment, holding that the agencies conducted adequate searches and properly withheld records under the cited FOIA exemptions. View "Kowal v. DOJ" on Justia Law