Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A firefighter with fifteen years of service applied for disability pension benefits from a municipal pension fund, claiming he was permanently disabled due to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) resulting from several traumatic events encountered during his career. The pension fund’s Board of Trustees denied his application after a hearing, finding he did not meet the policy’s requirements for a mental health disability benefit, specifically the requirement that the traumatic events causing the disability be “unexpected” within the context of his regular duties.The applicant sought judicial review in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County, which reviewed the Board’s decision under Tennessee’s Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). The trial court found the Board’s interpretation of the policy arbitrary and capricious, holding that the events were unexpected to the applicant and that the policy should be construed in favor of the employee. The trial court reversed the Board’s denial and awarded benefits. The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the policy ambiguous and applying a liberal construction doctrine to interpret the policy in favor of the applicant.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the term “unexpected” in the policy was not ambiguous and should be given its plain meaning. The Court concluded that the Board’s decision was supported by substantial and material evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. The Court also held that the liberal construction doctrine did not apply because the policy was unambiguous. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the trial court, reinstating the Board’s denial of disability benefits, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Long v. Chattanooga Fire and Police Pension Fund" on Justia Law

A longtime Alaska resident with extensive experience in personal-use and commercial fishing brought suit against the State of Alaska, alleging that the State’s management of chinook and chum salmon populations in the Yukon and Kuskokwim Rivers violated the sustained yield principle mandated by the Alaska Constitution. The plaintiff claimed that the significant decline in these salmon populations since statehood was evidence of unconstitutional management. He did not challenge any specific policy, regulation, or action, but instead sought a declaration that the State’s management had been unconstitutional for decades and requested injunctive relief to compel the State to fulfill its sustained yield obligations.The Superior Court for the Fourth Judicial District, Bethel, granted the State’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court found that the claims presented nonjusticiable political questions reserved for the legislative branch, that the plaintiff failed to allege a concrete injury or identify specific State actions causing harm, and that deference to agency expertise was warranted in the absence of a challenge to a particular policy or action.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the claims for injunctive relief were nonjusticiable because they would require the judiciary to make initial fisheries policy determinations, a function constitutionally committed to the legislative and executive branches. The Court further held that the claim for declaratory relief was not justiciable because it would not clarify or settle the legal relations between the parties, as it did not identify specific actions or policies to be addressed. The Court concluded that, absent a challenge to a particular State action or policy, the claims did not present an actual controversy suitable for judicial resolution. View "Forrer v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

Several months before an election, complaints were filed with the Alaska Public Offices Commission alleging that two political groups, A Stronger Alaska and the Republican Governors Association, had violated Alaska’s campaign finance laws by coordinating with a gubernatorial campaign and failing to comply with disclosure requirements. The Commission initiated expedited proceedings, held hearings where officials from the groups testified, and then chose not to make a final determination on the alleged violations. Instead, the Commission remanded the matters to its staff for further investigation on a regular, non-expedited basis. The Commission’s staff subsequently issued administrative subpoenas seeking documents and communications from the groups, but the groups refused to comply.The Commission sought judicial enforcement of its subpoenas in the Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District. The groups opposed enforcement, arguing that the subpoenas were unnecessary because the Commission already had relevant testimony, that further investigation was barred by res judicata, and that the process violated their due process rights. They also challenged the constitutionality of the statutory scheme authorizing the expedited process. The superior court rejected all of these arguments, granted summary judgment in favor of the Commission, and ordered enforcement of the subpoenas.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that the subpoenas were not unreasonable or oppressive simply because prior testimony had been given, as documentary evidence could still be relevant. The court also held that res judicata did not apply because the Commission had not issued a final decision on the merits, and that the process did not violate substantive due process or result in an absurd or unconstitutional statutory scheme. The court affirmed the order granting summary judgment to the Commission. View "Republican Governors Association v. Hebdon" on Justia Law

A firefighter employed by the City of Birmingham developed hypertension during his employment and applied to the City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System for both extraordinary and ordinary disability benefits, arguing that his condition and the medications required to control it prevented him from safely performing his job. He detailed unsuccessful attempts to manage his hypertension with various medications and provided medical opinions supporting his claim that only beta-blockers, which are not recommended for firefighters, could control his blood pressure. The Board, after considering the opinion of its medical expert, denied both applications, concluding that he had not exhausted all other antihypertensive regimens.The firefighter sought review of the Board’s decisions by filing a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Jefferson Circuit Court, as permitted by statute. Initially, the circuit court dismissed the action for lack of service, but the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed that dismissal and remanded the case. After service was obtained, the respondents argued that the claim for extraordinary disability benefits failed as a matter of law because the hypertension was not caused by a specific workplace accident, and that the Board’s denial of ordinary disability benefits was not manifestly wrong. The circuit court denied the mandamus petition without a hearing or consideration of evidence beyond the pleadings.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court’s denial of extraordinary disability benefits, holding that the statutory requirements were not met because the disability did not result from an accident at a definite time and place. However, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of ordinary disability benefits, finding that the circuit court erred by not allowing the petitioner to present evidence or reviewing the evidence considered by the Board. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the ordinary disability claim. View "Hoffman v. City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System" on Justia Law

A former federal employee retired before age sixty-two and began receiving an annuity supplement under the Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act (FERS). Years earlier, a Colorado state court had issued a divorce decree awarding his ex-wife a pro rata share of his “gross monthly annuity” and any benefit earned from his special service, but the decree did not specifically mention the annuity supplement. For nearly thirty years, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) only divided the annuity supplement between former spouses if a court order expressly required it. In 2016, OPM changed its policy, deciding that if a court order divided the basic annuity, the annuity supplement would also be divided in the same way, even if the order was silent on the supplement. OPM applied this new interpretation retroactively, resulting in a demand that the retiree pay his ex-wife nearly $25,000.The retiree challenged OPM’s decision before the Merit Systems Protection Board. The Board’s administrative judge found that OPM could only divide the annuity supplement if a court order expressly provided for such division. The Board affirmed this decision, rejecting OPM’s new interpretation. OPM then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that, under 5 U.S.C. §§ 8421(c) and 8467(a), OPM may apportion a federal retiree’s annuity supplement to a former spouse only when a court order expressly provides for such division. The court reasoned that the statutory text, structure, and history require the annuity supplement to be treated in the same way as the basic annuity, which is only divided if expressly ordered by a court. The court affirmed the Board’s decision. View "OPM v. MOULTON " on Justia Law

An advanced practice registered nurse in Texas, who maintained an active nursing license and a Prescriptive Authority Number, did not have a current prescriptive-authority agreement with a physician, as required by Texas law to prescribe drugs. She was not accused of any misconduct but was attending an educational program to transition careers. Because she lacked a prescriptive-authority agreement, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) initiated proceedings to revoke her federal Certificate of Registration, which allows her to handle controlled substances.An administrative law judge within the DEA recommended revocation, finding that she was “without state authority to handle controlled substances.” The Administrator of the DEA adopted this recommendation and revoked her registration. The nurse then petitioned for review directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, as permitted by statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the DEA’s action and concluded that the agency exceeded its statutory authority under 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(3). The court held that the statute requires both the loss of a state license or registration and the lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances before the DEA may revoke a registration. Because the nurse still held all relevant state licenses and registrations, the court determined that the DEA lacked authority to revoke her registration solely due to the absence of a prescriptive-authority agreement. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the DEA’s revocation order, and remanded the case to the agency for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "DeWitt v. Drug Enforcement Administration" on Justia Law

The case involved two related companies and three individuals who operated a business targeting immigrants detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and eligible for release on immigration bonds. The companies marketed their services as an affordable way to secure release, but in reality, they charged high fees for services that were often misrepresented or not provided. The agreements were complex, mostly in English, and required significant upfront and recurring payments. Most consumers did not understand the terms and relied on the companies’ oral representations, which were deceptive. The business was not licensed as a bail bond agent or surety, and the defendants’ practices violated federal and state consumer protection laws.After the plaintiffs—the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia—filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, the defendants repeatedly failed to comply with discovery obligations and court orders. They did not produce required documents, ignored deadlines, and failed to appear at hearings. The district court, after multiple warnings and opportunities to comply, imposed default judgment as a sanction for this misconduct. The court also excluded the defendants’ late-disclosed witnesses and exhibits from the remedies hearing, finding the nondisclosures unjustified and prejudicial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The Fourth Circuit held that the default judgment was an appropriate sanction for the defendants’ repeated and willful noncompliance. The exclusion of evidence and witnesses was also upheld, as was the issuance of a permanent injunction and the calculation of monetary relief, including restitution and civil penalties totaling approximately $366.5 million. The court found no abuse of discretion or legal error in the district court’s rulings and affirmed the final judgment in all respects. View "Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Nexus Services, Inc." on Justia Law

A group of Black farmers and their association, along with several individual members, sought to file claims with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) for financial assistance under a program created by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022. They wished to submit applications on behalf of deceased relatives who had allegedly experienced discrimination in USDA farm lending programs. The USDA, however, had a policy that excluded applications reporting only discrimination against individuals who were deceased at the time of application, making such claims ineligible for the program.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, seeking an injunction to require the USDA to accept these “legacy claims.” The district court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the government’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that the relevant statute only authorized financial assistance to living farmers. The plaintiffs appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and also sought an emergency injunction pending appeal, which was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the statutory language of § 22007(e) of the Inflation Reduction Act required the USDA to provide “assistance” to farmers who experienced discrimination, and that “assistance” was forward-looking and could not be provided to deceased individuals. The court found that the statute did not authorize compensation for past harm to deceased farmers, distinguishing “assistance” from “compensation.” The court affirmed the district court’s judgment and denied the motion for an injunction pending appeal as moot, holding that the USDA was required to reject applications filed on behalf of deceased farmers. View "Black Farmers & Agriculturalists Ass'n v. Rollins" on Justia Law

A federal inmate serving a 210-month sentence challenged the method used by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to calculate his good conduct time credits under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1), as amended by the First Step Act of 2018. The inmate argued that, following the amendments, he should receive a full 54 days of good conduct time credit for the last six months of his sentence, rather than a prorated amount. The BOP, however, interpreted the amended statute to require prorating the credit for any partial year, resulting in the inmate receiving 26 days of credit for the final six months instead of 54.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied the inmate’s habeas petition. The court found that the plain language of the amended statute allowed for proration of good conduct time credits for partial years. As an alternative basis, the District Court also relied on Chevron deference to uphold the BOP’s interpretation. The court rejected the inmate’s additional claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Due Process Clause, finding them either precluded by statute or inapplicable to the rulemaking context.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment, holding that the First Step Act’s amendments, while deleting the word “prorated,” introduced language (“for each year”) that sets a rate of 54 days per year, thereby requiring proration for any partial year. The court concluded that the statute’s natural reading supports the BOP’s method of prorating credits for the last portion of a sentence. The Third Circuit also rejected the inmate’s constitutional and APA-based arguments, and found no basis for applying the rule of lenity. View "Thieme v. Warden Fort Dix FCI" on Justia Law

Gujarat Fluorochemicals Ltd., an Indian manufacturer, was subject to a countervailing duty investigation initiated by the U.S. Department of Commerce after Daikin America, Inc., a U.S. producer, filed petitions regarding imports of granular polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) resin from India and Russia. During the period of investigation, Gujarat purchased wind energy from Inox Wind Limited, a cross-owned Indian company that had received a subsidized land lease from the Indian government. Inox sold all its wind energy to Gujarat, which was used at Gujarat’s production facility to manufacture PTFE resin and other products. The wind energy from Inox represented a small fraction of the total energy consumed at the facility.Commerce determined that the subsidy received by Inox should be attributed to Gujarat under the cross-ownership regulation at 19 C.F.R. § 351.525(b)(6)(iv), resulting in a significant portion of the countervailing duty rate assessed against Gujarat. Commerce reasoned that because all of Inox’s wind energy was supplied to Gujarat, the input was “primarily dedicated” to Gujarat’s downstream production. Gujarat challenged this determination before the United States Court of International Trade, arguing that Commerce misapplied the “primarily dedicated” standard. The Trade Court agreed, finding that the regulation required more than mere consumption of the input by the downstream producer and that the facts did not support attributing the subsidy under the cross-ownership provision. The Trade Court ordered Commerce to remove the portion of the duty rate based on this attribution, and Commerce complied under protest.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court’s judgment. The Federal Circuit held that the cross-ownership regulation does not apply solely because the downstream producer is the sole consumer of the input. Instead, the regulation requires a fact-specific inquiry into whether the input’s production is primarily dedicated to the downstream product, as reflected in the regulatory history and examples. The court affirmed the removal of the subsidy attribution and the adjusted duty rate. View "GUJARAT FLUOROCHEMICALS LTD. v. US " on Justia Law