Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) Communities Act, which mandates that cities and towns with local access to MBTA services adopt zoning laws to provide at least one district of multifamily housing "as of right" near their MBTA facilities. The town of Milton, which has four MBTA stations, voted down a proposed zoning scheme to comply with the act. The Attorney General then sued the town to enforce the act.The Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk reviewed the case. The town initially took steps to comply with the act, including hiring a consultant and submitting an action plan to the Executive Office of Housing and Livable Communities (HLC). However, a town-wide referendum ultimately rejected the proposed zoning bylaw. The Attorney General filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce compliance with the act.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the MBTA Communities Act is constitutional and that the Attorney General has the authority to enforce it. However, the court found that the HLC did not comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when promulgating the guidelines, rendering them ineffective. The court granted declaratory relief in part and dismissed the remaining claims, directing the single justice to enter a declaratory judgment consistent with the opinion. View "Attorney General v. Town of Milton" on Justia Law

Manley Barton, a registered member of the Navajo tribe, applied for relocation benefits from the Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation (ONHIR) based on his residence at his grandparents' homesite on the Hopi Partitioned Lands (HPL). The Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act required individuals residing on land partitioned to the tribe of which they were not a member to relocate. To be eligible for benefits, applicants had to show they were residents of the land partitioned to the other tribe on December 22, 1974, and were heads of household when they moved away. Manley claimed he lived at the HPL homesite until 1986, despite being away for education and employment.ONHIR denied Manley's application, and the Independent Hearing Officer (IHO) upheld the denial, concluding that Manley's residence at the HPL homesite ended in 1984 when his grandparents relocated. The IHO did not consider other evidence of Manley's intent to reside at the HPL homesite, such as his testimony and that of his family members about his continued use of the homesite for ceremonies and chores. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of ONHIR, finding the IHO's decision was supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's summary judgment. The court held that the IHO improperly applied the "temporarily away" exception, which allows applicants who are away for education or employment to establish residency through intent and manifestations of intent. The IHO's reliance solely on the grandparents' relocation to determine Manley's legal residence was arbitrary and capricious. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "BARTON V. OFFICE OF NAVAJO AND HOPI INDIAN RELOCATION" on Justia Law

Three plaintiffs, including a Virginia citizen, a Virginia entity, and an out-of-state entity, challenged Virginia Senate Bill 903, which regulates the retail sale of hemp products based on their total tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) concentration. The plaintiffs argued that the 2018 Farm Bill, which legalized hemp with a delta-9 THC concentration of no more than 0.3%, preempts the more restrictive Virginia law. They also claimed that the Virginia law violates the Dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their preemption arguments, as the 2018 Farm Bill does not expressly preempt state laws regulating hemp more stringently. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege that they were licensed processors under Virginia law, thus lacking standing to challenge the provision preventing Virginia processors from selling hemp products to others who would use them in violation of the total THC standard. Additionally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' Dormant Commerce Clause claims, finding no evidence that the Virginia law discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the sales restriction provision, as they did not allege sufficient facts showing they were licensed processors. The court vacated the district court's order regarding this claim and remanded with instructions to dismiss it without prejudice. However, the court affirmed the district court's denial of injunctive relief concerning the total THC standard, finding that the plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on their preemption and Dormant Commerce Clause claims. View "Northern Virginia Hemp and Agriculture, LLC v. Commonwealth of Virginia" on Justia Law

Oman Fasteners, LLC, a foreign producer and exporter of steel nails, was subject to a 2015 antidumping-duty order by the U.S. Department of Commerce. During the 2020-2021 administrative review, Oman Fasteners submitted a response to Commerce's detailed questionnaire 16 minutes past the 5:00 PM deadline. Commerce rejected the late submission and applied an adverse inference, resulting in a 154.33% antidumping-duty rate for Oman Fasteners.Oman Fasteners challenged Commerce's decision in the Court of International Trade (Trade Court), seeking a preliminary injunction against the imposition of the 154.33% duty rate. The Trade Court consolidated the preliminary injunction proceeding with a trial on the merits and held that Commerce abused its discretion. The court remanded the case to Commerce for recalculation and issued an injunction limiting cash deposits to the pre-existing 1.65% rate.Mid Continent Steel & Wire, Inc., a domestic steel-nail producer, intervened and filed an interlocutory appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit concluded that Mid Continent had standing and that the appeal was not moot. The court affirmed the Trade Court's injunction, agreeing that Commerce's application of the 154.33% rate was unsupported by substantial evidence and constituted an abuse of discretion. The court noted that the slight delay in submission did not justify such a punitive rate and that the balance of hardships favored Oman Fasteners, which faced irreparable harm without the injunction. View "OMAN FASTENERS, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

The State of Indiana approved a plan to retire a coal-fired facility and replace it with wind and solar energy sources, supplemented by two new natural gas turbines to ensure grid reliability. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved a natural gas pipeline to serve these turbines. The Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana challenged FERC’s approval, arguing that FERC’s environmental analysis was unreasonable and inconsistent with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Natural Gas Act (NGA). The core claim was that FERC should have analyzed non-gas alternatives before approving the pipeline.The Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission initially denied CenterPoint Energy’s proposal for an 850-megawatt natural gas unit due to inadequate consideration of alternatives. CenterPoint then modified its plan to include wind generation and applied to build two smaller gas-fired turbines, which the Indiana Commission approved. CenterPoint contracted with Texas Gas Transmission for a 24-mile pipeline to supply natural gas to the new units. Citizens Action intervened in the FERC proceeding, raising environmental concerns. FERC prepared an environmental impact statement and approved the pipeline. Citizens Action’s request for rehearing was denied by operation of law, leading to the current petition for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that FERC acted lawfully and reasonably in its environmental analysis and public convenience and necessity determination. FERC was not required to consider non-gas alternatives outside its jurisdiction and properly identified the project’s purpose as supporting CenterPoint’s new natural gas units. The court also found that FERC’s use of emissions percentages and the absence of a significance label were reasonable and consistent with NEPA. The petition for review was denied. View "Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Day Pacer LLC and EduTrek L.L.C., along with their managing members, were responsible for millions of telemarketing calls to consumers on the National Do Not Call Registry. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) brought a civil enforcement action against them, resulting in the district court finding the defendants liable on summary judgment and awarding over $28 million in civil penalties. The defendants appealed the court’s liability findings and damages award.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found the companies liable for violating the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR) by making calls to consumers on the registry without proper consent. The court also held the individual defendants liable, as they had control over the companies and knew or should have known about the illegal activities. The court substituted the estate of a deceased defendant, David Cumming, into the litigation, finding the penalties sought were remedial. The court awarded a $28.6 million penalty and issued a permanent injunction against the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of liability but reversed and remanded the decision to substitute Cumming’s estate and the damages award. The appellate court held that the penalties sought were penal, not remedial, and thus did not survive Cumming’s death. The court also found that the district court did not consider all mandatory statutory factors in calculating the damages award, constituting an abuse of discretion. The court affirmed the broad injunction against the defendants, prohibiting them from engaging in any telemarketing activities. View "FTC v. Day Pacer LLC" on Justia Law

A service-disabled veteran and his company, MJL Enterprises, LLC, alleged that the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) Section 8(a) Business Development Program discriminated against him based on race. The program uses a race-conscious presumption to determine social disadvantage, which the plaintiffs argued was unconstitutional. They sought a declaration that the program's racial classifications were unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the case, ruling it moot due to changes in the 8(a) Program following an injunction in another case, Ultima Services Corp. v. U.S. Department of Agriculture. The district court also found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to demonstrate economic disadvantage and could not establish social disadvantage without the presumption.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court’s ruling on mootness, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the case was not moot because the changes to the 8(a) Program were not final and could be appealed. However, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal based on lack of standing. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an injury in fact, as they did not show they were "able and ready" to bid on 8(a) Program contracts due to their inability to meet the program’s social and economic disadvantage requirements. The court also found that the plaintiffs could not establish causation or redressability, as their ineligibility for the program was not solely due to the race-conscious presumption.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to sue and affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Hierholzer v. Guzman" on Justia Law

Santa Rita Holdings, Inc. applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) from the County of Santa Barbara to cultivate cannabis on a 2.54-acre parcel owned by Kim Hughes. The only access to this parcel is via a private easement over land owned by JCCrandall, LLC. JCCrandall objected to the use of its easement for cannabis transportation, citing federal law and the terms of the easement deed. Despite these objections, the County granted the CUP, and the County’s Board of Supervisors upheld this decision on appeal.JCCrandall then petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate, challenging the County’s determination that the easement provided adequate access for the project. JCCrandall argued that the use of the easement for cannabis activities was prohibited by federal law and the easement deed, that state law required its consent for such use, and that the road did not meet County standards. The trial court denied the petition, applying the substantial evidence standard and finding the County’s decision supported by substantial evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the trial court should have applied the independent judgment standard because JCCrandall’s right to exclude unauthorized persons from its property is a fundamental vested right. The court further held that under federal law, cannabis is illegal, and thus, JCCrandall cannot be forced to allow its property to be used for cannabis transportation. The court also found that the use of the easement for cannabis activities exceeded the scope of the easement, which was created when cannabis was illegal under both state and federal law. The judgment was reversed, and costs were awarded to JCCrandall. View "JCCrandall, LLC v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

Tintina Montana, Inc. sought to operate an underground copper mine in Meagher County, Montana, which required the removal of substantial quantities of groundwater. Tintina planned to use part of this water for mining operations and return the rest to the aquifer. Montana Trout Unlimited and other environmental groups (collectively "MTU") challenged the issuance of a water use permit by the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) for the mine's operations, arguing that the removal and discharge of water should be considered a beneficial use requiring a permit under the Montana Water Use Act (MWUA).The Fourteenth Judicial District Court denied MTU's petition for judicial review and affirmed DNRC's decision. The court held that DNRC correctly categorized the removal and discharge of water as neither a beneficial use nor waste, thus falling outside the permitting process of the MWUA. The court also found that DNRC's interpretation of the MWUA did not contravene the Montana Constitution.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that DNRC's longstanding interpretation of the MWUA, which categorizes mine dewatering as neither a beneficial use nor waste, was reasonable and consistent with legislative intent. The court also concluded that the MWUA's exclusion of mine dewatering from the permitting process did not render the Act unconstitutional, as the primary purpose of the MWUA is to regulate water rights, not the water resource itself. The court noted that other statutory frameworks, such as the Montana Water Quality Act and the Metal Mine Reclamation Act, provide for the regulation of water quality and environmental impacts. View "Trout Unlimited v. DNRC" on Justia Law

A.D. Improvements, Inc. (ADI) leased property from the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) and sought to purchase it under Streets and Highways Code section 118.1, which mandates that Caltrans offer to sell commercial real property deemed excess to the current occupant at fair market value. ADI used the property commercially and applied to purchase it after Caltrans designated it as excess. However, Caltrans denied the application, arguing that the property was not commercial when initially acquired. The trial court agreed with Caltrans and denied ADI's petition for a writ of mandate.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County found that ADI met the conditions of section 118.1, including leasing, occupying, and improving the property. However, it ruled that the statute applied only to property that was commercial when acquired by Caltrans, interpreting "acquired" as a past-tense verb.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case de novo. The court determined that the plain and contextual reading of section 118.1 requires the property to be commercial at the time it is deemed excess, not when it was acquired. The court found that the statute's language, legislative history, and Caltrans' own manuals support this interpretation. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case with directions to issue a writ requiring Caltrans to offer to sell the property to ADI at fair market value. The court held that ADI is entitled to its costs on appeal. View "A.D. Improvements v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law