Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A man seeking treatment for mental health issues voluntarily admitted himself to a hospital in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Medical staff determined he needed emergency medication and began to physically restrain him when he refused a shot. An off-duty police officer, working as a hospital security guard and wearing his police uniform, intervened. He twisted the patient's arm behind his back, and when the patient pulled away to relieve pain, the officer punched the patient’s head into a cinderblock wall, causing head trauma. The patient remained nonviolent throughout and was smaller in stature than those restraining him.Following the incident, the Chattanooga Police Department conducted an internal investigation. Opinions within the review process were divided, but the interim chief ultimately found no policy violation. The patient filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, alleging excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, multiple state-law torts, and municipal liability against the City for failing to train or supervise the officer. The district court granted summary judgment for the officer on all but the assault and battery claim, finding qualified immunity on the excessive force claim, and granted summary judgment for the City on all claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Sixth Circuit held that, although a reasonable juror could find the officer’s use of force excessive under the circumstances, the law was not clearly established that an officer in this situation could not use such force. Therefore, the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. The court also found that the City was not liable under Monell since the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that a final policymaker’s actions were the moving force behind his injury. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Guptill v. City of Chattanooga" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, a microbrewery and its owner, operated a seasonal business in a tourist town and became known for engaging in political advocacy. The business applied for various permits to operate both an indoor retail outlet and, later, an outdoor beer garden. Despite being granted permits that included specific conditions—such as restrictions on outdoor operations—the plaintiffs repeatedly violated these conditions, operated without proper permits, and explicitly stated their intention to continue doing so regardless of regulatory decisions. Throughout this period, the owner was vocal in criticizing local officials on social media.After several rounds of permit applications, denials, suspensions, and revocations, the plaintiffs’ most recent permit application for an outdoor beer garden was denied by the county committee, which cited the plaintiffs’ ongoing and willful violations of permit conditions and their declared intent to continue such violations. The plaintiffs appealed administrative actions to the Oneida County Board of Adjustment, which upheld the revocations. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, asserting that the permit denials and revocations constituted retaliation for protected political speech, in violation of the First Amendment. They sought a preliminary injunction to reinstate their permit and prevent further alleged retaliation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction and affirmed it. The Seventh Circuit held that, while the plaintiffs engaged in protected speech and suffered adverse permit actions, they failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their First Amendment retaliation claim. The court concluded that the permit denials and revocations were based on the plaintiffs’ repeated and admitted violations of permit conditions, not on retaliatory motives, and that the plaintiffs offered no evidence of disparate treatment or pretext. View "Minocqua Brewing Company LLC v Hess" on Justia Law

A neurologist submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the United States Social Security Administration (SSA) seeking documents about how the SSA evaluates disability claims for migraines and other headache disorders. The SSA determined that this request was not directly related to the administration of any of its benefit programs. Relying on a provision in the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 1306(c)), the SSA required the requester to pay the full cost of processing the request, which totaled $2,908. The requester paid the fee but later objected because the SSA did not respond within the statutory deadline set by FOIA.The United States District Court for the District of Vermont found in favor of the requester. The district court concluded that FOIA’s provision prohibiting fees when the agency fails to respond on time superseded the Social Security Act’s cost-reimbursement clause. As a result, the court ordered the SSA to refund the fee and awarded the requester attorneys’ fees and costs. The court reasoned that allowing the SSA to charge fees despite late responses would undermine the FOIA amendments designed to ensure agency timeliness.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered whether the Social Security Act’s cost-reimbursement provision or FOIA’s fee-preclusion provision controlled. The Second Circuit held that the plain language of § 1306(c), which begins with a “notwithstanding” clause, explicitly exempts the SSA from FOIA’s fee rules for requests not directly related to program administration. The court agreed with the SSA’s determination that the request was not program-related and found the statute unambiguous. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s judgment and vacated the award of attorneys’ fees and costs. View "Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin." on Justia Law

An individual incarcerated at the Belmont Correctional Institution requested various records from the sheriff relating to the operation and administration of the county jail, including policies on inmate intake and booking, personnel employed during a specified period, and records-retention policies. When his attempts to submit the requests by hand delivery and certified mail failed—one being refused and the other returned as undeliverable—he sent the requests by fax. Additionally, a third party, claiming to be his agent, submitted similar requests via email. The sheriff provided some records, stated that others had already been given, and explained that many requested records were maintained by private entities that had operated the jail under contract during relevant periods.The inmate subsequently filed a mandamus action against the sheriff and the jail, but not against the private jail administrators. The Supreme Court of Ohio previously dismissed the claim against the jail as a non-legal entity, and granted a limited writ requiring the sheriff to obtain and provide certain records from the private entities or certify their nonexistence. The court deferred the issue of statutory damages until the sheriff complied. The sheriff requested the records from the private entities, forwarded what was provided to the inmate, and filed a notice of compliance.Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of Ohio denied the requests for statutory damages and for contempt and sanctions. The court held that the inmate had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that he successfully transmitted his records requests by hand delivery or certified mail, nor that he authorized the third party to submit requests as his agent by email. The court further found no evidence that the sheriff disobeyed or resisted the court’s prior order, noting that the sheriff acted to comply with the writ by seeking records from the private entities and forwarding their responses. The motions for statutory damages, contempt, and sanctions were therefore denied. View "State ex rel. Brown v. Columbiana Cty. Jail" on Justia Law

An agricultural company opposed a unionization effort initiated by the United Farm Workers of America, who sought certification as the exclusive bargaining representative for the company's employees under a new statutory procedure. The union filed a Majority Support Petition with the Agricultural Labor Relations Board, presenting evidence that a majority of employees supported union representation. The company responded by submitting objections and employee declarations alleging misconduct by the union during the signature collection process. The Board's regional director investigated and determined that the union had met the statutory criteria for certification, leading the Board to certify the union as the employees' representative.Following the certification, the company filed additional objections with the Agricultural Labor Relations Board, including constitutional challenges to the underlying statute. The Board dismissed most objections and set others for a hearing, but stated it could not rule on constitutional questions. While administrative proceedings were ongoing, the company filed a petition in the Superior Court of Kern County seeking to enjoin the Board from proceeding and to declare the statute unconstitutional. The Board and the union argued that the court lacked jurisdiction due to statutory limits on judicial review, but the superior court nonetheless issued a preliminary injunction halting the Board's proceedings. Appeals and writ petitions followed, consolidating the matter before the reviewing court.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, held that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to consider the challenge at this stage. The court reaffirmed that under California law, employers may not directly challenge union certification decisions in court except in extraordinary circumstances, which were not present here. The proper procedure is for employers to wait until an unfair labor practice proceeding or mandatory mediation is completed and a final order is issued before seeking judicial review. The court reversed the preliminary injunction and ordered dismissal of the company’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Wonderful Nurseries v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

John Kenney, a resident of Florida, sought to obtain a retail cannabis license in Rhode Island as a social equity applicant. He argued that, as a recipient of a social equity cannabis license in the District of Columbia and someone with nonviolent marijuana convictions in Maryland and Nevada, he would otherwise qualify under Rhode Island’s Cannabis Act. Kenney challenged two provisions of the Act: the requirement that all license applicants must be Rhode Island residents or entities controlled by Rhode Island residents, and the definition of “social equity applicant,” which, according to Kenney, only recognizes nonviolent marijuana offenses eligible for expungement under Rhode Island law.After Kenney filed an amended complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, the defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On February 6, 2025, the district court dismissed the case on ripeness grounds, reasoning that the Cannabis Control Commission had not yet promulgated final rules for retail cannabis licenses, and thus the court could not adjudicate the claims. The case was dismissed without prejudice, and Kenney appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the appeal. Following the Commission’s issuance of final rules for retail cannabis licenses, effective May 1, 2025, the appellate court determined that the district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of ripeness. The First Circuit held that Kenney’s claims were not moot and that he had standing to pursue them. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal order and remanded the case for prompt consideration of the merits of Kenney’s constitutional challenges, instructing the district court to rule at least forty-five days before the Commission issues retail licenses. View "Kenney v. Rhode Island Cannabis Control Commission" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization dedicated to promoting electoral transparency operates a website that republishes voter registration data collected from state agencies. The group obtained New Mexico’s voter data through a third party and published it online, including information such as names, addresses, party affiliation, and voting history. After the website highlighted discrepancies in the state’s voter rolls, New Mexico’s Secretary of State publicly questioned the group’s motives and the lawfulness of its actions. The Secretary referred the group to the Attorney General for criminal investigation under state statutes that restrict the use and sharing of voter data. The group’s subsequent requests for updated voter data were denied.After the state’s refusal, the organization filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that New Mexico’s restrictions were preempted by the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) and violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court issued a preliminary injunction preventing prosecution, which was later stayed by the Tenth Circuit. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court found that the NVRA preempted New Mexico’s restrictions and enjoined criminal prosecution. The court rejected most of the group’s remaining constitutional claims but, following a bench trial, held that the state engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination by refusing further data requests.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the NVRA preempts New Mexico’s restrictions on the use and sharing of voter data, holding that state laws that prevent broad public disclosure of voter data conflict with the NVRA’s requirements. The Tenth Circuit did not reach the First Amendment claims, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Voter Reference Foundation v. Torrez" on Justia Law

The case involves a request made by an individual to the Oklahoma State Department of Health for correspondence related to the COVID-19 pandemic, specifically seeking email records sent to the Governor’s office. The requester asked for digital copies, expressing a preference for receiving the records by email. The Department produced over 11,000 pages of email correspondence in PDF format, but the requester argued that this was insufficient because the PDFs did not contain the embedded metadata present in the emails’ native file format (such as PST files from Microsoft Outlook), which he believed was necessary for fully understanding the records.After initially filing for declaratory and injunctive relief in the District Court of Oklahoma County, the Department responded by providing records in PDF format and, later, some in native format. The Department moved for summary judgment, contending that the Oklahoma Open Records Act (ORA) did not require production in native file format. The District Court agreed, granting summary judgment for the Department and finding substantial compliance with the ORA. On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals reversed, holding that the Department was required to provide records in their native format if it had the capability to do so. The Department then sought review from the Oklahoma Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that the ORA does not require a public body to provide copies of email records in their native file format containing embedded metadata. The Court found the statute’s language clear, interpreting “data files” not to include metadata, and concluded that the Act does not obligate agencies to provide records in any specific format, so long as reasonable access is provided. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals’ opinion and affirmed the District Court’s order. View "BROOKE v. REED" on Justia Law

A bail bondsman requested records from a county jail operated by a public trust after an incident involving his ex-wife at the facility. Specifically, he sought audio and video footage, communications, jail policies and procedures, and a list of employees working during a certain time frame, citing the Oklahoma Open Records Act (ORA). The jail trust denied most of the requests, asserting that as a "law enforcement agency" under the ORA, it had discretion to withhold the records except for certain mandatory disclosures.The District Court of LeFlore County granted summary judgment to the jail trust, agreeing with its argument that it qualified as a "law enforcement agency" under the ORA. The court thus found the trust had discretion to withhold the requested records and was not required to provide them to the requester.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the matter de novo and focused on whether the jail trust fit the statutory definition of a "law enforcement agency" under 51 O.S.2022, § 24A.3(5). The court concluded that, although the trust was a "public body," it was not "charged with enforcing state or local criminal laws and initiating criminal prosecutions" as required by the statute. The court emphasized that the trust merely operated the jail and was not responsible for enforcing laws or initiating prosecutions. As a result, the court held that the jail trust does not qualify as a "law enforcement agency" under the ORA. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma reversed the district court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "LAWSON v. LeFLORE CO. DETENTION CENTER PUBLIC TRUST SECURITY COMM." on Justia Law

A senior account manager at a telecommunications company was terminated after several major accounts she managed decided to discontinue the company’s services. In the months leading up to her termination, she took eight and a half days of paid leave to care for her ill daughter and mother. Her supervisor had expressed concerns about her performance, particularly with her newer accounts, but consistently granted all her leave requests without referencing the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Despite meeting some of her performance objectives, the loss of major accounts and her supervisor’s ongoing performance criticisms culminated in her dismissal.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment to the employer on the employee’s FMLA interference and retaliation claims. The district court found that the employee had not shown she was denied any FMLA benefits or that her termination was in retaliation for taking leave. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her related claim under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), dismissing it without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the employee did not establish an FMLA interference claim because her supervisor’s criticisms were unrelated to her leave requests, which were fully granted, and she was not prejudiced by the employer’s failure to provide FMLA notice. The court also held that the employee failed to show retaliation, as her termination was based on documented performance issues rather than the exercise of FMLA rights. Finally, the court upheld the district court’s decision to dismiss the NYCHRL claim without prejudice. View "Haran v. Orange Business Services, Inc." on Justia Law