Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Two police associations negotiated collective bargaining agreements with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and the City of Las Vegas to designate certain dates—specifically Christmas Eve, New Year's Eve, and Juneteenth—as paid holidays in addition to those recognized by Nevada statute. These agreements provided for increased holiday pay on those days. The Nevada Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS), which is responsible for collecting retirement contributions based on employees’ regular compensation, refused to collect contributions on the additional holiday pay for these negotiated holidays, arguing that only holidays listed in Nevada’s statutory list qualified.The associations filed an action for declaratory relief in the Eighth Judicial District Court, seeking to compel PERS to collect retirement contributions on the negotiated holiday pay. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the associations, ordering PERS to collect the appropriate employer contributions for holiday pay on Christmas Eve, New Year's Eve, and Juneteenth. PERS appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case de novo, as it involved questions of statutory interpretation and no disputed facts. The court held that, under the plain language of NRS 288.150(2)(d) and NRS 286.025, PERS is required to collect retirement contributions on all holiday pay negotiated in collective bargaining agreements, not just those for statutory holidays. The court also determined that Juneteenth became a legal holiday in Nevada in 2021 following the federal declaration, and contributions for that holiday are required retroactively to 2022, when it was included in the agreements. The court rejected PERS’s arguments regarding its authority and potential conflicts with the Internal Revenue Code. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. View "PUB. EMPLOYEES' RET. SYS. OF NEV. VS. LAS VEGAS MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS ASS'N" on Justia Law

A hospital operating in Weston, West Virginia, sought to construct a new facility approximately four miles from its current location, at a cost of about $56 million. The hospital’s current site is about sixteen miles from another hospital in Buckhannon, which holds a critical access hospital (CAH) designation, allowing it to receive higher Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements. The Buckhannon hospital argued that the construction of the new facility within twelve mountainous miles of its own would jeopardize its CAH status and financial stability.Previously, the West Virginia Health Care Authority denied the Weston hospital’s application for a certificate of need, finding that the project would harm the Buckhannon hospital and was not a superior alternative under state law. The Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed this denial. However, after legislative amendments in 2023 raised the capital expenditure threshold for certificate of need requirements to $100 million, the Weston hospital requested a determination from the Authority as to whether its new project required such a certificate. The Authority, applying an unwritten guideline, concluded that a certificate of need was unnecessary for the relocation of an existing facility within the same service area if the cost was below the new threshold. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, finding the relevant statute ambiguous and deferring to the Authority’s interpretation.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and held that the statutory language requiring a certificate of need for the “construction . . . of a health care facility” is clear and unambiguous. The court determined that the construction of a new hospital building, even as a relocation, falls within this requirement, regardless of the capital expenditure amount. The court reversed the decisions of the lower courts and remanded the case to the Authority for further proceedings consistent with its interpretation. View "St. Joseph's Hospital of Buckhannon v. Stonewall Jackson Memorial Hospital Co." on Justia Law

Bedford Recycling, Inc. applied to the Monroe County Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) for a conditional use permit to operate a scrap metal collection and sorting facility on property zoned for mineral extraction. The county’s zoning ordinance did not specifically allow scrap metal recycling, so Bedford sought approval under the category of “Central Garbage/Rubbish Collection Facility.” The BZA granted the permit after a public hearing in which Bedford acknowledged the facility would not handle solid waste, a typical requirement for the permit. Subsequently, Republic Services, a neighboring property owner, filed for judicial review, arguing that Bedford’s facility did not meet the ordinance’s requirements. While preparing written findings to support its decision, the BZA’s attorney concluded that granting the permit was a legal error, as Bedford’s proposed use did not fit the permit’s definition.After several meetings and changes in BZA membership, the Board voted to revoke Bedford’s permit, finding that the facility was essentially a scrap yard, which was not a permitted use in the zoning district. Bedford then sought judicial review in the Monroe Circuit Court, which found that the BZA lacked statutory authority to revoke the permit based on a change in reasoning or alleged legal error, and reinstated the permit. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the BZA could correct its own legal error and revoke the permit.The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, vacating the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Court held that administrative bodies like the BZA have only the powers expressly granted by statute and possess no inherent or common law authority to reconsider or revoke final decisions absent explicit legislative authorization. The Court disapproved prior appellate decisions that recognized an “error of law” exception. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order vacating the BZA’s revocation and reinstated Bedford’s conditional use permit. View "Monroe County Board of Zoning Appeals v. Bedford Recycling, Inc." on Justia Law

A resident of University Heights, Ohio, who practices Orthodox Judaism, sought to use his home for group prayer sessions due to religious obligations and restrictions on travel during the Sabbath. After inviting neighbors to participate in these gatherings, a neighbor complained to city officials, prompting the city’s law director to send a cease-and-desist letter, warning that using the home as a place of religious assembly violated local zoning laws. The resident then applied for a special use permit to operate a house of worship but withdrew his application before the city’s Planning Commission could reach a decision, stating he did not wish to operate a house of worship as defined by the ordinance. Despite withdrawing, he later filed a federal lawsuit against the city and several officials, alleging violations of federal and state law, including constitutional and statutory claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted summary judgment for the city and its officials. The court found that the plaintiff’s claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Ohio Constitution were unripe because there was no final decision by the relevant local authorities regarding the application of the zoning ordinance to his property. The court also rejected his Fourth Amendment and Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE Act) claims on the merits and declined supplemental jurisdiction over a state public records claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court held that most of the plaintiff’s claims were unripe because he withdrew his application before any final decision was made by the city’s zoning authorities, and thus there was no concrete dispute for federal review. The court also held that his facial challenges to the ordinance were forfeited and, in any event, failed as a matter of law. The court further concluded that the Fourth Amendment and FACE Act claims failed on the merits and found no abuse of discretion in declining supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim. View "Daniel Grand v. City of University Heights, Ohio" on Justia Law

A long-term employee of a county government began experiencing workplace difficulties after a new supervisor was assigned. The employee alleged that the supervisor engaged in repeated, unwelcome comments about her appearance and closely monitored her, behavior corroborated by coworkers. After reporting the supervisor’s conduct to union representatives, who then informed higher management, the employee was subjected to increased scrutiny, including a performance improvement plan, a written warning, and public criticism of her work. The employee filed internal and external complaints alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. Following these events, her health deteriorated, leading her to take medical leave and ultimately retire early.The Utah Labor Commission’s Antidiscrimination and Labor Division initially found no reasonable cause for her claims. On appeal, an administrative law judge (ALJ) held an evidentiary hearing but was replaced by another ALJ, who dismissed her claims. The Labor Commission Appeals Board reviewed the case, reinstated her retaliation claim using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, and remanded for a damages determination. The Board and ALJ denied her request for attorney fees, citing a Utah Supreme Court decision, Injured Workers Ass’n of Utah v. State, as precluding such awards. Both parties appealed aspects of the Board’s decision to the Utah Court of Appeals, which adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s Burlington Northern standard for “adverse action” in retaliation claims, upheld the retaliation finding, and ruled that attorney fees could be awarded but not assessed for reasonableness.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case. It held that the Burlington Northern standard—defining adverse action as conduct likely to dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a discrimination charge—applies to retaliation claims under the Utah Antidiscrimination Act. However, the court found the Board had not applied this standard or made sufficient factual findings, so it remanded the case for further proceedings. The court also clarified that the McDonnell Douglas framework is a procedural device, not a set of claim elements, and that the Labor Commission may award and assess the reasonableness of attorney fees. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Christensen v. Labor Commission" on Justia Law

Several individuals challenged the validity of the District of Columbia’s Anti-SLAPP Act, which provides defendants in certain lawsuits—those deemed “strategic lawsuits against public participation” (SLAPPs)—with a special motion to dismiss and limits discovery in those cases. The challengers argued that the D.C. Council exceeded its authority under the Home Rule Act by enacting the Anti-SLAPP Act, claiming that its discovery-limiting provisions impermissibly intruded on the procedural rules governing the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, which are set by Title 11 of the D.C. Code.A division of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals previously agreed with the challengers, holding that the Anti-SLAPP Act’s discovery provisions violated the Home Rule Act by interfering with Title 11’s mandate that the Superior Court follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except as modified by the courts themselves. The division’s decision was subsequently vacated when the full court granted en banc review.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed the division’s decision. The court held that the D.C. Council did not exceed its authority under the Home Rule Act by passing the Anti-SLAPP Act. The court reasoned that the Act does not amend Title 11, does not alter the organization or jurisdiction of the District’s courts, does not divest the courts of their rulemaking authority, and does not fundamentally change the court system. Instead, the Act supplements procedures for a limited subset of cases in a manner consistent with Title 11. The court concluded that the Council’s broad legislative authority includes the power to enact such laws, and that the Anti-SLAPP Act does not violate the Home Rule Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Banks v. Hoffman" on Justia Law

Several agency heads in Oklahoma were appointed by the Governor to serve concurrently as Cabinet Secretaries. After these appointments, a state senator requested an opinion from the Attorney General regarding whether individuals could simultaneously hold multiple state offices. The Attorney General issued an opinion concluding that Cabinet Secretaries are not exempt from Oklahoma’s prohibition against holding dual office and, therefore, agency heads could not also serve as Cabinet Secretaries without violating state law.Governor Stitt then sought declaratory relief in the Oklahoma County District Court. After a hearing, the district court ruled in favor of the Attorney General, finding that Cabinet Secretaries are subject to the prohibition against holding dual office under Title 51, Section 6. The court reasoned that the expanded authority granted to Cabinet Secretaries, including the power to veto administrative rules, made them officers under Oklahoma law. As a result, the court concluded that agency heads serving as Cabinet Secretaries were unlawfully holding two offices. The district court also determined that Title 74, Section 10.3 did not create an express exception to the dual office prohibition. Governor Stitt appealed, and the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma retained the case.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that Title 74, Section 10.3 expressly authorizes agency heads to serve concurrently as Cabinet Secretaries, notwithstanding the general prohibition against holding dual office in Title 51, Section 6. The Court found that the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and that both statutes can be read together without conflict. The district court’s order was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to enter a declaratory judgment consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. View "STITT V. DRUMMOND" on Justia Law

The case concerns the authority of the South Carolina Attorney General to enter into and execute a contingent fee agreement with private law firms in connection with litigation against the United States Department of Energy (DOE). The Attorney General retained two law firms to represent the State in disputes over the DOE’s obligations regarding plutonium storage and removal at the Savannah River Site. After extensive litigation and negotiation, the State and the DOE reached a settlement in which the DOE agreed to pay South Carolina $600 million. The Attorney General subsequently paid $75 million in attorney’s fees to the law firms, pursuant to the contingent fee agreement.Previously, the Richland County Circuit Court dismissed a challenge to the fee payment, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing. However, the Supreme Court of South Carolina later determined that the plaintiffs had public importance standing and remanded the case for consideration of the merits. On remand, the circuit court granted summary judgment to the Attorney General and the law firms, holding that the Attorney General had the authority to enter into the fee agreements. The circuit court did not address all of the plaintiffs’ claims, but the Supreme Court found the record sufficient to resolve the remaining legal questions.The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the Attorney General’s payment of attorney’s fees directly to the law firms, without first depositing the gross settlement into the State’s general fund or a legislatively created Litigation Recovery Account, was permissible under South Carolina Code subsection 1-7-150(B). The Court found that the settlement agreement and related documents “awarded” attorney’s fees as part of the settlement, and that the Attorney General’s contractual obligation to pay the fees constituted a “disposition required by law.” The Court also held that judicial review of the reasonableness of the fee would violate the separation of powers, as no statute authorized such review in this context. The judgment was affirmed in result. View "SC Public Interest Foundation v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Elisabeth Koletas, who was four months pregnant, requested a pat-down instead of passing through a body scanner at Southwest Florida International Airport due to concerns about radiation. During the pat-down, Transportation Security Officer (TSO) Sarno conducted a prolonged probe of Koletas’s vaginal area, focusing on material in her underwear. Koletas explained it was toilet paper used to stem pregnancy-related bleeding. Sarno, skeptical, moved Koletas to a private room and brought in Supervising TSO Shane, who further probed Koletas’s underwear and vaginal area. Shane directed Koletas to lift her dress and ultimately removed the toilet paper, finding no prohibited items. Koletas experienced psychological and physical distress from the encounter.After exhausting administrative remedies, Koletas filed suit against the United States in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. The United States moved to dismiss, arguing that the FTCA’s intentional tort exception preserved sovereign immunity for the alleged battery and false imprisonment. The district court agreed, relying solely on an unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision, and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that TSOs are “officers of the United States” empowered by law to execute searches under the FTCA’s law enforcement proviso, which waives sovereign immunity for certain intentional torts committed by such officers. The court found the statutory language unambiguous and joined five other circuits in this interpretation. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits. View "Koletas v. USA" on Justia Law

A Saudi military officer, Mohammed Saeed Al-Shamrani, who was a member of the Royal Saudi Air Force, carried out a mass shooting at the Pensacola Naval Air Station in Florida in December 2019, resulting in the deaths of three U.S. servicemembers and injuries to several others. The officer had a documented history of expressing extremist and anti-American views on social media prior to his arrival in the United States for flight training, which was part of a broader U.S.-Saudi military training program. The victims and their families brought suit against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, alleging various tort and contract claims, including gross negligence in vetting and sending Al-Shamrani to the U.S., failure to supervise, vicarious liability for his actions, support for terrorism, and breach of contract.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida dismissed all claims, finding that the plaintiffs’ allegations were facially insufficient to overcome Saudi Arabia’s sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA). The district court also denied the plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery, concluding that the complaint did not plausibly allege facts that would support an exception to sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that most claims were properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as they either involved discretionary functions, acts of omission, or failed to establish proximate cause or a waiver of immunity. However, the court found that the plaintiffs’ claims based on grossly negligent acts of commission by Saudi Arabia in vetting, hiring, and sending Al-Shamrani to the United States were facially sufficient under JASTA to survive a jurisdictional challenge. The case was remanded for further proceedings on these claims. View "Watson v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia" on Justia Law