Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Barbara Harrison, a severely disabled individual, challenged the Texas Health and Human Services Commission's (HHSC) decision to deny funding for medical services she claimed were necessary for her survival. Harrison lived in a group home and received nursing services funded by HHSC’s program for providing home and community-based care to people with disabilities. However, when her condition deteriorated to the point where she required 24/7 one-on-one nursing care, HHSC determined that the cost of providing Harrison’s necessary level of care exceeded the cost cap set by the program. Harrison was therefore denied program-funded nursing services, meaning her only option for receiving government-funded medical care was to move to an institutional setting.Harrison challenged HHSC’s determination in court, arguing that HHSC discriminated against her because of her disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act, by denying her program-funded nursing services. The district court granted a preliminary injunction requiring HHSC to fund 24/7 one-on-one care for Harrison until she received a hearing on her request for general revenue funds. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings, holding that Harrison was unlikely to succeed on her due process claim and had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the ADA/Rehabilitation Act claims.After the case was remanded to the district court, Harrison submitted a new application to HHSC for 24-hour nursing care under the Program, the cost of which again exceeded the Cost Cap. HHSC determined that Harrison did not require 24-hour nursing care and that 5.5 hours of nursing care per day would be sufficient to meet her medical needs. The district court found that Harrison’s change in status— from receiving no Program funding to receiving some Program funding— mooted Harrison’s ADA/Rehabilitation Act claims. The court therefore dismissed them and then granted summary judgment to HHSC on Harrison’s due process claim. Harrison appealed this decision.The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to HHSC on Harrison’s due process claim but reversed the district court’s dismissal of Harrison’s discrimination claims. The court found that the district court’s mootness determination was erroneous and that the factual record was still not sufficiently developed to support a judgment as to Harrison’s discrimination claims. The case was remanded for further factfinding and proceedings. View "Harrison v. Young" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of California reviewed a case involving the University of California, Berkeley's (UC Berkeley) plan to build a housing project on a site called People's Park. The plaintiffs, Make UC a Good Neighbor and People’s Park Historic District Advocacy Group, challenged the certification of an environmental impact report (EIR) for the project, arguing that it failed to consider the environmental impacts of "student-generated noise" and did not adequately consider alternatives to the People’s Park location. The Court of Appeal agreed with the plaintiffs.The Supreme Court of California granted review of the Court of Appeal’s decision. During the review, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 1307, which added sections to the Public Resources Code stating that noise generated by project occupants and their guests is not a significant environmental effect for residential projects, and that public higher education institutions are not required to consider alternatives to the location of a proposed residential or mixed-use housing project if certain requirements are met. The plaintiffs conceded that this new law applied to the case and made clear that the EIR was not required to examine "social noise" or potential alternative locations to People’s Park.The Supreme Court of California concluded that none of the plaintiffs' claims had merit in light of the new law. The court held that the new law applied to both the People’s Park housing project and the development plan, and the EIR was not inadequate for having failed to study the potential noisiness of future students at UC Berkeley in connection with this project. The court declined to consider the plaintiffs' alternative locations argument with respect to potential future housing projects. The court reversed the Court of Appeal’s judgment. View "Make UC a Good Neighbor v. The Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

The case involves Melissa Palmer, who applied for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) benefits due to loss of income from her self-employment as a sign-language interpreter during the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite continuing to work her second job at Woofs and Waves, she did not report this income in her weekly requests for benefits. The South Dakota Department of Labor and Regulation, Reemployment Assistance Division (Department) determined that she had misrepresented her income and was therefore ineligible for the benefits she had received. The Department ordered her to repay the benefits and assessed a mandatory penalty.The administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the Department's decision, finding that Palmer had willfully misrepresented her income. The circuit court affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Palmer appealed, arguing that she had not willfully misrepresented her income because she believed she only needed to report her self-employment income.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Court found that the ALJ's finding that Palmer believed she only needed to report her self-employment income was inconsistent with the conclusion that she had willfully misrepresented her income. The Court held that a willful misrepresentation requires evidence of intentional misrepresentation, not merely knowledge of the falsity of the representation. The Court remanded the case for the ALJ to reconsider whether Palmer was at fault for the overpayment and whether she was eligible for a waiver. View "Palmer V. Dep’t Of Labor & Regulation" on Justia Law

The defendant, Roland Riemers, was found guilty of disorderly conduct by a jury after he pursued a train that was blocking a street for longer than twenty minutes, a violation of a city ordinance. Riemers parked his car near the tracks, approached the train, informed the employees of the violation, and ignited a road flare. Both Riemers and the train employees called the police, and Riemers was subsequently charged.Riemers transferred his case from the Grand Forks Municipal Court to the District Court for a jury trial. He was found guilty of disorderly conduct under the Grand Forks City Code. Riemers appealed, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction due to procedural errors, that he should have been prosecuted under state law rather than city ordinance, and that the court erred by not instructing the jury about the right to conduct a citizen's arrest. He also argued that no victim was identified and that there was insufficient evidence for a conviction.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the district court did not lack jurisdiction, as the city was not required to serve the criminal information on Riemers. The court also ruled that Riemers could be prosecuted under city ordinance, as the city's disorderly conduct ordinance did not supersede state law. The court rejected Riemers' argument about the right to conduct a citizen's arrest, as he had waived any claim of error by expressing satisfaction with the jury instructions. The court also found that the criminal information was sufficient to protect Riemers from a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. Finally, the court declined to review Riemers' argument about the sufficiency of the evidence, as he had not moved for a judgment of acquittal at trial. View "City of Grand Forks v. Riemers" on Justia Law

The case involves Jay Jelinek, who was appealing an order denying his motion to suppress evidence and challenging evidentiary rulings made by the district court during his trial. Jelinek was found by a North Dakota Game and Fish Department Warden in a field during deer hunting season. The Warden recognized Jelinek from previous encounters and knew that his hunting privileges were suspended. Jelinek was replacing batteries in a trail camera and stated that he had been sitting in a deer stand with his wife, who had a deer tag, earlier that day. Jelinek moved to suppress evidence gathered during his encounter with the Warden, arguing that he was unlawfully seized and that the Warden did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.The District Court of Grand Forks County denied Jelinek's motion to suppress, finding that he was not subject to an improper seizure prior to his arrest and that the Warden had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Jelinek also argued that the court erred in denying his motion for acquittal on one count, as the State's only evidence of guilt was his own statements. He further argued that the court erred in allowing evidence of his criminal history to go to the jury and that his 6th Amendment rights were violated.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court found that the district court did not err in denying Jelinek's motion to suppress, as there was sufficient evidence supporting the district court's findings that Jelinek was not unlawfully seized. The court also found that the district court did not err in denying Jelinek's motion for acquittal, as there was substantial independent evidence establishing the trustworthiness of Jelinek's statements to law enforcement. However, the court found that the district court erred in allowing Jelinek's criminal history to be considered by the jury after one count was dismissed. The case was remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Jelinek" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Monique H. Worrell, who was suspended from her position as State Attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit by Governor Ron DeSantis through Executive Order 23-160. The order alleged that during Worrell's tenure, the administration of criminal justice in the Ninth Circuit was fundamentally derelict, constituting both neglect of duty and incompetence. The order detailed that Worrell authorized or allowed charging practices that permitted violent offenders, drug traffickers, serious juvenile offenders, and pedophiles to evade incarceration when otherwise warranted under Florida law. It also alleged that Worrell authorized or allowed practices that prevented assistant state attorneys from seeking certain sentencing enhancements and limited charges for possession of child pornography.The Florida Constitution allows the governor to suspend any state officer not subject to impeachment for neglect of duty or incompetence. Worrell, not being subject to impeachment, was constitutionally subject to suspension. The Florida Senate has the power to remove from office or reinstate the suspended official.The Supreme Court of Florida's role was to determine whether the governor had met the constitutional mandate to state the grounds of the officer's suspension. The court's review was deferential, confirming that the governor had specified the applicable grounds for suspension and that the allegations in the suspension order bore a reasonable relation to the asserted basis for the suspension.The Supreme Court of Florida found that the Executive Order passed this test. It named the grounds for Worrell's suspension—neglect of duty and incompetence—and provided various factual allegations that reasonably related to those grounds of suspension. The court disagreed with Worrell's claim that the allegations in the Executive Order were impermissibly vague or that they addressed conduct that fell within the lawful exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Therefore, the court denied Worrell's petition for a writ of quo warranto. View "Worrell v. DeSantis" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the City of Helena-West Helena and its Mayor, Christopher Franklin, and a resident, Greg Williams. The dispute arose when the Helena-West Helena City Council passed two ordinances, one increasing the conflict-of-interest limit for contracts signed with the City and the other raising the mayor's base pay. The then-mayor, Kevin Smith, vetoed both ordinances, citing the timing of the meeting as an attempt to circumvent the new city council. When Mayor Franklin took office, he attempted to rescind Smith's veto, stating that the ordinances should become law.The Phillips County Circuit Court had previously granted Williams's request for declaratory relief, ruling that the previous mayor's veto of the two city ordinances was proper. The court found that Smith had timely and properly executed a veto regarding the ordinances and that his veto was not overridden by a two-thirds vote of the City Council. As a result, the court declared all actions taken by the Council on December 30, including the passage of the two ordinances, null and void.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision. The court disagreed with the appellants' argument that Smith's veto was ineffective due to his failure to comply with the statutory requirements. The court found that Smith had complied with the statute by timely vetoing the Council's actions and filing a written statement of his reasons for the veto prior to the next regular Council meeting. The court also disagreed with the appellants' interpretation of the statute, stating that the statute does not affirmatively require that the mayor's reasons for the veto be presented to the Council in order to effectuate the veto. View "CITY OF HELENA-WEST HELENA v. WILLIAMS" on Justia Law

The case involves Donald Ververka, who was employed as an administrator at a veterans home operated by the California Department of Veterans Affairs (CalVet). Ververka alleged that CalVet terminated him in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5, which prohibits retaliation against whistleblowing employees. He claimed that he was dismissed for reporting safety and health issues at the home and potential violations of federal law. The jury found that while Ververka made protected disclosures that were contributing factors in CalVet's decision to remove him, CalVet was not liable as it proved it would have made the same decision for non-retaliatory reasons.After the trial court entered judgment for CalVet, Ververka moved to vacate the judgment, arguing that he was entitled to declaratory relief and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the analysis in Harris v. City of Santa Monica, a Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) case, did not extend to section 1102.5 claims, which are evaluated under the procedures set forth in section 1102.6.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division One, Ververka contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate the judgment. He argued that an employer’s “same decision” showing under section 1102.6 precludes only an award of damages and backpay and an order of reinstatement, and as a result, he was entitled to declaratory relief and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The court disagreed with Ververka's interpretation of section 1102.6 and affirmed the judgment of the trial court, dismissing CalVet’s cross-appeal as moot. The court held that if the employer satisfies its burden at the second step in making a same decision showing, the employer is not liable regardless of whether the employee made an initial showing that his or her protected disclosure was a “contributing factor” in the adverse employment action. View "Ververka v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

The case involves the South Carolina Department of Parks, Recreation and Tourism (SCPRT) and Google LLC. The State of South Carolina, along with several other states, sued Google for violations of federal and state antitrust laws. Google subpoenaed SCPRT for discovery pertinent to its defense. SCPRT refused to comply, asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity and moved to quash the subpoena.The district court denied SCPRT's motion, holding that any Eleventh Amendment immunity that SCPRT may have otherwise been entitled to assert was waived when the State, through its attorney general, voluntarily joined the federal lawsuit against Google. SCPRT appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that by joining the lawsuit against Google, the State voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of a federal court, thereby effecting a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity as to all matters arising in that suit. And because SCPRT’s immunity derives solely from that of the State, South Carolina’s waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity equally effected a waiver of SCPRT’s immunity. The district court, therefore, properly denied SCPRT’s motion to quash. View "SC Dept of Parks, Recreation and Tourism v. Google LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves Disability Rights Texas (DRTx), an advocacy organization for individuals with mental illness, and Houston Behavioral Healthcare Hospital (Houston Behavioral). DRTx sought to compel Houston Behavioral to disclose video footage related to the involuntary confinement of its client, G.S., who alleged abuse during his detention at the hospital. G.S. had signed a waiver allowing DRTx to access his records. Houston Behavioral initially cooperated with DRTx's requests for information but refused to provide the requested video footage, citing confidentiality regulations related to substance use disorder treatment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of DRTx and issued an injunction, compelling Houston Behavioral to disclose the video footage. Houston Behavioral appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act (PAIMI Act) grants broad investigatory powers to organizations like DRTx, including access to "all records of any individual." The court held that the video footage requested by DRTx falls within the definition of "records" under the PAIMI Act. The court also found that the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) does not bar the disclosure of such records, as the required-by-law exception in HIPAA permits disclosure when another law, such as the PAIMI Act, requires it. The court concluded that Houston Behavioral's refusal to provide the video footage violated the PAIMI Act. View "Disability Rights Texas v. Hollis" on Justia Law