Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Anthony Perry, a former employee of the Census Bureau, who retired under a settlement agreement after the Bureau initiated procedures to terminate him. Perry filed a "mixed case" appeal before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), alleging violations of the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) and various federal anti-discrimination laws. The MSPB dismissed the case, stating it lacked jurisdiction over voluntary retirement decisions. Perry appealed to the district court, which upheld the MSPB's decision and granted summary judgment in favor of the government.Perry then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, arguing that the district court erred by not considering his discrimination claims de novo and by affirming the MSPB's dismissal of his case for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals partially reversed the district court's decision, ruling that the district court should have allowed Perry to litigate the merits of his discrimination claims as required by statute. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's conclusion that the MSPB correctly dismissed Perry's mixed case for lack of jurisdiction. View "Perry v. Raimondo" on Justia Law

The case involves Brian Dewayne Darden-Mosby, who was convicted of two federal drug-dealing offenses. During the investigation, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents executed a search warrant for Darden-Mosby’s house and car, discovering an unregistered firearm, a money counter, drug ledgers, marijuana, and a backpack containing cocaine. They also seized $112,690 in cash found in various locations in his bedroom. After the search, police pulled over one of Darden-Mosby’s cocaine suppliers and found Darden-Mosby in the passenger seat with a bank envelope containing $2,500 in cash and two cashier’s checks totaling nearly $150,000.The United States prosecuted Darden-Mosby for various crimes based on the drugs and guns found in his house. As part of the prosecution, the government initiated criminal-forfeiture proceedings against the cash from Darden-Mosby’s bedroom, the two cashier’s checks, and the $2,500 found in Darden-Mosby’s pocket. Darden-Mosby sought to suppress the cashier’s checks and $2,500, arguing the detective’s search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the motion. The government ultimately opted not to introduce that evidence at trial, and it dismissed the criminal forfeiture claims against the two checks.A jury convicted Darden-Mosby of two drug-dealing offenses. The government declined to prosecute the forfeiture of the $2,500 in cash from the traffic stop any further but continued to pursue criminal forfeiture of the $112,690 from Darden-Mosby’s house. After a hearing and additional briefing, the court concluded the cash was connected to Darden-Mosby’s drug dealing and ordered the criminal forfeiture of the money.Separate from the government’s criminal-forfeiture actions, the DEA commenced administrative-forfeiture proceedings against the two cashier’s checks and the $2,500. These proceedings resulted in the administrative forfeiture of all three assets.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court affirmed the district court’s criminal-forfeiture order with respect to the $92,470 found in the safe and shoebox at Darden-Mosby’s house but reversed with respect to the $20,220 found in and on the dresser. The court found that Darden-Mosby offered credible evidence that the $20,220 found on and in the dresser had legal sources and purposes. However, the court found that Darden-Mosby’s evidence was considerably weaker when it came to the $92,470 in the safe and shoebox. View "United States v. Darden-Mosby" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the legality of the Emergency Management Act (the Act) in Minnesota, which allows the Governor to declare a peacetime emergency in response to a pandemic. The appellants, led by Drake Snell, challenged the Act, arguing that it did not authorize the Governor to declare a peacetime emergency in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and that it violated the nondelegation doctrine.Previously, the district court had dismissed Snell's case, concluding that the Act was a constitutional delegation of power to the Governor. The court of appeals affirmed this decision, stating that the Act granted the Governor the authority to declare a peacetime emergency in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The court of appeals declined to consider Snell's argument that the Act violated the nondelegation doctrine, holding that it was not within the scope of remand.The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. The court concluded that the Act does authorize a governor to declare a peacetime emergency in response to a public health crisis such as a pandemic. Furthermore, the court found that Governor Walz was authorized under the Act to declare a peacetime emergency in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Lastly, the court rejected Snell's contention that the Act violates the nondelegation doctrine, stating that the Act does not represent an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. The court noted that the Act places durational limits on the powers and subjects them to termination by the Legislature, thus providing a check on the Governor's powers. View "Procaccini vs. Walz" on Justia Law

The case involves the Alaska Trappers Association and the National Trappers Association (collectively, the Trappers) who challenged a city ordinance enacted by the City of Valdez. The ordinance regulated animal trapping within the city limits, barring trapping in certain areas for the purpose of protecting public safety and domesticated animals. The Trappers argued that the ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional, asserting that it was preempted by state law and violated the Alaska Constitution.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Valdez, granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Valdez. The court concluded that the legislature's delegation of authority to the Board of Game was limited and did not grant the Board exclusive control of trapping. The court also determined that the ordinance did not directly contradict state regulations.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the ordinance was not prohibited by the Alaska Constitution or the legislature’s delegation of authority over fish and game to the Board. The court concluded that the ordinance was not impliedly prohibited by state law, as it was enacted pursuant to Valdez's authority to regulate land use and public safety, and was not substantially irreconcilable with the State's authority to regulate the conservation, development, or utilization of game. View "Alaska Trappers Association, Inc. v. City of Valdez" on Justia Law

The case involves Maria Esparraguera, a career appointee in the Senior Executive Service (SES), who was removed from her position by the Department of the Army. Esparraguera claimed that her constitutional due process rights were violated by the Army. The district court dismissed her suit, stating that she failed to show that the removal implicated a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause.Previously, the district court had dismissed Esparraguera’s due process claim, finding that she had no constitutionally protected property interest in her SES status. The court did not address whether the process Esparraguera received (or the absence thereof) complied with the Due Process Clause. Esparraguera appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that Esparraguera had a protected property interest in her SES status. The court reasoned that the statutory and regulatory provisions applicable to her case gave Esparraguera a property interest in her SES status. The court also concluded that the government was required to provide her, at a minimum, some form of meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard before removing her from the SES. The case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Esparraguera v. Department of the Army" on Justia Law

In September 2021, the House Select Committee investigating the January 6th attack on the U.S. Capitol issued a subpoena to Stephen Bannon, a former advisor to President Donald Trump, to testify and provide documents. Bannon did not comply with the subpoena, leading to his conviction for contempt of Congress under 2 U.S.C. § 192, which criminalizes willfully failing to respond to a congressional subpoena. Bannon appealed his conviction, arguing that "willfully" should be interpreted to require bad faith and that his noncompliance was justified because his lawyer advised him not to respond to the subpoena.The District Court had previously rejected Bannon's argument, holding that "willfully" in Section 192 only requires that the defendant deliberately and intentionally refused to comply with a congressional subpoena. The court also dismissed Bannon's claim that his noncompliance was authorized by government officials and that the Select Committee's subpoena was invalid. Bannon was found guilty on both counts and sentenced to four months' incarceration for each count to run concurrently, with a $6,500 fine.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that Bannon's interpretation of "willfully" was incorrect and that his "advice of counsel" defense was not a valid defense under Section 192. The court also rejected Bannon's arguments that his conduct was authorized by government officials and that the Select Committee's subpoena was invalid. The court concluded that Bannon's refusal to comply with the subpoena was a deliberate and intentional violation of the contempt of Congress statute, and his conviction was therefore affirmed. View "United States v. Bannon" on Justia Law

The case involves the City of Houston, which appealed a wrongful-death suit filed by the family of Dwayne Foreman, who was killed in a collision with a police cruiser. The police officers were responding to a suicide call at the time of the accident. The City argued that it was immune from the lawsuit because the officer was performing a discretionary duty in good faith and within the scope of his authority.The trial court denied the City's motion for summary judgment, and the City appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that a fact issue existed on the officer’s good faith, which precluded summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the lower courts. It held that, as a matter of law, the officer was performing a discretionary duty while acting within the scope of his authority in responding to the emergency call and was acting in good faith. The court reasoned that a reasonably prudent officer in the same or similar circumstances could have believed the actions were justified. Therefore, the court reversed the lower courts' decisions and dismissed the case. View "CITY OF HOUSTON v. SAULS" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Iowa was asked to determine who should bear the costs of a technology vendor hired to review a large volume of emails seized under a search warrant for potential attorney-client privileged communications. The emails belonged to a criminal defendant, Craig Juan Merrill, who was charged with multiple counts of ongoing criminal conduct, theft, assault, and misconduct in office. The search warrant stipulated that the seized materials would be reviewed by the district court to ensure no attorney-client privileged materials were inadvertently handed over to the prosecution.However, due to the large volume of emails and technical difficulties, the district court was unable to complete the review and decided to hire a technology vendor to assist. The question of who should bear the costs of this vendor became a point of contention. The district court initially ordered the prosecution to pay the costs, but left open the possibility that the costs could be taxed to the defendant at the conclusion of the case.The State of Iowa filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of Iowa, arguing that the district court acted illegally in assessing the costs of the privilege review against the prosecution. The State contended that the judicial branch should bear the costs, as the vendor was effectively acting as a special master to assist the court.The Supreme Court of Iowa sustained the writ, ruling that the judicial branch should be responsible for the costs of the technology vendor. The court reasoned that the district court had voluntarily assumed the responsibility of conducting the initial privilege review and, when it was unable to do so, it was compelled to employ a third-party vendor. Under these unique circumstances, the court concluded that the judicial branch must bear the costs of the vendor it employed. View "State of Iowa v. Iowa District Court For Emmet County" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Jay Anthony Dobyns, a former agent with the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), who sued the United States for failing to adequately protect him and his family from threats related to his undercover work. The government counterclaimed, alleging that Dobyns violated his employment contract and several federal regulations by publishing a book based on his experience as an agent and by contracting his story to create a motion picture. The Court of Federal Claims found that the government had not breached the settlement agreement but had breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, awarding Dobyns emotional distress damages. The court also found that the government was not entitled to relief on its counterclaim.The government appealed the Claims Court’s judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which reversed the finding that the government breached the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Dobyns, having prevailed on the government’s counterclaim, sought attorneys’ fees and costs. However, the Claims Court denied his application for attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) as untimely. Dobyns appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the Claims Court had abused its discretion and applied the incorrect legal standard. The Appeals Court held that the filing deadline for fee applications under EAJA is subject to equitable tolling. It found that Dobyns had justifiably relied on the government's representations about the procedure for Claims Court judgments, and thus his motion for attorneys’ fees under EAJA should be accepted as timely. The court reversed the Claims Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Dobyns v. United States" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the dispute over whether the main roads within the Deerfield Estates subdivision in Newton County, Mississippi, are private or public. In 2001, the Newton County Board of Supervisors voted to accept the two main roads of the subdivision into the county road system. However, the roads were never added to the official county road registry. In 2020, the subdivision filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the roads are public and an injunction mandating the county to add them to the registry and perform repairs.The Newton County Chancery Court held that the roads had become public roads via express common law dedication and ordered that the roads be added to the county map and road register. The county appealed this decision, arguing that the subdivision's claims were barred by the doctrine of laches or the general three-year statute of limitations.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the lower court's decision. It held that the county's 2001 acceptance of the roads was effective and that the roads served public interest or convenience. The court also found that the county's failure to add the roads to the registry and the map in a timely manner did not negate the county's explicit acceptance of the dedication. Furthermore, the court ruled that the county could not invoke the doctrine of laches or the general three-year statute of limitations to bar the subdivision's request for a declaratory judgment that the roads are public roads. View "Newton County, Mississippi v. Deerfield Estates Subdivision Property Owners Association, LLC" on Justia Law