Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

KalshiEx LLC, a regulated commodities exchange, sought to offer "Congressional Control Contracts" allowing individuals to bet on the outcome of the November 2024 congressional elections. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) prohibited these contracts, arguing they constituted gaming or election gambling, which is illegal in many states. Kalshi challenged this decision under the Administrative Procedure Act, claiming the CFTC's determination was arbitrary and capricious.The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in favor of Kalshi, finding that the CFTC erred in categorizing the contracts as gaming or gambling. The court vacated the CFTC's decision, reasoning that the term "gaming" did not apply to election contracts and that the contracts did not involve illegal activity under state law. The CFTC then sought a stay of the district court's judgment while it pursued an appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the CFTC's emergency motion for a stay pending appeal. The court denied the motion, concluding that the CFTC failed to demonstrate that it or the public would suffer irreparable harm without a stay. The court noted that the CFTC's concerns about potential harms, such as market manipulation and threats to election integrity, were speculative and not substantiated by concrete evidence. The court left open the possibility for the CFTC to renew its stay request if more concrete evidence of irreparable harm emerged during the appeal. The administrative stay was dissolved. View "KalshiEX LLC v. CFTC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a police officer for the Town of Salem, was involved in an off-duty incident over ten years ago where he drove at 62 mph in a 30 mph zone, refused to pull over for another officer, and avoided spike strips before stopping and laughing off the incident as a joke. An internal investigation found he violated the department's code of conduct for "Conduct Unbecoming an Employee." He accepted responsibility, waived hearings, and took a one-day unpaid suspension in a negotiated agreement with the Salem Police Department (SPD).Years later, following an audit, the New Hampshire Department of Justice (DOJ) requested the internal investigation report and added the plaintiff's name to the Exculpatory Evidence Schedule (EES). The plaintiff requested removal, citing a court order that his personnel file did not contain Brady/Giglio material. The DOJ denied the request, and the plaintiff filed a complaint in superior court seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The Superior Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the plaintiff's conduct was "potentially exculpatory evidence" under RSA 105:13-d, and that he had received adequate due process.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and concluded that the plaintiff's conduct was not "potentially exculpatory evidence" as it was not relevant to his general credibility and was stale. The court noted that the conduct was over ten years old, the plaintiff had accepted responsibility, and his criminal charges were nolle prossed and annulled. The court reversed the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the plaintiff's removal from the EES was warranted. View "Doe v. Salem Police Department" on Justia Law

Lazy D Grazing Association manages a 25,000-acre ranch along the Colorado-Wyoming border, which lacks sufficient surface water for irrigation. In 2020, Lazy D sought a determination from the water court that the groundwater beneath the ranch in the Upper Laramie Aquifer is nontributary, meaning it is not subject to Colorado's prior appropriation system. This designation would allow Lazy D to control the use of the groundwater. The State Engineer determined that the groundwater was nontributary, prompting opposition from various entities, including the Cities of Sterling and Fort Collins, who feared it would harm their water rights.The District Court for Water Division 1 in Greeley found in favor of Lazy D, determining that the groundwater was nontributary. The Cities of Sterling and Fort Collins appealed, arguing that the State Engineer exceeded his authority, the water court improperly presumed the truth of the State Engineer's findings, and that the court relied on sources not in evidence while discrediting expert testimony without justification.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and affirmed the water court's decision. The court held that the State Engineer was within his rights to determine the facts regarding whether the groundwater is nontributary, but the final determination is a mixed question of fact and law for the water court. Although the water court erred in giving a presumption of truth to the State Engineer's legal conclusion, this error was deemed harmless as the water court independently concluded that the groundwater was nontributary. The court also found that the water court did not improperly shift the burden of proof to the Cities and did not rely on information outside the record. The water court's reliance on expert testimony was found to be appropriate, and the decision to allow Lazy D to use the nontributary groundwater was upheld. View "City of Sterling v. Lazy D Grazing Association" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, including Free Speech Coalition, Inc. and others, sought to prevent Utah officials from enforcing a law requiring age verification for online pornography. They argued that the law violated the First Amendment and other constitutional rights. The law allows private parties to sue commercial entities that fail to verify users' ages. Plaintiffs claimed this law imposed unconstitutional restrictions on free speech and sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Attorney General of Utah and the Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety.The United States District Court for the District of Utah dismissed the case, ruling that the defendants were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court found that the defendants did not enforce or give effect to the law, thus the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity did not apply. The district court also noted that the Commissioner’s oversight of a mobile driver's license program did not constitute enforcement of the law, as the program did not yet provide for online age verification.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court agreed that neither the Attorney General nor the Commissioner enforced or gave effect to the law. The court held that the Ex parte Young exception did not apply because the law placed enforcement authority with private individuals, not state officials. The court also found that the Commissioner’s management of the mobile driver's license program was too attenuated to constitute enforcement of the law. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. View "Free Speech Coalition v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Steve L. Michaud sustained a traumatic injury to his left eye on December 26, 2014, while working as an auto mechanic, resulting in an immediate loss of more than eighty percent of his vision. Michaud underwent multiple surgeries between 2015 and 2019 in an attempt to restore his vision, but these efforts were largely unsuccessful. In September 2021, Michaud filed petitions for an award of compensation and specific-loss benefits. A doctor’s report in October 2021 confirmed that Michaud had reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) with a ninety-four percent vision loss in his left eye.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that Michaud’s specific-loss benefits became due on October 14, 2021, the date of the doctor’s report, and ordered interest to be paid from that date. Michaud appealed, arguing that the benefits should accrue from the date of his injury in 2014. The Workers’ Compensation Board (WCB) Appellate Division affirmed the ALJ’s decision, relying on the precedent set in Tracy v. Hershey Creamery Co., which held that specific-loss benefits for an eye injury are determined when the injury reaches a reasonable medical endpoint.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that Michaud’s injury immediately resulted in more than eighty percent vision loss and that his condition did not materially improve despite medical interventions. The court held that Michaud’s specific-loss benefits became due on the date of his injury, December 26, 2014, and that interest should accrue from that date. The court vacated the Appellate Division’s decision and remanded the case for entry of a decree ordering Michaud’s employer to pay interest from the date of the injury. View "Michaud v. Caribou Ford-Mercury, Inc." on Justia Law

Crusader Gun Group, L.L.C. applied for a Federal Firearms License (FFL) in November 2020, with Alan Aronstein identified as the president and responsible person. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) denied the application, citing Aronstein's history of willfully violating federal firearms laws through his previous roles in other firearms businesses. These violations included over 6,000 recordkeeping errors, failure to report the theft or loss of firearms, and possession of unlawful machine guns. Crusader requested a hearing, but the ATF upheld its decision, leading Crusader to seek judicial review.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of the ATF. The court found that the ATF was authorized to deny the application based on Aronstein's willful violations of federal firearms laws. Crusader's cross-motion for summary judgment was denied, prompting an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the ATF was authorized to deny Crusader's FFL application under 18 U.S.C. § 923(d)(1)(C) because Aronstein, as the responsible person, had willfully violated federal firearms laws. The court also rejected Crusader's due process claims, noting that adequate procedural safeguards were in place, including notice, a hearing, and the opportunity for judicial review. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to stay discovery, as the administrative record was sufficient for summary judgment. The court concluded that the ATF's denial of the FFL application was lawful and supported by substantial evidence. View "Crusader Gun Group v. James" on Justia Law

In 2020, a federal grand jury indicted David DeQuattro, an architect, and Cedric Cromwell, Chairman of the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council and President of the Mashpee Wampanoag Gaming Authority. They were charged with various federal offenses, including bribery and extortion, related to Cromwell allegedly soliciting and DeQuattro allegedly providing checks and other items of value to protect a contract between DeQuattro's firm and the Gaming Authority for building a casino on tribal land.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held a jury trial where DeQuattro was convicted of one count of federal-program bribery, and Cromwell was convicted of two counts of federal-program bribery and multiple counts of Hobbs Act extortion. However, the District Court later entered a judgment of acquittal on the Hobbs Act-related counts, determining that the Hobbs Act did not clearly abrogate tribal immunity. Both defendants appealed their § 666 convictions, and the government cross-appealed the judgment of acquittal on the Hobbs Act counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed both the § 666 convictions and the judgment of acquittal. The court found that the evidence did not suffice to show that the RGB contract was "business" of the Tribe, as required under § 666, because the Gaming Authority, which entered the contract, was a separate legal entity from the Tribe and received almost all its funding from a third party. The court also reversed the District Court's judgment of acquittal on the Hobbs Act convictions, holding that tribal officials do not enjoy immunity from federal criminal prosecution and that the evidence was sufficient to show Cromwell's intent to engage in a quid pro quo arrangement. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "United States v. Dequattro" on Justia Law

The City of Soldotna sought to expand its boundaries by annexing adjacent land and submitted an annexation petition to the Local Boundary Commission (Commission) for legislative review. The Commission, however, decided to convert the petition to a local vote, exercising its authority under a regulation that had not been previously used. Soldotna appealed the Commission’s decision, arguing that the Commission exceeded its authority, the regulation was invalid due to lack of standards and required rulemaking, there was insufficient basis for the decision, and the decision was internally inconsistent.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Kenai, upheld the Commission’s decision. The court found that the regulation under which the Commission acted was authorized by the Alaska Constitution and that the Commission’s decision to convert the petition was reasonable. The court held that the Commission acted within its statutory grant of authority and had a reasonable basis for converting the petition.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that the Commission had the authority under the Alaska Constitution and relevant statutes to adopt the regulation allowing it to convert a legislative review petition to a local action petition. The court found that the regulation provided a standard by requiring the Commission to balance the best interests of the locality and the state. The court also determined that the Commission’s decision had a reasonable basis in the record, considering the public opposition to the annexation and the support for local action from the Kenai Peninsula Borough. The court concluded that the Commission acted within its discretion and expertise in deciding to proceed by local action. View "City of Soldotna v. State" on Justia Law

Steve Winder became suicidal after discovering Facebook messages between his wife and her ex-husband. His wife, Latrisha, who was out of state, called her mother, Lou Anne, and the Young County Sheriff’s Department for a welfare check after Steve sent pictures of himself holding a gun to his head. Deputy Joshua Gallardo arrived at the scene, and after hearing Steve shout from within, opened the front door. Lou Anne indicated that Steve was armed. Deputy Gallardo then fatally shot Steve after ordering him to put the gun down.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the case at the 12(b)(6) stage. The court found that Steve’s suicidality and possession of a gun created exigent circumstances excusing the need for a warrant. It also ruled that an objectively reasonable officer in Deputy Gallardo’s position would not need to wait for Steve to point the gun at him before using deadly force, thus defeating the excessive force claim. Additionally, the court found no underlying constitutional violation to support claims for supervisory or Monell liability and ruled that Title II of the ADA does not support claims where police officers face exigent circumstances.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry and that Deputy Gallardo’s use of deadly force was reasonable under the circumstances. The court also found no basis for supervisory or Monell liability due to the absence of an underlying constitutional violation. Lastly, the court ruled that the ADA claims were foreclosed by the exigent circumstances and that there was no evidence that Steve was discriminated against by reason of his disability. View "Winder v. Gallardo" on Justia Law

The Tuscaloosa City Council passed an ordinance limiting the maximum occupancy of certain restaurants, affecting a sports bar owned by CMB Holdings Group. The ordinance required establishments with restaurant liquor licenses to maintain occupancy limits based on their configuration as restaurants, not as bars or entertainment venues. This change reduced the sports bar's maximum occupancy from 519 to 287, negatively impacting its revenue. CMB Holdings Group sued the City of Tuscaloosa, the mayor, city council members, and the fire marshal, alleging racial discrimination and other claims.The Tuscaloosa Circuit Court dismissed most of CMB's claims, including those for money damages against the City and personal-capacity claims against the mayor and councilors due to legislative immunity. The court also dismissed claims for procedural and substantive due process, equal protection, and others, leaving only claims for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Alabama Constitution's Contracts Clause. CMB requested the court to alter or amend its judgment or certify it as final for appeal purposes. The court denied the request to alter or amend but granted the Rule 54(b) certification, allowing CMB to appeal the dismissed claims.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the Rule 54(b) certification was improper. The court found that the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims were closely intertwined, particularly regarding whether the ordinance affected vested rights or mere privileges and whether it served a legitimate public interest. The court concluded that separate adjudication could lead to inconsistent results and dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. View "CMB Holdings Groupv. City of Tuscaloosa" on Justia Law