Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In a case involving the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and a group of petitioners, the petitioners challenged FERC's decision to allow a new auction rule to be applied retroactively. The auction in question, run by PJM Interconnection LLC, determines the selling price for electricity. The petitioners argued that the retroactive application of the new rule violated the filed rate doctrine, which prohibits retroactive rates.The court agreed with the petitioners, granting their petitions and vacating the orders in question. The court found that the new rule was retroactive because it changed the legal consequence of a past action, specifically the calculation and posting of the Locational Deliverability Area (LDA) Reliability Requirement. The LDA Reliability Requirement is a parameter used in the auction to determine the amount of electricity that must be produced to meet peak demand.The court noted that while the new rule allowed PJM to adjust the LDA Reliability Requirement downward to account for certain resources' lack of participation in the auction, the original tariff did not provide for this adjustment. Therefore, the new rule altered the legal consequence of the past action of calculating and posting the LDA Reliability Requirement.The court concluded that the retroactive application of the new rule violated the filed rate doctrine, and therefore FERC's approval of the rule was not in accordance with the law. The court emphasized that the doctrine's goal of predictability is of utmost importance and that FERC and the courts must respect the doctrine to ensure stability in the markets. As a result, only the portion of FERC's orders that allowed the new rule to be applied to the specific 2024/25 capacity auction was vacated. View "PJM Power Providers Group v. FERC" on Justia Law

In this case, the People of the State of California filed a lawsuit against Holiday Liquor (owned by Abdul Jamal Sheriff and operated under Freetown Holdings Company) for public nuisance. The People claimed that the store had become a hub for illegal drug transactions, with customers and dealers using the store as a meeting point. The store was accused of tolerating loitering and drug dealing, lacking security, operating until 2 a.m., and selling alcohol in cheap single-serving containers.The trial court granted summary judgment for the People, ordering the store to hire guards, stop selling single-serving containers of alcohol, and take other measures to address the issue. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision.The court held that Holiday Liquor had indeed facilitated a public nuisance by failing to take reasonable measures to prevent the sale of illegal drugs on its property. The court ruled that the proprietor was aware of the illegal activities as he had been informed multiple times by the police. Despite this knowledge, he failed to implement recommended measures to mitigate the issue, such as hiring security guards, limiting operating hours, and ceasing the sale of single-serving alcohol containers. The ruling was based on the violation of sections 11570 et seq. of the Health and Safety Code (the drug house law), sections 3479 et seq. of the Civil Code (the public nuisance law), and sections 17200 et seq. of the Business and Professions Code (the unfair competition law). View "P. v. Freetown Holdings Co." on Justia Law

The case involves Christopher Kabew, who pleaded guilty to attempted residential burglary, his first felony conviction. His sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation with the condition that he complete a substance abuse treatment program. After successfully completing the program, Kabew petitioned the district court to set aside his conviction under NRS 176A.240(6)(a), which states that upon completing the terms and conditions of a drug court program, a court "shall discharge the defendant and dismiss the proceedings or set aside the judgment of conviction" unless the defendant has a prior felony conviction or previously failed to complete a specialty court program. The district court denied the motion, and Kabew petitioned the Supreme Court of Nevada.The Supreme Court of Nevada found that the district court improperly denied Kabew's motion. The court held that NRS 176A.240(6)(a) is mandatory and does not afford district courts any discretion to deny a motion to set aside a judgment of conviction when the defendant meets the statutory requirements. The court further held that the statute does not intrude on judicial functions, as it is within the legislature's power to define crimes and determine punishments. The court concluded that the district court failed to perform a duty required by law by denying Kabew's motion, and ordered the district court to set aside Kabew's conviction. View "Kabew v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law

In a case tried in the Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada, the appellant, Kim A. Judd, was charged with one count of felony injuring or tampering with a motor vehicle and one count of felony coercion. This came after an altercation where Judd struck a 1957 Chevrolet truck several times with a sledgehammer following a disagreement with the owner of the vehicle, Scott Reber, over payment for repairs.The key issue addressed by the court was the interpretation of the phrase "physical force" in NRS 207.190(2), which distinguishes between coercion being punished as a felony versus as a misdemeanor. The court needed to determine whether "physical force" should be limited to physical force against a person, and not merely against property.The court concluded that the Nevada Legislature intended for the distinguishing statutory element of "physical force" to be limited to force against a person. As such, the jury should have been instructed accordingly. The court emphasized the importance of giving proper jury instructions for the essential elements of a crime and ruled that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the definition of physical force as being limited to force against a person necessitated the reversal of this conviction.However, the court affirmed the felony conviction for injuring or tampering with a motor vehicle, concluding that the jury was correctly instructed on the proper measure of damages for the partial destruction of property. The conviction for injuring or tampering with a motor vehicle was based on the uncontroverted expert testimony at trial, which provided a replacement cost for the damaged parts of the vehicle. View "Judd v. State" on Justia Law

In the case between the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and Bannum Place of Saginaw, LLC and Bannum, Inc., the court ruled in favor of the NLRB.Bannum Place of Saginaw, a provider of reentry services for formerly incarcerated individuals, had been found to have engaged in unfair labor practices, including the termination of two union supporters. The NLRB sought enforcement of its decision to award specific backpay amounts to the two affected employees. Bannum contested this decision, arguing that Bannum, Inc. and Bannum Place of Saginaw were not a single employer and that the backpay calculation was erroneous.The court, however, upheld the NLRB's decision, noting that substantial evidence supported the finding that Bannum, Inc. and Bannum Place of Saginaw constituted a single employer. The court also rejected Bannum's argument that the backpay calculation was erroneous, stating that the burden was on the employer to establish facts that would mitigate that liability. The court also dismissed Bannum’s claims that its due process rights were violated, explaining that the relationship between Bannum, Inc. and Bannum Place of Saginaw was so interrelated that they actually constituted a single integrated enterprise.In conclusion, the court granted the NLRB's application for enforcement and denied Bannum's cross-petition. View "NLRB v. Bannum Inc." on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Thurman King sued Officers Zachary Abbate and Jason Bradley, the City of Rockford, the Rockford Public Safety Department, and other municipal officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law for incidents stemming from a 2019 traffic stop. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants but denied their motion for summary judgment on qualified and governmental immunity grounds for King’s federal and state tort claims against Abbate and Bradley. The court also denied their motion on King’s Monell claim against the City and Department. The defendants appealed this denial.The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, and reversed in part, the district court’s denial of qualified and governmental immunity to Abbate and Bradley. The court found that Abbate was entitled to qualified and governmental immunity for his takedown maneuver against King but not for the subsequent conduct on the ground. The court also dismissed the City and Department’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.The court found a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Abbate and Bradley had probable cause to believe that King committed any underlying crimes, which defeated the officers' claims for summary judgment on King’s false arrest claim. The court affirmed the district court's denial of governmental immunity to Abbate and Bradley for their conduct on the ground but reversed the denial of governmental immunity to Abbate for his takedown maneuver. The court also affirmed the district court’s denial of governmental immunity to Abbate and Bradley for King’s false arrest claim. View "King v. City of Rockford, MI" on Justia Law

In the case at hand, the defendant, Christopher Condron, was convicted of wire fraud and conspiracy to defraud the United States by obtaining payment for false claims. He had been involved in submitting applications to the United States Department of the Treasury for grant money in connection with supposed renewable energy projects. The applications were submitted on behalf of four different companies, which were created under the name of his then-girlfriend, Jessica Metivier.Condron appealed his conviction on three main grounds: 1) He argued that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction on all counts. 2) He claimed that the government's argument and evidence at trial constructively amended, or at least prejudicially varied from, one of the wire fraud counts. 3) He contended that the district court abused its discretion when it limited his cross-examination of a key government witness.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected all three arguments and affirmed Condron's conviction. It found that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction, that the government did not constructively amend or prejudicially vary from the indictment, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting Condron's cross-examination of a key government witness. View "US v. Condron" on Justia Law

Three shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac sued the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and the Department of the Treasury, alleging harm from the unconstitutional removal restriction of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. Their claims were based on the premise that if President Trump had been able to remove the FHFA Director without restrictions, he would have ended a provision that, in the event of liquidation, allowed the Treasury to recover its full preference before any other shareholder. The district court dismissed the shareholders' claims, finding that they did not sufficiently demonstrate any harm.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court noted that to challenge agency action, a party must not only show that the removal restriction is unconstitutional but also that the provision caused or would cause them harm. The court found that the shareholders' assertions did not satisfy this standard. They relied heavily on a post-presidency letter from President Trump expressing his desire to have removed the FHFA Director during his presidency. The court determined that this letter did not meet the criteria of a "public statement expressing displeasure" as outlined by the Supreme Court in Collins v. Yellen. Furthermore, the court found the shareholders' circumstantial evidence of harm speculative and insufficient to state a claim for relief. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of the claims. View "Bhatti v. Fed. Housing Finance Agency" on Justia Law

This appeal originates from a dispute between Alameda Health System (AHS) and Alameda County Employees’ Retirement Association (ACERA), concerning the method employed by ACERA to calculate the annual contributions that participating employers must make towards unfunded liabilities. This system was intended to ensure the ability to finance the pensions promised to employees. AHS is one of seven public entities that are part of ACERA's retirement system.Since 1948, ACERA has used the “Percentage of Payroll” method to calculate annual contributions for unfunded liabilities among its participating employers. This common approach pools actuarial risk to reduce volatility in contribution rates, simplify contribution calculations, and ensure timely funding for the retirement system. AHS raised concerns about this method in 2015, suggesting an alternative approach, the “Percentage of Liability” method, could result in AHS paying $12 million less in contributions each year.AHS requested that ACERA change its methodology and retrospectively reallocate contributions made of “approximately $65 million.” ACERA's Board unanimously voted to deny AHS's requests after consideration and consultation. AHS subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief challenging ACERA’s decisions. In 2022, the court granted ACERA's motion for summary judgment and AHS appealed. The appeals court affirmed the judgment, finding no abuse of discretion by ACERA or the lower court. View "Alameda Health System v. Alameda County Employees' Retirement Association" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) denial of a whistleblower award. The petitioner, John Meisel, reported his suspicions about his former tenant's involvement in a Ponzi scheme, which he read about in a newspaper, to the SEC. After the SEC's successful enforcement action against the scheme's perpetrators, Meisel applied for a whistleblower award. The SEC denied his application, reasoning that Meisel's information did not contribute to the enforcement action. Furthermore, his assistance to a court-appointed receiver, who was tasked with recovering funds related to the scheme, did not qualify him for an award as the receiver was not a representative of the Commission. Meisel appealed the denial, claiming it was arbitrary and unsupported by substantial evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied Meisel’s petition for review. The court held that the SEC's denial of the whistleblower award was neither arbitrary nor capricious, nor was it unsupported by substantial evidence. The court found that the SEC had not used Meisel’s information in its enforcement action, and therefore, his information did not lead to its success. The court also held that Meisel's assistance to the receiver did not qualify him for an award because the receiver was an independent court officer, not a representative of the SEC. Lastly, the court determined that Meisel could not qualify for an award in any related actions because he did not qualify for an award in the covered action. View "Meisel v. Securities and Exchange Commission" on Justia Law