Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska considered whether law enforcement officers violated the Alaska Constitution by conducting warrantless aerial surveillance of a private property with high-powered optics to investigate a tip about marijuana cultivation. The property was located in an isolated area near Fairbanks and was surrounded by trees that obstructed ground-level view. The officers' aerial surveillance aided by a high-powered zoom lens led to a search warrant, which uncovered marijuana plants, methamphetamine, scales, plastic bags for packaging, a loaded AK-47 rifle, and a large amount of cash. The defendant, McKelvey, was subsequently charged with criminal offenses.The Superior Court denied McKelvey's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the aerial surveillance, holding that although McKelvey had a subjective expectation of privacy, this expectation was objectively unreasonable given the visibility of his property from the air. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling, holding that under the Alaska Constitution, a warrant was required for law enforcement to use high-powered optics for aerial surveillance of a private property.The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. It held that conducting aerial surveillance of a person's property using high-powered optics constitutes a search that requires a warrant under the Alaska Constitution. The court reasoned that such surveillance has the potential to reveal intimate details of a person's private life and could discourage Alaskans from using their private outdoor spaces. The court concluded that the chilling effect of such surveillance outweighed the utility of the conduct as a law enforcement technique. View "State of Alaska v. Mckelvey" on Justia Law

In this case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Danny Cruz, a prisoner, hatched a plan to smuggle cell phones into prison and sell them to fellow inmates by bribing a prison guard. Upon being caught, Cruz was charged with conspiring to violate the Travel Act under 18 U.S.C. § 371. Facing an additional five years in prison, Cruz entered a plea deal in which he pleaded guilty in exchange for the prosecution's agreement to recommend that the total offense level is 14. However, the Probation Office called for a four-level enhancement because the crime involved a public official in a sensitive position, leading to a dispute over whether this enhancement should apply.Cruz argued that if the government endorsed the enhancement, it would contravene the plea agreement, and the prosecution initially supported the enhancement during a presentence conference. Subsequently, the prosecution changed its stance in a brief, taking no position on the enhancement, and reiterated this at the start of the sentencing hearing. Despite this, the District Court found that the four-level enhancement did apply, leading to a final offense level of 15 and a final Guidelines range of 41 to 51 months.The Third Circuit Court concluded that the prosecution breached the plea agreement when it initially supported the four-level enhancement, as it had promised to recommend a total offense level no higher than 14. The Court further ruled that the prosecution's later neutral stance did not unequivocally retract its erroneous position, and thus did not cure its breach. Accordingly, the Third Circuit Court vacated Cruz's sentence and remanded the case, instructing that a different judge should decide whether to grant specific performance or allow withdrawal of the plea. View "United States v. Cruz" on Justia Law

In this case, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's decision that the defendants, R.L. Vallee, Inc., and Crystal Clear Hospitality, LLC (CCH), accepted and used payments issued by the Vermont Agency of Transportation (the Agency) in connection with a condemnation order and are therefore barred from contesting the necessity of the taking or the public purpose of the Agency’s highway project under 19 V.S.A. § 506(c).The Agency sought to acquire certain property rights for a highway project. After a judgment of condemnation was issued, the Agency tendered payments to the defendants. The defendants deposited these payments into their respective accounts but maintained that they had not "used" the funds. They appealed the judgment, intending to challenge the necessity and public purpose of the project.The court held that depositing a check constitutes both "acceptance" and "use" of a payment under 19 V.S.A. § 506(c). It rejected the defendants' argument that they had not used the "funds" because the issue was whether they used the Agency’s payments when they deposited its checks into their accounts. The court also rejected the defendants' argument that the Agency was required to show that they knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived their rights under § 506(c), noting that defendants are charged with knowledge of the law and were represented by counsel. Finally, the court did not address the defendants' argument that § 506(c) is unconstitutional, as the defendants failed to assign error to the lower court's decision not to address that argument. View "Agency of Transportation v. Timberlake Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves Brian Benjamin, a state senator in New York from 2017 to 2021, who was indicted on charges of federal funds bribery, honest services wire fraud, conspiracy to commit each of those offenses, and falsifying records. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed three of the charges on the ground that the indictment failed to allege an explicit quid pro quo between Benjamin and his campaign donor. The government appealed this decision.According to the allegations, Benjamin agreed to allocate state funds to a non-profit organization controlled by a real estate developer in his district, in exchange for campaign contributions. The developer was allegedly aware of the quid pro quo arrangement and proceeded to provide funds to Benjamin's campaign. Furthermore, Benjamin allegedly attempted to conceal this arrangement by falsifying campaign forms and providing false information during his background check when he was nominated to be lieutenant governor of New York.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that an explicit quid pro quo does not need to be expressly stated; it can be inferred from the official’s and the payor’s words and actions. The court concluded that the indictment sufficiently alleged an explicit quid pro quo, as it stated that Benjamin obtained campaign contributions in exchange for his agreement to use his official authority to obtain a state grant for a non-profit organization. Therefore, the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Benjamin" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute regarding the office of constable for the District 59 election precinct in Jefferson County, Alabama. Frederick Burkes, Sr. won the 2020 Democratic party primary for the office and was declared and certified as the winner. Prior to assuming office, he filed a bond as required by state law. However, James Franklin contended that the bond was not timely filed as it was not filed within 40 days of the declaration of Burkes's election. Consequently, Jefferson Probate Judge James Naftel declared the office of constable for District 59 vacant, leading to Governor Kay Ivey appointing Franklin to the office.Burkes initiated a quo warranto action against Franklin, challenging his appointment. The trial court ruled in favor of Franklin, a decision that was appealed by Burkes. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's decision. The Court found that Burkes had indeed filed his official bond on time, as per § 11-2-6 of the Alabama Code. However, Burkes's argument before the trial court was framed around a perceived conflict between § 36-5-2 and § 36-23-4 of the Alabama Code, not § 11-2-6. As a result, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's decision because Burkes had not presented an argument concerning § 11-2-6 to the trial court. View "State of Alabama ex rel. Burkes v. Franklin" on Justia Law

The case originates from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The appellant, Herbie D. Vest, served on active duty in the United States Army from 1966 to 1971. In 1971, Vest filed a claim for service connection for hearing loss and tinnitus, which was granted at a 0% rating. A subsequent request for an increased rating was denied. In 1972, Vest sent a letter to the Veterans Administration Regional Office (RO) expressing his belief of an error in their decision. In 2016, Vest submitted a claim for compensation for Meniere's disease and "ears-ringing," which was granted at a 60% disability rating, which Vest disputed.In 2020, Vest argued that his 1972 letter constituted a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) and should be considered as such. However, the RO did not accept the letter as an NOD. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals found that the letter expressed dissatisfaction with the decision on his hearing loss disability, but did not express disagreement with the decision regarding tinnitus. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims dismissed Vest's appeal, holding that they did not have jurisdiction to address the question of defective notice. The court noted that Vest did not argue that he had submitted an NOD with the initial decision concerning tinnitus, and he didn't challenge the Board’s determinations that the letter was not an NOD for the tinnitus decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the appeal by the Veterans Court due to lack of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the absence of an NOD on the 1971 tinnitus claim and the lack of any decision by the Board on that claim defeat jurisdiction in the Veterans Court. View "Vest v. McDonough" on Justia Law

The case involves the Mississippi Division of Medicaid and the Women’s Pavilion of South Mississippi, PLLC. Women's Pavilion, a physician-owned OBGYN clinic, challenged Mississippi Division of Medicaid's calculation of the "encounter rate," a set amount of money per visit by a Medicaid patient. Medicaid set the clinic’s encounter rate at $157.94, which was partially based on the compensation of the five physician owners of the clinic.Women’s Pavilion appealed this decision and requested an administrative hearing. The hearing officer evaluated whether Medicaid’s initial decision was supported by substantial evidence, affirming the reimbursement rate. However, Women’s Pavilion appealed again, arguing that the hearing officer applied the wrong standard of review.The Hinds County Chancery Court agreed with Women’s Pavilion, holding that the hearing officer should have made his own findings of fact and determinations of the issues presented, rather than merely evaluating whether Medicaid’s initial decision was supported by substantial evidence. The court vacated Medicaid’s final decision and remanded the matter back to Medicaid.The Mississippi Division of Medicaid appealed to the Supreme Court of Mississippi. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Hinds County Chancery Court, stating that the hearing officer had erred by applying the standard of review for courts reviewing a final administrative decision, rather than following Medicaid’s own administrative rules governing provider appeals. The case was remanded back to Medicaid for further proceedings under the proper standard of review. View "Mississippi Division of Medicaid v. Women's Pavilion of South Mississippi, PLLC" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court's dismissal of a case brought by John E. Federinko against Forrest County and its coroner, Butch Benedict, Jr. Federinko, the father of Alison Dawkins, disagreed with the findings of the county's investigation into his daughter's death by suicide. He argued that the county had a ministerial duty to perform an autopsy and to obtain postmortem blood and vitreous fluids, which they had failed to do. His subsequent private autopsy suggested that his daughter's death may have been a homicide.The court, however, ruled that Forrest County had no duty to perform an autopsy and did not breach any duty to obtain or attempt to obtain postmortem blood and fluids. They found that even if Federinko's suspicions were correct and his daughter's death was not a suicide, that would not change the county's obligations. The court concluded that Federinko failed to allege a tortious act, rendering the issue of discretionary-function immunity moot. Therefore, the trial court's denial of Federinko's motion for partial summary judgment, as well as its grant of Forrest County's motion for summary judgment and subsequent dismissal of the case, were affirmed. View "Federinko v. Forrest County, Mississippi" on Justia Law

Maximo Espinal, a security guard, was arrested by Houston police officers for aggravated assault. Although a grand jury initially indicted Espinal, the charges were subsequently dropped. Espinal then sued the officers involved and the City of Houston, claiming he had been subjected to false arrest, malicious prosecution, and assault. The district court dismissed all of Espinal's claims based on the officers' qualified immunity and immunity under Texas law.Espinal's arrest occurred after he had a heated interaction with a plainclothes police officer, M.T. Long, who was trespassing on the property Espinal was guarding. After Espinal instructed Officer Long to leave, the officer returned with multiple police vehicles and arrested Espinal. Espinal alleged that the officers made no effort to view or collect video surveillance evidence that he said would prove his innocence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court ruled that the officers had probable cause for Espinal's arrest. Furthermore, the court found that even if the officers had lacked probable cause, the grand jury's subsequent indictment of Espinal shielded them from liability under the independent intermediary doctrine. The court also rejected Espinal's claim that he had been maliciously prosecuted, finding that Espinal failed to allege that the officers had misled the grand jury. Finally, the court ruled that Espinal's assault claim was barred by the Texas Tort Claims Act. View "Espinal v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

The case involves Joseph A. Jakuttis, a former officer and detective in the Dracut Police Department, who also served as a Task Force Officer for the federal Drug Enforcement Administration's Cross Borders Initiative. Jakuttis brought multiple federal and state claims against the Town of Dracut, certain Dracut police officers, and members of the federal law-enforcement task force. He alleged that he was demoted and faced retaliation after reporting serious criminal activities implicating two Dracut police officers, which he learned from a confidential drug informant.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Jakuttis's Bivens claims against Michael V. O'Hanlon and Richard P. Poirier, Jr., and his §1983 claim against the Town of Dracut, David J. Chartrand Jr., and Demetri Mellonakos. The court ruled that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, as they could have reasonably thought that Jakuttis was speaking as part of his official duties rather than as a private citizen when he reported the misconduct, thus not clearly violating his First Amendment rights.The court also affirmed the dismissal of Jakuttis's state-law tort claims against Poirier, as Poirier was deemed to be acting within the scope of his federal employment during the relevant times. However, the court remanded the Massachusetts Whistleblower Act claim against the Town of Dracut and the Intentional Interference with Advantageous Economic Relationship claim against Chartrand and Mellonakos to the District Court. The court reasoned that these state-law claims should be resolved by a state court due to reasons of comity. View "Jakuttis v. Town of Dracut" on Justia Law