Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This case involves the Temple of 1001 Buddhas and others, who own a property in Fremont, California. They appealed against the City of Fremont's decision to uphold nuisance orders relating to their property based on alleged violations of the local building code. The plaintiffs argued that the appeals process used by the City of Fremont was preempted by section 1.8.8 of the California Building Code, which requires appeals to be heard by an independent agency or board, or the city's governing body. They also raised issues about the fairness of their administrative appeal hearing.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four concluded that the City of Fremont's appeals process did conflict with the state law in relation to enforcement determinations based on violations of Fremont’s Building Standards Code. However, it rejected the plaintiffs' claims about procedural unfairness and zoning violations.The court reversed part of the judgment and directed the trial court to issue appropriate mandamus relief. This included compelling Fremont to establish an appeals board or authorized agency to hear appeals, or provide for an appeal to its governing body as required by section 1.8.8 of the Building Code. Furthermore, Fremont was compelled to set aside the administrative hearing decision sustaining the nuisance determinations in NOA 3 that are premised on violations of the Fremont Building Standards Code and to provide for an appeal for those nuisance determinations. View "Temple of 1001 Buddhas v. City of Fremont" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington heard a case involving Assurance Wireless USA LP, a telecommunications company that provides wireless services to low-income consumers as part of the federal "Lifeline" program. Assurance contested the Department of Revenue's tax assessments on the reimbursements they received for their services, arguing that the transactions were not retail sales. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) upheld the tax assessments, finding that the transactions did constitute retail sales and that the tax burden fell on the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC), the nonprofit appointed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to administer the Lifeline program.The Supreme Court agreed that the transactions were retail sales and that USAC, not the Lifeline consumers or the FCC, bore the legal incidence of the tax. However, the Court concluded that USAC operates as an instrumentality of the federal government, meaning that the retail sales tax violated the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine as applied in this case. The Court ultimately reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the BTA for further proceedings in line with this opinion. View "Assurance Wireless USA, LP v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

This case involved a group of businesses (referred to collectively as Taxpayers) who filed applications for adjustments to the fair market value of their properties for tax year 2020 in the state of Utah. They claimed that their properties' values had decreased due to "access interruption" caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and associated government guidelines, which they argued constituted a circumstance beyond their control under Utah Code section 59-2-1004.6 (the Access Interruption Statute).The Utah State Tax Commission rejected this argument, maintaining that the pandemic did not qualify as an "access interruption event" under the Access Interruption Statute. It reasoned that the statute applies only if access was interrupted due to any of thirteen enumerated events or due to a similar event as determined by the Commission via administrative rule. Because the pandemic neither fit into any of the enumerated categories nor was included in the Commission's administrative rules, the Commission ruled that the statute did not apply.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah agreed with the Commission's reasoning, holding that the Access Interruption Statute allows only the Commission to add to the statute’s list of qualifying circumstances if the Commission determines by rule that the additional event is similar to the events enumerated in the statute. Because the pandemic was not an enumerated event and had not been added by administrative rule, the Supreme Court upheld the Commission's decision. View "Miller Theatres v. Tax Commission" on Justia Law

The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded a decision of the Phillips County Circuit Court, which had found in favor of Kit and Jole Wilson in their dispute with the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration (ADFA). The Wilsons had restored a building in Arkansas and were granted a historic-rehabilitation income-tax credit. The ADFA applied this credit to the Wilsons' 2015 tax return before apportionment, reducing their tax liability. The Wilsons protested, asserting that their tax liability should have been zero after applying the credit. The circuit court ruled in the Wilsons' favor, determining that the ADFA must apply the credit after apportioning the Wilsons’ tax due and that certain state codes conflicted with each other.However, the Supreme Court found that the ADFA correctly applied the tax credit before apportionment, in line with state law. The court also held that the state codes did not conflict with each other. The court concluded that the circuit court erred in its statutory interpretation and reversed its decision. View "STATE OF ARKANSAS, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND ADMINiSTRATION v. WILSON" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Lawrence Weber, who was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Weber's driving privileges were suspended for 180 days by a North Dakota Department of Transportation hearing officer following his refusal to take a chemical breath test after his arrest. Weber argued that he was not provided with a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney, which he claimed invalidated the authority of the North Dakota Department of Transportation to revoke his driving privileges.On February 26, 2023, Weber was arrested after an onsite screening test showed a blood alcohol content of .152 percent. Following his arrest, when asked to take a chemical breath test, Weber invoked his Fifth Amendment rights and requested an attorney. Despite being given access to his phone to contact his attorney, Weber made a call to an individual who refused to help him contact his attorney. Weber did not attempt to make further calls or ask for additional time to contact his attorney.The hearing officer found that Weber refused to take the chemical breath test and had a reasonable opportunity to call an attorney. The officer's findings were upheld by the district court. Weber appealed the decision, maintaining that he was not provided with a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court concluded that Weber was provided with a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney and his right to counsel was satisfied. Weber's claim that he was denied the opportunity to contact an attorney was not supported by the evidence. The court found that the hearing officer's findings were supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and her conclusion that Weber was not deprived of his right to consult counsel was in accordance with the law. View "Weber v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

The case involved Martin William Luther Hamilton, who pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The probation agent preparing Hamilton's presentence report determined that three of Hamilton’s prior North Carolina convictions qualified as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which mandates a minimum of fifteen years for defendants who have three prior convictions for offenses that qualify as a “violent felony or a serious drug offense.”Hamilton objected to the ACCA classification, disputing that the third conviction for attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon met the requirements of the ACCA. The district court followed a previous court's unpublished decision which held that a North Carolina conviction for attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon qualifies as a crime of violence for purposes of the career-offender provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines. As a result, the court concluded that Hamilton qualified as an armed career criminal and sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment.Hamilton appealed, challenging only the district court’s determination that the attempted robbery conviction was a predicate offense under the ACCA. In response, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding no error in the determination that Hamilton’s conviction under N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-87(a) qualifies as a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA. View "US v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois that a tin can filled with energetic powder, sealed with adhesive, and outfitted with a fuse qualifies as a "destructive device" under the National Firearms Act.The case involved Jeffrey E. Creek, who was found in possession of such a device, firearms, magazines, ammunition, and a silencer that had been shipped from China. Creek was subsequently charged with unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. At his sentencing hearing, the district court applied a two-level "destructive device" enhancement in calculating his Guidelines range.Creek appealed the decision, arguing that his device was a firework and not a destructive device. However, the appellate court found that the district court correctly classified the device as a bomb under the National Firearms Act due to it having a metal casing, an adhesive seal, explosive powder, and a fuse. It was irrelevant that Creek intended to use the device as a firework, as the device was fully assembled and fit the definition of a destructive device.Creek also challenged the district court's consideration of his criminal history and substance abuse disorder in his sentencing. However, the appellate court dismissed these arguments, stating that the district court correctly exercised its discretion in considering Creek's full criminal history and the risk to public safety. As a result, the district court's judgment was affirmed. View "USA v. Creek" on Justia Law

This case involves Avue Technologies Corporation ("Avue") and the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Administrator of the General Services Administration. Avue is a software development company that sells its software to private and government entities, which helps them automate administrative tasks while complying with statutory, regulatory, and policy requirements. Avue does not sell its software licenses directly to federal agencies. Instead, it sells annual subscriptions through third party Carahsoft Technology Corporation (“Carahsoft”), an authorized reseller that has a Federal Supply Schedule (“FSS”) contract with the General Services Administration (“GSA”).Avue tried to govern its relationship with end users of its software through an end-user licensing agreement ("EULA"), which is incorporated into the FSS contract between Carahsoft and the GSA. In 2015, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") placed a task order for a subscription to Avue's software under the FSS contract. However, in 2016, the FDA chose not to renew its subscription, leading Avue to claim that the FDA had violated its EULA.The Civilian Board of Contract Appeals ("Board") dismissed Avue's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, stating that even if the EULA established a contract between Avue and the U.S. Government, the Board lacked jurisdiction because the EULA was not a procurement contract within the meaning of the Contract Disputes Act ("CDA"). Avue appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The court disagreed with the Board's decision, stating that Avue only needed to allege non-frivolously that it had a contract with the U.S. Government to establish the Board's jurisdiction, and it didn't need to prove the existence of such a contract. The court held that Avue's allegation that it was part of a procurement contract was non-frivolous and sufficient to establish the Board's jurisdiction. Therefore, the court vacated the Board's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits. View "AVUE TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION v. HHS " on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over a public records request made by the relator, Thomas Clark, an inmate at Lebanon Correctional Institution. Clark sent a request to the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) for an up-to-date paper copy of the commissary price list for each commissary window at the prison. After several failed attempts to obtain the information through internal procedures, and despite an assurance from an inspector that he would provide the requested lists, Clark had still not received the paper copies. He therefore filed a mandamus action to compel the ODRC to provide the records.The Supreme Court of Ohio denied the writ of mandamus as moot because the ODRC had already provided Clark with the records he requested. However, the court found that the ODRC had failed to comply with its obligations under Ohio's Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, for 11 business days starting from the day Clark filed the mandamus action. Accordingly, the court awarded Clark $1,000 in statutory damages, the maximum amount allowed under the statute. The court declined to award court costs, finding no evidence of bad faith on the part of the ODRC. View "State ex rel. Clark v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a plaintiff, Jorden Brown, who was tasered by Officer Samuel Giles while fleeing from police, resulting in injuries to Brown. Brown sued Officer Giles, the police chief, and the municipality he was arrested in under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive use of force and violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. He also claimed that department policies or customs enabled these violations. The defendants moved to dismiss the case, and the district court granted the dismissal on the grounds that Brown failed to allege a violation of clearly established law. Brown appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court ruled that Brown failed to show that it was clearly established that tasing him in this particular context was excessive. They referred to previous cases where it was deemed reasonable for officers to tase fleeing suspects. The court further dismissed Brown's claim that the taser hit his head, arguing that during a chase, it is unrealistic to expect an officer to aim precisely to avoid the head.The court also rejected Brown's claim that Officer Giles continued to tase him after he was incapacitated. Brown had provided video footage of the incident which, according to the court, showed that Officer Giles tased Brown only once. The court therefore ruled that Officer Giles was entitled to qualified immunity. As Brown's claims against Officer Giles failed, his claims against the police chief and the municipality were also dismissed. View "Brown v. Giles" on Justia Law