Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In a suit involving the West Virginia Department of Human Services (the Department), the plaintiff, A.R., alleged that her injuries stemmed from the Department's negligence, specifically its failure to follow proper procedures, policies, and protocols mandated by the Child Welfare Act. The Department moved to dismiss the claims on the basis of qualified immunity, asserting that the claims were based on discretionary, governmental functions and thus it was immune from claims of negligence. However, the Circuit Court of Kanawha County denied the Department’s motion.In its decision, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the lower court's decision in part, ruling that the Department was indeed entitled to qualified immunity from A.R.'s negligence claims. The Court found that the hiring, training, and supervision of employees were discretionary governmental functions, and A.R.'s broad allegations that the Department violated the Child Welfare Act and the Child Protective Services Policy were insufficient to defeat the Department's claim of qualified immunity. The court remanded the case for further proceedings, consistent with its opinion. View "West Virginia Department of Human Resources v. A.R." on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of absolute and qualified immunity to two County of San Bernardino social workers, Gloria Vazquez and Mirta Johnson. The plaintiffs, Sydney Rieman and her minor child K.B., alleged that the social workers violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to provide them notice of a juvenile detention hearing and by providing false information to the Juvenile Court about why Ms. Rieman was not noticed for the hearing.The court held that the social workers were not entitled to absolute immunity for their actions and omissions, such as providing false information to the Juvenile Court and failing to give notice of the detention hearing. These actions were not similar to discretionary decisions about whether to prosecute. Absolute immunity did not apply to the plaintiffs' claim that the defendants failed to give them notice of the detention hearing as such notice was mandatory.The court also held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity from suit for failing to provide notice of the hearing. Ms. Rieman had a due process right to such notice and that right was clearly established. The court stated that it was clear at the time that parents could not be summarily deprived of the care and custody of their children without notice and a hearing, except when the children were in imminent danger.Finally, the court held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity for their misrepresentation to the Juvenile Court about why Ms. Rieman was not noticed for the hearing. The court concluded that a reasonable social worker in the defendants' shoes would have understood, based on prior decisional law, that providing incomplete and false information to the Juvenile Court about Ms. Rieman’s whereabouts to convince the court that the social workers had satisfied the due process notice requirement constituted judicial deception. View "RIEMAN V. VASQUEZ" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Sandeep and Sarvani Thigulla, were lawful nonimmigrant workers seeking to become lawful permanent residents (LPRs) in the United States and had applied for approval of their Form I-485 applications with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). When the Department of State decreased the number of applications it would adjudicate, the Thigullas sought a temporary restraining order against the Director of USCIS, compelling the prompt adjudication of their applications under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court denied this order, and the Thigullas appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit dismissed the case due to a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court found that the decision to delay adjudicating the Thigullas' applications falls under the Attorney General’s discretionary authority as stated in 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) and that this authority is protected from judicial review by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that this interpretation went against congressional intent, citing clear textual evidence in the statute. The court concluded that it lacked the jurisdiction to review the decision to delay adjudication of the applications, even under the Administrative Procedure Act. Consequently, the court dismissed the case and remanded it to the district court for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Thigulla v. Jaddou" on Justia Law

The Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation (MHA), an Indian nation of three affiliated tribes, appealed the U.S. Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) approval of eight applications for oil drilling by the Slawson Exploration Company, Inc. next to Lake Sakakawea, MHA's sole source of drinking water. MHA challenged the approvals under the Administrative Procedure Act, arguing that BLM's approval of the project was arbitrary and capricious due to an insufficient record and by precluding MHA from further developing the record about the threat the project posed to MHA's health and welfare.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to BLM and Slawson, dismissing the case with prejudice. The court found that BLM had engaged in reasoned decision-making and had evaluated all relevant factors. It noted that the agency placed the responsibility on Slawson to comply with tribal law without impeding MHA's ability as a sovereign to enforce its laws. The court also found that BLM's decision not to evaluate tribal law did not impact tribal sovereignty. The court concluded that MHA's jurisdiction over Slawson's project was not a relevant factor to the approvals and therefore further development of the record was not required.Furthermore, the court found that MHA was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as there was no dispute of material fact and MHA had adequate opportunities to submit evidence. Therefore, the court ruled that MHA had received all process required by the Constitution, laws, and agency regulation. View "Mandan, Hidatsa & Arikara Nation v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between the American Forest Resource Council and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service over the designation of critical habitat for an endangered species of spotted owl. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service originally issued a proposed rule reducing the amount of land designated as critical habitat for the owl in the Pacific Northwest. However, after a change in presidential administrations, the Service reversed its decision and twice issued rules delaying the effective date of the proposed rule.The Council challenged the validity of the delay rules, but after the rules had expired, the district court determined the plaintiffs’ claims had become moot and dismissed the case. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed with the lower court's decision, affirming the judgment of the district court.The court concluded that the Council’s lawsuit against the Service was moot because both delay rules had expired and had no continuing effect. The court also rejected the Council’s claim that their case fell under the exception to mootness for matters “capable of repetition yet evading review,” as they failed to provide evidence that they would be subjected to another Service delay rule in the future. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, finding the case to be moot. View "American Forest Resource Council v. Williams" on Justia Law

This case involves an appeal by Pfizer Inc. from decisions made by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Patent Trial and Appeal Board (the Board). The Board concluded that claims 1–45 of U.S. Patent 9,492,559, owned by Pfizer and related to immunogenic compositions comprising conjugated Streptococcus pneumoniae capsular saccharide antigens for use in pneumococcal vaccines, were unpatentable. The Board also denied Pfizer’s proposed amendments to the claims.Pfizer's first challenge pertained to the Board’s conclusion regarding the molecular weight of the glycoconjugate in the patent, arguing that the Board incorrectly applied the "result-effective variable doctrine." The court disagreed, upholding the Board's decision that the molecular weight was a result-effective variable that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to optimize.Pfizer's second challenge related to the Board’s finding that the compositions of additional claims incorporating more specific glycoconjugates would have been obvious. The court disagreed with Pfizer's argument that without examples showing the claimed glycoconjugates would have each been immunogenic, there would have been no reasonable expectation of success.Thirdly, Pfizer challenged the Board’s denial of its motions to amend the claims. The court affirmed the Board's decision on some of the proposed claims but vacated the decision on others, remanding them for further consideration due to the Board’s lack of clarity.Lastly, Pfizer challenged the Patent and Trademark Office’s Director Review procedure, alleging it violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court rejected this argument, finding any potential APA violation was harmless as Pfizer had not demonstrated prejudice.Therefore, the court affirmed the Board’s decisions in part, vacated them in part, and remanded the case back to the Board for further proceedings. View "PFIZER INC. v. SANOFI PASTEUR INC. " on Justia Law

In a dispute between the City of Winder and Barrow County, Georgia, the Supreme Court of Georgia addressed the interpretation of the Services Delivery Strategy (SDS) Act, with regard to the delivery of services to county and city residents and property owners and the funding of these services. The case initially revolved around three main issues: the maintenance of county roads and who benefits from them, the funding of services that primarily benefit the unincorporated area of the county, and whether the County could challenge the water rates charged by the City as an illegal tax.The court concluded that determining whether the maintenance of county roads primarily benefits the unincorporated area of a county cannot be resolved as a matter of law and requires analysis of the totality of the circumstances involved. The court held that services that primarily benefit the unincorporated area of the county should be funded through the mechanisms delineated in the Act, limiting the sources within a special district that can be used for funding.Finally, the court decided that a superior court adjudicating a petition under the SDS Act is not authorized to determine whether the City’s usage rates charged to water customers in unincorporated areas of the County are an illegal tax. The court reversed the rulings of the lower courts and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "CITY OF WINDER v. BARROW COUNTY" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc., adopted a policy requiring its employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19. The defendant, Shanika Jefferson, a home health aide employed by Fallon, sought a religious exemption from the vaccination requirement. Her request was denied, and her employment was terminated. Jefferson then applied for and was approved for unemployment benefits from the Department of Unemployment Assistance. However, Fallon contended that Jefferson was ineligible for the benefits and sought review of the decision. The board of review of the department, as well as a District Court judge, affirmed the decision.Fallon argued that Jefferson was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits as per § 25 (e) (2) of General Laws c. 151A because she refused the COVID-19 vaccine in knowing violation of Fallon's reasonable policy and in wilful disregard of Fallon's interest in keeping its vulnerable patient population healthy. However, the Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with Fallon's contention. The court held that Jefferson did not engage in "deliberate misconduct", but rather made a good faith effort to comply with Fallon's policy by applying for a religious exemption. The court also found that Fallon failed to demonstrate that Jefferson should be disqualified on the basis of a "knowing violation" of that policy. The court considered the unique circumstances of the case, including Jefferson's sincere religious beliefs, which did not present her with a meaningful choice regarding vaccination. Therefore, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the lower courts, allowing Jefferson to receive unemployment benefits. View "Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc. v. Acting Director of the Department of Unemployment Assistance" on Justia Law

This case involves an appeal from plaintiffs Sara Halsey and Susan Kiralis-Vernon against Fedcap Rehabilitation Services, Inc. The plaintiffs were participants in a state program, Additional Support for People in Retraining and Employment - Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (ASPIRE-TANF), for which Fedcap was a contract agency. The plaintiffs allege that Fedcap failed to correctly administer the program and fulfill its obligations, including informing them of available services and support, processing their requests for benefits, and engaging in an interactive process to evaluate their requests for reasonable accommodations. Kiralis-Vernon also alleges that a Fedcap employee verbally assaulted her due, in part, to her race.The U.S. District Court for the District of Maine dismissed the case, reasoning that the plaintiffs were required to first pursue an administrative remedy before the Department of Health and Human Services as required by Maine law. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims related to Fedcap’s administration of the ASPIRE-TANF program, agreeing that under Maine law, the plaintiffs had to first seek administrative review before bringing these claims to court.However, the appellate court vacated the dismissal of Kiralis-Vernon's claim of racial discrimination, ruling that this claim did not fall within the same jurisdiction and expertise of the Department, and thus, was not subject to the same requirement for administrative review. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this claim. View "Halsey v. Fedcap Rehabilitation Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Safety-Kleen of California, Inc. appealed against the denial of its petitions for a writ of mandate, which sought to compel the Department of Toxic Substances Control (the Department) to set aside final inspection violation scores concerning Safety-Kleen’s oil and hazardous waste treatment facility. The Department had classified certain violations at Safety-Kleen’s facility as Class I violations, which Safety-Kleen argued was an abuse of discretion under the Hazardous Waste Control Law (HWCL), as these violations did not pose a “significant threat to human health or safety or the environment.”The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District disagreed with Safety-Kleen, interpreting the HWCL to permit classification of a violation as Class I under independent statutory bases, including those that do not pose a significant threat to human health or safety or the environment. The court held that the Department did not abuse its discretion in determining Safety-Kleen’s final inspection violation scores. It also rejected Safety-Kleen’s argument that a Class II violation can only be reclassified as a Class I violation if the violation is chronic or the violator is recalcitrant. The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. View "Safety-Kleen of Cal., Inc. v. Dept. of Toxic Substances Control" on Justia Law