Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In the case before the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Rozalyn Rinde appealed from a criminal judgment after the district court revoked her probation and resentenced her. Rinde was initially charged with five counts, including unlawful possession of a controlled substance and endangerment of a child or vulnerable adult. She pleaded guilty to both charges and was sentenced to 360 days with the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, with all but 63 days suspended for two years of supervised probation. However, after multiple violations of her probation, the court revoked her probation and resentenced her to 360 days on the misdemeanor count and to five years on the felony count. Rinde argued that the court imposed an illegal sentence, exceeding the maximum penalty allowed at the time of her original offenses. She also claimed that the sentence violated the prohibition on ex post facto laws.The Supreme Court of North Dakota found that the district court had not imposed an illegal sentence. The court stated that the determining factor in applying the statute governing probation revocation (N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-07(6)) was the date of the original convictions and sentencing, not the date of the offense. Since Rinde’s original conviction and sentencing occurred after the August 2021 amendment of the statute, which removed the restriction on a court’s ability to resentence a defendant in the case of a suspended sentence, the court was not limited by the pre-amendment version of the statute. Therefore, the court was within its rights to resentence Rinde to five years on her felony count. The court also rejected Rinde's claim of an "ex post facto application," stating that the amendment did not increase the maximum possible punishment for her crime, nor did it make an innocent act criminal, aggravate the crime, or relax the evidence required to prove the offense. As such, the court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "State v. Rinde" on Justia Law

The case in discussion was brought before the Supreme Court of Ohio and involved an inmate, Kimani E. Ware, who filed an original action in mandamus under Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43. Ware sought to compel the Summit County Clerk of Courts, Tavia Galonski, to provide documents in response to a public-records request and sought an award of statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(2). Ware alleged that he sent the request by certified mail in May 2022 and that the clerk’s office received the request in June 2022. The clerk asserted that her office did not receive Ware’s public-records request and that her office sent the requested records to Ware only after he filed his complaint in February 2023.The court denied Ware's motions, denied the mandamus claim as moot, and denied the request for statutory damages. The court found that Ware's mandamus claim was moot as the requested records had been provided. The court also found that Ware had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that he delivered his public-records request to the clerk by certified mail and that the clerk failed to comply with an obligation under R.C. 149.43(B). Therefore, Ware was not entitled to statutory damages. Further, the court found no evidence of bad faith on the part of the clerk. View "State ex rel. Ware v. Galonski" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Ohio denied a writ of mandamus brought by Kimani E. Ware, an inmate at the Trumbull Correctional Institution (TCI), against Lori Beggs, the manager of TCI's cashier’s office, and TCI itself. Ware had requested certain public records related to his personal account at TCI, and claimed that he had not received the requested documents. Beggs, however, provided evidence that she had printed and mailed the requested records. The court found that Ware did not provide clear and convincing evidence that Beggs failed to send the requested records, and concluded that the mandamus claim was moot because Beggs had fulfilled her duty by mailing the records. The court also denied Ware's request for statutory damages because he did not meet the necessary burden of proof to demonstrate that Beggs failed to comply with her obligations under the Public Records Act at the time he filed the action. View "State ex rel. Ware v. Beggs" on Justia Law

In a healthcare fraud case involving Medicare kickbacks, defendants Lindell King and Ynedra Diggs appealed their convictions and sentences. They challenged the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas's decision to admit recordings involving them and other co-conspirators, and disputed the court's calculation of the improper benefit received for the purpose of their sentence, as well as the restitution award. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined these arguments and ruled in favor of the lower court.The defendants were accused of receiving bribes from a Medicare provider, Dr. Paulo Bettega, for referring Medicare beneficiaries to him for unnecessary treatment or non-provided treatment. The Court of Appeals rejected the defendants' Confrontation Clause arguments, stating the recordings were not testimonial and did not violate the Confrontation Clause. It further dismissed the defendants' assertion that the recordings were impermissible hearsay.Regarding the calculation of the improper benefit, the court concluded that the government had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the entire operation was fraudulent. The defendants failed to provide rebuttal evidence of any legitimate medical expenses that should offset the amount paid to Bettega for treatment provided to residents of their group homes.The Court of Appeals also upheld the restitution award. It rejected the defendants' argument that their maximum restitution was limited to the $70,000 they received in kickbacks. The court held the defendants jointly and severally liable for all foreseeable losses within the scope of their conspiracy.In conclusion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and sentence of the district court, finding no error in its proceedings or decisions. View "USA v. King" on Justia Law

In this case decided by the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, the defendant, Ronald Gordon Ferenz, had pleaded no contest to charges of rape of an unconscious person, forcible rape, and dissuading a witness. He was sentenced to a 12-year term in state prison and was imposed a criminal justice administration fee. On appeal, Ferenz challenged the trial court's denial of his post-plea motion to substitute his counsel, the court's decision to not strike certain exhibits attached to the prosecutor’s statement of view, and the imposition of the criminal justice administration fee.The appellate court held that the trial court did not err in denying Ferenz’s motion to substitute his counsel as there was no showing of a breakdown in communication between Ferenz and his counsel, nor was there any evidence that the counsel's conduct fell below the standard of care. The court also held that the trial court did not err in declining to strike portions of the prosecutor’s statement of view as the material was not expressly precluded by section 1203.01 and the court had inherent authority to accept the material. However, the court agreed with Ferenz that the criminal justice administration fee must be stricken due to the effect of Assembly Bill No. 1869 which rendered such fees unenforceable and uncollectible after July 1, 2021.The court modified the judgment to vacate the $129.75 criminal justice administration fee, and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "People v. Ferenz" on Justia Law

In a class action suit, the plaintiffs, a group of patients, alleged that the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania (Penn), who operate the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania Health System (Penn Medicine), were in violation of Pennsylvania privacy law. The plaintiffs claimed that Penn Medicine shared sensitive health information and online activity of its patients with Facebook through its patient portal. Penn removed the case to federal court, asserting that it was "acting under" the federal government, referencing the federal-officer removal statute. However, the District Court rejected this argument and returned the case to state court.This case was primarily focused on whether Penn was "acting under" the federal government in its operation of Penn Medicine's patient portal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision to remand the case back to state court. The Court of Appeals determined that Penn was not "acting under" the federal government, as it did not demonstrate that it was performing a delegated governmental task. The court declared that Penn was merely complying with federal laws and regulations, which does not qualify as "acting under" the federal government. The court noted that just because a private party has a contractual relationship with the federal government does not mean that it is "acting under" the federal authority. In conclusion, the court determined that the relationship between Penn and the federal government did not meet the requirements for Penn to be considered as "acting under" the federal government, thus the case was correctly returned to state court. View "Mohr v. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association (PIAA) is subject to the Right to Know Law’s record-disclosure mandates. The PIAA is a non-profit corporation and voluntary-member organization which organizes interscholastic athletics and promotes uniform standards in interscholastic sports. In 2020, Simon Campbell, a private citizen, filed a records request under the Right to Know Law seeking eight categories of records from the PIAA. The PIAA objected, asserting it is not a Commonwealth authority or entity subject to the Right to Know Law, and noted its intent to litigate the issue. The court found that the inclusion of PIAA in the definition of a state-affiliated entity, a subset of the definition of a Commonwealth agency, indicates that the General Assembly intended to subject PIAA to the Right to Know Law's record-disclosure scheme. Furthermore, the court found that the General Assembly did not mean the phrase "Commonwealth entity" to be strictly limited to official government agencies. Instead, the Assembly intended the phrase to include organizations that perform some role associated with statewide governance. View "Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association, Inc. v. Campbell" on Justia Law

In this case, the parents of W.J., a young man with a chromosomal abnormality and autism, brought a case under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 against the Secretary of Health and Human Services, claiming that the Measles, Mumps, and Rubella vaccine administered to their son had caused or significantly aggravated his health issues. They filed their petition more than 15 years after the vaccine was administered, well beyond the Act's three-year statute of limitations. The parents argued that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled due to their son's mental incapacitation, his minority status, and the government's alleged fraudulent concealment of a connection between the vaccine and autism.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims, which had denied the parents' petition for review and confirmed a special master’s decision to dismiss the case as untimely. The court concluded that the mental incapacitation of the son did not qualify as an "extraordinary circumstance" warranting equitable tolling because the parents, as his legal guardians, had failed to demonstrate that they were unable to file a claim on his behalf. The court also rejected the arguments for minority tolling and fraudulent concealment, finding no basis for these in the Vaccine Act or its legislative history. The court further held that the special master had not erred in raising the issue of the statute of limitations, nor in dismissing the claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "W. J. v. Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

This case was a negligence action brought by Dennis Vancos against the State of Montana, Department of Transportation, for injuries he sustained when struck by a car at an intersection. Vancos alleged that the traffic control device at the intersection was inadequately designed, installed, and maintained, leading to the accident. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana addressed three issues on appeal. The first was whether the District Court made an error in handling evidence of Vancos’s consumption of alcohol. The court found that the District Court did err by allowing evidence of Vancos's alcohol consumption but refusing to take judicial notice of his blood alcohol content (BAC), which was not deemed to be in evidence. The court held that a party need not introduce evidence of a fact judicially noticed, and therefore, the District Court's interpretation of the rule was incorrect, and it abused its discretion by refusing to take judicial notice of Vancos's BAC.The second issue was whether the District Court erred by not accepting Vancos’s proposed jury instruction on pedestrian rights-of-way. The court found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected Vancos’s proposed instruction and instead chose to instruct the jury on the entirety of the law.The third issue, which was not addressed due to the requirement for a new trial determined by the first issue, was whether the District Court erred by not striking a prospective juror for cause. Due to the error in handling evidence of Vancos's alcohol consumption, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded the case to the District Court for a new trial. View "Vancos v. Montana Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

In a dispute between Valley Hospital Medical Center and the National Labor Relations Board, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the Hospital's petition for review, granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement, and enforced the Board's order. The court previously remanded the case to the Board to better explain its decision that an employer may unilaterally cease union dues checkoff after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. Upon remand, the Board reversed its prior decision, readopting its rule prohibiting employers from unilaterally ceasing dues checkoff after expiration of a collective bargaining agreement, and found that Valley Hospital engaged in an unfair labor practice. Valley Hospital contended that the Board exceeded its mandate from the court, which only authorized supplementing its reasoning, not changing its interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act. However, the Ninth Circuit held that its earlier mandate did not explicitly prohibit the Board from reconsidering its rule, so the Board was not bound by its prior decision. The court also found that the Board's new decision was rational and consistent with the Act. Thus, the Board's order was enforced. View "NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. VALLEY HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC." on Justia Law