Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Indian citizens Sanket and Nehaben Patel who sued the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Ur Jaddou, under the Administrative Procedure Act for unreasonable delay in processing their applications for U visas. After their visas were granted, the Director moved to dismiss the case for mootness and attached an exhibit showing the applications' approval. The Director then realized she had not filed the exhibit under seal, violating the rule prohibiting the disclosure of information relating to noncitizens who are U visa applicants and recipients. The Patels sought civil penalties for the disclosure of their personal information. The district court dismissed the case and denied the Patels' motion for civil penalties, stating that any disclosure was not willful.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Director's disclosure of the Patels' visa application status was not "willful" under 8 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The court reasoned that the term "willful" refers to actions that are intentional or knowing, as opposed to accidental. The court noted that the Director realized her mistake in not filing the exhibit under seal, promptly contacted the court to seal the exhibit, and the information disclosed was already revealed in the Patels’ unsealed complaint. Therefore, the disclosure was not considered willful but at most amounted to negligence. View "Patel v. Jaddou" on Justia Law

In this case heard before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the appellant, Dewanis Rogers, sought a reduced sentence under the First Step Act of 2018. Rogers had been found guilty in 2008 of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a protected location, following two or more prior felony drug convictions. He received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, as prescribed by statute. In 2022, Rogers requested that his sentence be reduced under the provisions of the First Step Act. The district court denied this motion, determining that Rogers was ineligible for relief under the Act. Rogers appealed this decision, disputing his ineligibility.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that even if Rogers was eligible for relief under the First Step Act, the district court could not have lawfully reduced his sentence due to the mandatory term of imprisonment prescribed by statute. The court explained that Congress had not expressly repealed the mandatory punishment for Rogers’s offense in the First Step Act, and that the change in law cited by Rogers did not appear in the sections of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 made retroactive by the First Step Act. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Rogers" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered an appeal by several Missouri public officials who were denied qualified immunity by a lower court regarding five claims arising from a murder prosecution. The murder case, involving Donald Nash who was eventually convicted for the murder of Judy Spencer, was reopened in 2007, 25 years after the crime occurred. The officials based their case on a theory that DNA evidence found under Spencer's fingernails belonged to Nash, which they asserted could not have remained present if Spencer had washed her hair after their last encounter.Nash was convicted and spent 11 years in prison until the Missouri Supreme Court set aside his conviction in 2020. The charges were dismissed after DNA testing on the shoelace used to strangle Spencer supported Nash’s noninvolvement. Nash and his wife filed a lawsuit against the officials, claiming violations of rights including unlawful arrest and detention, fabrication of evidence, failure to investigate, violations of rights of access to courts, and violation of the right to familial and marital associations.The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and dismissed in part the appeals on the denial of qualified immunity. The court held that the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity on the claim of unlawful arrest and detention, finding that the omission of certain exculpatory facts from the probable cause affidavit negated probable cause for Nash's arrest. However, the court reversed the denial of qualified immunity for the claim alleging violation of the right to familial and marital associations, as this was not a clearly established constitutional right in 2008. The court dismissed the officials' appeal on the remaining claims due to lack of jurisdiction, as these involved genuine disputes of material fact to be resolved by a jury. View "Estate of Nash v. Folsom" on Justia Law

In the case before the Nebraska Supreme Court, Kathryn Wright was employed as a customer service agent for Southwest Airlines Co. (Southwest). In her volunteer role on a workplace social committee, she was found to have not kept adequate records of expenditures and to have spent committee funds for personal purposes. Consequently, Southwest terminated her employment. Wright then applied for unemployment insurance benefits, which were initially granted by the Nebraska Department of Labor (DOL) adjudicator. However, this decision was overturned by the DOL appeal tribunal, disqualifying her from receiving unemployment benefits for the week of the discharge and the 14 weeks thereafter. The district court affirmed this decision and Wright appealed.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Wright had committed misconduct connected with her work under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-628.10 (Reissue 2021). The court found that Wright's failure to keep a ledger and maintain supporting documentation for all committee expenses was misconduct connected with her work, regardless of the fact that her work on the committee was volunteer and separate from her paid job duties. The court also disagreed with Wright's argument that the committee funds were not Southwest's but her coworkers'. The court reasoned that the funds were contributed to the committee organized, promoted, supported, and regulated by Southwest, which had an interest in ensuring that the funds were spent appropriately. Therefore, Wright's failure to follow the rules harmed Southwest and was misconduct connected with her work. View "Wright v. Southwest Airlines Co." on Justia Law

In this case, the University of South Florida Board of Trustees (USF) sued the United States, claiming that the latter infringed a patent owned by USF regarding genetically modified mice for Alzheimer's Disease research. The USF contended that The Jackson Laboratory, with the government's authorization and consent, had been producing and using mice covered by the patent for the government. The government countered the claim by asserting it had a license to practice the patent under a provision of the Bayh-Dole Act, which addresses patent rights in work funded by the federal government. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that the provision does apply and therefore affirmed the judgment of noninfringement. The court confirmed that the April 1997 work, the first actual reduction to practice of the invention, was "in the performance of work under a funding agreement." The court also rejected USF's contention that a funding agreement must be in place at the time of the relevant work, clarifying that the Act can cover work already performed before a funding agreement is executed or becomes effective. View "University of South Florida Board of Trustees v. United States" on Justia Law

In the case, Mojave Pistachios, LLC (Mojave) and other petitioners sought to challenge a replenishment fee on groundwater extractions imposed by the Indian Wells Valley Groundwater Authority (the Authority) in California. Mojave, which owns approximately 1,600 acres of land in the Mojave Desert, uses groundwater to irrigate its pistachio orchard. The Authority, created under the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA), determined that all groundwater extractions in the water basin where Mojave’s orchard is located would be subject to a replenishment fee, which Mojave refused to pay. The Superior Court of Orange County sustained the Authority’s demurrer to certain causes of action in Mojave's third amended complaint, finding the claims were barred by California’s “pay first, litigate later” rule which requires a taxpayer to pay a tax before commencing a court action to challenge the tax’s collection.Mojave petitioned the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three for a writ of mandate overruling the lower court's order. The appellate court concluded that the well-established “pay first” rule applies to lawsuits challenging fees imposed by a local groundwater sustainability agency under SGMA. As such, because any alleged economic harm to Mojave stems from the imposition of the replenishment fee, the “pay first” rule bars the challenged causes of action. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision and denied Mojave's petition for a writ of mandate. View "Mojave Pistachios, LLC v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves Nathan Jackson, a detention officer with the Los Angeles Police Department, who was suspended for 10 days due to several misconduct charges. These charges included reporting late for duty, reporting unfit for duty, leaving his post without authorization, and refusing to provide a doctor's note as directed. Jackson appealed his suspension to the Board of Civil Service Commissioners, which upheld the suspension. He then filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, asking the court to set aside his suspension and award him back pay.The superior court granted the petition in part, setting aside the suspension but upholding the findings on three of the four counts. The court also ordered the Board to reconsider whether the City's amendment of one of the counts after initial notice of proposed discipline prejudiced Jackson's defense and entitled him to back pay. The court also ordered the Board to reconsider the appropriate penalty.Jackson appealed the judgment, arguing that substantial evidence did not support the findings on any of the counts and that he was entitled to back pay as a matter of law. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, however, dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the superior court's judgment was not a final appealable judgment because it vacated the suspension and remanded the matter back to the Board for reconsideration, allowing Jackson an opportunity to challenge any ultimate adverse disciplinary action. View "Jackson v. Board of Civil Service Commissioners" on Justia Law

A consumer, Reginald Kirtz, secured a loan from the Rural Housing Service, part of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Although Kirtz repaid his loan by mid-2018, the USDA continued to tell credit report company TransUnion that his account was past due, harming his credit score. The USDA failed to correct its records after being notified of the error, and Kirtz sued the agency under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.The USDA argued that the case should be dismissed based on sovereign immunity, since the Supreme Court has held that the federal government is immune from suits for damages unless Congress waives that immunity. The agency claimed that the FCRA does not make the federal government amenable to suit for a violation. The district court agreed, but the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the FCRA authorizes suits for damages against any person who violates the Act, and “person” is defined to include any government agency.The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Third Circuit, finding that sovereign immunity did not bar Kirtz’s claim. The Court held that the federal government is susceptible to suit when it provides false information to credit reporting agencies. It noted that dismissing a suit like Kirtz’s case would effectively negate a claim that Congress has clearly authorized. The Court’s ruling resolved a circuit split between the Third, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits, with which the Court agreed, and the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, with which it disagreed. View "Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota, petitioners Tammy Bohn, Justin Bohn, and Brenda Vasknetz (collectively, the Citizens) sought a writ of mandamus against several city officials after the finance officer for the City of Sturgis declined to certify their petition to hold an election to remove the position of city manager from the City’s government. The circuit court denied the writ by granting summary judgment in favor of the City. The Citizens appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed the circuit court’s decision. The Court concluded that the finance officer had a clear duty under administrative rules to certify the petition and present it to the city council, as long as the petition was in the correct form, contained the necessary number of valid signatures, and met the requirements in terms of header and verification. The Court held that neither the finance officer nor the city council had the authority to delay the scheduling of an election to vote on the submitted petition. Their attempts to do so were based on their mistaken belief that the law does not allow citizens to request an election on whether the City should no longer utilize a city manager.As a result, the Court remanded the case to the circuit court to enter a writ of mandamus directing the city council to schedule and hold an election consistent with the relevant statute as presented in the petition. The Court also concluded that the Citizens were not entitled to attorney fees, but, as the prevailing party, they were entitled to costs. View "Bohn V. Bueno" on Justia Law

In 2006, Charles H. Lester, Jr. was sentenced to 188 months' imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine. After serving a portion of his supervised release term, the United States Probation Office filed a report recommending the early termination of Lester's supervision, citing his low risk of recidivism and compliance with the conditions of his supervision. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied this request, asserting that it did not have the authority to terminate Lester's supervised release early due to the requirement in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) that a five-year term of supervised release be imposed, which the court interpreted as precluding early termination under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1).Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit disagreed with the district court's interpretation. The appellate court held that the language of § 841(b)(1)(A) requires the imposition of a five-year term of supervised release, but does not impact a district court's ability to later terminate an individual's supervised release after the individual has served at least one year, as provided in § 3583(e)(1). Thus, the district court retained discretion to consider whether Lester's supervised release could be terminated early under § 3583(e)(1). Consequently, the appellate court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Lester" on Justia Law