Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Two police officers employed by a city were injured in separate incidents while on duty. After their injuries, both received payments from the city under section 1(b) of the Illinois Public Employee Disability Act, which provides that eligible employees unable to work due to a duty-related injury must continue to be paid “on the same basis” as before the injury, without deductions from sick leave, compensatory time, or vacation. The city continued to pay their salaries as before, including withholding federal and state income taxes, Social Security, and Medicare taxes. The officers filed suit, alleging that the city violated the Disability Act by withholding employment taxes and, for one officer, by deducting accrued leave time.The Circuit Court of Tazewell County granted summary judgment for the officers, finding that section 1(b) prohibited the withholding of employment taxes and required payment of “gross pay.” The court also found the city had improperly deducted leave time and held that the ten-year statute of limitations for breach of contract applied, awarding damages and fees to the plaintiffs. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District, reversed, holding that section 1(b) does not prohibit withholding employment taxes, and that the five-year statute of limitations applied. The appellate court also found a genuine issue of fact regarding whether leave time was improperly deducted and remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court’s judgment. The court held that section 1(b) of the Disability Act does not prohibit a public employer from withholding employment taxes from payments made to an injured employee under that provision. The court reasoned that the statute’s language requires payment “on the same basis” as before the injury, which includes continued tax withholding, and expressly prohibits only certain deductions, not taxes. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the leave time deduction claim. View "Bitner v. City of Pekin" on Justia Law

A licensed clinical therapist and his employer provided substance abuse rehabilitation services to a physician whose medical license had been suspended. When the physician later sought reinstatement of his license, the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation requested the therapist’s personal notes from the rehabilitation program as part of the administrative proceedings. The therapist and his employer refused, asserting that the notes were protected under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act. They sought a protective order in the Circuit Court of Cook County to prevent disclosure of the notes.The circuit court conducted an in camera review and agreed that the notes were protected, issuing a protective order barring the Department from obtaining them. The court also awarded the plaintiffs attorney fees and costs under section 15 of the Confidentiality Act. The Department did not challenge the protective order but appealed the award of attorney fees and costs, arguing that such an award was barred by sovereign immunity. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the circuit court’s award, holding that the fees and costs were ancillary to the injunctive relief and thus not barred by sovereign immunity.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois reviewed the case to determine whether the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction to award attorney fees and costs against the Department. The court held that, absent an explicit statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, Illinois courts lack jurisdiction to enter monetary judgments against the State for attorney fees and costs. The court found that section 15 of the Confidentiality Act does not contain such a waiver. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s judgment and the portion of the circuit court’s judgment awarding attorney fees and costs, but did not disturb the protective order itself. View "Lavery v. Department of Financial and Professional Regulation" on Justia Law

An electric utility company operating both within and outside Oregon was subject to central assessment for property tax purposes. For the 2020-21 tax year, the company and the Oregon Department of Revenue disagreed on the company’s overall value and the portion attributable to Oregon. The dispute centered on the methods used to determine real market value, specifically whether certain deductions and valuation models used by the company’s appraiser were consistent with the Department’s adopted standards. The Department relied on an administrative rule that incorporated the Western States Association of Tax Administrators (WSATA) Handbook, which prescribes valuation methods for centrally assessed properties.The Oregon Tax Court heard the case and considered expert testimony from both parties. The Department argued that the WSATA Handbook, as adopted by administrative rule, was binding and should control the valuation methods used. The company contended that the Tax Court, conducting a de novo review, was not bound by the Handbook. The Tax Court agreed with the company, holding that it was not required to defer to the Department’s rule and could determine real market value using other methods if it found them more accurate. The court ultimately adopted some of the company’s valuation approaches and set a value lower than the Department’s assessment.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case on appeal. It held that, absent a finding that the Department’s rule is invalid on its face or as applied, the rule has the force of law and must be given legal effect by the Tax Court. The Supreme Court found that the Tax Court erred by not treating the Department’s rule as binding unless its application would conflict with constitutional or statutory definitions of real market value. The Supreme Court reversed the Tax Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings under the correct legal standard. View "PacifiCorp v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

A police officer employed by a city in Kentucky worked a rotating schedule of 36 and 44 hours per week, but was paid for 40 hours each week without overtime for hours worked beyond 40 in a given week. After a state audit revealed the city’s payroll practices violated overtime requirements, the city issued back pay to affected employees and revised its procedures. The officer, believing the back pay was insufficient and that certain categories of compensation were miscalculated, rejected the payment and filed suit for unpaid overtime, vacation, and sick leave, as well as liquidated damages and attorney’s fees. The relevant period for the claim was limited by statute to the officer’s last three years of employment.The Bullitt Circuit Court, after a bench trial, found the city liable for unpaid overtime and vacation pay, but denied liquidated damages and retirement hazardous duty pay, and initially awarded sick leave. Upon the city’s motion to amend, the trial court corrected calculation errors, eliminated the sick leave award based on a city ordinance, and reduced the overtime award. The court also awarded only $2,500 in attorney’s fees, far less than the amount requested and supported by detailed billing records. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of liquidated damages, sick leave, and retirement hazardous duty pay, but reversed and remanded for reconsideration of statutory interest and attorney’s fees.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals in full. It held that the trial court properly amended its judgment to correct errors based on evidence presented at trial, that liquidated damages under the wage statute are discretionary when the employer acts in good faith, that statutory interest applies from the date of judgment, and that the trial court abused its discretion by arbitrarily reducing attorney’s fees without explanation. The case was remanded for proper calculation of interest and attorney’s fees. View "WHEELER V. CITY OF PIONEER VILLAGE, KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

A local government enacted an ordinance that completely prohibited its police officers from seeking or executing no-knock warrants within its jurisdiction. This ordinance was adopted after the state legislature passed a statute (SB 4, now codified in KRS 455.180 and related provisions) that did not ban no-knock warrants outright, but instead imposed strict conditions and procedural safeguards for their issuance and execution. The statute allowed no-knock warrants only in limited circumstances, subject to a clear and convincing evidentiary standard, approval by a superior officer, consultation with prosecutors, and time-of-day restrictions.The Fraternal Order of Police challenged the ordinance in Fayette Circuit Court, arguing that it conflicted with state law. The trial court found no express or implied conflict, reasoning that the statute did not require the use of no-knock warrants, but merely set conditions for their issuance, and thus the ordinance’s total ban did not conflict with the statute. On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, but did not definitively resolve the conflict issue, instead remanding for further proceedings, particularly in light of collective bargaining questions.The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted discretionary review and held that the local ordinance directly conflicted with the state statute. The Court reasoned that the statute authorizes law enforcement officers to seek no-knock warrants under certain conditions, while the ordinance prohibits them from ever doing so, making it impossible for officers to comply with both. The Court concluded that when a local ordinance prohibits what a state statute permits, the ordinance is void. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals and declared the ordinance null, void, and of no effect. View "LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT V. FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE" on Justia Law

An unlicensed cannabis establishment, DC Smoke, applied for a medical cannabis retailer license under the District of Columbia’s Medical Cannabis Amendment Act of 2022, which allowed such applications during a designated 90-day period. Advisory Neighborhood Commission (ANC) 2C, the only entity permitted by statute to protest such applications at that time, submitted a formal protest to the District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage and Cannabis Board. After a protest hearing and review of evidence, the Board approved DC Smoke’s application in a written order issued on May 1, 2024.Following the Board’s decision, ANC 2C filed a petition for review with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals on May 31, 2024. The court questioned the ANC’s standing to seek judicial review, referencing its prior decision in Kopff v. D.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, which held that ANCs are prohibited by D.C. Code § 1-309.10(g) from initiating legal actions in the District’s courts. In response, ANC 2C Commissioner Thomas Lee filed his own petition for review, but did so after the thirty-day deadline required by D.C. App. R. 15(a)(2).The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that ANC 2C lacked standing to petition for review because the statutory prohibition on ANCs initiating legal actions in court was not implicitly repealed by the Medical Cannabis Amendment Act. The court further determined that the requirement to name a proper petitioner in a petition for review is jurisdictional, preventing the ANC from adding or substituting Commissioner Lee as a petitioner. Additionally, the court held that the thirty-day filing deadline for petitions for review is a mandatory claim-processing rule not subject to equitable tolling. As a result, both the ANC’s and Commissioner Lee’s petitions were dismissed, and the court declined to consider the merits of the Board’s licensing decision. View "ANC 2C v. D.C. Alcoholic Beverage and Cannabis Board" on Justia Law

A condominium association in Southwest Washington, D.C., which owns a large complex of over 200 townhomes, challenged the way the District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority (D.C. Water) calculates a stormwater runoff fee known as the Clean Rivers Impervious Area Charge (CRIAC). The association is classified as a multi-family customer because its water is supplied through several master-metered service lines, rather than each townhome having an individual meter. This classification results in the CRIAC being calculated based on the total impervious surface area of the property, rather than using a tiered system that applies to individually metered residential properties. The association argued that this method, which ties the fee calculation to how the property is metered, is arbitrary and capricious, as the metering method does not affect the amount of stormwater runoff.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to D.C. Water. The court found that D.C. Water’s classification and billing methodology were reasonable and consistent with industry standards, relying on declarations from D.C. Water officials and legislative history. The court also rejected the association’s constitutional and equal protection claims, which were not pursued on appeal.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment on the constitutional claims, as those were not contested on appeal. However, the appellate court vacated the summary judgment on the claim that D.C. Water’s use of metering as a factor in CRIAC calculation was arbitrary and capricious. The court held that D.C. Water had not provided an adequate explanation for why metering should affect the fee, and remanded the case for further proceedings on that issue. View "Capitol Park IV Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority" on Justia Law

Three non-profit corporations, each formed by littoral homeowners in the Portlock neighborhood of East Honolulu, purchased narrow beachfront reserve lots that separated their homes from the ocean. In 2003, Hawai‘i enacted Act 73, which declared certain accreted lands—land gradually added to the shoreline by natural forces—to be public property, preventing private parties from registering or quieting title to such land. Shortly after purchasing the lots, the non-profits (the Ohanas) filed an inverse condemnation action, alleging that Act 73 resulted in an uncompensated taking of accreted land seaward of their lots, in violation of the Hawai‘i Constitution. The parties stipulated that, if a taking occurred, just compensation would be based on the fair market rental value of the accreted land.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit initially granted partial summary judgment to the Ohanas, and the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed in part, holding that Act 73 effected a taking of existing accreted lands. On remand, after a bench trial with expert testimony, the circuit court found that the fair market rental value of the accreted land was zero dollars, based on credible evidence that the land’s use was highly restricted and had no market value. The court declined to award nominal damages or attorneys’ fees. The ICA affirmed, finding the circuit court’s factual determinations were supported by substantial evidence and that sovereign immunity barred attorneys’ fees.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i affirmed the ICA’s judgment. It held that the circuit court did not err in awarding zero dollars as just compensation, nor in declining to award nominal damages, because the Ohanas suffered no compensable loss. The court further held that the just compensation clause of the Hawai‘i Constitution does not waive sovereign immunity for attorneys’ fees in inverse condemnation cases. View "Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. State" on Justia Law

An employee with over twenty years of service at the State of Hawai‘i Department of Public Safety was discharged from her position as warden of a correctional facility following allegations of creating a hostile work environment and sexual harassment. The investigation led to multiple charges, some of which were sustained by a hearings officer, resulting in the Director’s decision to terminate her employment. The employee had no prior disciplinary record and had previously received recognition for her service.The employee appealed her discharge to the Merit Appeals Board (MAB), which held a contested case hearing. The MAB found credible evidence to sustain some, but not all, of the charges, including one for sexual harassment under a progressive discipline policy. However, the MAB found no credible evidence to support the charge brought under the employer’s zero-tolerance workplace violence policy. Considering the employee’s long, discipline-free record and the principle of progressive discipline, the MAB modified the discharge to a sixty-day suspension and ordered her reinstatement.The Department of Public Safety appealed to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, which reversed the MAB’s decision, concluding that the MAB exceeded its statutory authority by applying progressive discipline rather than deferring to the zero-tolerance policy. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s judgment.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case and held that the MAB acted within its statutory authority under Hawai‘i law when it modified the disciplinary action from discharge to a sixty-day suspension. The Supreme Court determined that the sustained charges were not subject to the zero-tolerance policy, and the MAB’s application of progressive discipline was proper. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions and affirmed the MAB’s order. View "Department of Public Safety v. Forbes" on Justia Law

After the Washington Medical Commission adopted a policy to discipline physicians for spreading COVID-19 “misinformation,” several plaintiffs—including physicians who had been charged with unprofessional conduct, physicians who had not been charged, and advocacy organizations—filed suit. The Commission’s actions included investigating and charging doctors for public statements and writings about COVID-19 treatments and vaccines. Some plaintiffs, such as Dr. Eggleston and Dr. Siler, were actively facing disciplinary proceedings, while others, like Dr. Moynihan, had not been charged but claimed their speech was chilled. Additional plaintiffs included a non-profit organization and a public figure who alleged their right to receive information was affected.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington dismissed the plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. The court found that the claims were constitutionally and prudentially unripe, and that the doctrine of Younger abstention required federal courts to refrain from interfering with ongoing state disciplinary proceedings. The district court also addressed the merits, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to state a plausible First Amendment or due process claim, but the primary basis for dismissal was abstention and ripeness.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Younger abstention barred claims challenging ongoing state disciplinary proceedings (including as-applied and facial constitutional challenges, and due process claims) for all plaintiffs subject to such proceedings. The court also held that Younger abstention did not apply to claims for prospective relief by plaintiffs not currently subject to proceedings, but those claims were constitutionally and prudentially unripe because no concrete injury had occurred and further factual development was needed. The Ninth Circuit thus affirmed the dismissal of all claims. View "STOCKTON V. BROWN" on Justia Law