Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

West Virginia filed a complaint in state court against CaremarkPCS Health, LLC, a pharmacy benefit manager (PBM), alleging that Caremark unlawfully drove up the cost of insulin, causing financial harm to the state. The complaint included state law claims of civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment, fraud, and breach of contract. Caremark removed the case to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), arguing that its conduct in negotiating rebates, which is central to the complaint, was performed under the direction of the federal government as part of its work for federal health plans.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia found that removal was unwarranted and remanded the case to state court. The district court concluded that Caremark failed to meet the requirements for federal officer removal and noted that West Virginia had disclaimed any federal claims in its complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that Caremark was entitled to remove the case to federal court under § 1442(a)(1). The court found that Caremark acted under a federal officer because it administered health benefits for federal employees under contracts with FEHBA carriers, which are supervised by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). The court also determined that Caremark had a colorable federal defense, specifically that federal law preempted West Virginia's claims. Finally, the court concluded that the charged conduct was related to Caremark's federal work, as the rebate negotiations for federal and non-federal clients were indivisible. Thus, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's remand decision and returned the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "West Virginia ex rel. Hunt v. CaremarkPCS Health, L.L.C." on Justia Law

In October 2017, the FBI mistakenly raided the home of Hilliard Toi Cliatt, Curtrina Martin, and her 7-year-old son in suburban Atlanta, instead of the intended gang hideout. The error occurred due to Special Agent Guerra's reliance on a personal GPS device and the team's failure to notice the correct street sign and house number. The raid resulted in personal injuries and property damage. The plaintiffs sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for the officers' negligent and intentional actions.The district court granted summary judgment to the government, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Eleventh Circuit applied a unique approach to FTCA claims, holding that the law enforcement proviso in §2680(h) overrides all exceptions, including the discretionary-function exception, allowing intentional-tort claims to proceed without further analysis. The court also allowed the government to assert a Supremacy Clause defense, which it found valid, leading to summary judgment for the United States.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the law enforcement proviso in §2680(h) overrides only the intentional-tort exception, not the discretionary-function exception or other exceptions in §2680. The Court also held that the Supremacy Clause does not afford the United States a defense in FTCA suits. The case was vacated and remanded to the Eleventh Circuit to reconsider whether the discretionary-function exception bars the plaintiffs' claims and to assess liability under Georgia state law without reference to a Supremacy Clause defense. View "Martin v. United States" on Justia Law

Simon Soto, a Marine Corps veteran, served from 2000 to 2006 and was medically retired due to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In 2016, Soto applied for combat-related special compensation (CRSC) and was approved, but his retroactive compensation was limited to six years due to the Barring Act's limitations period. Soto filed a class-action lawsuit arguing that the CRSC statute should displace the Barring Act's limitations period.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of Soto and the class, holding that the CRSC statute provides its own settlement mechanism, thus displacing the Barring Act. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed this decision, stating that the CRSC statute does not explicitly grant settlement authority and therefore cannot displace the Barring Act.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the CRSC statute does confer authority to settle CRSC claims, thereby displacing the Barring Act’s settlement procedures and limitations period. The Court reasoned that the CRSC statute authorizes the Secretary concerned to determine both the validity of CRSC claims and the amount due, creating a comprehensive compensation scheme. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Soto v. United States" on Justia Law

SWT Global Supply, Inc. (SWT Global), a Missouri-based manufacturer of electronic nicotine delivery system (ENDS) vaping products, sought review of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) denial of market authorization for its menthol-flavored ENDS products. The FDA denied the premarket tobacco product applications (PMTAs) submitted by SWT Global, citing insufficient evidence that the products would benefit adult users enough to outweigh the risks to youth.The FDA's decision was based on the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, which requires new tobacco products to receive FDA authorization before being sold. The FDA determined that SWT Global's PMTAs lacked product-specific evidence demonstrating that the menthol-flavored ENDS products would attract adults away from combustible cigarettes and reduce overall harm. The FDA also found SWT Global's marketing plan insufficient to prevent youth access to the products.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. SWT Global argued that the FDA's denial was arbitrary and capricious, claiming the FDA changed its position on the required scientific evidence and failed to justify its finding that the marketing plan was insufficient. The court referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Food & Drug Administration v. Wages & White Lion Investments, L.L.C., which held that the FDA's denial of PMTAs for flavored ENDS products was consistent with its guidance and did not violate the change-in-position doctrine.The Eighth Circuit found that the FDA did not change its position regarding the scientific evidence required for PMTAs and provided a satisfactory explanation for its decision. The court also determined that the FDA's treatment of menthol-flavored ENDS products was reasonable and consistent with its approach to other non-tobacco-flavored ENDS products. Consequently, the court denied SWT Global's petition for review. View "SWT Global Supply, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Administration" on Justia Law

Krista Dozier slipped and fell on an unmarked puddle of water in the Jefferson County courthouse. She filed a tort action against Jefferson County, which moved to dismiss the case, claiming immunity under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA). Dozier argued that the spill was a "dangerous condition" of a public building, an exception to CGIA immunity. The district court found the County's response to the spill reasonable and dismissed Dozier's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the reasonableness of the County's response was irrelevant to jurisdiction and that the County had waived CGIA immunity under the dangerous-condition exception.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that when disputed jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits, a plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of the existence of the facts necessary to establish a waiver of CGIA immunity. Additionally, the plaintiff must show that a public entity's negligent act or omission proximately caused the condition in question for the dangerous-condition exception to apply. The district court had found the County's response to the spill reasonable, concluding that Dozier failed to establish the spill as a "dangerous condition" and thus lacked jurisdiction over her claims.The Supreme Court of Colorado reinstated the district court's order dismissing Dozier's complaint, emphasizing that the plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood that the public entity's negligent act or omission proximately caused the dangerous condition to establish a waiver of CGIA immunity. View "Jefferson Cnty. v. Dozier" on Justia Law

Citizens for a Better Eureka (CBE) filed a petition challenging the City of Eureka's decision to redevelop a city-owned parking lot into affordable housing, claiming the project was improperly exempted from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The City Council had adopted a resolution authorizing the reduction or removal of public parking to facilitate the development, citing a Class 12 CEQA exemption for surplus government property sales. CBE argued that the project was unlawfully piecemealed and that the entire redevelopment should be considered under CEQA.The Humboldt County Superior Court dismissed the petition, agreeing with the Wiyot Tribe's motion that the Tribe, selected as the developer for the project, was a necessary and indispensable party to the proceedings. The court found that the Tribe could not be joined due to its sovereign immunity, and thus, the case could not proceed without it.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the Tribe was indeed a necessary and indispensable party. The court reasoned that the Tribe had significant interests in the project, having invested time and resources into its development. The court also found that any judgment in favor of CBE would prejudice the Tribe by hindering its ability to proceed with the project. Additionally, the court noted that CBE failed to join the Tribe within the statutory period, further justifying the dismissal. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition. View "Citizens for a Better Eureka v. City of Eureka" on Justia Law

Fabian Grey, a Jamaican citizen and lawful permanent resident in the U.S., applied for naturalization in 2016. After delays in processing his application, Grey filed a lawsuit seeking a court order to declare him eligible for naturalization and to compel the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to naturalize him. He also sought documents from USCIS under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and amended his lawsuit to compel USCIS to produce those documents. The district court granted summary judgment to USCIS on both claims, allowing the agency to withhold or redact certain documents under FOIA’s law enforcement exemption and concluding that Grey was ineligible for naturalization due to lying under oath during his deposition.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina found that Grey had lied under oath about a 2016 criminal charge for misprision of a felony during his deposition. The court also determined that USCIS had appropriately responded to Grey’s FOIA request, producing substantial documentation and justifiably withholding or redacting certain documents. Grey appealed the district court’s rulings on both the FOIA and naturalization claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court agreed that USCIS was entitled to withhold certain information under FOIA’s law enforcement exemption and that Grey’s false testimony during his deposition disqualified him from demonstrating the good moral character required for naturalization. The court concluded that Grey was ineligible for citizenship and upheld the district court’s summary judgment in favor of USCIS. View "Grey v. Alfonso-Royals" on Justia Law

Derrick Clark and Shawn Mesner worked for Didion Milling, Inc., a corn milling company. In May 2017, Didion’s grain mill exploded, killing five employees. The Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) investigated and referred Didion for criminal prosecution. The government charged Didion and several employees with federal crimes related to their work at the mill. Clark and Mesner proceeded to trial, challenging the district court’s evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, the indictment, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the constitutionality of their convictions.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin convicted Clark on four counts and Mesner on two counts. Clark was found guilty of conspiracy to commit federal offenses, false entries in records, using false documents within the EPA’s jurisdiction, and obstruction of agency proceedings. Mesner was found guilty of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and conspiracy to commit federal offenses. Both defendants were sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment and one year of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated Mesner’s conviction on Count 4, remanding for an entry of judgment of acquittal and further proceedings consistent with the opinion. The court affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings and jury instructions, as well as Clark’s convictions and Mesner’s conviction on Count 1. The court found sufficient evidence to support the convictions and determined that the jury instructions, when considered as a whole, accurately reflected the law. The court also rejected challenges to the constitutionality of the OSHA regulation involved. View "USA v Mesner" on Justia Law

David J. Rudometkin was found guilty of several offenses by a military judge in 2018 and sentenced to seventeen years of confinement. His post-trial motion for a mistrial was denied by another military judge after the original judge was suspended for inappropriate conduct. Rudometkin then submitted FOIA requests to the Army and the Department of Defense for records related to the judges involved. The government either did not respond meaningfully or rejected the requests under FOIA exemptions.Rudometkin filed a pro se complaint in the District Court in 2020, challenging the government's withholding of records. He later amended his complaint to focus solely on records related to the appointment of the Chief Trial Judge. The District Court granted the government's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the government had adequately searched for records and appropriately withheld information under Exemption 5’s deliberative-process privilege. The court also denied Rudometkin’s motions to amend his complaint to include his original FOIA claim regarding the Army’s investigatory records of the first judge.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the government did not establish that it properly withheld records under Exemption 5’s deliberative-process privilege and had not shown that it released all reasonably segregable information. The court reversed and remanded on the segregability issue. However, the court affirmed the District Court’s denial of Rudometkin’s motion to amend his complaint, as his FOIA claim regarding the Army’s investigatory records of the first judge was now live in a separate action. View "Rudometkin v. USA" on Justia Law

Fifteen restaurants and bars in Ohio and Florida challenged the Small Business Administration's (SBA) operation of the COVID-19 relief program under the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA). The plaintiffs argued that the SBA did not process their applications for the Restaurant Revitalization Fund (RRF) in the order received, as required by law, and that the SBA failed to recover improperly awarded funds. They sought an injunction to prevent the SBA from closing the RRF until all applications were adjudicated and improperly awarded funds were returned and redistributed.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to request enforcement actions to recover RRF grants and that the case was moot because the covered period for using the funds had ended, and Congress had rescinded unobligated funds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the case was moot because the RRF program expired on March 11, 2023, and any awarded funds could no longer be used by the plaintiffs. The court concluded that even if the plaintiffs were awarded grants, they would be required to return the funds to the Treasury, rendering any court decision ineffectual. The court did not address the SBA's additional arguments regarding standing or mootness, as the expiration of the covered period was sufficient to moot the case. View "W6 Restaurant Group, Ltd v. Loeffler" on Justia Law