Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-appellant Melonie Staheli appealed the denial of her application for Social Security disability benefits. She applied for benefits in 2018, alleging disability beginning March 28, 2018. In 2005, an automobile accident caused Staheli to suffer facial damage and other injuries. In March 2015, she suffered a stroke. After the stroke, she reported frequent headaches, memory loss, and vision problems. Medical professionals also diagnosed her with mental health issues including anxiety, depression, bipolar disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Psychologists determined her IQ scores fell within the lowest ten percent of the population. Staheli was eventually terminated from her medical records job because she was unable to perform her work duties. She later obtained part-time work, and by the time of her benefits hearing, she was working 20 hours per week. An ALJ determined Staheli was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Finding no reversible error in the district court’s acceptance of the ALJ’s judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Staheli v. Commissioner, SSA" on Justia Law

Petitioners James Beal, Mary Beth Brady, Mark Brighton, Lenore Weiss Bronson, Nancy Brown, William R. Castle, Lawrence J. Cataldo, Ramona Charland, Lucinda Clarke, Fintan Connell, Marjorie P. Crean, Ilara Donarum, Joseph R. Famularo, Jr., Philippe Favet, Charlotte Gindele, Julia Gindele, Linda Griebsch, Catherine L. Harris, Roy W. Helsel, John E. Howard, Nancy B. Howard, Elizabeth Jefferson, Cate Jones, Robert McElwain, Mary Lou McElwain, Edward Rice, April Weeks, Michael Wierbonics, and Lili Wierbonics, appealed a Housing Appeals Board (HAB) order that reversed a decision of the Portsmouth Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA), which, in turn, had reversed certain approvals granted by the Portsmouth Planning Board (Planning Board) to respondent, Iron Horse Properties, LLC (Iron Horse). Iron Horse owned real property at 105 Bartlett Street in Portsmouth. In 2021, it requested various approvals from the Planning Board in connection with its proposed redevelopment of the site: three multi-family apartment buildings with a total of 152 dwelling units. Iron Horse sought a site review permit, lot line revision permit, conditional use permit (CUP) for shared parking, and a wetland CUP. The Planning Board granted the approvals, and the petitioners, describing themselves as “a group of abutters and other concerned citizens,” then filed an appeal with the ZBA. The ZBA granted the appeal, effectively reversing the Planning Board’s site plan and CUP approvals. Following denial of its motion for rehearing, Iron Horse then appealed the ZBA’s decision to the HAB. The HAB reversed the ZBA’s findings as to six of the petitioners’ claims and dismissed the remaining three claims. Petitioners took their appeal to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, raising a number of issues that were consolidated under two overarching questions: (1) whether Iron Horse’s proposed project met the six criteria for a wetland CUP set forth in section 10.1017.50 of the Portsmouth Zoning Ordinance; and (2) whether Iron Horse’s permit requests were barred under the doctrine of Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187 (1980). Finding no reversible error in the HAB’s decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Beal, et al." on Justia Law

The City of Austin, Texas, issued an ordinance (1) declaring that the shoreline properties are within the city’s full purpose jurisdiction; (2) repealing a 1986 ordinance that putatively declared the shoreline properties to be within the city’s limited purpose jurisdiction but promised not to tax those properties until the city made city services available to them; and (3) announcing that the shoreline properties are subject to taxation by the city, albeit without providing city services. The owners asserted claims under the due process, equal protection, takings and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution, together with state law claims, and sought various declarations, injunctions, and writs of mandamus. They alternatively sought just compensation for the taking of their properties’ jurisdictional status. The district court dismissed all claims without prejudice as barred by the Tax Injunction Act. 28 U.S.C. Section 1341 Plaintiffs appealed that judgment.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court explained that apart from two minor exceptions, Plaintiffs do not ask the district court to “enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law.” Their claims thus fall outside the TIA. The court explained that Plaintiffs here seek the invalidation of the 2019 ordinance and a declaration that their properties are within the city’s extraterritorial or limited purpose jurisdiction. Although the ordinance authorized the taxation of Plaintiffs’ properties, the county tax assessor had to add their properties to the Travis County Appraisal District’s rolls, appraise the properties, determine their tax liabilities, levy the taxes, collect the taxes, and remit those payments to the city. View "Harward v. City of Austin" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the decision of the immigration judge (IJ) to deny Petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that the IJ's and BIA's decisions were supported by substantial evidence.Petitioner, a member of Ecuador's Quchua indigenous group, went before the IJ seeking to avoid removal through applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. The IJ denied all three forms of relief and ordered Petitioner's removal to Ecuador. The BIA affirmed the IJ's denial of relief on the merits. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Petitioner's application for asylum was appropriately denied, and therefore, withholding of removal was also appropriately denied. View "Caz v. Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs—five individuals and the California Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc.—filed this action in the Southern District of California challenging the constitutionality of Section 32310 under the Second Amendment. On September 22, 2023, the district court issued an order declaring Section 32310 “unconstitutional in its entirety” and enjoining California officials from enforcing the law. Defendant Rob Bonta, the Attorney General of California, filed an emergency motion for a partial stay pending appeal. The Attorney General seeks to stay “all portions of the order except those regarding Sections 32310(c) and (d), which relate to large-capacity magazines that were acquired and possessed lawfully prior to the district court’s order granting a permanent injunction.”   The Ninth Circuit granted the motion. First, the court concluded that the Attorney General is likely to succeed on the merits. The court explained that the Attorney General makes strong arguments that Section 32310 comports with the Second Amendment under Bruen. Second, the Attorney General has shown that California will be irreparably harmed absent a stay pending appeal by presenting evidence that large-capacity magazines pose significant threats to public safety. Third, it does not appear that staying portions of the district court’s order while the merits of this appeal are pending will substantially injure other parties interested in the proceedings. Finally, the court concluded that the public interest tips in favor of a stay. View "VIRGINIA DUNCAN, ET AL V. ROB BONTA" on Justia Law

Western requested records “about or related to” the “Strada Verde Project.” including: “all Public Records Act requests sent by anyone concerning” the Project; “[a]ll writings received by the County concerning the Project”; “[a]ll writings sent by the County to anyone” concerning the Project; “[a]ll writings concerning” two individuals; “[a]ll text messages sent or received by” two individuals relating to the Project; “[a]ll writings" concerning procedures relating to the consideration of general plan amendments; and “[a]ll writings concerning potential offsite consequences.” Western later requested documents “concerning or discussing” a presentation titled “San Benito Public Records Reveal Deception and Misconduct” and investigations into said deception and misconduct.Western sued to compel the County to produce the documents for both requests and sought a declaration that the County’s policies and procedures were unlawful. In the litigation, Western’s requests for production of documents included a request for “[a]ll documents responsive to the [public records] request.”The court of appeal modified the discovery order, citing the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code 7921.000) the "court must determine whether the discovery sought is necessary to resolve whether the agency has a duty to disclose, and … consider whether the request is justified given the need for an expeditious resolution.” Although most of Western’s discovery requests were proper, the request to produce the same documents ultimately at issue in the proceeding and the interrogatories seeking a new narrative justification for the County’s past decisions were improper. View "County of San Benito v. Superior Court of San Benito County" on Justia Law

In 2018, the California Insurance Commissioner (Commissioner) found that State Compensation Insurance Fund (State Fund) violated the Insurance Code by miscalculating the workers’ compensation insurance policy premiums of A-Brite Blind & Drapery Cleaning (A-Brite). Rather than challenging that ruling by way of a petition for writ of mandate, State Fund entered into a settlement agreement with the Department of Insurance (the Department) to resolve the action. Just a few weeks later, in a separate action involving a different insured employer, the Department took official notice of key documents from the A-Brite file and gave preclusive effect to the A-Brite decision, actions which State Fund perceived to be a breach of the settlement agreement. In response, State Fund filed a writ petition in the trial court challenging the original decision and order in A-Brite. The trial court granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the writ was untimely, rejecting State Fund’s arguments of equitable estoppel and equitable tolling. Although the Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court’s interpretation of the settlement agreement, it concluded the grant of summary judgment was nonetheless proper and affirmed. View "State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Dept. of Insurance" on Justia Law

Oklahoma counties were required to house state prison inmates in certain instances. In turn, Oklahoma law required the state to reimburse counties twenty-seven Dollars ($27.00) per day per state inmate for the cost of housing, unless the "actual daily cost" exceeded $27. The primary issue before the Oklahoma Supreme Court concerned the meaning of "actual daily cost" as provided in 57 O.S. 2017, § 38.2. The Court held "actual daily cost" included both consumable costs as well as those additional costs that were directly attributable to housing a DOC inmate. View "Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections v. Byrd" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether the Oregon Department of Revenue erred in declining to reduce the assessed value of taxpayer’s property for tax years 2018-2019 and 2019-2020. After persuading the Department that the valuation methodology it used to assess the property in 2020-2021 was flawed, the taxpayer asked the Department to use the corrected methodology to re-assess the two previous tax years. The Department denied the request, finding the statute the taxpayer used as grounds, ORS 306.115, did not authorize the Department to change its value opinion for the earlier tax years because another statute, ORS 308.624(4), expressly precluded the Department from making that change. The Oregon Tax Court agreed with the Department, and the taxpayer appealed, contending the Department and Tax Court misinterpreted the applicable statutes. The Oregon Supreme Court found no misinterpretation and affirmed. View "D. E. Shaw Renewable Investments, LLC v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of prohibition sought by Relator ordering Cuyahoga County Board of Elections and its individual members to remove a proposed East Cleveland city-charter amendment from the November 7, 2023 general election ballot and refrain from going forward with a special mayoral-recall election, holding that Relator was not entitled to the writ.Relator, the mayor of East Cleveland, sought a writ of prohibition ordering Respondents - the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections and its individual members - to remove a proposed city-charter amendment from the November 2023 general election ballot and refrain from proceeding with a May 5, 2023 mayoral-recall election. Relator further sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction asking that the elections and the mayoral recall not go forward. The Supreme Court denied the writ and denied as moot Relator's motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, holding that Relator was not entitled to the writ of prohibition. View "State ex rel. King v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law