Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Elmer Miller, a general contractor and owner of a construction company, was cited by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) for failing to provide fall protection for workers. OSHA sent the citation by certified mail to an address (433 E. County Road, 100 North, Arcola, Illinois) that it had used for Miller in the past. The certified mail was twice refused at that address and returned. OSHA then resent the citation to the same address using UPS, which was marked as received by “Miller.” Miller later argued that the citation was not properly served because it was sent to the wrong address and that there was no proof he received it, claiming his correct address was 435 E. County Road, not 433.After Miller did not contest the citation within the statutory period, the citation became a final order. The Secretary of Labor petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for summary enforcement of the order. In response, Miller raised the issue of improper service, asserting that the Commission failed to prove adequate service because the citation was not sent to his correct address. The Secretary countered with public records and prior court documents showing Miller and his business had repeatedly used the 433 address for official purposes, including previous OSHA citations and court filings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that OSHA’s service of the citation to the 433 address was reasonably calculated to provide Miller with notice, satisfying due process requirements. The court found that Miller’s history of using the 433 address and his prior acceptance of service there undermined his claim. The court granted the Secretary of Labor’s petition for summary enforcement and issued the enforcement decree pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §660(b). View "Chavez-DeRemer v. Miller" on Justia Law

Verizon Communications Inc. provided mobile voice and data services to customers and, until 2019, operated a program that sold access to customer device-location data through third-party aggregators. These aggregators resold the data to various entities for uses such as call routing and roadside assistance. Verizon relied on contractual arrangements and an external auditor to ensure that customer consent was obtained before disclosing location data. In 2018, a news report revealed that a third party, Securus Technologies, enabled law enforcement to access customer location data without proper consent, exposing flaws in Verizon’s safeguards. Verizon subsequently terminated access for Securus and related entities, but continued the program for other providers for several months.Following the news report, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) initiated an enforcement action, issuing a Notice of Apparent Liability and, after considering Verizon’s response, a forfeiture order. The FCC found that Verizon’s device-location data qualified as “customer proprietary network information” under § 222 of the Communications Act, and that Verizon failed to reasonably protect this information both before and after the Securus incident. The FCC imposed a $46.9 million penalty, calculated as 63 continuing violations—one for each third-party relationship that persisted after the breach was publicized—and included a 50% upward adjustment for egregious conduct. Verizon paid the penalty and petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that device-location data is protected under § 222, the FCC’s liability finding was not arbitrary or capricious, and the penalty did not exceed statutory limits. The court also found that Verizon’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial was not violated, as Verizon could have obtained a jury trial by declining to pay the penalty and contesting the forfeiture in federal district court. The petition for review was denied. View "Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n" on Justia Law

Two related Wyoming companies, one owning the surface estate and the other owning the mineral estate in an adjacent tract, sought to drill a horizontal well. The plan involved drilling from the surface owner’s land, traversing through federally owned subsurface minerals, and ending in the mineral owner’s adjacent tract. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which manages the federal minerals, informed the companies that they needed to obtain a permit to drill through the federal mineral estate, as the process would involve removing a small amount of federal minerals. The companies disagreed, arguing that BLM lacked authority to require a permit for a well that would not produce from the federal minerals, and filed suit seeking a declaration of their right to drill without BLM’s consent.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming ruled in favor of BLM, holding that Congress had retained sufficient regulatory authority over the mineral estate and had delegated that authority to BLM under the Mineral Leasing Act. The court concluded that BLM could require a permit for the proposed traversing well and that the companies qualified as “operators” under BLM regulations, thus subject to the permit requirement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The Tenth Circuit determined that the dispute was fundamentally about property rights—specifically, whether the surface owner had the right to drill through the federal mineral estate without BLM’s consent. The court held that such disputes must be brought under the Quiet Title Act (QTA), which is the exclusive means for challenging the United States’ title or property interests in real property. Because the companies brought their claim under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act instead of the QTA, the district court lacked jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "True Oil v. BLM" on Justia Law

A county public guardian sought to place an individual, A.H., under a conservatorship pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act, alleging that A.H. was gravely disabled due to a mental disorder. After the initial petition was filed in February 2023, the trial court imposed a temporary conservatorship. A.H. requested a trial, which by statute should have commenced within 10 days, but the trial was repeatedly continued due to court and counsel unavailability, ultimately beginning months later. As the first temporary conservatorship neared expiration, the public guardian filed a second petition and obtained a new temporary conservatorship, further extending A.H.’s involuntary confinement. A.H. objected to the continuances and sought dismissal of both petitions, arguing that the delays violated statutory deadlines and his due process rights.The Superior Court of Contra Costa County denied A.H.’s motions to dismiss, continued the trials multiple times, and ultimately dismissed the first petition at the public guardian’s request. The trial on the second petition began approximately ten weeks after the statutory deadline, and the court found A.H. gravely disabled, ordering a one-year conservatorship with various restrictions. The public guardian did not seek to renew the conservatorship after it expired.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, held that the statutory deadline for commencing trial under the LPS Act is directory, not mandatory, and does not require automatic dismissal if missed. The court also found that, although the trial court abused its discretion by repeatedly granting continuances without good cause, this error was harmless as it did not affect the outcome of the conservatorship order. However, the appellate court concluded that the cumulative delay—over ten months of involuntary confinement before a final adjudication—violated A.H.’s due process rights, particularly since none of the delay was attributable to A.H. and he had never previously been found gravely disabled. The conservatorship order was therefore reversed. View "Conservatorship of A.H." on Justia Law

An inmate in Georgia, who practices veganism as part of his religious beliefs, was enrolled in a prison program that provided vegan meals to accommodate religious diets. He was removed from this program twice after prison officials discovered he had purchased non-vegan food items from the prison store, such as chicken soup and Cheetos. The inmate claimed he bought these items to sell to other prisoners and would have stopped if he had known it could result in removal from the program. At the time of his removals, the prison’s policy did not explicitly list non-vegan purchases as grounds for removal, though this was later added. The inmate also alleged that only Black inmates were removed from the program, while similarly situated white inmates were not.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia granted summary judgment to the prison officials on the inmate’s claims under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as most of his claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court found that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment and due process claims, that there was no evidence of discriminatory intent or similarly situated comparators for the equal protection claim, and that the non-vegan meals provided were nutritionally adequate. The court also dismissed the remaining RLUIPA claim as moot after the inmate was reenrolled in the vegan meal program.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity, that there was insufficient evidence to support the equal protection and Eighth Amendment claims, and that the RLUIPA claims either failed on the merits or were moot because the inmate had been reinstated in the vegan meal program. View "Sumrall v. Georgia Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization sought to provide free legal advice to low-income New Yorkers facing debt-collection lawsuits by training nonlawyer “Justice Advocates” to help individuals complete a state-issued check-the-box answer form. The organization and a prospective Justice Advocate argued that many defendants in such cases default due to lack of understanding, leading to severe consequences. However, New York law prohibits nonlawyers from providing individualized legal advice, and all parties agreed that the proposed activities would violate the state’s unauthorized practice of law (UPL) statutes.The plaintiffs filed a pre-enforcement challenge in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming that applying the UPL statutes to their activities would violate their First Amendment rights. The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing and were likely to succeed on the merits, holding that the UPL statutes, as applied, were a content-based regulation of speech that could not survive strict scrutiny. The court granted a preliminary injunction, barring the Attorney General from enforcing the UPL statutes against the plaintiffs and participants in their program.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that the UPL statutes, as applied, regulate speech. However, the Second Circuit held that the regulation is content neutral, not content based, and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny. Because the district court applied the wrong standard, the Second Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings under the correct legal standard. The court did not reach a final decision on whether the statutes, as applied, ultimately violate the First Amendment, leaving that determination for the district court on remand. View "Upsolve, Inc. v. James" on Justia Law

Two former officers and directors of a Texas community bank faced regulatory action after the bank failed in 2013 following significant losses during the 2008 financial crisis. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) alleged that the individuals engaged in unsafe and unsound banking practices, breached fiduciary duties, and filed materially inaccurate reports. The OCC’s claims centered on three main strategies: the bank’s practice of making loans to finance purchases of its holding company’s stock (which were then counted as capital), aggressive and risky sales of real estate owned by the bank, and improper accounting for nonaccrual loans. These actions allegedly overstated the bank’s capital and masked its true financial condition, ultimately resulting in substantial losses.After the OCC initiated an enforcement action in 2017, the matter was reassigned to a new Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) following the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia v. SEC. The new ALJ ratified prior rulings, conducted a hearing, and issued a recommendation. The Comptroller adopted most of the ALJ’s findings but imposed industry bans and civil penalties on both petitioners, concluding that their conduct warranted prohibition from banking and monetary sanctions. The petitioners then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that the OCC’s enforcement action fell within the public rights doctrine, so the petitioners were not entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. The court also found that the ALJ’s appointment was constitutionally valid, the enforcement action was timely under the applicable statute of limitations, and the agency’s evidentiary and procedural rulings were supported by substantial evidence. The court further upheld the Comptroller’s decision to impose prohibition orders and civil penalties, finding the preponderance of the evidence standard appropriate for such administrative proceedings. View "Ortega v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency" on Justia Law

After the 2025 Presidential Inauguration, the federal government initiated mass terminations of thousands of probationary employees across numerous federal agencies. These employees, who were subject to one- or two-year probationary periods, were dismissed without the advance notice typically required for reductions in force (RIFs). The affected states alleged that the lack of notice hindered their ability to provide rapid response services to the terminated employees, resulting in increased unemployment claims and diversion of state resources.Nineteen states and the District of Columbia filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, arguing that the terminations violated statutory RIF procedures, including the requirement to provide 60 days’ notice to state governments. The district court granted a temporary restraining order and later a preliminary injunction, ordering the federal government to reinstate the terminated employees and prohibiting further terminations without compliance with all applicable laws and notice requirements. The injunction was later stayed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the plaintiff states lacked Article III standing to bring the suit. The court found that the states did not suffer a cognizable and redressable injury, as the direct harm was to the terminated employees, not the states. The court also determined that the relief sought by the states—indefinite reinstatement and broad injunctive relief—was not tailored to their alleged informational injury and primarily served to vindicate the rights of non-party employees. As a result, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the action. View "State of Maryland v. USDA" on Justia Law

Catherine Baker was employed by San Mateo County as a Social Worker III but went on medical leave in 2009 due to back pain. In 2015, she returned to work in a different position as a screener trainee, which involved different duties but was compensated at the same pay rate as her original position. Her last paycheck was issued in January 2016. In 2017, Baker applied for a service-connected disability retirement, and the San Mateo County Employees Retirement Association (SamCERA) determined that the effective date for her retirement benefits should be January 22, 2016, the day after her last receipt of “regular compensation.”After SamCERA’s Board approved her application and set the effective date, Baker sought administrative review, arguing that her compensation as a screener trainee did not qualify as “regular compensation” under Government Code section 31724 because she had not returned to her original job. An administrative law judge recommended denial of her request to change the effective date, and the Board adopted this recommendation. Baker then filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in the Superior Court of San Mateo County, which denied the petition and confirmed the January 22, 2016 effective date.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed whether “regular compensation” under section 31724 included Baker’s pay as a screener trainee. Exercising independent judgment on statutory interpretation, the court held that “regular compensation” refers to regular salary or full wages, regardless of whether the position is the employee’s original job. Because Baker’s screener trainee pay matched her original position’s rate, it qualified as “regular compensation.” The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, upholding the effective date set by SamCERA. View "Baker v. San Mateo County Employees Retirement Assn." on Justia Law

A company had been diverting large amounts of water from streams in East Maui for over twenty years under a series of annually renewed, so-called “temporary” permits issued by the state’s Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR). Each year, the company applied to renew these permits, which allowed it to use state land and divert millions of gallons of water daily. In 2020, before BLNR voted to renew the permits for 2021, an environmental group timely requested a contested case hearing, arguing that new evidence and changed circumstances warranted further scrutiny. BLNR denied this request and proceeded to renew the permits, adding some new conditions.The environmental group appealed to the Environmental Court of the First Circuit, challenging both the denial of a contested case hearing and the permit renewals. The Environmental Court found that the group had a constitutionally protected right to a clean and healthful environment, as defined by state law, and that due process required a contested case hearing before the permits were renewed. The court vacated the permits but stayed its order to avoid disruption, temporarily modifying the permits to reduce the allowable water diversion. The court also awarded attorney fees and costs to the group.On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) held that the group’s protected interest was defined by some, but not all, relevant environmental laws, and that due process did not require a contested case hearing in this instance. The ICA further found that the Environmental Court lacked jurisdiction over the permit renewals and erred in modifying the permits and awarding attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi reversed the ICA in relevant part. It held that the group’s constitutional right was defined by all cited environmental laws, including those governing coastal zone management. The court concluded that due process required a contested case hearing before the permits were renewed, and that the Environmental Court had jurisdiction to review both the denial of the hearing and the permit renewals. The Supreme Court also affirmed the Environmental Court’s authority to temporarily modify the permits and to award attorney fees and costs to the environmental group. View "Sierra Club v. Board of Land and Natural Resources" on Justia Law