Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's motion to dismiss a complaint citing him with violating 49 C.F.R. 393.11, incorporated by Mont. Code Ann. 61-10-154, which required a red light to be affixed to protruding loads, holding that the district court did not err by denying Appellant's motion to dismiss for unlawful delegation of legislative authority.After Appellant was convicted in justice court he appealed de novo to the district court, arguing that section 61-10-154, which authorizes the Montana Department of Transportation to adopt rules and regulations, and Mont. Code Ann. 61-9-512, which criminalizes violations of regulations adopted pursuant to section 61-10-154, constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to an administrative body. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the legislature did not delegate the lawmaking function, as argued by Appellant. View "State v. Akhmedli" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Minnesota Tax Court reducing the Commissioner of Revenue's valuations of CenterPoint Energy Minnegasco's natural gas distribution pipeline system for January 2, 2018 through January 2, 2019, holding that the Commissioner was not entitled to relief.The tax court reduced the Commissioner's valuations and ordered the Commissioner to recalculate Minnegasco's tax liability. The Commissioner appealed, challenging the tax court's income-equalization and cost approaches. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the tax court (1) did not err in the way that it used the Commissioner's initial assessments when evaluating the totality of the evidence and making its independent evaluations; (2) did not abuse its discretion in considering the conflicting expert opinions; and (3) did not clearly err in finding external obsolescence. View "Commissioner of Revenue v. CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the appellate court concluding that the circuit court erred in determining that there was no public road over the parcel of real property in St. Mary's County at issue in this case but did not err in determining that the County owned the property in fee simple absolute, holding that the appellate court did not err.The trustee of the Wilkinson Family Trust sued the Board of County Commissioners of St. Mary's County asserting ownership of the property at issue. The circuit court found that the County owned the property in fee simple absolute and that no public road existed on the property. The appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded the case. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the appellate court (1) did not err in concluding that the County owned the property in fee simple absolute; and (2) did not err in holding that, as a matter of law, a public road was established on the property by dedication. View "Bd. of County Commissioners v. Aiken" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the decision of the Compensation Review Board upholding the finding and award of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner for the Second Districting ordering the town of Waterford to accept as compensable Plaintiff's claim for heart disease benefits pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-433c, holding that the appellate court erred.In concluding that Plaintiff was entitled to benefits the Commissioner determined that section 7-433c does not define the phrase "uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department." The appellate court affirmed. On appeal, the town argued that the appellate court erred in determining that the definition of "member" in Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-425(5) does not govern whether the plaintiff was a uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department for purposes of section 7-433c. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the definition of "member" in section 7-425(5) governs eligibility for benefits under section 7-433c. View "Clark v. Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Dep't" on Justia Law

In 2018, voters in the City of South Lake Tahoe (City) enacted Measure T, an initiative that prohibited the use of dwellings in residential zones as short-term or vacation rentals. Measure T amended the City’s vacation home rental ordinances to bar the City from issuing any new permits for vacation home rentals in residential zones except for permanent residents’ dwellings, and to declare that all such existing and new permits would expire by the end of 2021. Measure T also imposed more strict occupancy limits on vacation rental homes which were to be effective immediately. Plaintiff South Lake Tahoe Property Owners Group brought this action against the City to have Measure T declared unconstitutional. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City and denied plaintiff’s motion. On appeal, contended Measure T: (1) unconstitutionally interfered with vested property rights; (2) created an unconstitutional durational residency requirement to qualify for the exception to the ban; (3) exceeded the initiative power in violation of land use authority vested in the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA); and (4) violated rights of privacy and equal protection by restricting occupancy. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court to the extent that it found Measure T’s exception for resident owners did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "South Lake Tahoe Property etc. v. City of South Lake Tahoe" on Justia Law

In January 2022, plaintiffs A.S. and her husband B.S. brought a claim under the Child Sexual Abuse Accountability Act (CSAAA or “Act”) against a former high school athletic coach and a school district, alleging that the coach sexually abused A.S. between 2001 and 2005 when she was a minor. At the time plaintiffs filed suit, any previously available claims for this alleged abuse was time-barred. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review was whether the CSAAA was unconstitutionally retrospective to the extent it created a new cause of action for conduct that predated the Act, and for which any previously available claims would be time-barred. The Supreme Court concluded that because the CSAAA created a new cause of action for child sexual abuse, the Act created a new obligation and attached a new disability with respect to past transactions or considerations to the extent it permitted victims to bring claims for which any available cause of action would have been time-barred. Therefore, the CSAAA amounted to unconstitutional retrospective legislation as applied to the plaintiffs’ claim under the Act. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s order granting defendants’ motions to dismiss. View "Aurora Public Schools v. A.S. & B.S." on Justia Law

According to the Environmental Protection Agency, greenhouse gases called hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) threaten the environment because they “can be hundreds to thousands of times more potent than carbon dioxide.” To reduce their use, Congress enacted the American Innovation and Manufacturing Act. 42 U.S.C. Section 7675. The Act directs the EPA to pass a rule phasing them out. After the EPA passed that rule, two regulated companies and three trade associations sought judicial review. They say that the agency exceeded its statutory authority in two different ways and that the Act violates the nondelegation doctrine.   The DC Circuit vacated in part the EPA’s Phasedown Rule, holding that the EPA has not identified a statute authorizing its QRcode and refillable-cylinder regulations. The court explained that the AIM Act gives the EPA authority to regulate HFCs within blends, and the court wrote it may not consider the nondelegation argument because Petitioner failed to exhaust it before the agency. But the trade associations’ petition fares better: The EPA does not identify a statutory provision authorizing its QR-code and refillable cylinder rules. View "Heating, Air-Conditioning, & Refrigeration Distributors International v. EPA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Gannett Satellite Information Network, LLC (Gannett) sought an award of attorneys’ fees from its common law right of access claim to Internal Affiars (IA) files pertaining to a former Neptune Township, New Jersey police officer. In 2015, the former officer, Philip Seidel, killed his former wife. After a local prosecutor’s office issued a report on the Seidel case that was based in part on Seidle’s IA files, Gannett submitted an Open Public Records Act (OPRA) request and one under the common law, seeking copies of those files. The Township denied the request. A trial court ultimately dismissed Gannett’s OPRA claim but ordered the release of the contested records, redacted in accordance with guidelines prescribed in the court’s opinion, on the sole basis of the common law right of access. The trial court granted a partial fee award. The Appellate Division affirmed in part and reversed in part: (1) it affirmed the trial court’s determination that Gannett had no claim under OPRA but was entitled to a redacted version of Seidle’s IA files pursuant to the common law; and (2) it held that the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized a right to counsel fees in common law right of access cases under certain circumstances in Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 57 (2008). On the facts presented, however, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s partial award of counsel fees. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, the Appellate Division’s judgment. “Imposing fee-shifting in this category of cases would venture far beyond the narrow exceptions to the American Rule that New Jersey courts have adopted to date. Accordingly, Gannett is not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees in this appeal.” View "Gannett Satellite Information Network, LLC v. Township of Neptune" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that government agents searched his cell phone at the border without a warrant on at least five occasions and that agents copied data from his cell phone at least once. Plaintiff sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the respective heads of each entity in their official capacity (collectively, the government), challenging the searches, as well as ICE and CBP policies regarding border searches of electronic devices. In the district court, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking, among other relief, a preliminary injunction preventing the government from searching his cell phone at the border without a warrant. The district court denied the preliminary injunction.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a substantial threat he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted. The court reasoned that Plaintiff has demonstrated that the ICE and CBP policies authorize warrantless searches. Further, the allegations in Plaintiff’s verified complaint are evidence of a pattern of warrantless searches of Plaintiff’s cell phone. However, Plaintiff has no additional evidence to establish that he will be stopped by border agents in the future and that the agents will search his cell phone without a warrant. View "Anibowei v. Morgan" on Justia Law

The False Claims Act (FCA) imposes civil liability on those who present false or fraudulent claims for payment to the federal government, 31 U.S.C. 3729–3733, and authorizes private parties (relators) to bring “qui tam actions” in the name of the government. A relator may receive up to 30% of any recovery. The relator must file his complaint under seal and serve a copy and supporting evidence on the government, which has 60 days to decide whether to intervene. As a “real party in interest,” the government can intervene after the seal period ends, if it shows good cause.Polansky filed an FCA action alleging Medicare fraud. The government declined to intervene during the seal period. After years of discovery, the government decided that the burdens of the suit outweighed its potential value, and moved under section 3730(c)(2)(A) (Subparagraph (2)(A)), which provides that the government may dismiss the action notwithstanding the objections of the relator if the relator received notice and an opportunity for a hearing.The Third Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The government may move to dismiss an FCA action whenever it has intervened, whether during the seal period or later. It may not move to dismiss if it has never intervened. A successful motion to intervene turns the movant into a party; it can assume primary responsibility for the case’s prosecution, which triggers the Subparagraph (2)(A) right to dismiss, consistent with the FCA’s government-centered purposes. The government’s motion to dismiss will satisfy FRCP 41 in all but exceptional cases. The government gave good grounds for believing that this suit would not vindicate its interests. Absent extraordinary circumstances, that showing suffices for the government to prevail. View "United States ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Inc." on Justia Law