Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Board of Education of the Borough of Somerville challenged the award of relief to former teacher Catherine Parsells in a tenure dispute. The Board employed Parsells as a full-time preschool teacher from September 2010 to June 2016. Parsells earned tenure in 2013. In May 2016, she wrote to the superintendent, expressing an interest in a temporary part-time preschool teaching position that included health benefits “for as long as [such a position] is available, or until my family decides that full-time work would be in our best interests again,” so that she could “pursu[e] [her] career goals while also being able to spend time with [her] son during his precious first few years.” Even though Parsells never formally applied for a part-time teaching job, and without addressing her assertion that she understood that her switch would be temporary, the superintendent notified Parsells that the Board approved her transfer from the full-time preschool teacher to the part-time position. Parsells began the 2016-17 school year as a part-time tenured teacher with health benefits. After requesting and receiving approval for maternity leave followed by a childcare leave of absence from February through June 2017, Parsells re-expressed interest in remaining a temporary part-time teacher for the 2017-18 school year. In an email to the school’s principal, the new superintendent noted that Parsells “was under the impression that she had the option of coming back full-time if she wanted to” and had “stated that if she had known all of this before changing to part-time, she would not have made the change.” Parsells returned to her part-time tenured teaching job in September 2018, but without health benefits. Parsells then applied for a full-time teaching position, and the Board rejected her applications, hiring non-tenured teachers from outside the district for some of those positions. Parsells filed a petition against the Board alleging it violated her tenure rights by hiring non-tenured teachers for the full-time positions to which she applied and that she had not voluntarily relinquished her tenure rights by moving temporarily to a part-time position. The New Jersey Supreme Court determined Parsells did not knowingly waive her tenured right to a full-time teaching position, and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision upholding the Commissioner’s award of “full back pay, benefits, and emoluments, less mitigation.” View "Parsells v. Borough of Somerville Board of Education" on Justia Law

Petitioner Todd Wood appealed after his driving privileges were suspended following breath alcohol testing (BAC) by the Idaho State Policy. After a lawful traffic stop, Wood submitted to BAC testing. His results were 0.178 and 0.175, both in excess of Idaho’s legal limit of 0.08. However, during the fifteen-minute pretest observation period, the deputy sheriff admittedly did not observe Wood for roughly three minutes to ensure mouth alcohol was not present by way of burp, external contaminant, or otherwise prior to evidentiary testing. Wood challenged his suspension and argued that his BAC results were inadmissible because they had not been obtained in compliance with the required fifteen-minute pretest observation procedure. The ALS hearing officer disagreed, reasoning that ISP had promulgated rules making the pretest observation period only discretionary; thus, Wood’s BAC test results were not based on unlawful procedure. Wood petitioned for judicial review and argued the BAC rules allowing for a discretionary observation period are violative of “due process” and “fundamental fairness.” Wood further argued that the automatic admission of BAC results in his ALS hearing, pursuant to section 18-8004(4), unconstitutionally usurped the judicial branch’s power over the admission of evidence. The district court rejected Wood’s arguments and upheld his administrative license suspension. Wood appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court on the same grounds, which likewise upheld the suspension. View "Wood v. ITD" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court in favor of Defendant, in his capacity as the finance director/treasurer for the Town of Smithfield, in this action challenging the calculation of a former employee's retirement benefits, holding that the court erred in concluding that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.Armand Beaudry worked as a firefighter for the Town for several years before he was placed on disability retirement benefits. The retirement benefits were governed by a pension system that constituted "an amalgamation of various documents." The case arose from a dispute over the calculation of Beaudry's benefits. Beaudry filed a complaint challenging the amount. The trial court granted the Town's motion for summary judgment based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the hearing justice erred by finding that a challenged amendment to the plan was enforceable at the time of Beaudry's retirement, thus creating an administrative remedy that Beaudry failed to exhaust. View "Beaudry v. Rossi" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging that the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe failed to warn motorists of unsafe road conditions. The district court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that as a sovereign, the United States is immune from suit. It has waived immunity in some FTCA cases but expressly retains immunity in cases involving “a discretionary function or duty.” If the discretionary function exception applies, “it is a jurisdictional bar to suit.” The court wrote that Plaintiffs “have failed to rebut the presumption that the Tribe’scdecision not to post warning signs was grounded in policy.” Accordingly, the court concluded it lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the FTCA’s discretionary function exception. View "Jade Mound v. The United States of America" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests with six intelligence agencies for any records about the unmasking of members of President Trump’s campaign and transition team. Plaintiff sought to uncover what he alleges was inappropriate intelligence surveillance for political purposes. Declining to produce any records, the Agencies issued so-called Glomar responses, explaining that even the existence or nonexistence of such records was exempted from FOIA. The district court granted summary judgment for the Agencies, concluding that FOIA exempted the information Plaintiff requested and that the Agencies had no obligation to search for responsive records before invoking Glomar.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that an agency properly issues a Glomar response when its affidavits plausibly describe the justifications for issuing such a response, and these justifications are not substantially called into question by contrary record evidence. Because the Glomar procedure protects information about even the existence of certain records, an agency need not search for responsive records before invoking it. Here, the Agencies have properly invoked Glomar on the grounds that the information Plaintiff seeks is protected by FOIA Exemptions One and Three, and nothing in the record suggests the Agencies acted in bad faith in issuing their responses. View "Gene Schaerr v. DOJ" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from the denial of a motion for a default judgment. End Citizens United (“ECU”) sued the Federal Election Commission alleging the Commission unlawfully dismissed its administrative complaint. Although the Commission failed to enter an appearance or otherwise defend the lawsuit, the district court denied ECU’s motion based on the Commission’s after-the-fact explanation for its dismissal. The issue on appeal is whether the district court erred by relying on the non-contemporaneous explanation in light of well-established circuit precedent requiring the Commission to provide a timely explanation of its reason for dismissing an administrative complaint.   The DC Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case to it with instructions to return the case to the Commission. The court explained that here the Commission has not defended its decision in court, much less the reasoning in the Dickerson/Cooksey statement. Moreover, the Commission’s composition has apparently changed since its dismissal of ECU’s administrative complaint so that different “agency personnel” would consider the matter on remand. In any event, the Supreme Court has contemplated that “a reviewing court . . . will set aside” Commission action taken contrary to law and “remand the case,” even though the Commission might later “reach the same result exercising its discretionary powers lawfully.” View "End Citizens United PAC v. FEC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court denying three plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in this suit brought to challenge the City of Des Moines' use of the state's income offset program to collect automated traffic citation penalties and granting summary judgment in favor of the City, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to a preemption claim and a claim for unjust enrichment.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs' claims that, among other things, the City's use of the income offset program amounted to an unconstitutional taking and that their right to procedural due process was violated. As to Plaintiffs' contention that the City's use of the program was preempted by state law, however, the district court reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in dismissing one plaintiff's preemption claim with respect to his requests for declaratory and injunctive relief and in dismissing two plaintiffs' claim for unjust enrichment. The Court remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Livingood v. City of Des Moines" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs' lawsuit challenging the City of Windsor Heights's attempts to collect automated traffic citation fines not reduced to a judgment in a municipal infraction proceeding, holding that the district court erred in part.At issue was an income offset program authorized pursuant to Iowa Code 8A.504 allowing the department of administrative services to "establish a debt collection setoff procedure for collection of debts owed to the public agency." Plaintiffs brought this action against the City and the City's collection agent challenging the program to enforce civil penalties issued pursuant to the automated traffic enforcement system. The district court dismissed all claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the district court erred in dismissing some claims against the City as time-barred. View "Stogdill v. City of Windsor Heights" on Justia Law

Since 1961, Santa Clara County has owned and operated Reid-Hillview Airport, a reliever airport for the San Jose International Airport. Reid-Hillview serves all aviation other than commercial passenger flights and air carrier aviation, supports emergency responses for Bay Area hospitals, and houses Cal Fire and Civil Air Patrol operations. Although the County is required to operate the airport until 2030, in 2018 the Board of Supervisors voted to engage with the City of San Jose in a joint planning process concerning possible alternative uses of Reid-Hillview after 2031. Mohler claims that, in furtherance of this plan, the County intentionally has allowed the airport to fall into disrepair.Mohler sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the county has committed waste by failing to perform basic maintenance; has failed to repair hangars, rendering one nonfunctional and allowing rust to drip onto planes; and has failed to renew soon-to-expire leases for fixed base operators (which provide support operations such as flight training, aircraft maintenance or repair, and aircraft rental), threatening significant revenue losses. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Code of Civil Procedure 526a’s prohibition against waste requires more than a mistaken exercise of judgment or discretion. Mohler failed to show that the County has any duty to maintain the airport and failed to allege “dangerous conditions.” View "Mohler v. County of Santa Clara" on Justia Law

The City of San Buenaventura (City) removed a statute of Father Junípero Serra because it is now offensive to significant members of the community. This appeal stems from the denial of the Coalition for Historical Integrity’s (Coalition) writ of mandate requiring the City to restore the statue.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the judgment. The Coalition contends that the removal of the bronze statue requires review under CEQA. Here the 2020 HRG report discusses the history of the statue and the criteria for evaluating its historical significance. Among other matters, the report points out that the bronze replica statue does not meet the 40-year-old threshold required for local designation as a historical landmark. The report constitutes substantial evidence.   Further, the Coalition contends that removal of the bronze statue violates the City’s Specific Plan. The court found the Specific Plan provides that the demolition of a historical resource may require review by the Historic Preservation Committee, the committee that approved removal of the statue. Nothing in the Specific Plan prohibits the destruction or removal of a statue that is listed as a historical resource upon a finding that on reexamination, it, in fact, never had historical value.   Moreover, The Coalition contends that the City failed to follow the procedure set forth in the municipal code for removing landmark status from the statue. But the City found that the bronze statue was never a landmark. That finding is supported by substantial evidence. The code provisions for removing landmark status do not apply. View "Coalition for Historical Integrity v. City of San Buenaventura" on Justia Law