Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS) provides for collective bargaining between federal agencies and their employees’ unions and establishes the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) to investigate and adjudicate labor disputes, 5 U.S.C. 7101. The Union represents federal civil-service employees (dual-status technicians) who work for the Ohio National Guard. After their prior collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) expired, the Guard, the Ohio Adjutant General, and the Ohio Adjutant General’s Department (petitioners) asserted that they were not bound by the FSLMRS. The Union filed a complaint with the FLRA. An ALJ concluded that the FLRA had jurisdiction over the Guard; the dual-status technicians had collective bargaining rights under the FSLMRS; and repudiating the CBA violated the FSLMRS. The Sixth Circuit upheld the decision.The Supreme Court affirmed. A State National Guard acts as a federal agency for purposes of the FSLMRS when it hires and supervises dual-status technicians serving in their civilian roles. When the Guard employs dual-status technicians, it exercises the authority of the Department of Defense, an agency covered by the FSLMRS. The statutory authority permitting the Ohio Adjutant General to employ dual-status technicians as civilian employees in the federal civil service is found in 5 U.S.C. 2105(a)(1)(F). Dual-status technicians are ultimately employees of the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force, and the petitioners are the Secretaries’ designees for purposes of dual-status technician employment. View "Ohio Adjutant General's Department v. Federal Labor Relations Authority" on Justia Law

Chapman filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1) request, seeking information pertaining to the Citation Administration and Adjudication System (CANVAS) for the enforcement of parking, red-light, and speed-camera tickets. The Chicago Department of Finance denied the request, citing section 7(1)(o), which exempts: “Administrative or technical information associated with automated data processing operations, including but not limited to software, operating protocols, computer program abstracts, file layouts, source listings, object modules, load modules, user guides, documentation pertaining to all logical and physical design of computerized systems, employee manuals, and any other information that, if disclosed, would jeopardize the security of the system or its data or the security of materials exempt under this Section.” The First District affirmed an order requiring the production of the documents.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The requested records are file layouts under section 7(1)(o); a reasonable, commonsense interpretation of section 7(1)(o) indicates that file layouts are exempt from disclosure. While public records are presumed to be open and accessible, the legislature has specifically provided for a narrow exemption with respect to administrative or technical information associated with automated data processing operations. Section 7(1)(o)'s exemption is focused on the security of the government body’s data system, and requiring a hearing to determine whether disclosure would jeopardize the security of that system every time a file layout is requested would weaken the specific exemption. View "Chapman v. Chicago Department of Finance" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court ruling that Defendants, five members of the Prince William County Board of Supervisors, knowingly and willfully violated the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA), holding that the circuit court erred by granting Defendants' motion to strike.Plaintiffs, residents of Prince William County, filed a petition for mandamus and injunctive alleging that Defendants violated VFOIA by attending a meeting as defined by VFOIA without complying with statutory requirements. At the conclusion of Plaintiffs' evidence the circuit court granted Defendants' motion to strike on the grounds that the gathering did not constitute a meeting under VFOIA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in granting the motion to strike. View "Gloss v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

After the Texas Legislature amended the Election Code in 2021, the United States and others sued, alleging the changes were racially discriminatory. When Plaintiffs sought discovery from individual, nonparty state legislators, those legislators withheld some documents, citing legislative privilege. The district court largely rejected the legislators’ privilege claims, and they filed this interlocutory appeal.   The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court explained that for their part, the legislators rely on the privilege for each of the disputed documents. Plaintiffs, too, do not argue that the documents are non-legislative. Instead, they argue only that the privilege either “was waived” or “must yield.” The court wrote that the legislators did not waive the legislative privilege when they “communicated with parties outside the legislature, such as party leaders and lobbyists.” The district court’s contrary holding flouts the rule that the privilege covers “legislators’ actions in the proposal, formulation, and passage of legislation.” Finally, the court reasoned that Plaintiffs’ reliance on Jefferson Community Health Care Centers, Inc. v. Jefferson Parish Government is misplaced. That decision stated that “while the common-law legislative immunity for state legislators is absolute, the legislative privilege for state lawmakers is, at best, one which is qualified.” But that case provides no support for the idea that state legislators can be compelled to produce documents concerning the legislative process and a legislator’s subjective thoughts and motives. View "LULAC Texas v. Hughes" on Justia Law

A.C. (Mother) challenged a juvenile court’s dispositional finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 did not apply to the dependency proceedings to her five children. Mother contended that San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) failed to discharge its duty of initial inquiry under Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2 (b). After review of the juvenile court record, the Court of Appeal concluded that Mother’s argument lacked merit and therefore affirmed. View "In re Ja.O." on Justia Law

Rosemont Copper Company (Rosemont) challenged the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s (FWS) designation of certain areas in southern Arizona as critical habitat for jaguar under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Rosemont sought to develop a copper mine and related processing facilities in the area. The Center for Biological Diversity (Center) sued after the FWS concluded that Rosemont’s proposed mine project would not destroy or adversely modify the designated critical habitat. Rosemont intervened and filed crossclaims against the FWS. The district court concluded that the FWS erred in designating occupied critical habitat because the record did not establish that jaguar occupied this area when this species was listed as endangered. But it upheld the FWS’s designation of this same area and an adjacent area as unoccupied critical habitat. The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of the Center.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the FWS, vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Center, remanded with instructions for the district court to vacate the FWS’s critical-habitat designations, and remanded to the agency for further proceedings. The panel held that because the FSW did not comply with Section 424.12(e) its designation of Unit 3 and Subunit 4b as unoccupied critical habitat was arbitrary and capricious. The panel concluded that the FWS did not provide a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made, or articulate a satisfactory explanation to justify its designations of Unit 3 and Subunit 4b as unoccupied critical habitat. View "CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. USFWS, ET AL" on Justia Law

Idaho Power Company and Avista Corporation (collectively the “Companies”) contested the the Idaho State Tax Commission (the “Commission”), in its capacity as the State Board of Equalization, assessments of their operating property during 2019 and 2020, asserting that those assessments violated the proportionality and uniformity requirements set out in Article VII, sections 2 and 5 of the Idaho Constitution. The Commission rejected the Companies’ challenges and upheld its assessments. The Companies then sought judicial review of the Commission’s decision in district court, arguing that the Commission had erred in two significant ways: (1) because the Commission reduced the assessed values of certain railroads’ operating property in compliance with federal law, the assessed values of the Companies’ operating property were unconstitutionally assessed at a higher percentage of their actual cash value than were the railroads’ operating properties (the "4-R" claim); and (2) that commercial property had been assessed (and therefore taxed) at a lower percentage of its actual cash value than the Companies’ operating property, rendering the Companies’ operating property unconstitutionally disproportionally over-taxed (the "alternative claim"). The district court granted summary judgment to the Commission as to the Companies’ first argument. However, the district court concluded genuine issues of material fact existed as to the Companies’ second argument and declined to grant the Commission’s request for summary judgment. Both parties appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in dismissing the 4-R claim, but did not err as to the alternative claim. Judgment was reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Idaho Power Company v. Idaho State Tax Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals issuing a limited writ of mandamus directing the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order denying Amanda Carpenter's request for death benefits after her fiancé, Christopher McDonald, died in an industrial accident, holding that a writ of mandamus was appropriate.In denying Carpenter's request for death benefits the Commission determined that Carpenter was not McDonald's surviving spouse. In issuing its limited writ of mandamus the Tenth District concluded that Carpenter could potentially qualify for death benefits as a member of McDonald's family. The court directed the Commission to vacate its order and to determine whether Carpenter was a member of McDonald's family under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.59(D) and, if so, the extent of her dependency. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Carpenter had a clear legal right to have the Commission apply section 4123.59(D) correctly to her claim for death benefits, and the Commission had a clear legal duty to do so. View "State ex rel. McDonald v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court issued a writ prohibiting the Honorable Steven A. Judge Privette from proceeding in the underlying proceeding initiated against Betty Grooms, the circuit clerk of Oregon County, for contempt of court, holding that Judge Privette lacked authority to hold Grooms in contempt for alleged deficiencies in complying with the court order at issue.The subject court order directed Groom to prepare a spreadsheet of court costs assessed in criminal cases after local sheriff departments alleged that they had not received reimbursement for costs incurred incarcerating individuals in their county jails. Judge Privette subsequently ordered Grooms to show cause why she should not be held in contempt of court. The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition requested by Grooms, holding that Judge Privette lacked authority to hold Grooms in contempt for her alleged deficiencies in complying with the court order. View "State ex rel. Grooms v. Honorable Privette" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court determining that the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) erred in granting Montana Artesian Water Company's application for a beneficial use permit and denying Objectors' motion for attorney fees, holding that the district court erred in denying Objectors' motion for attorney fees.The district court vacated the DNRC's order granting Artesian's application for the permit and remanded the case on the grounds that the DNRC improperly relied on an internal agency memorandum in analyzing availability. Artesian appealed, and the Objectors in this case - Flathead Lakers Inc. and Water for Flathead's Future - cross appealed from the deemed denial of their motion for attorney fees. The Supreme Court held that the district court (1) erred by determining that DNRC erroneously granted Artesian's application for a beneficial use permit; and (2) abused its discretion by denying Objectors' fee motion by operation of law. View "Flathead Lakers Inc. v. Mont. Dep't of Natural Resources & Conservation" on Justia Law