Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Jackson-Medgar Wiley Evers International Airport is a major airport located in Jackson, Mississippi. Since 1960, the airport has been operated by the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority, whose five commissioners are selected by the city government. In 2016, the Mississippi legislature passed, and the governor signed into law SB 2162, which abolishes the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority and replaces it with a regional authority composed of nine commissioners, only two of whom are selected by Jackson city government.   A Jackson citizen filed a suit seeking to enjoin the law. The mayor, the city council, the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority, its board of commissioners, and the commissioners in their individual capacities intervened in that lawsuit. The intervenors contend that SB 2162 violates the Equal Protection rights of the citizens of Jackson by eliminating the locally controlled Jackson Municipal Airport Authority for racially discriminatory reasons. The intervenors served subpoenas on eight nonparty state legislators who participated in SB 2162’s drafting and passage. The Legislators refused to comply with Request #3 in the subpoena, which sought documents and communications related to SB 2162, asserting that any responsive discovery would either be irrelevant or protected by legislative privilege. The magistrate judge, and later the district court, rejected this position.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the Legislators to produce a privilege log. But the district court erred in broadly holding that legislative privilege was automatically waived for any documents that have been shared with third parties. View "Jackson Muni Airport v. Harkins" on Justia Law

Eberspaecher North America (“ENA”), is a company that manufactures car components with its headquarters in Novi, Michigan and six other locations across the country. An employee at one of these locations—ENA’s Northport, Alabama plant—complained to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) that he was fired for taking protected absences under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). An EEOC Commissioner charged ENA with discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (“ADAAA”), listing only the Northport facility in the written charge. The EEOC then issued requests for information on every employee terminated for attendance-related infractions at each of ENA’s seven domestic facilities around the nation. ENA objected to the scope of those requests. The district court ordered ENA to turn over information related to the Northport, Alabama, facility but refused to enforce the subpoena as to information from other facilities. The EEOC appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion. In the alternative, the EEOC contends that, even if the charge were limited to the Northport facility, nationwide data is still relevant to its investigation.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order enforcing only part of the EEOC’s subpoena. The court explained the EEOC’s investigatory process is a multi-step process designed to notify employers of investigations into potentially unlawful employment practices. The court held that the EEOC charged only ENA’s Northport facility— which provided notice to ENA that the EEOC was investigating potentially unlawful employment practices only at that specific facility—and thus that the nationwide data sought by the EEOC is irrelevant to that charge. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Eberspaecher North America Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Relator's complaint seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (DRC) to provide documents in response to submitted public records requests, holding that this action was moot.Relator, an inmate at the London Correctional Institution, sent several requests to the DRC for records and kites. DRC provided a requested record and concluded that the remaining records were electronic kites. Relator then made subsequent requests. The DRC denied the requests and ultimately gave Relator a formal directive to stop the repetitive requests. Relator then filed his mandamus complaint. The Supreme Court denied the writ and awarded Relator $1,000 in statutory damages, holding (1) Relator's requests for the kites were moot because the DRC provided all the requested kites; and (2) Relator was entitled to statutory damages. View "State ex rel. Straughter v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) issued its “final determination to regulate perchlorate in drinking water” under the Safe Drinking Water Act. Drinking Water: Regulatory Determination on Perchlorate. That determination started a clock under the Safe Drinking Water Act requiring EPA to propose regulations within twenty-four months and promulgate regulations within eighteen months of the proposal. But EPA never promulgated perchlorate regulations. Instead, nine years later, the agency purported to withdraw its regulatory determination. Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) petitioned for review of this action, arguing that EPA lacks the authority to withdraw a regulatory determination under the Act and that, even if EPA possesses such authority, it acted arbitrarily and capriciously by doing so. EPA, joined by Intervenor American Water Works Association, defends its action.   The DC Circuit granted NRDC’s petition, vacated EPA’s withdrawal of its regulatory determination, and remand to the agency for further proceedings. The court held the Safe Drinking Water Act does not permit EPA to withdraw a regulatory determination. The court explained that first, and most fundamentally, EPA’s interpretation of what Congress intended in the statute cannot overcome the statute’s directive that the agency “shall” regulate. And second, the history EPA cites is not inconsistent with the court’s interpretation. The 1996 amendments undoubtedly gave the agency more discretion in determining which contaminants to consider for regulation and whether to regulate them in the first instance. But they also balanced that discretion with a mandatory scheme requiring EPA to regulate after it determines to do so. View "NRDC v. Michael Regan" on Justia Law

Alexander Nelson appealed a district court judgment affirming the Department of Transportation hearing officer’s decision revoking his driving privileges for two years. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded there was not a valid request to submit to a screening test in accordance with N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14(3) to support a determination of refusal to submit to testing under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14. The Court therefore reversed the district court judgment and the Department’s decision and remanded to reinstate Nelson’s driving privileges. View "Nelson v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

Defendant-landowner Sisters & Brothers Investment Group, LLP (SBIG) appealed an environmental-division enforcement order: enjoining it from using real property in the City of Burlington; ordering it to address site-improvement deficiencies as required by an agreement executed by a prior owner and the City; and imposing $66,759.22 in fines. SBIG purchased the subject property in 2004, which was then in use as a gas and service station, a preexisting, nonconforming use permitted under the City’s zoning ordinance. The property had eighteen parking spaces that were required to be used in connection with the service-station business. Following an unappealed 2002 notice of violation (NOV), the prior owner and the City signed an agreement on June 16, 2004—one day before SBIG purchased the property—which set out specific requirements to cure those violations. The agreement required the prior owner to take certain steps if it wished to sell the property and provided that the agreement was “specifically enforceable and . . .binding upon the successors and assigns of” the previous owner. The City did not enforce compliance with the agreement before this action. At some point after 2004, SBIG began renting out a small number of parking spaces to private individuals. This was not a permitted use under the zoning ordinance. In July 2017, the gas and service station closed, and SBIG thereafter increased the number of parking spaces it rented out to private individuals. Following complaints about the private-parking use and graffiti, the City contacted SBIG in 2018 about bringing the property into compliance with the zoning ordinance. SBIG took no remedial action, and the City issued an NOV. In June 2019, the Development Review Board (DRB) affirmed the NOV with respect to the change-of-use violation, finding the nonconforming use as a gas and service station had been discontinued for more than one year, which constituted abandonment of that use. In March 2020, the City filed a complaint in the environmental division to enforce the decision and sought fines. The Vermont Supreme Court determined the trial court erroneously found that SBIG knew or should have known about the 2004 agreement, therefore, it reversed the judgment order, directed the trial court to strike the condition requiring SBIG to address the site-improvement deficiencies in the agreement, and remanded for the court to recalculate fines without considering whether SBIG violated the agreement’s terms. View "City of Burlington v. Sisters & Brothers Investment Group, LLP" on Justia Law

In 2014 the Los Angeles City Council passed a resolution directing various City departments and officials to prepare and execute the necessary approvals and agreements to convey the property to Childhelp in exchange for Childhelp’s agreement to continue using the property to provide services for victims of child abuse. Ultimately, however, the City decided not to transfer the property to Childhelp. Childhelp filed this action against the City for, among other things, declaratory relief, writ of mandate, and promissory estoppel, and the City filed an unlawful detainer action against Childhelp. After the trial court consolidated the two actions, the court granted the City’s motion for summary adjudication on Childhelp’s cause of action for promissory estoppel, sustained without leave to amend the City’s demurrer to Childhelp’s causes of action for declaratory relief and writ of mandate, and granted the City’s motion for summary judgment on its unlawful detainer complaint. Childhelp appealed the ensuing judgment.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Childhelp had occupied the property for almost 30 years and had an expectation it would eventually own the property. The 2014 resolution certainly suggested the City was seriously considering selling the property to Childhelp. But it was undisputed the parties never completed the transaction in accordance with the City Charter. While Childhelp cites cases reciting general principles of promissory estoppel, it does not cite any cases where the plaintiff successfully invoked promissory estoppel against a municipality in these circumstances. The trial court did not err in granting the City’s motion for summary adjudication on Childhelp’s promissory estoppel cause of action. View "Childhelp, Inc. v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

After years of what the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) viewed as unsatisfactory teaching performance by a certificated teacher, LAUSD served the teacher with a Notice of Intent to Dismiss and a Statement of Charges, which included notice that the employee was suspended without pay. The teacher brought and prevailed on a motion for immediate reversal of suspension (MIRS) and thus received pay during the pendency of the dismissal proceedings. LAUSD ultimately prevailed in those proceedings. LAUSD then sought a writ of administrative mandamus in the superior court seeking to set aside the order granting the MIRS and to recoup the salary payments it had made to the teacher during the pendency of the proceedings. The trial court denied the writ, holding that the MIRS order is not reviewable. The court also ruled (1) LAUSD cannot recover the payments to the teacher under its cause of action for money had and received and (2) LAUSD’s cause of action for declaratory judgment is derivative of its other claims. The trial court entered judgment against LAUSD in favor of the teacher.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that LAUSD has failed to show that in adding the MIRS procedure, the Legislature intended school districts to be able to recover payments to subsequently dismissed employees. The court wrote that if LAUSD believed such recovery should be permitted through judicial review of MIRS orders or otherwise, it should address the Legislature. View "L.A. Unified School Dist. v. Office of Admin. Hearings" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court denying Defendants' motion to dismiss the underlying case or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration under section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), holding that Defendants were not entitled to reversal.Plaintiffs, who distributed Defendants' baked goods along routes in Massachusetts, brought this action alleging that Defendants misclassified them as independent contractors and seeking unpaid wages, overtime compensation, and other damages. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration under the FAA. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Plaintiffs fell within the FAA's section 1 exemption from the FAA's purview "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) two of Defendants' arguments were waived; and (2) Defendants were not entitled to relief on the merits of their remaining arguments. View "Canales v. CK Sales Co., LLC" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the continuing validity of the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity, adopted in Knapper v. Connick, 681 So. 2d 944 (1996). This case presented the issue of whether Louisiana law recognized a cause of action for claims asserted against an assistant district attorney (“ADA”), who, during the plea and sentencing phase of a prosecution, misrepresents, either directly or by omission, a victim’s preference as to the sentence to be imposed upon a defendant, and thereafter, attempts to conceal this alleged misconduct. A secondary question concerned whether a cause of action could be maintained against the district attorney (“DA”) who employed the ADA, under a theory of vicarious liability or for employment-related claims. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Knapper and further found that, under the circumstances of this case, both the ADA and the DA were entitled to immunity. The Court thus found that the lower courts erred in overruling the defendants’ peremptory exception of no cause of action. View "Jameson v. Montgomery, et al." on Justia Law