Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
United Natural Foods v. NLRB
After the Acting General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board withdrew an unfair labor practice complaint that his predecessor had issued against a union, the aggrieved employer requested permission to appeal the complaint’s withdrawal to the Board. The Board denied the request, concluding that the Acting General Counsel’s decision was an unreviewable act of prosecutorial discretion. The employer then petitioned the Fifth Circuit for review of the Board’s order.
The Fifth Circuit denied the petition. The court concluded that it has jurisdiction over the petition for review, that Acting General Counsel’s designation was valid and that the Board permissibly determined that Acting General Counsel had discretion to withdraw the complaint against the Unions. The court explained that the Board’s own conclusion that the General Counsel has the discretion to withdraw unfair labor practice complaints in cases where a motion for summary judgment has been filed but no hearing has occurred, and the Board has neither issued a Notice to Show Cause nor transferred the case to itself fits squarely within the holding of UFCW. As such, it is a permissible interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) View "United Natural Foods v. NLRB" on Justia Law
City of Wheeling v. Public Service Comm’n of W. Va.
The Supreme Court vacated the order of the Public Service Commission resolving City of Benwood's complaint about the City of Wheeling's increase in the wholesale rate it charged to Benwood for wholesale sewage treatment services by forty-five percent, holding that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority.At issue was whether the Commission exceeded its authority under the plain and unambiguous language of W. Va. Code 24-2-1(b)(6) when it elected to start the jurisdictional, 120-day clock on the date the Commission argued it received sufficient information from Wheeling to resolve the dispute between the two cities. The Supreme Court vacated the order below, holding that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority by entering its final order more than 120 days after Benwood filed its complaint. View "City of Wheeling v. Public Service Comm'n of W. Va." on Justia Law
Valdez v. City and County of Denver
In 2013, Sergeant Robert Motyka, a Denver police officer, shot Michael Valdez, who was lying unarmed on the ground and surrendering. In the ensuing lawsuit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a jury awarded Valdez $131,000 from Sergeant Motyka for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment1 and $2,400,000 from the City and County of Denver (“Denver”) for failure to train its officers. The district court awarded $1,132,327.40 in attorney fees and $18,199.60 in costs to Valdez’s lawyers. The Tenth Circuit addressed three appeals arising from this litigation. Denver challenged the district court's: (1) denial of its motion for summary judgment; (2) reversal of a discovery order and permission for Valdez to present additional municipal liability theories; and (3) jury instructions on municipal liability. Valdez cross-appealed the district court's grant of qualified immunity to Lieutenant John Macdonald, another Denver police officer who shot at him. And Sergeant Motyka and Denver contend that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs. The Tenth Circuit: (1) affirmed the judgment against Denver; (2) affirmed qualified immunity because Valdez did not show the court erred in this respect; and (3) affirmed the attorney fee award but reversed costs, finding the district court did not explain its award after finding Valdez had not substantiated them. The case was remanded for the district court to reexamine whether costs should be awarded. View "Valdez v. City and County of Denver" on Justia Law
MURPHY COMPANY, ET AL V. JOSEPH BIDEN, ET AL
President Obama issued a Proclamation under the Antiquities Act expanding the Cascade-Siskiyou National Monument (“Monument”) in southwestern Oregon. Proclamation 9564 (“Proclamation”). Murphy Timber Company and Murphy Timber Investments, LLC (collectively, “Murphy”) are Oregon timber businesses. Murphy owns woodlands and purchases timber harvested in western Oregon to supply its wood products manufacturing facilities. Concerned that the Proclamation imposed a new limitation on its timber supply and deleterious effects on its woodlands adjacent to the expanded Monument, Murphy sued the President, the Secretary of the Interior (“Secretary”), and the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the United States and intervenor environmental organizations. First, the Court has recognized constitutional challenges to presidential acts as reviewable. Second, the Court has held that actions by subordinate Executive Branch officials that extend beyond delegated statutory authority— i.e., ultra vires actions—are reviewable. The panel concluded that Murphy’s particularized allegations that the O&C Act restricts the President’s designation powers under the Antiquities Act satisfied the applicable jurisdictional standard. The panel held that the Proclamation’s exercise of Antiquities Act power was consistent with the text, history, and purpose of the O&C Act. Third, the panel held that the dissent’s concerns that the Proclamation and the O&C Act are in conflict are unsubstantiated. View "MURPHY COMPANY, ET AL V. JOSEPH BIDEN, ET AL" on Justia Law
Suffolk Construction Co. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.
This appeal arises from litigation involving a public construction project to build the Central Region 9th Street Span K-8 school in downtown Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD or District) and Suffolk Construction Company, Inc. (Suffolk), entered into a development and construction agreement (contract), for the development and building of the school. Suffolk later entered into subcontracts with various subcontractors, including R.J. Daum Construction Company (Daum) and Fisk Electric Company (Fisk). Throughout the project, various problems arose, which caused delay and disruption and resulted in increased costs to Suffolk, Daum and Fisk. Suffolk sued LAUSD, alleging breach of the contract, implied contractual indemnity, and seeking declaratory relief. The jury found that Suffolk substantially performed its contract and that LAUSD breached the implied warranty of correctness by providing plans and/or specifications for the concrete footing design that was not correct. Further, the jury determined Suffolk’s damages for the concrete issue decided in phase 1 (TIA 5).
The Second Appellate District found that the phase 1 verdict must be reversed and remanded for retrial on the ground that the special jury instruction based on Public Contract Code section 1104 was improper. The reversal of the phase 1 liability verdict requires that the phase 2 trial of damages for TIA 5 (related to the concrete cracking issue) must also be reversed and remanded for retrial. Finally, the court held that the trial court erred in granting JNOV on the phase 2 jury verdict. Thus, the decision granting the JNOV is reversed with direction to reinstate the jury verdict on that issue. View "Suffolk Construction Co. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist." on Justia Law
Takiguchi v. Venetian Condominiums Maintenance Corp.
Venetian Condominiums Maintenance Corporation was a condominium project with 368 condominium units in the University Town Center area of San Diego. It was a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation governed by the California Nonprofit Mutual Benefit Corporation Law. Ali Ghorbanzadeh owned 18 units at the Venetian. He was elected to Venetian’s board of directors in 2008. In 2009, Ghorbanzadeh appointed his son Sean Gorban to the board. They controlled the three-member board continuously from 2009 through at least 2021. Guy Takiguchi was elected as the third director in 2015. From 2009 to 2021, the board repeatedly failed to hold annual elections, either due to the absence of a quorum or for other reasons. Ghorbanzadeh’s seat was up for re-election at the 2020 annual meeting, and there were two other candidates for the seat, including Nishime. The Ballot Box, Inc. contracted as the Venetian's inspector of elections, declaring there was no quorum for the meeting because Ballot Box had only received 166 ballots, and the quorum was 188. Nishime participated in the January 20, 2021 meeting remotely by computer and took multiple screenshots of the participants. Nishime was able to identify eight members who were present (representing 37 units). Had those units been counted with written ballots, there would have been a quorum of 203 present at the meeting. The eight participating members who represented units for which no ballot had been submitted included Ghorbanzadeh (representing 18 units), his son Sean Gorban (representing one unit), his other son Brian Gorban (representing three units), and an ally of Ghorbanzadeh’s who was also running for the director’s seat (representing one unit). An allegation asserted Ghorbanzadeh and his allies did not submit their ballots “in a deliberate and tactical effort to not reach quorum so they could remain in power another year or two.” Venetian submitted no evidence refuting this accusation. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court properly ordered Venetian to hold a meeting for the purpose of counting the 166 written ballots cast for its January 20, 2021 annual member meeting and election. Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that there was a quorum present for that meeting. By adjourning the meeting based on the purported absence of a quorum, Venetian failed to conduct the scheduled meeting or cover the noticed agenda items, which included counting the ballots and determining the results. View "Takiguchi v. Venetian Condominiums Maintenance Corp." on Justia Law
United States v. State of Delaware Department of Insurance
The IRS investigated the companies to determine whether they are liable for penalties for promoting abusive tax shelters. Summonses led to the production of documents in 2014, including email chains involving the Delaware Department of Insurance, relating to the issuance of certificates of authority to the companies' clients and to a meeting with the Department’s Director of Captive and Financial Insurance Products. The IRS issued an administrative summons to the Department for testimony and records relating to filings by and communications with the companies. “Request 1” seeks all e-mails between the Department and the companies related to the Captive Insurance Program. The Department raised confidentiality objections under Delaware Insurance Code section 6920. The IRS declined to abide by section 6920's confidentiality requirements. The Department refuses to produce any response to Request 1.The government filed a successful petition to enforce the summons. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the Department’s argument that, under the McCarran-Ferguson Act (MFA), 15 U.S.C. 1011, Delaware law embodied in section 6920 overrides the IRS’s statutory authority to issue and enforce summonses. While the MFA does protect state insurance laws from intrusive federal action when certain requirements are met, before any such reverse preemption occurs, the conduct at issue (refusal to produce summonsed documents) must constitute the “business of insurance” under the MFA. That threshold requirement was not met here. View "United States v. State of Delaware Department of Insurance" on Justia Law
Teck American, Inc., et al. v. Valhalla Mining, LLC, et al.
After a mining company abandoned its mining claims, the claims were located and recorded by a second mining company, which also abandoned the claims. After the second company abandoned the claims, the first company attempted to cure its earlier abandonment. The same year that the first company filed to cure its abandonment, a third mining company attempted to locate and record ownership of some of the same claims. The Alaska Department of Natural Resources (DNR) refused to issue permits to the third company, reasoning that the first one had validly cured its abandonment of its claims before the third company located the claims. After exhausting its administrative remedies, the third company appealed DNR’s decision. The superior court reversed DNR’s decision. Because DNR’s interpretation of the controlling statute was reasonable, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the superior court decision and affirmed DNR’s decision. View "Teck American, Inc., et al. v. Valhalla Mining, LLC, et al." on Justia Law
Lloyd v. Ford Motor Co.
Consumers alleged that Ford cheated on its fuel economy and emissions testing for certain truck models, including the F-150 and Ranger. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. 6201, and its regulations control such testing, the results of which are sent to the EPA. The EPA uses the information to provide fuel economy estimates for labels affixed to new vehicles. The FTC regulates advertising to consumers; Its “Guide Concerning Fuel Economy Advertising for New Vehicles” advises vehicle manufacturers and dealers about disclosing the established fuel economy of a vehicle, as determined by the EPA. The EPA and Department of Justice investigated Ford’s testing and resultsThe Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the purported class action, which included claims of breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, breach of express warranty, fraud, and unjust enrichment under the laws of every state. The claims are preempted by federal law as they inevitably conflict with the EPA’s regime. The EPA accepted Ford’s testing information and published its own estimate based on that information. The EPA has the authority to approve or reject Ford's figures. The tort claims essentially challenge the EPA’s figures. The EPA must balance several objectives in reaching those figures, and these claims would skew this balance. View "Lloyd v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law
Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation v. DOI
This is an appeal from the district court’s denial of the State of North Dakota’s supplemental motion to intervene in the lawsuit against the Department of the Interior brought by the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation, recognized as the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation (“Tribes”). The Tribes, joined by the Interior Department, filed oppositions to the State’s continuing as a party. In response, the State moved again to intervene with respect to the remaining Counts. This time the district court denied the State’s intervention motion. The district court explained that “there [was] no longer a live controversy before the Court on that issue.” The court explained: “At various points, the State argues that ‘an M-Opinion does not establish legal title’ and that, as a result, a dispute remains.
The DC Circuit reversed. The court explained that the Interior lacks “authority to adjudicate legal title to real property.” The Interior Department conceded as much. The action of the Bureau of Indian Affairs recording title in its records office, therefore, could not “establish legal title,” as the district court supposed. As the Interior stated in its brief, “there has been no final determination of title to the Missouri riverbed.” The action of the Bureau of Indian Affairs recording title in its records office, therefore, could not “establish legal title,” as the district court supposed. Accordingly, the court wrote that there is no doubt that the State satisfied the Rule’s requirement that the intervention motion must be timely. View "Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation v. DOI" on Justia Law