Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Jane Doe, a three-year-old child, was in the custody of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (the “Department”); she was six days shy of her first birthday when the State removed her from the custody of her mother and placed her with a foster family. Her mother’s attempts to stick to a permanency plan were inconsistent, and while for the majority of the life of this case, the magistrate court held fast to a permanency goal of reunification, it modified that goal in the summer of 2022 so that termination of parental rights and adoption became the primary goals for Jane and reunification became the concurrent goal. Mother appealed the district court’s change of the permanency goals. She also sought a permissive appeal from the magistrate court to appeal to the district court. The magistrate court granted the motion. The district court dismissed the case and remanded it back to the magistrate court sua sponte after determining it did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Mother then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found no error in the district court’s judgment and affirmed. View "IDHW v. Jane Doe (2022-36)" on Justia Law

In this workers' compensation case, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Employee's appeal of the decision of the the administrative law judge (ALJ) dismissing Employee's petition claiming entitlement to workers' compensation benefits, holding that the circuit court correctly dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.Employee petitioned the Department of Labor for a hearing on his claim that he was entitled to additional workers' compensation benefits. When Employee did not disclose and identify his experts by the date set in the scheduling order, Employer/Insurer moved for summary judgment. The ALJ granted the motion, concluding that Employee did not create a genuine issue of material fact in dispute precluding summary judgment. View "Hussein v. Showplace Wood Products Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Petitioner, who was ordered to show cause why she should not be further sanctioned and barred from filing any pro se pleadings in the Supreme Court, had abused the Court's limited judicial resources and directed the Clerk of Court to reject any future pleadings or other requests for relief submitted by Petitioner, unless such filings were signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar. The Court further denied any pending motions or requests for relief, holding that based on Petitioner's history of filing pro se petitions and requests for relief that were meritless or otherwise inappropriate for appellate review, Petitioner failed to show cause why she should not be sanctioned. View "A.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s order upholding a decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying her disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. She argued that the Commissioner’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to sufficiently articulate his rationale for rejecting Plaintiff’s treating physician’s opinion, rendering the ALJ’s decision legally erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that ALJ was justified in finding the physician’s opinion unpersuasive. The opinion’s bare, formulaic conclusion presumptively warranted little evidentiary weight “because it was rendered on a check-box and fill-in-the-blank form.” The physician checked some boxes and left blank the short-answer section asking what objective medical findings supported his assessment. The ALJ also found the checkbox form “unsupported and highly inconsistent” with the record because the physician’s conservative treatment plan, other medical opinions, and Plaintiff’s own descriptions of her activities contradict the checkbox assessment. View "Vickie Nolen v. Kilolo Kijakazi" on Justia Law

The Disputed Instruments, prepaid financial instruments used to transfer funds to a named payee, are sold by banks on behalf of MoneyGram and others. When these instruments are not presented for payment within a certain period of time, they are deemed abandoned. MoneyGram applies the common-law escheatment practices outlined in 1965 by the Supreme Court: The proceeds of abandoned financial products should escheat to the state of the creditor’s last known address, or where such records are not kept, to the state in which the company holding the funds is incorporated. MoneyGram does not keep records of creditor addresses but transmits the abandoned proceeds to its state of incorporation. States invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to determine whether the abandoned proceeds of the Disputed Instruments are governed by the Disposition of Abandoned Money Orders and Traveler’s Checks Act (FDA), which provides that a money order or “similar written instrument (other than a third-party bank check)” should generally escheat to the state in which the instrument was purchased, 12 U.S.C. 2503.The Court held that the Disputed Instruments are sufficiently similar to money orders to fall within the FDA’s “similar written instrument” category. Being prepaid makes them likely to escheat. The FDA was passed to abrogate common law because, for instruments like money orders, the entities selling such products often did not keep records of creditor addresses, resulting in a “windfall” to the state of incorporation. Bank liability is not a trigger for exclusion, given that banks can be liable on money orders, which are expressly covered. Whatever the intended meaning of “third-party bank check,” it cannot be read broadly to exclude prepaid instruments that escheat inequitably due to the business practices of the company holding the funds. View "Delaware v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

Petitioner, the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), petitioned under the New Hampshire Supreme Court's original jurisdiction seeking review of a superior court order denying DCYF’s motion to dismiss a complaint brought against it. In 2019, Respondent filed a complaint as parent and next friend of his children, M.M. and J.M., asserting various claims against both DCYF and the Court Appointed Special Advocates of New Hampshire (CASA). DCYF and CASA moved to dismiss the complaint, with DCYF arguing, inter alia, that the claims were time-barred by RSA 541-B:14, IV. Respondent objected, asserting that RSA 508:8 (2010) tolled the period of limitations in RSA 541-B:14, IV. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court dismissed the claims against CASA as precluded by quasi-judicial immunity, but denied the motion to dismiss the claims against DCYF. In its order, the trial court reasoned that RSA 508:8 operated as a tolling provision and that failing to read the tolling provision into the statute of limitations in RSA 541-B:14, IV would lead to “an absurd, unfair, and unjust result.” In its petition to the Supreme Court, DCYF asked the Court to determine that RSA 508:8 did not apply to claims brought under RSA chapter 541-B. The Supreme Court concurred with Respondent, holding that RSA 508:8 had to be read into RSA 541-B:14, IV in order to comport with the equal protection guarantees afforded to the citizenry under Part I, Articles 2 and 12 of the New Hampshire Constitution. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Petition of New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying a motion to intervene on the grounds that it was untimely, holding that the proposed intervenors were not entitled to relief on their claim of error.Plaintiffs appealed to the trial court from a decision of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of New Canaan (Board) upholding the issuance of a zoning permit to Grace Farms Foundation, the intervening defendant. Nearly nineteen months later and after the trial court issued a decision remanding the case to the Board for further proceedings, the proposed intervenors brought the motion to intervene at issue. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that it was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the motion to intervene as of right was untimely. View "Markatos v. Zoning Board of Appeals" on Justia Law

Petitioner Firestorm Pyrotechnics, Inc. (“Firestorm”) sought review of a decision by the Acting Director (“Director”) of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF” or “Bureau”) revoking Firestorm’s license to import and sell fireworks. Firestorm challenged the revocation decision, maintaining the Director misapplied the willfulness standard in 27 C.F.R. § 771.42 and 27 C.F.R. § 771.5 and contending further the Director’s decision was unsupported by substantial evidence. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals discerned no error in the Director’s understanding and application of the willfulness standard. The Court found Firestorm made several contrary arguments, but none was persuasive. Furthermore, the Court found the Director's decision was supported by substantial evidence. View "Firestorm Pyrotechnics v. Dettelbach, et al." on Justia Law

A U.S. Postal Service (USPS) vehicle allegedly ran over A.M.L.’s foot on July 18, 2018. A.M.L.’s mother sent a Claim for Damage, Injury or Death (Standard Form 95) to USPS in August 2018. A year later, A.M.L.’s attorney sent a demand letter that set forth A.M.L.’s medical expenses. After USPS denied liability, A.M.L. (by and through her parent) filed suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The government moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that A.M.L. had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before bringing suit. The district court dismissed the suit, and A.M.L. appealed, arguing that her claims satisfied the FTCA’s presentment requirement.   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that Sections 2672 and 2675(b) do not require that a claim set forth a single-dollar amount, but that it must express the maximum value of the asserted claim. Accordingly, the expression of a range complies with the statute’s requirements because it presents the maximum value of the claim. A.M.L.’s claim of “$250,000 to $275,000” thus presented a sum certain in compliance with the FTCA’s presentment requirement. View "A.M.L. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the circuit court reversing the judgment of the tax appeals commission concluding that the sales tax exemption in Wisconsin Act 185, which expanded an existing sales tax exemption to include the sale of aircraft parts or maintenance, did not apply to Lessees' payments for aircraft repairs and engine maintenance, holding that the court of appeals did not err.Citation Partners, LLC owned an aircraft that it leased to Lessees. Citation Partners charged per-flight-hour rates for aircraft repairs and maintenance as part of the total amount Lessees paid to lease the aircraft, which rates corresponded to the amount Citation Partners spent on repairs and maintenance. Citation Partners argued that this portion of the lease payment was tax exempt because it was a sale of aircraft parts or maintenance. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the court of appeals correctly found that the payments were not exempt from sales tax under the plain language of the statutes. View "Citation Partners, LLC v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law