Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the Public Utilities Commission denying the petition of Maine Coalition to Stop Smart Meters for reconsideration of a previous order approving revised terms and conditions for the smart-meter opt-out program created by Central Maine Power (CMP), holding that there was no abuse of discretion.The revised terms and conditions of the smart-meter opt-out program at issue allowed CMP to install solid-state meters, which are smart meters with the transmitting function disabled, instead of electromechanical (analog) meters for opt-out customers. The Coalition filed a petition for reconsideration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission's finding that solid-state meters are safe was not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the Commission's decision to approve the revised terms was not arbitrary or unreasonable, unjust, or unlawful and was supported by competent evidence in the record. View "Maine Coalition to Stop Smart Meters v. Public Utilities Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the government pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), asserting multiple negligent and intentional tort causes of action after being sexually assaulted by an employee of the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The government moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court granted the government’s motion. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s determination that the assault occurred outside the scope of the employee’s employment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the FTCA makes clear that the scope-of-employment test is defined by state law, not the employer. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in concluding that the provider’s duties were restricted to providing battlefield acupuncture therapy (BFA). The court explained that initially, the provider denied sexually assaulting or massaging Plaintiff. He later admitted to the sexual assault and admitted that it was inappropriate for him to massage a patient. He also failed to document anything that occurred after the BFA therapy, including the massage. This is consistent with the finding that the massage and subsequent sexual assault exceeded the scope of his treatment authority. The court explained that in light of the pleadings and undisputed evidence, the district court did not err, determining that the provider acted outside the scope of his employment. View "Jane Doe v. United States" on Justia Law

Approximately 30 years after Arellano’s honorable discharge from the Navy, a VA regional office granted Arellano service-connected disability benefits for his psychiatric disorders. Applying the default rule in 38 U.S.C. 5110(a)(1), the VA assigned an effective date of June 3, 2011—the day that it received Arellano's claim—to the award. Arellano argued that the effective date should be governed by an exception in section 5110(b)(1), which makes the effective date the day following the date of the veteran’s discharge or release if the application “is received within one year from such date of discharge or release.” Alleging that he had been too ill to know that he could apply for benefits, Arellano maintained that this exception’s one-year grace period should be equitably tolled to make his award effective the day after his 1981 discharge.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals, Veterans Court, Federal Circuit, and Supreme Court disagreed. Section 5110(b)(1) is not subject to equitable tolling. Equitably tolling one of the limited exceptions would depart from the terms that Congress “specifically provided.” The exceptions do not operate simply as time constraints, but also as substantive limitations on the amount of recovery due. Congress has already considered equitable concerns and limited the relief available, aware of the possibility that disability could delay an application for benefits. View "Arellano v. McDonough" on Justia Law

The petitions for review sought reversal of a refund order by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission) upon finding a discrepancy in petitioner Ameren Illinois’s self-reported operational costs. Instead of reporting construction-related materials and supplies costs on line 5 of page 227 of Form 1, Ameren Illinois reported these costs on line 8 with the result that it over-collected for transmission costs. The Commission found that this reporting error was contrary to Ameren Illinois’s filed rate, which, prior to June 1, 2020, did not allow it to recover costs recorded to line 5 of page 227.   The DC Circuit affirmed the Order, denying review and reconsideration. The court explained that the Commission’s decision that Ameren lacked the discretion to report construction-related costs on line 8 was not unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, or otherwise contrary to law. The court reasoned that although the Commission “may not retroactively alter a filed rate to compensate for prior over- or underpayments,” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. FERC, 571 F.3d 1208, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2009), that is not what occurred here. All the Commission has done is require Ameren Illinois to correct a reporting error that resulted in overcharging customers for expenses not allowed under Ameren Illinois’s then-registered formula rate. Its contrary arguments fail to demonstrate that the refund order was unjust or contrary to the law. View "Ameren Illinois Company v. FERC" on Justia Law

Sanchez filed a whistleblower complaint with the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) against his former employer, DuPage Regional Office of Education. Sanchez claimed that, after he made two protected disclosures concerning expenditures to DuPage, he suffered five reprisals in violation of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2013, 41 U.S.C. 4712. The OIG investigated and determined his claims to be unsubstantiated. An ALJ determined, contrary to the findings of the OIG, that Sanchez was entitled to relief for all five alleged reprisals and ordered DuPage to pay Sanchez compensatory damages of $210,000.The Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the Department of Education, “suggesting” assignment to a different ALJ. The court held that DuPage did not establish that it was entitled to sovereign immunity from the Department’s adjudication of Sanchez’s whistleblower complaint. On the merits, the court concluded that the actions described by Sanchez were not retaliatory. View "DuPage Regional Office of Education v. United States Department of Education" on Justia Law

G.L.A. (“Mother”) brought L.S., who was one year old at the time, to the hospital for medical treatment. Hospital staff conducted a skeletal survey, which revealed that L.S. had a broken tibia; two additional fractures that were healing; severe bruising and swelling to his groin; and significant bruising on his back, face, and genitals. The hospital sent a referral to the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services, and the state filed a petition for dependent or neglected children in district court, alleging that Mother had physically abused L.S. The district court adjudicated L.S. dependent or neglected. About a month later, the court found that an appropriate treatment plan couldn’t be devised for Mother based on L.S.’s serious bodily injury(“SBI”), and Mother appealed. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the State satisfies its burden of proving that an appropriate treatment plan can’t be devised for a respondent parent in a dependency and neglect case when the State establishes by a preponderance of evidence a single incident resulting in serious bodily injury to the child. To this, the Court concluded that it did: the district court erred by imposing a clear and convincing burden of proof on the State at the dispositional hearing. Because there was no dispute L.S. sustained a serious bodily injury, the district court’s order granting Mother’s motion for directed verdict was reversed and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "In Re Colorado in the interest of L.S." on Justia Law

In May 2020, Koballa died of COVID-19. Hudak, the executrix of Koballa’s estate, sued, asserting negligence and related state-law claims against Elmcroft, an assisted-living facility. Elmcroft removed the case to federal court under the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1441(a), and the federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1), based on arguments it made under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP), 42 U.S.C. 247d-6d.The district court found that the PREP Act did not provide grounds for removal under either removal statute and remanded the case to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Hudak does not allege that Elmcroft engaged in willful misconduct in the administration or use of a covered COVID-19 countermeasure, so the PREP Act does not “provide[] the exclusive cause of action for the claims” and does not completely preempt Hudak’s state-law claims. Hudak’s state-law claims do not arise under federal law and could not be removed. Elmcroft is not a "federal officer"; it operated a facility that came under significant federal regulation as part of the federal government’s COVID-19 response but did not have an agreement with the federal government, did not produce a good or perform a service on behalf of the government, and has not shown that the federal government exercised control over its operations to such a degree that the government acted as Elmcroft’s superior. View "Hudak v. Elmcroft of Sagamore Hills" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a qui tam action against Prime Healthcare Services—Encino Hospital, LLC (Encino Hospital) and others to impose civil penalties for violation of the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (IFPA), Insurance Code section 1871 et seq. The State of California and relator (Plaintiffs) appealed from a judgment entered after a bench trial in which the court found insufficient evidence to support their allegations that Defendants engaged in insurance fraud by billing insurers for services performed in a detox center for which they had no appropriate license, and by employing a referral agency to steer patients to the center.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the judgment. The court explained that, CDI alleged that Encino Hospital misrepresented to insurers that it was properly licensed to provide detox services when it was not. The trial court found no evidence suggesting that Defendants presented a false claim to any insurer. The court agreed, reasoning that no authority of which it is aware or to which it has been directed obligates Encino Hospital to hold any license other than its license as a general acute care hospital. Because Encino Hospital needed no separate license or approval, and no evidence showed it concealed any provider, the CDI’s cause of action for false claims failed for lack of a predicate. View "State of Cal. v. Encino Hospital Medical Center" on Justia Law

Thirteen states sued the Treasury Secretary and related officials to challenge a tax offset provision in the American Rescue Plan Act, a coronavirus stimulus package passed by Congress in 2021. That offset provision prohibits states from using Rescue Plan funds “to either directly or indirectly offset a reduction in [their] net tax revenue” that results from a change in law that “reduces any tax.” The States argued that this “tax mandate” exceeds Congress’s authority under the Constitution. The district court agreed and permanently enjoined enforcement of the offset provision. The Secretary appealed.   At issue was whether the States’ challenge presents a justiciable controversy and if so, whether the offset provision is unconstitutional. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court answered both questions correctly. The court explained that all four elements weigh in favor of granting a permanent injunction. The district court did not misapply the law nor base its determination on clearly erroneous facts. It did not abuse its discretion. We also agree with the district court that the permanent injunction fully redresses the States’ harm in this case—declaratory relief is unnecessary. The court reiterated, however, that the permanent injunction applies only to Section 802(c)(2)(A), which is severable from the remaining provisions of the Act. View "State of West Virginia, et al v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, six individuals employed by the County of Imperial, and the three unions representing them (the Imperial County Sheriff’s Association (ICSA), the Imperial County Firefighter’s Association (ICFA), and the Imperial County Probation and Corrections Peace Officers’ Association (PCPOA)), brought a class action lawsuit against the County of Imperial, the Imperial County Employees’ Retirement System, and the System’s Board alleging that the defendants were systematically miscalculating employee pension contributions. After two years of failed mediation, plaintiffs moved for class certification under Code of Civil Procedure section 382. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the conflicting interests of two primary groups of employees, those hired before the effective date of the Public Employee Pension Reform Act and those hired after, precluded the court from certifying a class. The court found that because the employees hired before PEPRA took effect were entitled to an enhanced pension benefit unavailable to those hired after, the two groups’ interests were antagonistic and the community of interest among the proposed class members required for certification could not be met. The trial court also concluded the proposed class representatives had failed to show they could adequately represent the class. On appeal, plaintiffs contended insufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that there was an inherent conflict among the class members that precluded class certification and that the court’s legal reasoning on this factor was flawed. The plaintiffs also argued they should have been given an opportunity to show they could adequately represent the interests of the class. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court’s reasoning concerning the community of interest among the proposed class, and agreed with plaintiffs they should be provided an opportunity to demonstrate their adequacy. Accordingly, the order denying class certification was reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court with directions to allow the proposed class representatives to file supplemental declarations addressing their adequacy to serve in this role. Thereafter, if the trial court approves of the class representatives, the court was directed to grant plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, including the creation of the subclasses identified by the Court. View "Imperial County Sheriff's Assn. v. County of Imperial" on Justia Law