Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Misty Coleman alleges that she fell and broke her ankle after slipping on a wet shower floor in a county jail. She pursued constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and negligence claims under Ohio law against the county, corrections officers, and medical personnel. Coleman claimed that the slippery shower violated the Due Process Clause and that a county policy or custom was behind her poor medical care. She also questioned whether the county could invoke state-law immunity from her negligence claim at the pleading stage.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed all claims against all parties. The court found that Coleman failed to allege a plausible constitutional violation regarding the slippery shower and did not connect the inadequate medical care to a county policy or custom. The court also held that Ohio law granted immunity to Hamilton County on the negligence claim. The court allowed Coleman to conduct limited discovery to identify unnamed officers and nurses, but her subsequent amended complaint was dismissed as it was filed outside the statute of limitations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court's dismissal, holding that Coleman’s claims accrued on the date of her accident and that her amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. The court also found that Coleman did not meet the requirements for equitable tolling, as she did not allege facts showing that she was intentionally misled or tricked into missing the deadline. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Coleman’s complaint. View "Coleman v. Hamilton County Bd. of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

Maryland and South Carolina filed lawsuits in state courts against 3M Company and other chemical manufacturers, alleging contamination of their waterways with per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). The states filed separate complaints for PFAS contamination from aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF) and non-AFFF products, explicitly disclaiming any connection between the two in their non-AFFF complaints.In the District of Maryland, 3M removed Maryland's non-AFFF complaint to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, arguing that PFAS from its Military AFFF production was indistinguishably commingled with PFAS from its non-AFFF products. The district court remanded the case, giving dispositive effect to Maryland's disclaimer and concluding that 3M's federal work was not implicated. Similarly, in the District of South Carolina, 3M removed South Carolina's non-AFFF complaint, but the district court also remanded, crediting the state's disclaimer and finding no connection to 3M's federal work.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the consolidated appeals. The court held that the states' disclaimers were not dispositive in determining the connection between 3M's federal work and the charged conduct. The court concluded that 3M plausibly alleged that PFAS contamination from its Military AFFF production was related to the states' claims, satisfying the nexus requirement for federal officer removal. The court vacated the district courts' decisions and remanded for further consideration of whether 3M met the other elements for federal officer removal, including acting under a federal officer and having a colorable federal defense. View "State of Maryland v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

Richard Hightower, a pretrial detainee, was attacked by his cellmate, Anthony Tyler, in a Philadelphia jail, resulting in Hightower's paralysis. Hightower was classified as a low-security risk, while Tyler was classified as a high-security risk with a history of violent behavior. Due to a mistake by a prison health services company, Tyler was placed in Hightower's intake cell instead of being transferred to a permanent cell. Tyler's aggressive behavior escalated, culminating in a violent attack on Hightower.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Philadelphia and the guards. Hightower did not appeal the judgment for the guard but did appeal the judgment for the city.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Hightower failed to prove that the city caused any constitutional violation. To succeed in his Monell claim, Hightower needed to show that the city had an unconstitutional policy or custom or was deliberately indifferent to inmates' rights. The court found that the city had no policy of not separating inmates by security-risk level during intake and that the lack of a policy is not a policy. Additionally, Hightower could not show a custom that violated his rights or that the city acted with deliberate indifference. The court concluded that the risk to Hightower was not so obvious that the city could be held liable without a pattern of similar violations.The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's summary judgment in favor of the City of Philadelphia. View "Hightower v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

John Hudnall, a former financial advisor, applied for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, claiming he had been unable to work since May 1, 2015, due to major depressive disorder, anxiety, and insomnia. His application included a function report from his wife, Miyuki Sato, detailing his limitations in daily activities and self-care. Despite this, the Social Security Administration denied his application and request for reconsideration. Hudnall then sought a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who also denied his claim, finding him not disabled based on medical evidence and Hudnall's self-reported activities, without explicitly addressing Sato's lay evidence.Hudnall appealed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, which granted summary judgment in favor of the Social Security Administration. Hudnall then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that under the Social Security Administration's new regulations, effective March 27, 2017, ALJs are no longer required to provide germane reasons for discounting lay witness testimony. The court found that these regulations, which state that ALJs are not required to articulate how they considered evidence from nonmedical sources, are within the Commissioner of Social Security's broad authority and are not arbitrary and capricious. Consequently, the ALJ did not err in discounting Sato's evidence without explanation. The court resolved all other issues in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. View "HUDNALL V. DUDEK" on Justia Law

Gray Television, a broadcaster in Alaska, sought review of a final forfeiture order by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The FCC had imposed the maximum forfeiture penalty on Gray for violating the prohibition on owning two top-four stations in a single designated market area (DMA). Gray acquired the CBS network affiliation of KTVA-TV for its own station, KYES-TV, which resulted in Gray owning two top-four stations in the Anchorage DMA. Gray did not seek a waiver from the FCC for this transaction.The FCC issued a Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture (NAL) against Gray, proposing a penalty of $518,283, the statutory maximum. Gray responded, arguing that the transaction did not violate the rule because KYES was already a top-four station according to Comscore ratings data. Gray also contended that the FCC failed to provide fair notice of its interpretation of the rule and that the enforcement action violated the First Amendment and the Communications Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the FCC's determination that Gray violated the rule, finding that the FCC reasonably relied on Nielsen ratings data, which showed that KYES was not a top-four station at the time of the transaction. The court also held that the FCC's interpretation of the rule was reasonable and that Gray had fair notice of the rule's application to its transaction.However, the court vacated the forfeiture penalty and remanded for further proceedings. The court found that the FCC failed to provide adequate notice to Gray that the proposed penalty was based on a finding of egregiousness, which violated due process. Additionally, the court held that the FCC did not adequately explain its consideration of Gray's good faith in determining the penalty amount. View "Gray Television, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

Vandewater International Inc. requested a scope ruling from the U.S. Department of Commerce to determine if its steel branch outlets were subject to an antidumping duty order on "butt-weld pipe fittings" from China. Vandewater argued that its products did not meet the definition of "butt-weld pipe fittings" as they had contoured ends and were used differently. Commerce determined that Vandewater's products were within the scope of the order, leading to an appeal.The U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) reviewed the case and initially found that the term "butt-weld pipe fittings" was ambiguous, requiring further analysis. The CIT remanded the case to Commerce to conduct a full scope inquiry using the (k)(2) criteria, which include physical characteristics, expectations of purchasers, ultimate use, channels of trade, and manner of advertisement. Commerce reaffirmed its decision that Vandewater's products were within the scope of the order based on these criteria.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the CIT's decision. The court held that the term "butt-weld pipe fittings" was ambiguous and that Commerce's determination using the (k)(2) criteria was supported by substantial evidence. The court also found that the (k)(1) sources were not dispositive in determining whether Vandewater's products were within the scope of the order. Additionally, the court dismissed SCI's challenge to Commerce's suspension of liquidation instructions as moot, as there were no unliquidated entries of Vandewater's products before the relevant date. View "Vandewater International Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Nikos Sharp was charged with several criminal offenses related to child abuse or neglect following an investigation by the Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS). Sharp sought information from DFS reports involving the alleged victim, E.S., which included the identities of individuals who reported the abuse. The district court ordered DFS to disclose this information despite DFS's objections.The district court reviewed the reports in camera and initially released redacted versions to Sharp. Sharp then requested unredacted versions, including the identities of the reporters. The district court granted this request, and DFS's motion for reconsideration was denied. DFS subsequently sought relief through an original writ petition.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and held that NRS 432B.290(4) provides a limited privilege for reporter identities, protecting them if DFS determines that disclosure would harm an investigation or the life or safety of any person. The court found that this limited privilege did not apply in this case because DFS had not made such a determination. Consequently, the district court did not err in ordering the disclosure of the reporter identities. The Supreme Court of Nevada denied the petition, affirming the district court's decision. View "Clark County Department of Family Services v. District Court" on Justia Law

Military-Veterans Advocacy (MVA) filed a petition for review challenging the validity of two provisions in a Final Rule issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The provisions in question are 38 C.F.R. § 1.601(a)(2), which requires users of VA’s Information Technology (IT) systems to potentially pass a background suitability investigation, and 38 C.F.R. § 1.602(c)(1), which permits the VA to inspect the computer hardware and software used to access VA IT systems and their location at any time without notice.The VA issued the Final Rule on June 24, 2022, after a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and consideration of public comments, including those from MVA. MVA argued that the regulations violated the pro-veteran canon of construction, due process, and were arbitrary and capricious. The VA addressed some of these comments in the Final Rule but maintained the provisions as proposed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the VA has the authority to promulgate the Background Check Provision under 38 U.S.C. §§ 501, 5721–28, which allows the VA to establish and maintain information security programs. The court found that the Background Check Provision was reasonable and based on risk assessments, thus within the VA’s statutory authority.However, the court found that the Inspection Provision exceeded the VA’s statutory authority. The provision allowed the VA to inspect the location where the hardware and software are used, which could include private areas such as a user’s home. The court determined that this provision was not based on a risk assessment and was overly broad, thus not the product of reasoned decision-making.The court granted MVA’s petition in part, setting aside 38 C.F.R. § 1.602(c)(1), and denied the petition in part, upholding 38 C.F.R. § 1.601(a)(2). View "MILITARY-VETERANS ADVOCACY v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS " on Justia Law

Nathan Zent, who has spastic quadriplegic cerebral palsy, has been a student at Dickinson State University (DSU) since 2015, pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in English with a Political Science Minor. Zent, who uses a motorized wheelchair and an iPad with text-to-speech assistive technology, received vocational rehabilitation (VR) services from the North Dakota Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) from 2015 until May 2023. His individualized plan for employment (IPE) identified an employment outcome of journalist or writer, which DHHS supported until 2022. However, DHHS discontinued Zent’s services, citing concerns about his ability to achieve competitive integrated employment due to his need for significant support.The Division of Vocational Rehabilitation of DHHS decided to discontinue Zent’s VR services, and an administrative law judge (ALJ) affirmed this decision. Zent appealed to the district court of Stark County, which also affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Zent then appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court, arguing that DHHS’s decision was based on an erroneous interpretation of the statutes and regulations governing VR services and that the ALJ applied the incorrect standard of proof.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that DHHS did not misapply the statutes and regulations governing VR services in determining that Zent’s chosen employment outcome of journalist or writer was inconsistent with the goal of competitive integrated employment. The court also concluded that the ALJ correctly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard, as the clear and convincing standard only applies to eligibility determinations for VR services, not to determinations regarding specific employment outcomes. View "Zent v. NDDHHS" on Justia Law

The case involves the U.S. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) approving the New York State Department of Health’s (NYSDOH) application to distribute $361.25 million to certain managed care organizations. These organizations were to direct the funds to the top one-third of revenue-generating licensed home care services agencies (LHCSAs) in New York’s four rate regions, provided they agreed to use the funding in a specified manner. The plaintiffs, who are LHCSAs that did not meet the revenue threshold, argued that the approval was unlawful under federal law and regulations because the class of eligible agencies was improperly defined and the application was not assessed for actuarial soundness before approval.The district court dismissed the amended complaint against the State Appellees for failing to adequately allege a cause of action under Ex parte Young and granted summary judgment to the Federal Appellees. The court concluded that the approval of the State’s application did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and denied the plaintiffs’ motion to admit extra-record evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the district court’s decision. The court held that CMS’s approval of NYSDOH’s application complied with federal law. It found that the provider class was properly defined under 42 C.F.R. § 438.6(c)(2)(ii)(B) and that CMS was not required to assess actuarial soundness during the pre-approval process. The court also concluded that CMS did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in approving the application and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the extra-record evidence. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Safe Haven Home Care, Inc. v. United States Department of Health and Human" on Justia Law