Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Petitioner's complaint seeking an injunction and declaratory relief to enjoin a student member on the Board of Education of Howard County from exercising any voting power and a declaration that the election process for the student member violates the Maryland Constitution, holding that there was no error.After relying on remote learning for schooling during the Covid-19 pandemic, at the end of 2020, the Board of Education of Howard County held votes on motions to resume in-person instruction. Each motion failed by a stalemate vote, with the student member causing the stalemate. After the Board decided to continue with remote learning Petitioners brought this action seeking an injunction and a declaration that the statute creating the student member on the Board is unconstitutional. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Board, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the provisions of section 3-701 of the Education Article concerning the student member position on the Board do not violate the Maryland Constitution. View "Spiegel v. Board of Education of Howard County" on Justia Law

One of the California Board of Registered Nursing (the Board) regulations stated: “An approved nursing program shall not make a substantive change without prior board authorization,” which included changes such as a change in location, a change in ownership, an addition of a new campus or location, and, for certain nursing programs, a significant change in the agreement between the nursing program and the institution of higher education with which it is affiliated. Here, the Board determined that West Coast University, Inc. (West Coast) made a substantive change under the regulation when it increased its annual student enrollment from 500 to 850 over a five-year period. After West Coast sought a writ of mandate, the trial court denied each of West Coast’s claims and entered judgment in favor of the Board and its executive officer. The Court of Appeal concluded the Board could consider the change in enrollment to be a substantive change under the regulation. View "West Coast University, Inc. v. Board of Registered Nursing" on Justia Law

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) oversees the Section 8 low-income housing assistance program, 42 U.S.C. 1437f. New Lansing renewed its Section 8 contract with Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority in 2014 for a 20-year term. In 2019, at the contractual time for its fifth-year rent adjustment, New Lansing submitted a rent comparability study (RCS) to assist CM Authority in determining the new contract rents. Following the 2017 HUD Section 8 Guidebook, CM Authority forwarded New Lansing’s RCS to HUD, which obtained an independent RCS. Based on the independent RCS undertaken pursuant to HUD’s Guidebook requirements, the Housing Authority lowered New Lansing’s contract rents amount.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of New Lansing’s suit for breach of contract. The Renewal Contract requires only that the Housing Authority “make any adjustments in the monthly contract rents, as reasonably determined by the contract administrator in accordance with HUD requirements, necessary to set the contract rents for all unit sizes at comparable market rents.” HUD has authority to prescribe how to determine comparable market rents, the Renewal Contract adopted those requirements, and thus the Housing Authority was required to follow those HUD methods. The Housing Authority did not act unreasonably by following the requirements in the 2017 HUD guidance. View "New Lansing Gardens Housing Limited Partnership v. Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority" on Justia Law

The Clean Water Act empowers citizens to sue for violations of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 1365(a)(1); a citizen-suit plaintiff must “give[] notice of the alleged violation” to the “alleged violator,” and also to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and to the state in which the alleged violation occurs. After the plaintiff has provided the required notice, it must wait 60 days before suing, to give the alleged violator an opportunity to bring itself into complete compliance. Shark River Cleanup Coalition, a non-profit citizen’s group, delivered a notice letter alleging a Clean Water Act violation.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Coalition's subsequent suit. Under the applicable regulation, Notice regarding an alleged violation “shall include sufficient information to permit the recipient to identify the specific standard, limitation, or order alleged to have been violated, the activity alleged to constitute a violation, the person or persons responsible for the alleged violation, the location of the alleged violation, the date or dates of such violation, and the full name, address, and telephone number of the person giving notice, 40 C.F.R. 135.3(a). The Coalition’s Notice was deficient in that it did not “include sufficient information to permit [Defendants] to identify the specific standard, limitation, or order alleged to have been violated[.]” View "Shark River Cleanup Coalition v. Township of Wall" on Justia Law

Kirtz obtained loans from the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (AES), a “public corporation” that makes, guarantees, and services student loans, and the USDA through the Rural Housing Service, which issues loans to promote the development of affordable housing in rural communities. Kirtz alleges that, as of June 2018, both of his loan accounts were closed with a balance of zero. AES and the USDA continued to report the status of Kirtz’s accounts as “120 Days Past Due Date” on his Trans Union credit file, resulting in damage to his credit score. Kirtz sent Trans Union a letter disputing the inaccurate statements. Trans Union gave AES and USDA notice of the dispute, as required by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681. According to Kirtz, neither AES nor the USDA took any action to investigate or correct the disputed information.The district court dismissed Kirtz’s lawsuit, concluding that FCRA did not clearly waive the United States’ sovereign immunity. Courts of Appeals that have considered this issue are split. The Third Circuit reversed. FCRA’s plain text clearly and unambiguously authorizes suits for civil damages against the federal government. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the district court relied on its determination that applying the FCRA’s literal text would produce results that seem implausible. Implausibility is not ambiguity, and where Congress has clearly expressed its intent, courts may neither second-guess its choices nor decline to apply the law as written. View "Kirtz v. Trans Union LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court determining that the procedures leading to the dismissal of Petitioner from the City of Rawlins Fire Department violated Petitioner's right to due process and ordering her to be reinstated with back pay, holding that the Rawlins Fire Department Civil Service Commission's decision terminating Petitioner's employment was supported by substantial evidence in accordance with law.The Commission concluded that the reason for Petitioner's discharge was "sufficient and established" pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 15-5-112(b) because Petitioner violated Civil Service Commission Rules 21.3 and 2.7 and ordered Petitioner's employment be terminated. In so concluding, the Commission explicitly rejected Petitioner's argument that she was denied due process. The trial court reversed, finding that Petitioner's due process rights were violated. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Petitioner was afforded due process prior to her discharge by the Commission; and (2) the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. View "City of Rawlins v. Schofield" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Wyoming Board of Equalization (Board) concluding that WPX Energy Rocky Mountain, LLC was entitled to deduct some of its "reservation fees," holding that the Board erred in interpreting the plain language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 39-14-203(b)(vi)(C) in its decision.At issue on appeal was whether and to what extent WPX was entitled to deduct "reservation fees" under the "netback" severance tax valuation method, section(vi)(C), for natural gas production years 2013-2015. The Board concluded that WPX was entitled to deduct some of its reservation fees. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the statute allows WPX to fully deduct its pipeline reservation fees for months when some but not the full reserve capacity of gas was transported on that pipeline; (2) the statute does not allow WPX to deduct its Bison Pipeline reservation fees for months when it shipped no gas on the pipeline; and (3) the Board's conclusion that WPX cannot deduct any portion of its Bison Pipeline reservation fees it used to recoup pipeline construction costs was contrary to the plain language of the statute and the Bison agreement. View "Wyo. Department of Revenue v. WPX Energy Rocky Mountain, LLC" on Justia Law

The Idaho Board of Pharmacy (“Board”) filed an administrative complaint against pharmacist Cindy Chambers, alleging that she dispensed a controlled substance without a valid prescription. Chambers prevailed before the Board and it determined that she was entitled to recover her reasonable attorney fees and costs; however, she failed to comply with the 14-day deadline for requesting her award. When she filed a request almost seven months after the deadline had passed, the Board denied her request upon finding that she failed to show good cause for the late filing. Chambers then sought judicial review from the district court, which dismissed her petition. Chambers then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, maintaining that both the Board and the district court erred by applying the wrong legal standard. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Chambers v. Idaho Board of Pharmacy" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud and ordered to pay restitution. The district court granted the Government’s application for writs of garnishment seeking access to Defendant’s 401(k) retirement accounts. Defendant appealed. 
 The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court held that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) authorizes garnishment of Defendant’s 401(k) retirement funds. The court remanded to the district court, however, to determine whether the ten-percent early withdrawal tax will be imposed upon garnishment, limiting the Government’s access to Defendant’s retirement funds. The court also held that the Consumer Credit Protection Act’s 25-percent cap on garnishments does not apply to limit the Government’s garnishment. View "United States v. Greebel" on Justia Law

T.T. (Mother) challenged a juvenile court’s finding that the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) did not apply to the dependency proceedings concerning her son, Dominick D. She argued the juvenile court failed to ensure that San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) discharged its duty of initial inquiry into Dominick’s possible Indian ancestry under California Welfare & Institutions Code section 224.2(b). To this, the Court of Appeal agreed, but declined to address the parties’ arguments concerning harmlessness, because ICWA inquiry and notice errors did not warrant reversal of the juvenile court’s jurisdictional or dispositional findings and orders other than the finding that ICWA did not apply. The Court accordingly vacated that finding and remanded for compliance with ICWA and related California law, but otherwise affirmed. View "In re Dominick D." on Justia Law