Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Missouri challenged the Secretary of the Treasury’s implementation of the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA), Pub. L. No. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4. Missouri argues that the Secretary’s “erroneously broad interpretation” of a provision in ARPA—the “Offset Restriction”—is unconstitutional. The district court dismissed the case, finding that Missouri lacked standing and that Missouri’s claims were not ripe for adjudication.   On appeal, Missouri identifies five specific ways it has been injured: (1) the broad interpretation of the Offset Restriction punishes Missouri for exercising its constitutional right to set taxes; (2) the Secretary’s “embrace of the broad interpretation” has harmed Missouri’s interest in the offer Congress provided to the State; (3) Treasury’s regulations make ARPA’s requirement more onerous, leading to greater compliance costs; (4) under the broad interpretation, there is an increased chance Missouri will lose ARPA funds; and (5) under the pre-enforcement test, Missouri has alleged an intention to engage in conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by statute, with a credible threat of enforcement hanging over it.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that Missouri has not alleged an injury in fact. The court explained that Missouri has only alleged a “conjectural or hypothetical” injury, not one that is actual or imminent. It has also not alleged a future injury that is “certainly impending” or even likely to occur. Instead, Missouri asked the court to declare, in the abstract, what a statute does not mean. It asked the court to enjoin a hypothetical interpretation of the Offset Restriction that the Secretary has explicitly disclaimed, without alleging any concrete, imminent injury from the Secretary’s actual interpretation. View "State of Missouri v. Janet Yellen" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that article III, section 305 of the Charter for Prince George's County establishes the procedures for decennial redistricting of councilmanic districts and requires the Prince George's County Council to adopt the plan of the redistricting commission by resolution upon notice and public hearing.The circuit court invalidated an alternative redistricting plan using a resolution that was proposed by the Council after considering the redistricting plan proposed by the Prince George's County 2021 Redistricting Commission, after which Prince George's County appealed. The Court of Appeals held (1) the Council is prohibited by the Charter from enacting an alternative redistricting plan by resolution; and (2) because the Council passed no other law changing the Commission's proposal the Commission's plan became effective by operation of law on November 30, 2021. View "Charter for Prince George's County v. Thurston" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the superior court judge granting partial summary judgment and entering declarations in the two underlying cases that certain waterways regulations were an improper delegation of the Department of Environmental Protection's public trust responsibilities, holding that there was no error.Consistent with its public trust responsibilities, the Department set certain specifications for buildings within one hundred feet of protected tidelands and promulgated regulations purporting to allow the Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs to override the Department's specifications by approving substitute specifications as part of a municipal harbor plan. At issue was whether the Department had the authority to delegate this override authority to the Secretary. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the delegation was ultra vires and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Armstrong v. Secretary of Energy & Environmental Affairs" on Justia Law

In this dispute between the Maine lobster industry and the National Marine Fisheries Service (the Agency) over a rule barring frequently employed methods of lobstering the First Circuit lifted its issuance of a preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that Plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim.Plaintiffs, a union of oyster fishers and fishing companies, challenged a regulation issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service in August 2021 that prohibited lobster fishing with vertical buoy lines in certain areas during certain times of year. After the district court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the seasonal disclosure, the government and conservation grounds sought a stay of the order. The First Circuit first stayed the preliminary injunction and then vacated the injunction, holding that Plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim. View "District 4 Lodge of the International Ass'n v. Raimondo" on Justia Law

At issue is whether certain records maintained by appellant Kern High School District (“KHSD”) and pertaining to Plaintiff, a police officer formerly employed by KHSD, are subject to disclosure in response to requests made in 2019, pursuant to the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, Section 6250 et seq.) (“CPRA”).   Plaintiff petitioned the Kern County Superior Court for a writ of mandate, temporary restraining order, and preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin KHSD from disclosing the subject records in response to the CPRA requests. Plaintiff argued, among other things, that the subject records did not relate to “sustained” findings as defined in subdivision (b) of Penal Code section 832.8 because Plaintiff was never notified of the findings or afforded an “opportunity for an administrative appeal pursuant to Sections 3304 and 3304.5 of the Government Code.” KHSD appealed from the order granting the writ of mandate and injunction and denying KHSD’s motion for reconsideration, and from the judgment entered pursuant to said order.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part, trial court’s order and subsequent judgment granting Plaintiff’s injunctive relief. The court held that KHSD has a right to appellate review of the judgment and has standing to appeal. Further, the subject records do not relate to sustained findings under the 2018 amendments to penal code sections 832.7 and 832, thus KHSD has forfeited the argument that there was some other process available to Plaintiff to challenge the internal investigation findings. Thus, the court held that the peremptory writ should be recalled, and both the writ and the judgment should be modified to limit the injunction. View "Wyatt v. Kern High School" on Justia Law

To dispute a property tax assessment under Detroit ordinances and Michigan state law, taxpayers “make complaint on or before February 15th" before the Board of Assessors. Any person who has complained to the Board of Assessors may appeal to the Board of Review. For the Michigan Tax Tribunal to have jurisdiction over an assessment dispute, “the assessment must be protested before the board of review.” On February 14, 2017, Detroit mailed tax assessment notices to Detroit homeowners, including an “EXTENDED ASSESSORS REVIEW SCHEDULE” that would conclude on February 18, just four days later. At a City Council meeting on February 14, the city announced: “The Assessors Review process will end this year February the 28th.” News outlets reported the extension and that Detroit had waived the requirement of appearance before the Board of Assessors so residents could appeal directly to the Board of Review. Detroit did not distribute individualized mailings to so inform homeowners.Plaintiffs filed a class action, alleging violations of their due process rights; asserting that Michigan’s State Tax Commission assumed control of Detroit’s flawed property tax assessment process from 2014-2017 so that its officials were equally responsible for the violations; and claiming that Wayne County is “complicit” and has been unjustly enriched. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing the Tax Injunction Act and the principle of comity. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that a state remedy is uncertain. View "Howard v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

After a man was found incompetent to stand trial, and his civil commitment proceeding was dismissed, he stayed in jail for six more years. Plaintiff, the man’s guardian, filed suit against the District Attorney, Sheriffs, and Clay County under Section 1983, challenging the man’s years-long detention.   The district court first dismissed the District Attorney from the case. However, the court determined that the Sheriffs were not entitled to qualified immunity on the detention claim because their constitutional violations were obvious. It denied summary judgment to Clay County too, finding that there was strong evidence that the Sheriffs were final policymakers for the county.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed Clay County’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to the Sheriffs.  The court first held that it lacked jurisdiction over the ruling keeping Clay County in the case. The Court explained that, unlike the Sheriffs, municipalities do not enjoy immunity. Further, the court wrote it did not have pendent party jurisdiction over Clay County. Defendants assume that if Clay County’s liability is “inextricably intertwined” with that of the individual officers, that provides “support [for] pendent appellate jurisdiction.” But the court has never permitted pendent party (as opposed to pendent claim) interlocutory jurisdiction.   Further, taking the evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, the Sheriffs violated the man’s due process right by detaining him for six years in violation of the commit-or-release rule and the circuit court’s order enforcing that rule. The court explained that it was clearly established that the Sheriffs could be liable for a violation of the man’s clearly established due process right. View "Harris v. Clay County, MS" on Justia Law

The Mobile County Board of Equalization ("the Board") petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Mobile Circuit Court ("the trial court") to dismiss, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, an appeal filed by Atwood Drilling, Inc. ("Atwood"), challenging the Board's final assessment of ad valorem property taxes. This case concerns a dispute between Atwood and the Board as to the assessed value of personal property owned by Atwood ("the property"). Atwood timely filed a notice of appeal to the trial court, challenging the assessment as too high. the Board moved to dismiss Atwood's appeal, alleging: (1) taxes on the property had become delinquent because they had not been paid by January 1, 2021; and (2) by failing to pay the disputed amount before January 1, 2021, Atwood had not satisfied a jurisdictional requirement in § 40-3-25 -- specifically, the requirement that, when appealing a tax assessment, a taxpayer who has not executed a supersedeas bond must pay the assessed taxes before they become delinquent. In support of the motion to dismiss, the Board attached a receipt from the office of the Mobile County Revenue Commissioner ("the Commissioner") indicating that Atwood had not paid the assessed taxes as of January 19, 2021. Atwood alleged that it had sent the Commissioner via certified mail on December 10, 2020, and suggested that delivery had been likely delayed because of service disruptions related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Board argued that the "mailbox rule" in § 40-1-45 did not extend to undelivered tax payments. At some point following the Board's filing of the motion to dismiss, Atwood paid the tax bill, including penalties and interest, with a second check. After holding several hearings on the matter, the trial court, without stating the findings on which its decision was based, entered an order denying the Board's motion to dismiss on September 10, 2021. Because the appeal was not perfected, the Alabama Supreme Court determined the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and should have granted the Board's motion to dismiss. The petition was thus granted and the writ issued. View "Ex parte Mobile County Board of Equalization." on Justia Law

Petitioner M.V. appealed a Human Services Board order granting summary judgment to the Department for Children and Families (DCF) regarding DCF’s decision to substantiate him for child abuse. Petitioner argued the same underlying facts to which he admitted when he pleaded guilty to criminal charges of child-pornography possession could not substantiate a report of child abuse. He contended the Board applied the wrong legal standard because it did not require DCF to prove the existence of identifiable child victims or to establish a relationship between himself and each child. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment. View "In re Appeal of M.V." on Justia Law

The House of Representatives Oversight Committee issued a subpoena to then-President Trump’s personal accounting firm, Mazars USA, LLP. The subpoena sought an array of the President’s personal financial records. President Trump then brought a lawsuit challenging the Committee’s authority to subpoena his financial records.   After the DC Circuit upheld the subpoena, the Supreme Court took up the matter. Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020). Since the remand, there have been two developments that potentially affected the shape of the court’s inquiry into the subpoena’s validity. First, President Trump is no longer the sitting President. And second, the Committee’s chairwoman has prepared a detailed explanation of the legislative purposes the subpoena serves and of how the subpoena satisfies the test laid out by the Supreme Court.   The DC Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court. The court agreed with President Trump that the heightened separation-of-powers scrutiny prescribed by the Supreme Court continues to govern in the unique circumstances of this case even though he is no longer the sitting President. However, the court also agreed with the Committee that the court can consider its detailed accounting of the legislative purposes its subpoena serves even though that explanation came after the subpoena’s original issuance.   Thus, the court upheld the Committee’s authority to subpoena certain of President Trump’s financial records in furtherance of the Committee’s enumerated legislative purposes. However, the court wrote it cannot sustain the breadth of the Committee’s subpoena. Rather, in carrying out the Supreme Court’s directive to “insist on a subpoena no broader than reasonably necessary to support Congress’s legislative objective,” the court determined that the Committee’s subpoena must be narrowed in a number of respects. View "Donald Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP" on Justia Law