Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A group of bar owners and employees in North Carolina challenged a series of executive orders issued by the Governor during the COVID-19 pandemic. These orders required bars to remain closed for over 400 days, while allowing other businesses, including restaurants, breweries, and wineries, to reopen under certain restrictions. The plaintiffs argued that this differential treatment lacked a meaningful public health justification and violated their constitutional and statutory rights. They also sought records supporting the Governor’s decisions and claimed entitlement to compensation under the Emergency Management Act.In the Superior Court, Wake County, the trial judge denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction and granted the Governor’s motion to dismiss, finding that the executive orders were reasonable and based on scientific data. The trial court also dismissed the statutory claims, concluding that the Emergency Management Act did not provide compensation for mere restrictions on business operations and that the Public Records Act claim was moot because the requested records had been produced. The North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that the trial court had effectively granted summary judgment and vacated that order on the constitutional claims, remanding for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals applied rational basis review to the Fruits of Labor claim and strict scrutiny to the Equal Protection claim, finding the Governor’s actions unjustified under both standards. It affirmed dismissal of the statutory claims.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. It held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the Fruits of Labor claim and that the proper legal standard, as clarified in Ace Speedway, is not rational basis but a fact-intensive inquiry into whether the government’s action was reasonably necessary to promote a public good. The Court modified and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ remand for further proceedings on this claim, allowing additional discovery. However, it reversed the Court of Appeals’ application of strict scrutiny to the Equal Protection claim, holding that rational basis review applies to economic regulations not involving a suspect class or fundamental right. The Court affirmed dismissal of the statutory claims, finding no entitlement to compensation under the Emergency Management Act and no jurisdiction for the Public Records Act claim due to failure to complete required mediation. View "Bar and Tavern Ass'n v. Stein" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, after consuming a significant amount of alcohol and becoming heavily intoxicated, joined a group of friends at a municipal golf course and later proceeded to the driving range. While at the driving range, the plaintiff sat in a golf cart, distracted by his phone and unaware of his surroundings. The cart’s exact position was disputed, but evidence showed it was in or near the range of play. Defendant Hendricks, one of the group, hit a golf ball from the tee-off area, which struck the plaintiff in the eye, causing serious injury. The plaintiff did not see the ball coming and was unaware of the risk due to his lack of attention and intoxication.The plaintiff filed a negligence suit in the Superior Court, Wilson County, against both Hendricks and the City of Wilson, alleging negligent conduct and inadequate safety measures. Both defendants raised contributory negligence as a defense, and the City also asserted governmental immunity. The trial court granted summary judgment for both defendants, finding the plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The plaintiff appealed, and a divided panel of the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiff’s lack of situational awareness, due in part to intoxication and distraction, barred recovery. The majority also found no genuine issue of material fact regarding the cart’s location or movement and declined to address governmental immunity.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law because the risk of injury was open and obvious, and a reasonably prudent person would have recognized and avoided the danger. The Court did not address the issue of governmental immunity, as contributory negligence was dispositive. View "Moseley v. Hendricks" on Justia Law

A group of bar owners and operators in North Carolina challenged a series of executive orders issued by the Governor in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. These orders initially required bars to close statewide, then imposed restrictions that effectively prevented them from operating, such as prohibiting onsite consumption of alcohol and limiting service to outdoor areas only. Some bars could not reopen at all due to lack of outdoor space, while others found the restrictions made operation unprofitable. The restrictions lasted for approximately nine months, during which time the plaintiffs allege they were forced to remain closed or operate at a loss.After the Governor allowed bars to fully reopen, the plaintiffs filed suit in Superior Court, Carteret County, alleging that the executive orders violated their fundamental rights to earn a living under the North Carolina Constitution. They sought damages and other relief. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that sovereign immunity barred the claims. The trial court denied the motion in part, allowing the constitutional claims to proceed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs had stated colorable constitutional claims and that sovereign immunity did not bar their action.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. It held that, under established precedent, plaintiffs may bring direct constitutional claims against the state when they allege a violation of their rights and lack an adequate alternative remedy. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ complaint sufficiently alleged facts that, if proven, could support violations of their rights to earn a living under the Fruits of Their Own Labor Clause and the Law of the Land Clause. The Court also clarified that plaintiffs are not required to plead that they seek the least intrusive remedy at this stage. The decision of the Court of Appeals was modified and affirmed. View "Howell v. Cooper" on Justia Law

An employee of the North Carolina Department of Transportation, responsible for training and certifying school bus drivers, was terminated after admitting to recertifying five bus drivers without conducting the required ride-along observations. The Department asserted that this conduct violated a criminal statute, N.C.G.S. § 20-34.1, which makes it a felony for an employee to knowingly enter false information concerning a driver’s license or special identification card into department records, and mandates dismissal for such violations. The Department argued that the false information about school bus driver certificates fell within the statute’s scope.The employee challenged his termination before the Office of Administrative Hearings. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the statute did not apply because the information at issue concerned school bus driver certificates, not driver’s licenses, and concluded that the Department failed to prove just cause for termination. The Department appealed, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the ALJ’s decision. The Court of Appeals reasoned that, since a school bus driver must have both a commercial driver’s license and a school bus driver’s certificate, false information about the certificate was “concerning a driver’s license,” especially since the information was entered into the same database as driver’s license records. The Court of Appeals did not address the just cause issue, finding the statutory violation dispositive.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and clarified that courts must apply de novo review to questions of statutory interpretation, expressly rejecting any rule requiring deference to agency interpretations of state statutes. The Court held that N.C.G.S. § 20-34.1 does not apply to false information concerning school bus driver certificates, as the statute is limited to driver’s licenses and special identification cards. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for consideration of the remaining issues. View "Savage v. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Maurice Devalle, a former North Carolina State Highway Patrol sergeant, was terminated in April 2017 after an internal investigation revealed he had falsified his home address to meet residency requirements, submitted false time sheets, and was untruthful about his work activities. Shortly after his termination, Devalle accepted a position as a deputy sheriff and school resource officer in Columbus County and applied for justice officer certification from the North Carolina Sheriffs’ Education and Training Standards Commission. Over the following year and a half, Devalle received strong character endorsements from his new supervisors and colleagues, who testified to his rehabilitation and positive impact in his new role.After reviewing Devalle’s application, the Commission’s Probable Cause Committee determined he lacked good moral character based on his prior misconduct and did not conduct a new investigation into his recent conduct. Devalle challenged the denial in a contested case before an administrative law judge (ALJ), who found his supporting witnesses credible but noted Devalle’s own testimony was evasive and lacked candor. The Commission ultimately denied certification, citing Devalle’s lack of truthfulness during the hearing. Devalle sought judicial review in Superior Court, Columbus County, which reversed the Commission’s decision, finding insufficient evidence to support the denial and ordering retroactive certification.The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding the Commission’s decision was arbitrary and capricious compared to its handling of a prior, similar case. On discretionary review, the Supreme Court of North Carolina applied the whole record test and found substantial evidence supported the Commission’s conclusion that Devalle lacked the requisite candor and truthfulness. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstating the Commission’s indefinite denial of certification. View "Devalle v. Sheriffs’ Education & Training Standards Commission" on Justia Law

A property owner purchased land in a rural area adjacent to a growing town. After a private developer acquired and sought to develop neighboring tracts, the developer needed sewer access for a new subdivision. The developer attempted to purchase an easement across the property owner’s land, but the owner refused. The developer then persuaded the town to use its eminent domain power to take a sewer easement across the owner’s property, agreeing to cover the town’s costs. The town initiated condemnation proceedings and, before the legal challenge was resolved, installed a sewer line under the property.The Superior Court of Wake County held a hearing and found that the town’s taking was for a private, not public, purpose, rendering the condemnation null and void. The town’s appeal was dismissed as untimely by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, making the trial court’s judgment final. Subsequently, the property owner sought to enforce the judgment and have the sewer line removed, while the town filed a separate action seeking a declaration that it had acquired the easement by inverse condemnation. The trial court denied the owner’s request for injunctive relief and granted the town’s motion for relief from judgment, reasoning that the owner’s only remedy was compensation. The Court of Appeals vacated and reversed in part, holding that injunctive relief might be available but affirmed the denial of immediate removal of the sewer line.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that when a municipality’s exercise of eminent domain is found to be for a private purpose, title and possession revest in the original landowner. The court further held that the trial court has inherent authority to order a mandatory injunction to restore the property, subject to equitable considerations. The court vacated the town’s separate action as barred by the prior pending action doctrine and remanded for the trial court to determine the appropriate remedy for the continuing trespass. View "Town of Apex v. Rubin" on Justia Law

The case concerns a land exchange between the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the J.R. Simplot Company, involving land that was formerly part of the Fort Hall Reservation in Idaho. The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes had ceded this land to the United States under an 1898 agreement, which Congress ratified in 1900. The 1900 Act specified that the ceded lands could only be disposed of under certain federal laws: homestead, townsite, stone and timber, and mining laws. In 2020, BLM approved an exchange of some of these lands with Simplot, who sought to expand a waste facility adjacent to the reservation. The Tribes objected, arguing that the exchange violated the restrictions set by the 1900 Act.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho reviewed the Tribes’ challenge and granted summary judgment in their favor. The court found that the BLM’s approval of the exchange violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it did not comply with the 1900 Act’s restrictions. The court also held, in the alternative, that the exchange failed to meet requirements under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) and the National Environmental Policy Act. The district court certified the case for interlocutory appeal to resolve the legal question regarding the interplay between the 1900 Act and FLPMA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the 1900 Act’s list of permissible land disposal methods is exclusive and that the BLM’s exchange under FLPMA was not authorized because FLPMA is not among the listed laws. The court further held that FLPMA does not repeal or supersede the 1900 Act’s restrictions, and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the Tribes under established Indian law canons. The court concluded that BLM’s authorization of the exchange was not in accordance with law. View "SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES OF THE FORT HALL RESERVATI V. USDOI" on Justia Law

Two University of Washington professors, who serve as moderators for a faculty email listserv, were investigated by the Washington State Executive Ethics Board after forwarding emails that allegedly contained political discussion and requests for fundraising. The Board reviewed several months of their emails during its investigations. One professor was ultimately fined $750 for improper use of state resources, while the other was not disciplined. The professors, on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of listserv subscribers, filed suit challenging the Board’s investigatory policies and practices, alleging that these chill their First Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed the professors’ complaint as unripe under Article III, finding that they had not sufficiently alleged that the Board’s policies chilled their speech. The district court also concluded that the professors’ emails, as public employees, were public records and thus not protected by a First Amendment privacy interest. Additionally, the court found the claims prudentially unripe because the Board’s investigations were ongoing.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the professors’ claims are ripe under both constitutional and prudential ripeness doctrines. The court found that the professors had sufficiently alleged a credible threat of future enforcement and chilling of speech, given their ongoing roles and the Board’s history of enforcement. The court also determined that the issues presented are fit for judicial decision and that withholding review would impose substantial hardship on the professors. The panel remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the professors’ First Amendment claims against the Board’s investigatory policies and practices are ripe for adjudication. View "FLAXMAN V. FERGUSON" on Justia Law

A certified nurse midwife in Nebraska sought to provide home birth services but was prevented from doing so by state law. The Nebraska Certified Nurse Midwifery Practice Act requires midwives to work under a supervising physician through a practice agreement and prohibits them from attending home births outside authorized medical facilities. The midwife alleged that these restrictions forced her to turn away women seeking home births and sued state officials, claiming the law violated her constitutional rights and the rights of her prospective patients.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska dismissed the midwife’s claims. The court found that she failed to state a claim for violation of her own rights under the Due Process Clause and lacked standing to assert claims on behalf of her prospective patients. The district court concluded that the statutory requirements were rationally related to legitimate state interests in health and safety and that the midwife did not have a sufficiently close relationship with prospective patients nor could she show that those patients were hindered from bringing their own suits.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the Nebraska law regulating midwifery is subject to rational basis review and that the legislature could rationally believe the restrictions serve legitimate interests in public health and safety. The court also held that the midwife lacked third-party standing to assert the rights of prospective patients because she did not have a close relationship with them and they were not hindered from bringing their own claims. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the dismissal of all claims. View "Swanson v. Hilgers" on Justia Law

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated a civil enforcement action against several individuals, alleging they orchestrated profitable “pump-and-dump” schemes to artificially inflate stock prices and then sell shares at a profit, harming investors. The SEC ultimately obtained final judgments and recovered over $11 million in sanctions. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC is required to pay whistleblower awards to individuals who voluntarily provide original information leading to successful enforcement actions. After posting a Notice of Covered Action, five claimants submitted applications for whistleblower awards related to this enforcement action.The SEC’s Claims Review Staff awarded 30 percent of the monetary sanctions to Daniel Fisher, a former executive at a company central to the investigation, finding that Fisher provided new, helpful information that substantially advanced the investigation. The staff denied the other applications, including those from Lee Michael Pederson, John Amster, and Robert Heath, concluding that their information was either duplicative, based on publicly available sources, or not used by enforcement staff. Pederson and Fisher were found not to have acted jointly as whistleblowers, and Amster and Heath’s information was not relied upon in the investigation. The SEC affirmed these determinations in its final order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the SEC’s final order, applying a deferential standard to the agency’s factual findings and reviewing legal conclusions de novo. The court held that substantial evidence supported the SEC’s determinations: Pederson and Fisher did not act jointly, Pederson’s individual tips were not original or helpful, and Amster and Heath’s information did not lead to the enforcement action. The court also rejected Pederson’s due process and procedural arguments and denied his motion to compel. The petitions for review were denied, and the SEC’s order was affirmed. View "Pederson v. U.S. Securities Exch. Comm." on Justia Law