Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Energy Facility Siting Board (the board or EFSB) concerning the relocation of power lines across the Providence and Seekonk Rivers, holding that Petitioners had standing and that review of the Board's decisions was timely.Petitioners in this case were the City of Providence, Friends of India Point Park, The Hilton Garden Inn, and The R.I. Seafood Festival. Petitioners sought review of a January 17, 2018 order in which the Board stated that the "bridge alignment north" and the "underground alignment" were not feasible but approved the "bridge alignment south." Respondents - EFSB, the City of East Providence, and National Grid - sought review of the order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) all Petitioners except for Hilton lacked standing in this matter; and (2) while the Board's order was deficient, the next preferred alignment was the bridge alignment south, and therefore, the order of the Board is upheld. View "In re Narragansett Electric Co." on Justia Law

The Federal Power Act (“FPA”), 16 U.S.C. Section 824d(d), ISO-NE filed tariff revisions with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or “the Commission”) to compensate generators for maintaining an inventory of energy during the winter months of 2023–24 and 2024–25. The revisions implemented the Inventoried Energy Program (“IEP”), under which ISO-NE will provide additional payments to generators to maintain up to three days’ worth of fuel on-site and convert it into electricity.  The Commission issued an order accepting ISO-NE’s proposed tariff revisions. Petitioners contended that FERC’s decision to approve IEP imposes unjust and unreasonable, discriminatory, and preferential rates.   The DC Circuit upheld all but one component of the Commission’s decision to approve ISO-NE’s proposed tariff revisions implementing the Inventoried Energy Program. The court left in intact the Commission’s June 2020 order except for the portion of IEP that is arbitrary and capricious: the agency’s inclusion of nuclear, biomass, coal, hydroelectric generators. The court wrote that it believes there is no substantial doubt that FERC would have adopted IEP if it had not included these resources in the first place, and IEP can function sensibly without them. View "Belmont Municipal Light Department v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT) to rescind Petitioner's license under Iowa Code 322.3(12), holding that there was substantial evidence to revoke the motor vehicle dealer license.Petitioner, who owned and operated a vehicle dealership, pleaded guilty to one count of structuring transactions to avoid mandatory reporting requirements in violation of 31 U.S.C. 5324(a)(1) and (3) and was sentenced to a term of probation. The DOT then revoked Petitioner's Motor Vehicle Dealer License for a period of five years because of the structuring conviction. The district court upheld the revocation, stayed enforcement of the license revocation until the completion of the appeal, and tolled the entirety of the five-year revocation period. The court of appeals upheld the license revocation but determined that the district court lacked the authority to toll the five-year license revocation period. The Supreme Court held (1) there was substantial evidence to revoke the motor vehicle dealer license; and (2) the revocation period shall be extended by the length of the stay. View "Carreras v. Iowa Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Division" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Public Service Commission (PSC), which approved the application of Black Hills Nebraska Gas, LLC seeking an enlargement or extension of its natural gas mains in Sarpy County, holding that there was no error.On appeal, the Metropolitan Utilities District (MUD) contended that Black Hills' application was contrary to a 2010 order that MUD argued conclusively established that it was in the public interest for MUD to provide natural gas service to the area at issue in the application. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding that the PSC had authority to determine the public interest with respect to the current application. View "In re Application No. P-12.32 of Black Hills Nebraska Gas, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner Bruce Querbach sought to overturn a final order of the Oregon Department of Human Services (DHS) which determined that reports to DHS that petitioner had abused two children were “founded.” The circuit court, reviewing the order as an order in other than a contested case, assumed that the “reasonable cause to believe” standard in that rule was a “probable cause” standard. After holding a trial to develop the record for review, as required by Norden v. Water Resources Dept., 996 P2d 958 (2000), the circuit court concluded that only two of DHS’s four “founded” determinations could be sustained under that standard. On petitioner’s appeal and DHS’s cross-appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected the circuit court’s application of a “probable cause” standard and, instead employing the “reasonable suspicion” standard that it had used in an earlier, similar case, concluded that not just two, but three of DHS’s “founded” determinations had to be sustained. Appealing to the Oregon Supreme Court, petitioner argued that “probable cause” was the correct standard for determining that a report of abuse is founded and that none of DHS’s “founded” determinations hold up when the record on review was considered under that standard. Petitioner also argued that, given that the circuit court found that the DHS investigation and analysis into the reported abuse was incomplete and flawed in various respects, the “founded” determinations had to be set aside. The Supreme Court rejected those arguments and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that three of the four “founded” dispositions were supported by substantial evidence. View "Querbach v. Dept. of Human Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Department of Labor of Regulation granting Employer/Insurer's motion for summary judgment regarding medical expenses Claimant incurred while being treated by Dr. Donald Corenman, holding that the circuit court erred in part.Employer and Insurer denied coverage for the medical expenses Claimant incurred by being treated for her back injury by Dr. Corenman. Claimant filed a petition for hearing with the Department, which granted summary judgment for Employer/Insurer as to these medical expenses. The circuit court affirmed. Claimant appealed, and Employer/Insurer filed a notice of review regarding an earlier Department ruling. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the Department erred in granting summary judgment denying compensation for Dr. Corenman's medical services. View "Dittman v. Rapid City School District" on Justia Law

In this case concerning the medical marijuana licensing and regulatory process the Supreme Court affirmed in part and dismissed in part this interlocutory appeal from the circuit court's denial of Defendants' motion to dismiss this action on the basis of sovereign immunity, holding that the circuit court erred in its ruling.Plaintiff brought this complaint seeking a writ of mandamus and declaratory relief to compel Defendants - the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration, the Arkansas Alcoholic Beverage Control Division, and the Arkansas Medical Marijuana Commission - to revoke a cultivation facility license granted to another company and instead award it to Plaintiff. The circuit court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court remanded the action, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss the writ of mandamus on the basis of sovereign immunity; (2) the circuit court erred in denying gate State's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claim of declaratory relief; and (3) to the extent that Appellants were seeking relief under the APA the case must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Arkansas Department of Finance & Administration v. 2600 Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals declining to extend the holding in Livingood v. Transfreight, LLC, 467 S.W.3d 249 (Ky. 2015) to Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(c)1, otherwise known as the three-multiplier, holding that this Court declines to extend Livingood to the three-multiplier.At issue was whether the holding in Livingood "that the legislature did not intend to reward an employee's wrongdoing with a double benefit" should be extended to preclude application of the three-multiplier when a claimant has been terminated for misconduct. Claimant in this case was allegedly fired for filing false information on a company report. The ALJ found that Claimant retained a permanent impairment due to a work injury and that this case justified application of the three-multiplier. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed, determining that Livingood did not apply to the three-multiplier. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that nothing in the statue or the facts below requires extension of Livingood to section 342.730(1)(c)1. View "Tractor Supply v. Wells" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the order of the Workers Compensation Board reversing an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) application of the 2x multiplier in Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(c)2, holding that there was no error.After suffering a work-related injury Claimant continued working his normal job for almost one year before he was laid off for unrelated reasons. The ALJ determined that, since Claimant earned no wage after the lay-off he qualified for the 2x multiplier, which doubles a claimant's benefits if the claimant returns to work after injury at the same or higher wages but subsequently experiences a cessation of that employment. The Board reversed as to the application of the 2x multiplier, determining that there was no "return" to work under section 342.730(1)(c)2. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ misapplied the law to the facts. View "Helton v. Rockhampton Energy, LLC" on Justia Law

While residing in a nursing home, Hill died of COVID-19. Her estate sued in state court under the Illinois Nursing Home Care Act, The defendant removed the suit to federal court, asserting that Martin’s suit necessarily rests on federal law, 28 U.S.C.1441(a), and that it was “acting under” a federal officer under 28 U.S.C.1442(a)(1).The district judge remanded to state court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed,. The nursing home is subject to extensive federal regulation (especially for Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement), and CDC orders during the pandemic have increased that regulatory burden but regulation does not turn a private entity into a public actor. The Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, 42 U.S.C. 247d, forbids liability under state law for injuries caused by use of a “covered countermeasure”, and creates a federal claim for injuries caused by “willful misconduct” in connection with covered countermeasures (payable from a federal fund), but does not preempt any other kind of claim nor occupy the field of health safety. The estate’s claims are not even arguably preempted. The principal disputes in this suit are likely to be whether the nursing home allowed members of the staff to work while ill or failed to isolate residents who contracted COVID-19, which are unrelated to federal law. View "Martin v. Petersen Health Operations, LLC" on Justia Law