Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Judge Pauline Newman, a sitting judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, was investigated by a Special Committee of her circuit under the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980. The investigation was initiated after the Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit raised concerns about Judge Newman’s ability to manage her workload due to alleged health and age-related impairments. The Special Committee requested that Judge Newman undergo medical examinations and provide medical records, which she refused, arguing the requests and investigation were unlawful. As a result, the Federal Circuit’s Judicial Council suspended Judge Newman from receiving new case assignments for one year, with the suspension subsequently renewed.Judge Newman filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging her suspension on statutory and constitutional grounds. She argued that the Judicial Council exceeded its statutory authority, violated her due process rights by not transferring the matter to another circuit, and that the Act’s case-suspension provision was unconstitutional both facially and as applied. The district court dismissed her statutory and as-applied constitutional claims for lack of jurisdiction, relying on circuit precedent, and rejected her facial constitutional challenge on the merits.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that, under binding precedent from McBryde v. Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders of the Judicial Conference of the United States, it lacked jurisdiction to review Judge Newman’s statutory and as-applied constitutional claims. The court further held that Judge Newman’s facial constitutional challenge to the Act’s case-suspension provision failed because the provision has many constitutional applications. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Newman v. Moore" on Justia Law

The case centers on the southwestern willow flycatcher, a bird listed as an endangered subspecies by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service since 1995. The New Mexico Cattle Growers’ Association petitioned the Service to remove the bird from the endangered species list, arguing that it is not a valid subspecies and thus does not qualify for protection under the Endangered Species Act. Their petition relied heavily on a 2015 scientific article by Robert Zink, which critiqued previous studies supporting the subspecies classification. The Service conducted a thorough review, including public comment and expert consultation, and ultimately reaffirmed the subspecies designation, finding that the best available scientific evidence supported its continued listing.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the Service’s decision after the Cattle Growers filed suit, claiming the agency’s determination was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Service and its intervenors, the Center for Biological Diversity and the Maricopa Audubon Society, finding that the Service had reasonably explained its reliance on scientific studies and its application of the non-clinal geographic variation standard to determine subspecies validity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The appellate court held that the Service’s decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious, as it was based on a reasonable and well-explained evaluation of scientific evidence. The court rejected the Cattle Growers’ arguments regarding the indeterminacy of the non-clinal geographic variation standard and found no merit in claims of constitutional or procedural deficiencies. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "New Mexico Cattle Growers' Association v. FWS" on Justia Law

A group of hospitals challenged the calculation of their Medicare fractions for fiscal year 2007, which is a key component in determining eligibility and payment amounts under the Medicare disproportionate share hospital (DSH) adjustment. The DSH adjustment provides increased reimbursement to hospitals serving a high number of low-income patients. The hospitals disputed the inclusion of Medicare Part C beneficiaries in the Medicare fraction, arguing that this reduced their payments. After the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) published the Medicare fractions, the hospitals appealed to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board, seeking review of the calculation before the final DSH adjustment was determined.The Provider Reimbursement Review Board dismissed the hospitals’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that a challenge could only be brought after the final determination of the DSH adjustment was made and reflected in the Notice of Program Reimbursement (NPR). The Board concluded that publication of the Medicare fraction alone did not constitute a “final determination” as required by statute. The hospitals then sought review in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which disagreed with the Board and held that the hospitals’ challenge could proceed, interpreting precedent to allow appeals at the stage of Medicare fraction publication.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the Board lacked jurisdiction to hear the hospitals’ challenge prior to the issuance of the NPR, because only the NPR constitutes the Secretary’s “final determination as to the amount of the payment” under the relevant statutory provision. The court clarified that while some prospective payment system components may be appealed before the NPR, retrospective adjustments like the DSH adjustment require final settlement before an appeal is ripe. View "Battle Creek Health System v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

In 2020, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) proposed a rule to address insider threats in airports, specifically targeting the risk that aviation workers with unescorted access to secured areas could facilitate the introduction of weapons or dangerous items onto aircraft. Instead of following the usual public notice-and-comment procedures required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), TSA provided notice and an opportunity to comment only to airport operators. The finalized rule, known as the National Amendment, required major airports to physically screen aviation workers entering certain secured areas and to acquire explosives-detection equipment. Noncompliance could result in civil enforcement actions by TSA.After TSA finalized the National Amendment in April 2023, various municipalities operating airports and a trade organization, Airport Council International-North America (ACI-NA), submitted timely requests for reconsideration, arguing that TSA lacked statutory authority, that the APA required public notice and comment, and that the rule unlawfully compelled local officials to implement a federal scheme. TSA denied all reconsideration requests, maintaining that its own regulations permitted it to amend airport security programs by providing notice and comment only to affected operators. The petitioners then sought review of TSA’s denial in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the National Amendment is a legislative rule subject to the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements, which TSA failed to follow. The court vacated the National Amendment but withheld its mandate, allowing TSA time to promulgate a procedurally proper rule or inform the court if no rule is needed. The court required TSA to submit periodic status reports until a final resolution. View "City of Billings v. TSA" on Justia Law

Two landowners initiated mandamus actions challenging an order issued by a local natural resources district (NRD) that permanently reduced certified irrigated acres on their properties under the Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act. One party, a corporation, owned the affected real estate at the time the administrative proceeding began, while the other acquired ownership only after the proceeding and subsequent appeals had concluded. The NRD’s order stemmed from findings that flow meters on wells had been tampered with, violating district rules. Notice of the proceeding was served on the original landowners and published in local newspapers, but not directly on the corporation.The District Court for Harlan County reviewed the case. It dismissed related declaratory judgment actions but granted mandamus relief to both plaintiffs, finding that the NRD’s order was void as to them because they were not served or made parties to the original administrative proceeding. The court ordered the NRD not to enforce the penalties against the plaintiffs and to take steps to restore their rights to irrigate the affected acres. Attorney fees were also awarded to both plaintiffs.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court found that the corporation was entitled to relief because it was not properly served with notice, rendering the order void as to it. However, the individual who acquired property after the administrative proceeding was not entitled to relief, as the reduction of irrigated acres was completed before he obtained an interest, and the statute does not provide for restoration in such circumstances. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and attorney fee award for the individual, but affirmed as modified the judgment and attorney fee award for the corporation. The main holdings are: due process requires notice to a corporation owning certified irrigated acres, and a reduction completed before a person acquires an interest is not affected by later acquisition. View "State ex rel. Seeman v. Lower Republican NRD" on Justia Law

Westside Community School District was entitled to receive payments in lieu of taxes (PILOT funds) from the Douglas County treasurer, as required by the Nebraska Constitution and statutes. In 2021, the Nebraska Auditor of Public Accounts found that the treasurer had erroneously distributed PILOT funds, resulting in Westside being underpaid by millions of dollars, while other entities, including Omaha Public Schools (OPS), Douglas County, and the city of Omaha, were overpaid. The parties did not dispute the existence of these errors. Westside filed suit seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the treasurer to correct the underpayment.After litigation began, Westside, the treasurer, and the city of Omaha entered into a settlement agreement to rectify the payment errors from 2019 to 2021, agreeing to prospective repayments over six years. OPS declined to participate. Pursuant to the agreement, Westside and the treasurer jointly moved for a peremptory writ of mandamus, which the District Court for Douglas County initially granted. OPS then intervened, arguing the writ was improper and that the statutory provisions did not authorize the proposed remedy. The district court vacated the writ, finding no statutory duty to correct the underpayment in the manner outlined, and left the case pending.Westside renewed its motion for a writ, seeking only correction of the underpayment without specifying the remedy’s form. The treasurer moved to enforce the settlement agreement, arguing the court’s vacation of the writ was equivalent to a denial, requiring dismissal. The district court denied Westside’s renewed motion and dismissed the case with prejudice, enforcing the settlement agreement.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the treasurer has a ministerial duty to properly distribute PILOT funds according to the statutory formula, and that mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel correction of erroneous distributions. The court affirmed the vacation of the initial writ but reversed the denial of the renewed motion and the dismissal, remanding with direction to issue an alternative writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Ewing" on Justia Law

Two affiliated freight railroad companies challenged a series of security directives issued by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) that required certain high-risk and strategically significant railroads to implement extensive cybersecurity measures. These directives, which were updated annually, imposed significant compliance costs and were motivated by ongoing and evolving threats from foreign adversaries such as Russia and China. The railroads argued that the directives should have undergone notice-and-comment rulemaking and that the ongoing nature of the cybersecurity threat did not constitute an “emergency” justifying bypassing those procedures.The petitioners sought direct review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, as permitted by statute, after the TSA issued new versions of the directives in May 2024, July 2024, and May 2025. The court consolidated the challenges because the directives were substantively identical. The railroads argued that TSA was required to conduct notice-and-comment rulemaking, perform a cost-benefit analysis, and that TSA lacked statutory authority to issue the directives. They also contended that the directives were arbitrary and capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied the petitions. The court held that the ongoing cybersecurity threats described in the directives constituted an emergency within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. § 114(l)(2), allowing TSA to bypass notice-and-comment procedures. The court further held that TSA was not required to conduct a cost-benefit analysis for security directives, as the relevant statutory provision applied only to regulations, not directives. The court also found that TSA had sufficient statutory authority to issue the directives and that the directives were not arbitrary or capricious. The petitions for review were therefore denied. View "Grand Trunk Corp. v. Transportation Security Administration" on Justia Law

A sitting judge of the San Diego County Superior Court applied to be appointed as the county’s Public Defender in 2023. The County of San Diego informed him that he was ineligible for the position based on Government Code section 27701, which requires that a person must have been a practicing attorney in all courts of the state for at least the year preceding the date of election or appointment. The judge, believing the County’s interpretation was incorrect, filed a declaratory relief action seeking a judicial determination of the statute’s meaning. He argued that the statute only required one year of prior practice at any time before appointment, not necessarily the year immediately preceding.The case was reassigned to the Superior Court of Orange County. Both parties agreed to resolve the statutory interpretation issue through a motion. The plaintiff argued that his interpretation avoided absurd results and was consistent with constitutional principles and legislative intent. The County maintained that the statute’s plain language was clear and required the year of practice to be immediately before appointment. The trial court held a hearing and agreed with the County, finding the statutory language unambiguous and declining to rewrite the statute. Judgment was entered in favor of the County, and the plaintiff appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the language of section 27701 is unambiguous and requires that eligibility for the office of public defender is limited to those who have been a practicing attorney in all courts of the state for at least the one year immediately preceding their election or appointment. The court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, concluding that the plain meaning of the statute must govern. View "Washington v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

A Virginia-based company provided tax debt relief services to clients in Idaho, assisting them in negotiating settlements or payment plans for tax debts owed to the IRS and the State of Idaho. The company did not offer services for other types of debt and employed IRS-enrolled agents to represent clients in administrative tax proceedings. Despite conducting substantial business in Idaho, the company did not register as a corporation in the state or obtain a license under the Idaho Collection Agency Act (ICAA). After receiving multiple complaints from Idaho residents about the company’s practices, the Idaho Department of Finance investigated and determined that the company was operating as a “debt counselor” under the ICAA and required a license.The Department initiated an administrative enforcement action, resulting in a hearing officer’s order imposing civil penalties and restitution. The company appealed to the Director of the Department of Finance, who largely upheld the hearing officer’s findings but reduced the restitution amount. The company then sought judicial review in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, which affirmed the Director’s final order. The company appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that the company’s activities—negotiating and managing tax debts—fell within the ICAA’s definition of a “debt counselor,” and that unpaid taxes constitute “debt” or “indebtedness” under the Act’s plain language. The Court also found that the ICAA was not preempted by federal law, that the Director did not abuse her discretion in evidentiary or sanction decisions, and that the civil penalties and restitution were supported by substantial evidence. The Court affirmed the district court’s decision and awarded costs, but not attorney fees, to the Department on appeal. View "Wall & Associates, Inc. v. Idaho Department of Finance" on Justia Law

A group of researchers at the University of California received multi-year federal research grants from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH). In April 2025, the EPA and NEH sent form letters to these researchers, terminating their grants. The letters cited changes in agency priorities and referenced the implementation of several Executive Orders issued in early 2025, which directed agencies to eliminate funding for projects related to diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI), environmental justice, and similar initiatives. The researchers alleged that these terminations were not based on individualized assessments but were instead the result of broad policy changes.The researchers filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, challenging the mass termination of grants on constitutional and statutory grounds, including violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the First and Fifth Amendments, and separation of powers. The district court provisionally certified two classes: one for those who received form termination letters without specific explanations, and another for those whose grants were terminated due to the DEI-related Executive Orders. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, ordering the agencies to reinstate the terminated grants, finding that the terminations were likely arbitrary and capricious and, for the DEI class, likely violated the First Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the government’s motion for a partial stay of the injunction. The court denied the motion, holding that the government had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits regarding jurisdiction, standing, or the substantive claims. The court found that the agencies’ actions were likely arbitrary and capricious under the APA and likely constituted viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. The court also concluded that the balance of harms and public interest did not favor a stay. View "THAKUR V. TRUMP" on Justia Law