Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Two affiliated freight railroad companies challenged a series of security directives issued by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) that required certain high-risk and strategically significant railroads to implement extensive cybersecurity measures. These directives, which were updated annually, imposed significant compliance costs and were motivated by ongoing and evolving threats from foreign adversaries such as Russia and China. The railroads argued that the directives should have undergone notice-and-comment rulemaking and that the ongoing nature of the cybersecurity threat did not constitute an “emergency” justifying bypassing those procedures.The petitioners sought direct review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, as permitted by statute, after the TSA issued new versions of the directives in May 2024, July 2024, and May 2025. The court consolidated the challenges because the directives were substantively identical. The railroads argued that TSA was required to conduct notice-and-comment rulemaking, perform a cost-benefit analysis, and that TSA lacked statutory authority to issue the directives. They also contended that the directives were arbitrary and capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied the petitions. The court held that the ongoing cybersecurity threats described in the directives constituted an emergency within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. § 114(l)(2), allowing TSA to bypass notice-and-comment procedures. The court further held that TSA was not required to conduct a cost-benefit analysis for security directives, as the relevant statutory provision applied only to regulations, not directives. The court also found that TSA had sufficient statutory authority to issue the directives and that the directives were not arbitrary or capricious. The petitions for review were therefore denied. View "Grand Trunk Corp. v. Transportation Security Administration" on Justia Law

A sitting judge of the San Diego County Superior Court applied to be appointed as the county’s Public Defender in 2023. The County of San Diego informed him that he was ineligible for the position based on Government Code section 27701, which requires that a person must have been a practicing attorney in all courts of the state for at least the year preceding the date of election or appointment. The judge, believing the County’s interpretation was incorrect, filed a declaratory relief action seeking a judicial determination of the statute’s meaning. He argued that the statute only required one year of prior practice at any time before appointment, not necessarily the year immediately preceding.The case was reassigned to the Superior Court of Orange County. Both parties agreed to resolve the statutory interpretation issue through a motion. The plaintiff argued that his interpretation avoided absurd results and was consistent with constitutional principles and legislative intent. The County maintained that the statute’s plain language was clear and required the year of practice to be immediately before appointment. The trial court held a hearing and agreed with the County, finding the statutory language unambiguous and declining to rewrite the statute. Judgment was entered in favor of the County, and the plaintiff appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the language of section 27701 is unambiguous and requires that eligibility for the office of public defender is limited to those who have been a practicing attorney in all courts of the state for at least the one year immediately preceding their election or appointment. The court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, concluding that the plain meaning of the statute must govern. View "Washington v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

A Virginia-based company provided tax debt relief services to clients in Idaho, assisting them in negotiating settlements or payment plans for tax debts owed to the IRS and the State of Idaho. The company did not offer services for other types of debt and employed IRS-enrolled agents to represent clients in administrative tax proceedings. Despite conducting substantial business in Idaho, the company did not register as a corporation in the state or obtain a license under the Idaho Collection Agency Act (ICAA). After receiving multiple complaints from Idaho residents about the company’s practices, the Idaho Department of Finance investigated and determined that the company was operating as a “debt counselor” under the ICAA and required a license.The Department initiated an administrative enforcement action, resulting in a hearing officer’s order imposing civil penalties and restitution. The company appealed to the Director of the Department of Finance, who largely upheld the hearing officer’s findings but reduced the restitution amount. The company then sought judicial review in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, which affirmed the Director’s final order. The company appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that the company’s activities—negotiating and managing tax debts—fell within the ICAA’s definition of a “debt counselor,” and that unpaid taxes constitute “debt” or “indebtedness” under the Act’s plain language. The Court also found that the ICAA was not preempted by federal law, that the Director did not abuse her discretion in evidentiary or sanction decisions, and that the civil penalties and restitution were supported by substantial evidence. The Court affirmed the district court’s decision and awarded costs, but not attorney fees, to the Department on appeal. View "Wall & Associates, Inc. v. Idaho Department of Finance" on Justia Law

A group of researchers at the University of California received multi-year federal research grants from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH). In April 2025, the EPA and NEH sent form letters to these researchers, terminating their grants. The letters cited changes in agency priorities and referenced the implementation of several Executive Orders issued in early 2025, which directed agencies to eliminate funding for projects related to diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI), environmental justice, and similar initiatives. The researchers alleged that these terminations were not based on individualized assessments but were instead the result of broad policy changes.The researchers filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, challenging the mass termination of grants on constitutional and statutory grounds, including violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the First and Fifth Amendments, and separation of powers. The district court provisionally certified two classes: one for those who received form termination letters without specific explanations, and another for those whose grants were terminated due to the DEI-related Executive Orders. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, ordering the agencies to reinstate the terminated grants, finding that the terminations were likely arbitrary and capricious and, for the DEI class, likely violated the First Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the government’s motion for a partial stay of the injunction. The court denied the motion, holding that the government had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits regarding jurisdiction, standing, or the substantive claims. The court found that the agencies’ actions were likely arbitrary and capricious under the APA and likely constituted viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. The court also concluded that the balance of harms and public interest did not favor a stay. View "THAKUR V. TRUMP" on Justia Law

The case concerns the Estate of Jack Halverson, which sought to compel the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), to partition a parcel of land on the Crow Reservation in Montana. Jack Halverson had owned a significant fractional interest in Allotment 1809 and, in 2015, applied for a partition under federal law. After Halverson’s death, his estate and the BIA entered into a settlement agreement that purported to resolve the partition. The BIA executed deeds to effectuate the partition, but the Estate contended that the BIA failed to assign the ownership interests as required by the agreement, resulting in the Estate receiving a smaller share of land than anticipated.After the BIA recorded the deeds, the Estate moved before an Administrative Law Judge to compel the BIA to comply with the settlement agreement, but the motion was denied. The Estate then filed a mandamus action in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, seeking to compel the BIA to partition the land as agreed. The district court granted summary judgment for the BIA, finding that the agency had fully performed its obligations under the settlement agreement. The Estate appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the action was barred by sovereign immunity. The court held that a mandamus suit seeking to enforce contract rights against a federal official is, in effect, a suit against the United States, and such suits are barred unless there is a clear waiver of sovereign immunity. The court found no statute waiving immunity for this type of claim. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "HALVERSON v. BURGUM" on Justia Law

A government agency responsible for marketing hydroelectric power operated a warehouse in Colorado, where an employee, Jared Newman, orchestrated a fraudulent procurement scheme from 2014 to 2017. Newman arranged for the agency to purchase supplies from vendors owned by friends and family, including the defendant, who owned two such companies. The vendors submitted invoices for goods that were never delivered, received payments from the agency, and then funneled most of the money back to Newman, keeping a portion as a commission. The defendant received nearly $180,000 through 59 fraudulent payments, writing checks back to Newman and taking steps to conceal the scheme.A grand jury indicted the defendant in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado on six counts of wire fraud, each corresponding to a specific transfer, and sought forfeiture of all proceeds. At trial, the government introduced evidence of a co-participant’s guilty plea and the district court instructed the jury that it could infer the defendant’s knowledge of the fraud if he was deliberately ignorant. The defendant was convicted on all counts. The district court limited forfeiture to the six charged transfers, totaling about $20,000, but ordered restitution for the full amount received, for which the defendant and Newman were jointly and severally liable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the co-participant’s guilty plea, as it was used to assess credibility and not as substantive evidence of guilt, and the jury was properly instructed on its limited use. The court also held that, because there was sufficient evidence of the defendant’s actual knowledge, any error in the deliberate ignorance instruction did not warrant reversal. On the government’s cross-appeal, the Tenth Circuit vacated the forfeiture order, holding that forfeiture should include all proceeds obtained through the fraudulent scheme, not just the charged transactions, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Cline" on Justia Law

A prisoner incarcerated in a California state prison was found guilty of a serious institutional rule violation after a search of his shared cell uncovered a large quantity of inmate-manufactured alcohol. The reporting officer believed both cell occupants were aware of the alcohol due to its strong odor and issued a rules violation report (RVR) for each. The original RVR was classified as a serious offense by Captain Hopper, and after a disciplinary hearing, the senior hearing officer found the prisoner guilty. The chief disciplinary officer (CDO) at that time affirmed the result. The prisoner appealed administratively, and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) office of grievances found merit in his due process claim, ordering the RVR to be reissued and reheard.After the RVR was reissued and classified by a different officer, a new hearing was held. The prisoner’s cellmate provided statements suggesting the prisoner had no knowledge of the alcohol, but the hearing officer again found the prisoner guilty. By this time, Hopper had become the acting CDO and conducted the final review, affirming the hearing results. The prisoner’s subsequent administrative appeal was unsuccessful, leading him to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court, which was denied. He then sought relief in the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One.The appellate court held that under California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 3320(h), an officer who classified the original RVR is disqualified from conducting the final review of the same RVR as CDO. Because Hopper performed both roles, the court found this violated the regulation’s requirement for impartiality. The court granted the petition, vacated the disciplinary finding, and ordered a new review by a non-disqualified CDO or restoration of lost credits and pay if such review is not feasible. View "In re Dixon" on Justia Law

The United States government brought suit against several defendants, including EZ Lynk, SEZC, Thomas Wood, and Bradley Gintz, alleging that their product, the EZ Lynk System, violated the Clean Air Act by enabling vehicle owners to bypass or disable emissions controls. The EZ Lynk System consists of a physical device that connects to a vehicle’s diagnostics port, a smartphone app, and a cloud-based service. Through this system, users can download and install “tunes” created by third-party technicians, including “delete tunes” that defeat emissions controls. The complaint detailed how EZ Lynk collaborated with tune creators, provided technical support, and maintained an online forum where users discussed using the system to delete emissions controls.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found that the government’s complaint sufficiently alleged that the EZ Lynk System was a “defeat device” under the Clean Air Act. However, the district court dismissed the complaint, holding that EZ Lynk and its principals were immune from liability under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. The court reasoned that EZ Lynk merely published third-party information (the delete tunes) and did not create them, thus qualifying for Section 230 immunity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Second Circuit agreed that the complaint adequately alleged the EZ Lynk System was a defeat device. However, it held that the complaint also sufficiently alleged that EZ Lynk, Wood, and Gintz directly and materially contributed to the creation of the unlawful delete tunes, making them ineligible for Section 230 immunity. The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. The main holding is that Section 230 immunity does not apply where a defendant directly and materially contributes to the creation of unlawful content. View "United States v. EZ Lynk" on Justia Law

Three employers—SpaceX, Energy Transfer, and Findhelp—each faced unfair labor practice complaints before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Before administrative proceedings began, each employer filed suit in a different federal district court in Texas, challenging the constitutionality of the NLRB’s structure. Specifically, they argued that the dual for-cause removal protections for both NLRB Board Members and Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) unconstitutionally insulated these officials from presidential removal, violating Article II and the separation of powers.Each district court granted a preliminary injunction, halting the NLRB’s proceedings against the respective employer. The courts found that the removal protections for ALJs (and, in one case, for Board Members) were unconstitutional, that the employers would suffer irreparable harm if forced to proceed before an unconstitutionally structured agency, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored injunctive relief. The NLRB appealed, arguing that the district courts lacked jurisdiction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act and that the employers had not shown a likelihood of success or irreparable harm.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the consolidated appeals. The court held that the district courts had jurisdiction to enjoin the NLRB’s proceedings, as the employers’ constitutional challenges to the agency’s structure did not “grow out of a labor dispute” within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit held that the dual for-cause removal protections for NLRB ALJs are unconstitutional, following its own precedent in Jarkesy v. Securities & Exchange Commission. The court further held that the removal protections for Board Members likely violate Article II, as the NLRB’s structure does not fit within the narrow exception recognized in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States. The court also found that being subjected to proceedings before an unconstitutionally structured agency constitutes irreparable harm. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunctions granted by the district courts. View "Space Exploration v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Seven residents of Ojai and its surrounding area brought suit against a city council member and her attorney, alleging that confidential information from closed session meetings of the Ojai city council was improperly disclosed. The disclosures related to litigation and development agreements discussed in closed sessions, and included both oral statements and written materials distributed to the public and posted online. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming these disclosures violated the confidentiality provisions of the Brown Act.The defendants responded by filing a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing the suit was politically motivated. The plaintiffs opposed, asserting their action qualified for the public interest exception to the anti-SLAPP law. The Superior Court of Ventura County found the plaintiffs failed to establish the public interest exception applied, granted the motion to strike, and awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the defendants, concluding the Brown Act’s fee-shifting exception did not apply because the plaintiffs sought relief only under section 54963, not section 54960.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs’ action fell within the public interest exception to the anti-SLAPP statute, as the relief sought was solely for the benefit of the public and aimed to enforce important rights under the Brown Act. The court also determined that the attorney’s fees award was improper, as the action was brought pursuant to the Brown Act and thus subject to its fee-shifting exception. The judgment was reversed and remanded with instructions to deny both the special motion to strike and the motion for attorney’s fees. The appellate court expressed no opinion on the merits of the underlying complaint. View "Byrne v. Rule" on Justia Law