Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A petitioner sought to file a referendum challenging a specific section of a recently enacted state law concerning student and parental rights in public education. The law included provisions aimed at promoting student safety, preventing discrimination, and ensuring parental notification in certain circumstances. The legislature included an emergency clause in the bill, declaring it necessary for the immediate preservation of public peace, health, or safety, which made the law effective immediately. When the petitioner submitted the referendum to the Secretary of State, the Secretary refused to process it, citing the emergency clause as rendering the legislation exempt from the referendum process under the state constitution.After the Secretary’s refusal, the petitioner filed an original action in the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary to process the referendum and to challenge the validity of the emergency clause. The court granted expedited review due to the time-sensitive nature of referendum signature collection. The petitioner argued that the Secretary had a mandatory duty to process all properly filed referenda, regardless of the presence of an emergency clause, and that the validity of such a clause was a judicial question.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that the Secretary of State does not have a mandatory duty to process a referendum on legislation that is, on its face, constitutionally exempt from referendum due to a valid emergency clause. The court further found that the legislature’s declaration of emergency in this case was valid, as the record and legislative history supported the need for immediate action. As a result, the petition for a writ of mandamus was denied. View "Eyman v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

A shift supervisor at a coffee shop in Ann Arbor, Michigan, led efforts to organize a union at her workplace. She was a prominent organizer, engaging in various activities such as wearing union buttons, speaking to customers about unionization, and attending a labor board hearing. Several months into the campaign, she was terminated by her employer, who cited her violation of a company policy requiring at least two employees to be present in the café. The supervisor had left a barista alone at the store at the end of her shift without notifying management, which the company claimed was the reason for her discharge.After her termination, Workers United filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging that the discharge was motivated by anti-union animus. An Administrative Law Judge found in favor of the union, concluding that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual and that the discharge was unlawfully motivated. The NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s decision and expanded the remedy, ordering the employer to compensate the supervisor not only for lost earnings and benefits but also for any “direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms” resulting from the discrimination.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case on the NLRB’s application for enforcement of its order. The court held that substantial evidence supported the NLRB’s finding that the supervisor’s discharge was motivated by anti-union animus and thus constituted an unfair labor practice. However, the court determined that the NLRB exceeded its statutory authority under the National Labor Relations Act by awarding compensation for “direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms” beyond lost earnings and benefits. The court granted enforcement of the unfair labor practice finding but vacated the expanded remedy and remanded for further proceedings. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Starbucks Corp." on Justia Law

Gregory Bonnie was serving a 144-month federal prison sentence in South Carolina, consisting of 120 months for drug trafficking convictions and a consecutive 24 months for violating supervised release, which included a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. While incarcerated, Bonnie sought to earn time credits under the First Step Act (FSA) for the 120-month portion of his sentence related to drug offenses, acknowledging that the 24-month portion for the § 924(c) conviction was disqualifying under the FSA.The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) denied Bonnie’s request, treating his consecutive sentences as a single, aggregate term of imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c), and finding him ineligible for FSA time credits because his aggregate sentence included a disqualifying § 924(c) conviction. After exhausting administrative remedies, Bonnie filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. The district court granted summary judgment for the warden, holding that the plain text and statutory context of the FSA and § 3584(c) required aggregation of sentences, making Bonnie ineligible for FSA time credits for the entire 144-month sentence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. The court held that, under the FSA and § 3584(c), the BOP must treat multiple consecutive or concurrent sentences as a single, aggregate sentence for administrative purposes, including the computation of FSA time credits. Because Bonnie’s aggregate sentence included a conviction under § 924(c), he was ineligible for FSA time credits for any portion of the sentence. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment denying Bonnie’s habeas petition. View "Bonnie v. Dunbar" on Justia Law

Mark and Jane Thompson, residents of Aiken County and the City of Aiken, paid road maintenance fees levied by both the county and city for several years. After the City of Aiken rescinded its fee in 2021 and agreed to reimburse fees paid after that date, the Thompsons filed suit against various city and county officials and entities. They sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinances imposing the fees were invalid, reimbursement of unlawfully collected fees, damages under section 8-21-30 of the South Carolina Code, and relief for alleged violations of their constitutional rights.The case was first heard in the Circuit Court for Aiken County. The Thompsons voluntarily dismissed some claims and parties before and during the hearing. The trial court ultimately dismissed the remaining claims, finding that the South Carolina Revenue Procedures Act (RPA) deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction, that section 12-60-80(C) barred class actions against political subdivisions, that section 8-21-30 did not apply to the road maintenance fees or the actions of the county treasurer, and that sovereign immunity barred the unjust enrichment claim. The constitutional claim was dismissed by stipulation. The Thompsons appealed, and the Supreme Court of South Carolina certified the appeal before the Court of Appeals could rule.The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the road maintenance fees at issue were not “taxes” under the RPA, so the RPA did not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the individual or class claims. The catchall provision of section 12-60-80(C) does not bar class actions against political subdivisions unless the claim concerns value-based property taxes. The court affirmed the dismissal of the unjust enrichment, section 8-21-30, and constitutional claims, but reversed the dismissal of the declaratory judgment claim and remanded for further proceedings on that claim, both individually and as a class. View "Thompson v. Killian" on Justia Law

The plaintiff resided at an apartment complex with his son, who was arrested for aggravated armed robbery by the local police department. After the arrest, the police informed the apartment management, which then evicted both the plaintiff and his son based on a lease provision prohibiting criminal conduct. The plaintiff sought information about his son’s arrest from the city and police department under the Texas Public Information Act, but his request was denied after the city consulted the Texas Attorney General and invoked a law-enforcement exception.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the plaintiff filed suit against the city, the police department, the apartment complex, a debt collection agency, and the Texas Attorney General, alleging violations of the U.S. Constitution, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and Texas law. All defendants either appeared, filed answers, or moved to dismiss. The plaintiff moved for default judgment against each defendant, but the district court denied those motions and granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. On appeal, the plaintiff only challenged the denial of default judgment, as he did not brief arguments regarding the dismissals and thus forfeited them.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed only the denial of default judgment for abuse of discretion. The court held that default judgment was not warranted because the city, police department, and debt collector had all appeared or answered, and the Attorney General had not been properly served. The court also found that arguments regarding attorney conflict and judicial bias were either forfeited or unsupported. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of default judgment. View "Clark v. City of Pasadena" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, a law firm and its principal, challenged a Montana statute enacted in 2021 that prohibits discrimination based on an individual’s vaccination status or possession of an immunity passport. The law applies broadly to businesses, governmental entities, employers, and public accommodations, with certain exceptions for schools, daycare facilities, and healthcare providers. One provision of the law also prohibits requiring individuals to receive vaccines authorized only for emergency use or still undergoing safety trials. The plaintiffs alleged that the statute violated several provisions of the Montana Constitution, including rights to a clean and healthful environment, equal protection, inalienable rights, and the constitutional requirement that a bill’s subject be clearly expressed in its title.The case was first heard in the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Richland County. The District Court denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction and dismissed most of their constitutional claims, but allowed the claim regarding the bill’s title and single-subject requirement to proceed. On remand from the Montana Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Netzer Law Office, P.C. v. State, the District Court ultimately held that the main antidiscrimination provision of the law complied with the constitutional clear-title requirement, but that the provision prohibiting mandates for emergency use or trial vaccines did not, and voided that subsection.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ other constitutional claims. The Supreme Court held that the law’s title was sufficiently clear and not misleading as to its main antidiscrimination provision, affirming its validity. However, the Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s invalidation of the provision regarding emergency use and trial vaccines, holding that this subsection was germane to the bill’s general purpose and did not violate the clear-title or single-subject requirements. Thus, both challenged provisions of the statute were upheld. View "Netzer v. State" on Justia Law

Phillip Weeks submitted a request under Missouri’s Sunshine Law to the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, seeking files containing traffic stop data from 2014 through 2018, specifically in spreadsheet (Excel) format and including officer identification numbers. The Department initially offered to provide traffic analysis reports with redacted officer numbers for a fee, which Weeks declined. During discovery in the resulting lawsuit, the City produced .CSV files containing the requested data. Weeks acknowledged these files matched his request in content but maintained he wanted the data in Excel spreadsheet format. Testimony at trial established that the Department did not maintain the data in Excel format, and there was conflicting evidence about whether the .CSV files could be accurately converted to Excel.The Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis found in favor of the City, concluding that the City did not possess an existing record in the specific format Weeks requested. The court determined that the City had not violated the Sunshine Law because it did not withhold any records it actually maintained in the requested format. Weeks appealed, arguing that the judgment was against the weight of the evidence, and also contended that the City’s admissions during litigation established it had responsive files at the time of his request.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. The Court held that Weeks failed to follow the required analytical framework for challenging a judgment as against the weight of the evidence. Specifically, he did not identify all favorable evidence supporting the judgment or address conflicting evidence in accordance with the trial court’s credibility determinations. The Court also found that the City’s admissions did not establish it possessed records in the requested format. The judgment in favor of the City was affirmed. View "Weeks vs. City of St. Louis" on Justia Law

An armed fugitive fleeing law enforcement entered a print shop owned by the plaintiff, forcibly removed him, and barricaded himself inside. After a thirteen-hour standoff, Los Angeles Police Department SWAT officers used dozens of tear gas canisters to subdue the fugitive, causing significant damage to the shop and its contents. The parties agreed that the officers’ actions were authorized, reasonable, and lawful. The plaintiff alleged that the damages, which exceeded $60,000, were caused exclusively by the police.The plaintiff initially sought compensation from the United States Marshals Service, which denied the claim and referred him to the City of Los Angeles. After the City did not respond to his claims or his attorney’s letter, the plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. The City moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the Takings Clause does not require compensation for property destroyed by police acting reasonably in an emergency. The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied the City’s initial motion but later granted summary judgment for the City, finding that the destruction was a valid exercise of police power and not a compensable taking.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the government’s destruction of private property, when necessary and reasonable for public safety, is exempt from the Takings Clause. The court relied on historical understanding and longstanding precedent, concluding that such actions fall outside the scope of the Takings Clause. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment. View "PENA V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge to amended energy efficiency standards issued by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for consumer furnaces (specifically, residential non-weatherized gas furnaces and mobile home gas furnaces) and certain commercial water heaters under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA). Petitioners, including trade associations, manufacturers, and energy providers, argued that the new standards would effectively eliminate non-condensing appliances from the market, claiming these products offer unique features and performance characteristics not available in condensing models. They also contended that DOE failed to provide adequate economic justification for the new standards and did not comply with procedural requirements during rulemaking.Previously, DOE had issued a series of proposed rules and interpretive rules regarding whether non-condensing technology constituted a protected performance characteristic under EPCA. After public comment and a period of shifting interpretations, DOE ultimately concluded in its 2021 Interpretive Rule that non-condensing technology does not provide a unique performance-related feature compared to condensing appliances. DOE then promulgated final rules in 2023 amending the efficiency standards for both consumer furnaces and commercial water heaters. Petitioners sought review of these actions in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that DOE’s interpretation—that non-condensing appliances do not offer performance characteristics or features substantially different from condensing appliances—was reasonable and supported by the record. The court also found that DOE’s economic justification for the amended standards was robust and supported by substantial evidence (and, for commercial water heaters, by clear and convincing evidence). Additionally, the court determined that DOE provided an adequate opportunity for public comment. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review, upholding DOE’s rules. View "American Gas Association v. DOE" on Justia Law

An inpatient rehabilitation facility employed a sales representative who raised concerns about the facility’s use of nonclinical personnel in the preadmission screening process required for Medicare reimbursement. The sales representative was terminated after five months of employment. Shortly thereafter, she filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, alleging that the facility presented false claims to Medicare, used false records to obtain payment, and conspired to submit false claims. She amended her complaint multiple times, and the government declined to intervene in the case.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas reviewed the second amended complaint after the defendant moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of all claims, finding the complaint insufficiently plausible and lacking the particularity required by Rules 8(a) and 9(b). The magistrate judge also recommended denying leave to further amend the complaint as futile under Rule 16. The district court adopted these recommendations, entered final judgment, and dismissed the case with prejudice. The plaintiff timely appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo and the denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion. The Fifth Circuit held that the complaint failed to plead sufficient facts to support the elements of a False Claims Act violation, specifically the falsity of the claims and the connection between the alleged conduct and the submission of false claims. The court also found that amendment would be futile, as the plaintiff had already amended her complaint twice without remedying the deficiencies. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claims with prejudice. View "Gentry v. Encompass Health Rehabilitation Hospital of Pearland, L.L.C." on Justia Law