Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
John Doe, 1 v. USA
Three children attending a government-owned daycare center at Robins Air Force Base in Georgia suffered physical and emotional abuse at the hands of two childcare workers. The children’s parents, who had entrusted them to the Center and paid for their care, alleged that the government had provided assurances of safety and had adopted formal criteria to prevent and respond to child abuse. The parents claimed that the Center’s director failed to report the abuse to authorities and that the government breached its duty to protect the children.The parents brought suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, alleging negligence in failing to protect the children. The government moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were barred by the FTCA’s intentional tort exception, which preserves sovereign immunity for claims arising out of certain intentional torts, including assault and battery. The district court agreed, finding that the parents’ claims were dependent on the employment status of the abusers and thus fell within the exception. The court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denied the parents’ motion to amend, reasoning that amendment would be futile.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the FTCA’s intentional tort exception did not apply because the government’s duty to care for and protect the children was independent of the employment status of the abusers. The court vacated the district court’s dismissal and denial of leave to amend, and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to consider whether the parents had stated a claim for relief. View "John Doe, 1 v. USA" on Justia Law
Newport School Committee v. Rhode Island Department of Education
Two children were placed in the temporary custody of the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) by the Family Court in 2018. The Family Court determined that Newport and Cumberland were responsible municipalities for the children’s education, as they were the residences of the custodial parents. DCYF placed the children in residential treatment facilities where they received general education services, but not special education services.DCYF requested orders from the Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education that Newport and Cumberland reimburse DCYF for education costs at the per-pupil special-education rate. The commissioner agreed and ordered the municipalities to pay at that rate. Both municipalities appealed to the Council on Elementary and Secondary Education, which denied their appeals. The municipalities then appealed to the Rhode Island Superior Court under the Administrative Procedures Act. The Superior Court consolidated the cases and found that the statute required the municipalities to pay their share of educational costs, but not at the special-education rate unless special education services were provided. The trial justice also held that, even after statutory amendments removed references to general education, the municipalities were still responsible for the per-pupil general-education rate for children not receiving special education.On review, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island considered whether the municipalities were obligated to pay the general-education rate after the statutory reference to general education was removed. The Court held that the plain language of the statute only requires reimbursement for special education costs and does not obligate municipalities to pay for general education where no special education services are provided. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Superior Court. View "Newport School Committee v. Rhode Island Department of Education" on Justia Law
Allison v. McCoy-Post
The case concerns a referendum petition submitted in Norman, Oklahoma, regarding a municipal ordinance that adopted the Rock Creek Entertainment District Project Plan. The ordinance created two tax increment financing districts to support the construction of a multipurpose arena, parking garage, and related infrastructure. The increments from local sales and ad valorem taxes were designated to fund the project up to certain financial limits or for a maximum period of twenty-five years. The ordinance was enacted without voter approval, prompting proponents to submit a referendum petition seeking a public vote on the ordinance.After the petition was filed, including 10,689 signatures, a protest was lodged in the District Court of Cleveland County, challenging both the legal sufficiency and signature count of Referendum Petition 2425-1. The protest focused on alleged inaccuracies and omissions in the petition’s gist, which is intended to briefly and accurately describe the purpose and effect of the proposed measure for potential signatories. The District Court, presided over by Judge Jeff Virgin, concluded that the gist was insufficient, specifically finding that it misrepresented the financial triggers and duration of the tax districts, and ordered the petition invalidated and stricken.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the sufficiency of the gist de novo. The Court determined that the gist failed to accurately state the maximum amount of public assistance and omitted the fact that the tax districts would expire upon the earliest of three specified events, not necessarily after twenty-five years. These deficiencies rendered the gist misleading and legally insufficient. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s order invalidating Referendum Petition 2425-1, holding that the petition’s gist was legally insufficient and therefore the petition could not proceed. View "Allison v. McCoy-Post" on Justia Law
In re: Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2705(b)
Empower Oversight Whistleblowers & Research, a nonprofit organization, filed a motion to intervene in a closed grand jury proceeding and sought to unseal Department of Justice applications for non-disclosure orders related to a 2017 grand jury subpoena for Google account records. At the time of the subpoena, Jason Foster, Empower’s founder, was the Chief Investigative Counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee, investigating alleged misconduct at the Department. Google notified Foster in 2023 that a subpoena and non-disclosure order had been issued and extended multiple times. Empower argued that the applications should be unsealed, claiming they were judicial records subject to public access under common law and the First Amendment, and that grand jury secrecy had been waived due to public disclosures.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia permitted Empower to intervene but granted only partial unsealing. It held that the applications were ancillary grand jury records protected by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(6), limiting unsealing to jurisdictional and legal standard sections. The court found no waiver of secrecy, as disclosures were not sufficiently public to meet the threshold established by precedent. Most of the documents remained sealed, and Empower appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed for abuse of discretion and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the applications were covered by Rule 6(e)(6), which displaces any common law or First Amendment right of access, and that grand jury secrecy had not been waived by the disclosures identified by Empower. The court also declined to review new evidence (the December 2024 OIG report) not presented to the district court but remanded the case for the lower court to consider whether to allow Empower to amend its motion and supplement the record with the OIG report. View "In re: Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2705(b)" on Justia Law
Essintial Enterprise Solutions LLC v. SBA
Essintial Enterprise Solutions, LLC, a staffing and services company, received a $7 million Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan during the COVID-19 pandemic. The company calculated its loan amount based on its reported payroll costs, which included payments made to both employees and independent contractors. After the loan was issued and the company applied for forgiveness, its bank approved forgiveness of the full amount. However, the Small Business Administration (SBA) reviewed the forgiveness request and determined that payments made to independent contractors were not eligible as “payroll costs” under the CARES Act, resulting in only partial forgiveness. The SBA forgave approximately $3.7 million and denied forgiveness for the remainder that was based on contractor payments.Essintial challenged the SBA’s decision by filing suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The company argued that the SBA’s interpretation of “payroll costs” was erroneous and violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The District Court agreed with Essintial, granting summary judgment in its favor. It held that the SBA’s exclusion of independent contractor payments from payroll costs was arbitrary and capricious, and ordered full loan forgiveness for Essintial.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the statutory definition of “payroll costs” in the CARES Act de novo. The Third Circuit held that the SBA’s interpretation was correct: payments to independent contractors by a business are not included as “payroll costs” for PPP loan forgiveness purposes. The court concluded that the CARES Act provides two separate definitions of “payroll costs” depending on the borrower’s type, and Essintial’s payments to independent contractors did not qualify. The Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Essintial Enterprise Solutions LLC v. SBA" on Justia Law
In re United States
In this case, the central issue arose during a countervailing duty investigation into phosphate fertilizers imported from Morocco and Russia. The International Trade Commission (Commission) collected information through questionnaires sent to various parties, including domestic and foreign producers. The Commission’s longstanding practice was to automatically designate all questionnaire responses as confidential, regardless of whether the submitting party requested confidentiality or whether the information would qualify for such treatment under the relevant statute. This led to heavy redactions in the administrative record when the investigation was challenged in court.A Moroccan producer, OCP S.A., sought review of the Commission’s injury determination in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT). The CIT initially remanded the injury determination due to insufficient evidentiary support. When the remand record again included substantial redactions, the CIT held a hearing to scrutinize the Commission’s confidentiality designations. After reviewing arguments from the Commission and affected parties, the CIT concluded that the Commission’s practice of automatically treating all questionnaire responses as confidential was unauthorized by law. The CIT found that much of the redacted information was either publicly available, generalized, or outdated, and thus not entitled to confidential treatment, with only a small portion warranting protection.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the CIT’s Confidentiality Opinion and Order. The Federal Circuit held that the governing statute does not abrogate the common law right of public access to judicial records and that the Commission’s blanket confidentiality rule conflicts with statutory requirements, which demand public disclosure of non-confidential information and proper justification for confidentiality. The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s order that required the Commission to comply with statutory standards for confidentiality and to cease automatic confidential designation of questionnaire responses. View "In re United States" on Justia Law
In re United States
In a dispute concerning antidumping and countervailing duties on mattresses imported from several countries, the U.S. International Trade Commission determined that domestic industry suffered material injury from imports sold at less than fair value and from subsidized imports. The Commission treated certain information submitted in response to its questionnaires as confidential. After the Court of International Trade issued a public opinion sustaining the Commission’s injury determination, it did not redact information the Commission had deemed confidential. The Commission requested retraction of the public opinion and sought redactions for specific company names and numerical data, arguing these deserved confidential treatment.The parties jointly moved for redaction, relying on the Commission’s practice of treating questionnaire data as confidential and citing statutory provisions. The Court of International Trade denied the motion, reasoning that the information was either publicly available or not linked to specific entities, and that some claims of confidentiality had been waived due to procedural oversight. The court also emphasized the common law right of access and transparency, but did not specifically address the statutory authority for disclosure.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the denial of the joint motion. The court found the case moot because the allegedly confidential information had already been publicly disclosed more than two years earlier, rendering any relief unavailable. The Federal Circuit held that the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness did not apply, as the companion case decided that day resolved the same confidentiality issues. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded. View "In re United States" on Justia Law
O’Connell v. Woodland Park Sch. Dist.
Several newly elected members joined a school district’s board of education in late 2021. Their priority was to make Merit Academy a charter school within the district. After previous unsuccessful attempts, the board moved forward with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to streamline the process. The agenda for the January 26, 2022, meeting where the MOU was discussed did not clearly indicate this topic, being labeled only as "BOARD HOUSEKEEPING." The board approved the MOU at this meeting. Subsequent meetings in February and April further addressed the MOU, with the April meeting involving a detailed discussion and statements from each board member.After the January meeting, a community member, Erin O’Connell, filed suit alleging a violation of Colorado’s Open Meetings Law (COML) due to insufficient public notice. The District Court initially granted an injunction requiring the board to provide clearer agendas. Later, upon summary judgment, the District Court found that the board cured the COML violation at the April meeting, which was properly noticed and involved substantive reconsideration. The court held O’Connell was not a prevailing party and denied her request for attorney fees.On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed most of the district court’s rulings. It upheld the “cure doctrine,” allowing public bodies to remedy prior open meetings violations by holding a subsequent compliant meeting, provided it is not a mere “rubber stamp.” The Court of Appeals also found that the doctrine does not distinguish between intentional and unintentional violations and that the April meeting cured the earlier violation. It denied O’Connell costs and attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed that the cure doctrine is consistent with the COML and longstanding precedent, and applies regardless of the violation’s intent. However, it reversed regarding attorney fees, holding that because O’Connell proved a violation that was not cured until after suit was filed, she is the prevailing party and entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. The case was remanded for determination and award of such fees. View "O'Connell v. Woodland Park Sch. Dist." on Justia Law
Brown v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles
A completed driver reexamination request was submitted to the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) by a confidential reporter, prompting the DMV to initiate a review of Richard Louis Brown’s driving qualifications. Brown was notified that he must submit a medical evaluation. His physician, a new provider to Brown, recommended a driving test but did not advise against driving. Following a reexamination, Brown failed a driving test, and his license was suspended. A second hearing officer later reinstated his license, finding no medical basis for the initial suspension and stating that Brown should not have been required to take the tests.Brown filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Sacramento County, seeking disclosure of the reporter’s identity and criminal sanctions against the reporter for alleged false information. The DMV opposed, explaining the confidentiality policy for reporters is intended to promote road safety and prevent retaliatory actions. The trial court denied the petition, applying a public interest balancing test and finding that the interest in maintaining reporter confidentiality outweighed the interest in disclosure. Judgment was entered against Brown, who then appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, held that due process was not violated by the DMV’s nondisclosure of the reporter’s identity. The court found that the risk of erroneous deprivation was low because the suspension was based on Brown’s failed driving test, not the reporter’s complaint, and Brown received notice and two hearings. The court concluded that neither federal nor California constitutional due process required disclosure of the reporter’s identity under the circumstances and affirmed the superior court’s judgment denying Brown’s petition. View "Brown v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law
Kalbers v. Department of Justice
After Volkswagen AG became the subject of a criminal investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for its use of defeat device software to evade emissions standards—a scandal widely known as “Dieselgate”—the company agreed to a plea deal with the DOJ. As part of the investigation, Volkswagen, through its law firm Jones Day, produced approximately six million documents to federal prosecutors in response to a grand jury subpoena. Lawrence Kalbers, a university professor, subsequently filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request seeking all documents Volkswagen provided to the DOJ during the investigation, specifically referencing materials described in Volkswagen’s 2017 Annual Report.The DOJ denied the FOIA request, citing exemptions for law enforcement records and information protected by statute, including Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which safeguards grand jury materials. Kalbers challenged this denial in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The district court ordered the DOJ to produce all responsive documents and a Vaughn index, later appointing a special master due to the volume of records. The special master recommended disclosure, reasoning the documents did not clearly reveal grand jury deliberations. The district court overruled DOJ and Volkswagen’s objections and ordered disclosure, prompting both parties to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that nearly all the requested documents are exempt from FOIA disclosure under Exemption 3 because they were obtained solely via a grand jury subpoena and their release would reveal matters occurring before the grand jury, thus compromising grand jury secrecy protected by Rule 6(e). The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order requiring disclosure of these documents, but vacated and remanded as to four documents not marked as grand jury materials, instructing further review to determine their status. View "Kalbers v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law