Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners, whose applications for disability benefits were denied by the Social Security Administration (SSA) unsuccessfully challenged their adverse determinations before an SSA administrative law judge (ALJ). The SSA Appeals Council denied discretionary review in each case. Thereafter, the Supreme Court decided Lucia v. SEC, holding that the appointment of Securities and Exchange Commission ALJs by lower-level staff violated the Constitution’s Appointments Clause. The SSA ALJs were also appointed by lower-level staff. The Courts of Appeals held that the petitioners could not obtain judicial review of their Appointments Clause claims because they failed to raise those challenges in their administrative proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed. The Courts of Appeals erred in imposing an issue-exhaustion requirement on petitioners’ Appointments Clause claims. Administrative review schemes commonly require parties to give the agency an opportunity to address an issue before seeking judicial review of that question. If no statute or regulation imposes an issue-exhaustion requirement, courts decide whether to require issue exhaustion based on “an analogy to the rule that appellate courts will not consider arguments not raised before trial courts.” In the context of petitioners’ Appointments Clause challenges, two considerations tip the scales against imposing an issue-exhaustion requirement: agency adjudications are generally ill-suited to address structural constitutional challenges, which usually fall outside the adjudicators’ areas of technical expertise, and the Supreme Court has consistently recognized a futility exception to exhaustion requirements. Petitioners assert purely constitutional claims about which SSA ALJs have no special expertise and for which they can provide no relief. View "Carr v. Saul" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) that upheld three use-tax assessments based on Appellant's purchase of three trucks, holding that the BTA erred by failing to correlate its findings with the distinct primary uses of the trucks.The trucks at issue were two Peterbilt trucks and one Lodal truck. Appellant argued that because it purchased the three trucks for use in its business as a for-hire motor carrier, the purchase were exempt from sales and use tax under Ohio Rev. Code 5739.02(B)(32)'s "highway transportation for hire" exemption. The tax commissioner and the BTA determined that the exemption did not apply to the purchases because Appellant's use of the trucks to transport waste material to landfills did not qualify as the transportation of "personal property belonging to others." The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) for purposes of section 5739.02(B)(32), waste is "personal property belonging to" the person or entity that generated it when the person or entity has an agreement with the hauler that specifies where the waste is to be taken for disposal; and (2) because the generators of the waste hauled by the Peterbilt trucks designated the destination of the waste, the Peterbilt trucks were entitled to the exemption. View "N.A.T. Transportation, Inc. v. McClain" on Justia Law

George Glassmeyer sent Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the South Carolina Lottery Commission for information relating to million-dollar lottery winners. The Lottery Commission claimed the information sought was "personal" and "disclosure . . . would constitute unreasonable invasion of personal privacy." Instead, the Lottery Commission disclosed the hometown and state of each winner, the amount of each prize, the date of each prize, and the game associated with each prize. Glassmeyer responded that the Lottery Commission's disclosure did not satisfy his requests. The Lottery Commission then filed this lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the release of lottery winners' names, addresses, telephone numbers, and forms of identification would constitute an unreasonable invasion of personal privacy under subsection 30-4-40(a)(2) and could be withheld. The Lottery Commission also sought injunctive relief preventing Glassmeyer from obtaining the information. The circuit court granted the Lottery Commission's motion and declared the release of the lottery winners' personal identifying information as an unreasonably invasion of personal privacy, and also entered an injunction permanently restraining Glassmeyer from seeking the lottery winners' full names, addresses, telephone numbers, and forms of identification. The court of appeals reversed, by the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed: "a proper injunction could restrict Glassmeyer only from seeking this information from the Lottery Commission. The Lottery Commission had no right to request an injunction permanently restraining Glassmeyer from seeking this information from any source, and the circuit court had no authority to prevent Glassmeyer from doing so." View "South Carolina Lottery Commission v. Glassmeyer" on Justia Law

Developers submitted an application for a Berkeley mixed-use development with 135 apartments over 33,000 square feet of retail space and parking, pursuant to Government Code section 65913.4, which provides for streamlined, ministerial approval of affordable housing projects meeting specified requirements. The site is the location of the West Berkeley Shellmound, “believed to have been one of the first of its kind at the Bay’s edge, built ca 3,700 B.C.,” part of a City of Berkeley Landmark. Shellmounds were “sacred burial sites for the average deceased mound-dweller,” slowly constructed over thousands of years from daily debris and artifacts. The city denied the application.The court of appeal ruled in favor of the developers. There is no evidence that the project “would require the demolition of a historic structure that was placed on a . . . historic register.” Remnants and artifacts could be disturbed, but that is not the issue under section 65913.4(a)(7)(C). With regard to tribal cultural resources, the project’s draft environmental impact report concluded impacts on the Shellmound would be reduced to “a less-than-significant level” by agreed-upon mitigation measures. Given the Legislature’s history of attempting to address the state’s housing crisis and frustration with local governments’ interference with that goal, and the highly subjective nature of historical preservation, the intrusion of section 65913.4 into local authority is not broader than necessary to achieve the legislation's purpose. View "Ruegg & Ellsworth v. City of Berkeley" on Justia Law

Karen and Jerome Schirado appealed a judgment granting the City of Glen Ullin and the Glen Ullin Park District permanent injunctive relief and awarding the Park District attorney’s fees. The Schirados owned land near both Park District and City property. In 2013, the Park District sued the Schirados to enjoin them from fencing and allowing their horses to graze on Park District lots. The Park District was granted default judgment. In 2019, the Park District and the City sued again, alleging the Schirados violated the 2013 judgment. The suit contained claims similar to the 2013 suit, with additional claims involving the City’s streets and alleys which were not involved in the original action. The Schirados conceded they placed fencing on the properties and allowed their horses to graze, but alleged they were given permission by the City. The district court granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the City and the Park District. The court found the Schirados in contempt of court because of their violation of the 2013 judgment, and awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the City and the Park District. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the judgment in favor of the City, and reversed and remanded the fee award for the district court to explain its rationale for the award, including which amount is a sanction for contempt, and which portion is allocated to each plaintiff. On remand, the Schirados moved a new trial, claiming Karen Schirado possessed additional testimony and evidence “necessary to allow her to fully present her case.” The district court denied the motion for trial and concluded the Schirados had two opportunities to present evidence of an oral or written agreement to use the City property and failed to do so. The court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, concluding the Schirados failed to present admissible evidence in resistance to the City and Park District’s motion for summary judgment. The court also granted the City and the Park District permanent injunctive relief and awarded the Park District $5,460.00 in attorney’s fees. The Schirados appeal from the amended judgment. Finding no reversible error in the amendment judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Glen Ullin, et al. v. Schirado, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission awarding permanent total disability (PTD) benefits to Jonathan Parker under Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.220.2, holding that the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission erred in applying subsection 2 of section 287.220 rather than subsection 3 of the statute, and remand was required.Before the Supreme Court, the Second Injury Fund argued that Parker should be denied benefits under subsection 3. Parker, in turn, argued that the Supreme Court should award him benefits under subsection 3. The Supreme Court vacated the Commission's decision, holding (1) under Mo. Const. art. V, 18, the Supreme Court is permitted to review only the decisions and findings of the Commission, not to make such decisions in the first place; and (2) therefore, remand to the Commission was required to determine whether Parker was entitled to benefits under subsection 3. View "Treasurer of State as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund v. Parker" on Justia Law

In March 2019, the North Dakota State Board of Chiropractic Examiners (the “Board”) issued an administrative complaint against Dr. Jacob Schmitz, a chiropractor licensed by the Board. The administrative complaint initiated an administrative proceeding against Schmitz, which resulted in the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) issuing a recommended order granting summary judgment to the Board. The ALJ declined recommending the disciplinary action that the Board should take against Schmitz. Instead, he noted six observations to aid the Board’s determination of disciplinary action against Schmitz. In April 2020, the Board noticed a special meeting, with Schmitz listed in the notice and agenda, including a footnote stating, "The governing body anticipates this topic may be discussed in Executive Session." Schmitz alleged the Board discussed and established sanctions against him in the executive session. In May 2020, the Board held a regular meeting. Soon after the meeting began, the Board went into executive session for approximately thirty-five minutes. After the executive session, the Board voted to confirm the sanctions against Schmitz. Schmitz requested the recording of this executive session, and was denied by the Board. Thereafter, Schmitz filed this lawsuit, alleging the Board violated the law on access to public records and meetings. The Board moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. After a hearing, the district court granted the Board’s motion and dismissed the complaint. Schmitz argued to the North Dakota Supreme Court that the trial court misapplied the law. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding the district court erred in its application of Rule 12(b)(6), and remanded for further proceedings. View "Schmitz v. State Board of Chiropractic Examiners" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court affirming a 2019 decision of the State Board of Property Tax Review granting the tax abatement requests of Expera Old Town, LLC for the 2014 and 2015 tax years for a wood pulp and paper mill, holding that the superior court erred.Expera Old Town, LLC requested tax abatements for 2014 and 2015, but the City of Old Town denied the requests. In 2017, the Board affirmed the City's denial of the requested abatements. The superior court vacated the Board's decision and remanded the case. On remand, in 2019, the Board granted Expera Old Town's tax abatement requests for the same tax years. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment, holding that Expera Old Town failed to meet its initial burden of showing that the assessments were manifestly wrong. View "City of Old Town v. Expera Old Town, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant School Administrative Unit No. 55 (the SAU), appealed a superior court order denying its motion to dismiss the complaint filed by plaintiffs the Hampstead School District and Hampstead School Board (collectively, "Hampstead"), and granting Hampstead’s request for an order compelling the SAU to produce immediately an investigative report prepared by an attorney. In November 2018, the Hampstead School Board unanimously adopted a resolution “reject[ing] and disapprov[ing] . . . the inappropriate and unprofessional conduct and commentary engaged in by” Timberlane Regional School Board members regarding certain Hampstead School District representatives and SAU administrators. In the summer of 2019, a former SAU employee and a current SAU employee alleged that certain SAU board members had engaged in workplace harassment and/or had created a hostile work environment. The chair of the SAU board arranged for a lawyer to investigate the allegations. At a December 2019 public session, the SAU board chair stated that “[a]n independent, experienced employment attorney conducted an extensive investigation of a hostile work environment allegation,” and that the attorney had “found that the allegations had no merit.” Hampstead’s counsel subsequently requested to view the report pursuant to the New Hampshire Right-to-Know Law. The SAU declined the request, asserting the report was protected by attorney-client privilege. Hampstead then filed this suit, alleging that the report was a public document about public officials and, therefore, was subject to disclosure under RSA chapter 91-A. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the superior court, finding that the SAU’s contention that records protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine were per se exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law rested upon "an understandable, but mistaken, interpretation of our precedent." View "Hampstead School Board et al. v. School Administrative Unit No. 55" on Justia Law

In order to fund construction of an underground parking garage and other improvements in Balboa Park, the City of San Diego entered into a “lease revenue bond” transaction. This type of transaction was approved by the California Supreme Court in Rider v. City of San Diego, 18 Cal.4th 1035 (1998) and by the Court of Appeal court in San Diegans for Open Government v. City of San Diego, 242 Cal.App.4th 416 (2015) (SanDOG). After these cases, San Diego voters approved several amendments to the San Diego City Charter regarding bond issuance. Plaintiff San Diegans for Open Government (SanDOG) challenged the Balboa Park lease revenue bond transaction based on these amendments. In SanDOG’s view, one newly-amended provision restricted the ability of the City to use the Financing Authority to issue bonds without voter approval. The trial court disagreed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the court’s judgment on this issue. "The provision in question reflects a limitation on City-issued bonds; it does not cover bonds issued by the Financing Authority. Moreover, even if the provision were not limited to City-issued bonds, it would not cover the lease revenue bonds contemplated here. The additional challenge asserted by SanDOG (regarding a cooperation agreement) was moot; accordingly, that portion of the judgment was reversed and remanded for the trial court to dismiss the challenge as moot. View "San Diegans for Open Gov. v. Pub. Facilities Financing etc." on Justia Law