Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's writ of mandamus and contempt orders in this case, holding that Wis. Stat. 6.50(3) does not place a positive and plain duty on the Wisconsin Elections Commission to change the registration status of eligible voters when receiving reliable information that the elector moved out of their municipality.Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus against the Commission and its commissioners to carry out the instructions set forth in section 6.50(3) and change the registration of electors who may have moved. The circuit court granted the writ and later found several commissioners in contempt after the Commission failed to comply. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the writ was erroneously granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court erred by issuing a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to carry out the requirements of section 6.50(e) because the Commission has no statutory duty, and therefore, no plain and positive duty, to carry out the requirements of the statute. View "Zignego v. Wisconsin Elections Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that Data Foundry, Inc., an internet service provider, had standing to bring its claims but affirming the trial court's dismissal of Data Foundry's claims in part on other grounds, holding that the court of appeals erred by affirming portions of the trial court's judgment.The City of Austin sets the rates that Austin Energy, an electric utility owned by the City, charged to Austin residents for retail electric services. Data Foundry, which purchased electricity from Austin Energy, brought this action alleging that the rates charged by the City were illegal. The trial court granted the City's motion to dismiss on the ground that Data Foundry lacked standing because it failed to allege it had suffered a particularized injury. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal on other grounds. The Supreme Court remanded all of Data Foundry's claims to the trial court for further proceedings, holding (1) Data Foundry had standing to bring its claims; (2) the court of appeals correctly reversed the dismissal of some of Data Foundry's claims, including its common-law and constitutional claims; and (3) the court of appeals erred by affirming portions of the trial court's judgment on other grounds. View "Data Foundry, Inc. v. City of Austin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the trial court concluding that indemnity claims fell within an exception to an arbitration clause and that the non-signatory assignees were bound by the agreement under a theory of assumption, holding that Plaintiffs' request for a declaratory judgment was subject to mandatory arbitration.As president of Wagner Oil Company, Bryan Wagner signed a purchase and sale agreement (PSA) purchasing several assets from Apache Corporation. The PSA contained an indemnification provision and an arbitration clause. Later, third-party surface landowners filed lawsuits against Apache, seeking damages for alleged environmental contamination caused by Apache's operation of the assets before they were sold. Apache filed a demand for arbitration against Plaintiffs, including Wagner Oil and Wagner, for indemnity and defense. Plaintiffs then filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that Plaintiffs were not parties to the PSA and therefore not subject to the arbitration and indemnity clauses. The trial court denied Apache's motion to compel arbitration. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the indemnity disputes over third party-claims fall within the scope of the arbitration clause and outside its exception; and (2) the Wagner Oil signees were bound by the arbitration clause. View "Wagner v. Apache Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Defendants' motion for summary judgment and holding that the City of Davenport's mayor was required to show cause to remove an appointee from the Davenport Civil Rights Commission, holding that the law imposed no obligation on the mayor to show cause for the appointee's removal from the commission.Mayor Frank Klipsch entered an order removing Commissioner Nicole Bribriesco-Ledger from the Davenport Civil Rights Commission before her term had expired. Bribriesco-Ledger brought this action claiming that Klipsch had no authority to remove her absent a showing of cause. Defendants - Klipsch and the City of Davenport - filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that removal from office under Iowa Code 372.15 does not require that the removal be for cause. View "Bribriesco-Ledger v. Klipsch" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the ruling of the district court denying Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction in this case, holding that record lacked necessary findings and that remand was required.This case arose from a decision by the Speaker of the New Hampshire House of Representatives to enforce a House rule precluding any representative from participating in proceedings involving the full House, including House matters, other than in person. Plaintiffs, including seven members of the House who claimed to suffer from medical conditions making them vulnerable to COVID-19, brought this action arguing that the Speaker was required to allow them to participate remotely under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, and section 504 of the Rehabiliation Act, 29 U.S. 794. The district court denied Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The First Circuit vacated the district court's decision, holding that the court erred in finding that the doctrine of legislative immunity shielded the Speaker from having to comply with the ADA and/or Section 504. View "Cushing v. Packard" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) was required to conduct an environmental analysis under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) when it re-opened an area that it had temporarily closed to off-highway vehicles (OHVs) pursuant to its authority under 43 C.F.R. section 8341.2(a). In 2006, the BLM closed a portion of the Factory Butte area in Utah to OHVs due to their adverse effects on the endangered Wright fishhook cactus. The BLM lifted that closure order in 2019 and re-opened the area to OHV use, but did not perform any kind of environmental analysis under NEPA before doing so. Plaintiffs filed suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331, alleging violations of NEPA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court disagreed with Plaintiffs' contention and dismissed their complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "Natural Resources Defense v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs were indigent defendants represented in criminal actions by attorneys provided through Idaho’s public defense system. They alleged that numerous inadequacies in Idaho’s public defense system, as administered by the State and the Idaho Public Defense Commission (“PDC” or together “Respondents”), violated the rights of the named plaintiffs, as well as those of similarly situated criminal defendants across Idaho, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. In 2019, the district court denied cross motions for summary judgment, citing a lack of precedent as to the controlling legal standard to be applied, and requested this appeal. The Idaho Supreme Court granted the district court’s request for permissive appeal to determine the standard of review. The central issue presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on how to properly evaluate the deficiencies in Idaho’s public defense systems alleged by Appellants. In sum, Appellants insisted that a broader view was sufficient, while Respondents demanded the district court examine this issue closely. The Supreme Court held that both views were necessary: "a close up view, which allows for greater specificity, must be applied to the individual claims of at least one of the named plaintiffs whose allegations formed the basis of standing; however, a more distant view, which allows for greater overall perspective, is permissible for the examination of the systemic constitutional shortcomings alleged by Appellants." View "Tucker v. Idaho" on Justia Law

In these cases concerning property tax abatement requests the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed two decisions of the superior court vacating a decision denying requests for abatement and granting a petition for judicial review of an adverse decision concerning another request for a tax abatement, holding that the superior court did not err.This consolidated appeal concerned property tax abatement requests made by the Roque Island Gardner Homestead Corporation (RIGHC). The superior court vacated a decision of the Board of Appeals (BOA) of the Town of Jonesport denying RIGHC's requests for abatement concerning three tax years and remanded the matter for the BOA to make an independent determination of the property's fair market value. The court also granted judicial review as to the State Board of Property Tax Review's adverse decision concerning RIGHC's request for another tax year abatement and directed the Town to grant the abatement request. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed both decisions, holding that the superior court did not err. View "Roque Island Gardner Homestead Corp. v. Town of Jonesport" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying U.S. Tubular Products, Inc.'s complaint in mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission to vacate its decision requesting John Roush's request for an award of additional compensation, holding that the Commission's decision was supported by evidence in the record.Under Ohio Const. art. II, 35, a worker who sustains injuries as a result of her employer's violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR) may seek an award of additional compensation. Roush sustained injuries while working at U.S. Tubular, and his workers' compensation claim was allowed for numerous conditions. Roush later filed an application for a VSSR award, claiming that U.S. Tubular had violated specific safety requirements set forth in the Ohio Administrative Code. The Commission granted a VSSR award of an additional twenty-five percent in compensation. U.S. Tubular filed a mandamus complaint seeking a writ compelling the Commission to vacate the VSSR award. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission's determinations were supported by evidence in the record. View "State ex rel. U.S. Tubular Products, Inc. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio" on Justia Law

Pavlicek, age 49. applied for Disability and Supplemental Security Income benefits. He suffers from anxiety, depression, severe tremors, and pseudoseizures that resemble epileptic seizures but stem from psychological causes. A truck driver, he has a high-school education. Two non-examining agency consultants determined that he could function with some limitations. Pavlicek testified that he had constant tremors and had seven pseudoseizures in the past 16 months when he lost consciousness; in seven other episodes, he remained conscious. A vocational expert testified about employers’ tolerance for absenteeism and about a hypothetical employee with various restrictions. The treating psychiatrist reported that Pavlicek could not work.The ALJ determined that Pavlicek retained the residual functional capacity to perform medium work with exceptions and could perform work that existed in significant numbers in the national economy. The ALJ largely dismissed the report by the treating psychiatrist, who had not justified how his findings could apply “as far back as 2013,” having not treated Pavlicek until 2015 and who relied heavily on Pavlicek’s subjective reporting. The ALJ noted the “infrequent” nature of the treatment relationship and that the report’s assessment of severe functional limitations was unsupported by the clinical records. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The decision was supported by substantial evidence. The court rejected claims that the ALJ gave inadequate reasons for rejecting the treating psychiatrist's opinion, afforded too much weight to the opinions of non-examining agency physicians, and posed hypothetical questions to the vocational expert that failed to account for his limitations. View "Pavlicek v. Saul" on Justia Law