Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court remanded this case to the Workers' Compensation Board, holding that Mark Ivey's pre-employment lower back disc herniation and two surgeries required an impairment rating to be carved out of his permanent partial disability rating for which his employer, ViWin Tech, would be responsible.An ALJ assigned a whole-person impairment of twenty-eight percent and rejected a carve-out for a pre-existing injury. The Board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on a plain reading of the relevant statutes and the AMA Guides, the ALJ erred in concluding that a carve-out was unwarranted. View "Viwin Tech Windows & Doors, Inc. v. Ivey" on Justia Law

Appellee John Linkosky applied for renewal of his Pennsylvania driver’s license. The Department of Transportation (PennDOT) granted the renewal application and issued him a temporary internet driver’s license, which was valid from October 4 to October 18, 2018. The accompanying instructions advised Linkosky that he would receive a camera card within ten days. The instructions further directed Linkosky to present the camera card at any Department photo center and have a new photo taken for purposes of receiving a renewed photo driver’s license. On October 16, 2018, Linkosky pled guilty in Ohio to DUI. As a result, his operating privileges were suspended in that state for a period of twelve months, with credit awarded to him from June 30, 2018. At some point during October 2018, Linkosky received his camera card from the Department, but misplaced it. Nearly two months after his Ohio DUI conviction, Linkosky asked for a replacement camera card from PennDOT. PennDOT denied Linkosky’s request, finding that as of the date of his application for a replacement camera card, the National Driver Register (“NDR” or “Register”) indicated that his operating privileges were suspended in Ohio. The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on whether PennDOT erred in denying Linkosky a replacement camera card. The Supreme Court found PennDOT did not err in denying the replacement card; the Commonwealth Court's judgment, which affirmed the trial court's sustaining of the licensee's statutory appeal, was reversed. View "Linkosky v. PennDOT" on Justia Law

In this dispute over who had the authority to lease shellfishing beds on behalf of the Town of Branford, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Town, holding that summary judgment was improper.Plaintiffs had been granted the right of first refusal by Branford's Shellfish Commission to lease certain shellfishing grounds located in the Town, but the Commission leased the grounds to Plaintiffs' competitor. Plaintiff brought this action alleging breach of contract and promissory estoppel and that it enjoyed a right of first refusal. The Town moved for summary judgment, arguing that the right of first refusal was no a valid or enforceable contract because the Commission lacked authority to enter into it. The trial court agreed, holding that only the Town's Board of Selectmen had authority to lease the shellfishing beds on behalf of the Town. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. View "Shoreline Shellfish, LLC v. Branford" on Justia Law

In an appeal by allowance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether the Commonwealth, by the Office of Attorney General (OAG), could bring claims under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) on behalf of private landowners against a natural gas exploration and production company for its alleged deceptive, misleading, and unfair practices in obtaining natural gas leases from the landowners. The Supreme Court concluded the OAG could not bring claims under the UTPCPL on behalf of private landowners against Anadarko Petroleum Corporation and Anadarko E&P Onshore, L.L.C. (Anadarko) for its alleged unfair and deceptive practices in acquiring natural gas leases from the landowners. Furthermore, the Court found its resolution of the first issue rendered the second issue moot. The Court affirmed the portion of the Commonwealth Court’s decision that reversed the trial court order overruling Anadarko’s preliminary objections to Count III of the OAG’s second amended complaint, and otherwise reversed the order of the Commonwealth Court. View "Com. v. Chesapeake Energy, et al (Anadarko, Aplt.)" on Justia Law

Landowners Cash Aaland, Larry Bakko, and Penny Cirks, appealed orders granting the Cass County Joint Water Resource District (the “District”) a right of entry onto their properties to conduct surveys and examinations related to the Fargo-Moorhead Flood Diversion Project. The Landowners argued these surveys and examinations are beyond the scope of N.D.C.C. 32-15-06. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, concluding the District’s right of entry exceeded the limited testing permitted under the statute. The matter was remanded for a determination on attorney’s fees and costs. View "Cass County Joint Water Resource District v. Aaland, et al." on Justia Law

Dakota Bee appealed a criminal judgment entered on a conditional plea of guilty, reserving the right to appeal a district court order denying her motion to suppress evidence. Burleigh County Social Services (BCSS) contacted the Bismarck Police Department requesting assistance in removing a child from Bee’s care. Officers accompanied BCSS social workers to Bee’s residence and informed her that they were there to remove her child. Bee refused, backing up into the home, picking up the child, and then running towards the rear of the home. Officers pursued Bee through the home and out the back door. Fleeing out the back, Bee fell while holding the child, and officers separated her from the child. After Bee had been detained outside the residence, a social worker entered the residence to obtain personal belongings for the child, and an officer followed. Once the officer was inside, the social worker pointed out a glass smoking pipe. Bee was subsequently charged with Child Neglect; Possession of Methamphetamine; Possession of Drug Paraphernalia; and Refusal to Halt. The district court found that the officers entered “the residence with BCSS to retrieve personal belongings for the child” after Bee had been detained and the child was in BCSS’s custody. The court further found that the officers observed the glass smoking device on a shelf in plain view. The court concluded the officers’ actions did not violate Bee’s Fourth Amendment rights. On appeal, Bee argued the court erred in concluding that her Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when the officers entered her home. The North Dakota Supreme Court found that during the first entry to the residence, the officers observed nothing that Bee sought to suppress. The second entry of the residence was justified only by a need to collect clothing and other personal items needed by the child. Because the search was concededly warrantless and no exception applies, the Court concluded Bee was entitled to claim the protection of the exclusionary rule. The district court erred by denying Bee’s motion to suppress the results of the warrantless search. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to allow Bee to withdraw her guilty plea. View "North Dakota v. Bee" on Justia Law

Joshua Breeze appeals a district court judgment affirming the North Dakota Department of Transportation’s suspension of his driving privileges based on a conviction for driving under the influence. On appeal, Breeze argued that Waltz, a UND police officer, was outside of his jurisdiction when he stopped Breeze, and therefore had no authority for the stop or the subsequent chemical test. The Department argued that Waltz was in “hot pursuit” and therefore had authority for the stop. After review of the trial court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined Waltz did not have authority to arrest Breeze: "a reasoning mind could not have reasonably concluded the preponderance of the evidence supports that Waltz was in 'hot pursuit,' as defined by section 15-10-17(2)(d), N.D.C.C., when he continued beyond his jurisdictional boundary to arrest Breeze." The Department's order suspending Breeze's driving privileges, and the district court's judgment affirming the Department's order were reversed. View "Breeze v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

Appellants Somerset Court, LLC, and Kari Riggin appealed a district court judgment dismissing their action seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of the North Dakota Governor’s executive orders. This case began as a challenge to the Governor’s statutory powers in issuing executive orders during the COVID-19 pandemic relating to the operations of certain North Dakota businesses. In April 2020, Somerset, an assisted living facility with an in-house salon, and Riggin, a licensed cosmetologist operating the salon as an independent contractor, claimed the executive orders prohibited Somerset and Riggin from engaging in their business and profession, and placed limitations as to their business and profession. Appellants argued the executive orders were beyond the Governor’s statutory powers; the executive orders involved fundamental rights requiring the application of the strict scrutiny standard of review; and that a declaratory judgment should have been issued as a matter of law and enforced by an appropriate writ. Because Appellants failed to adequately challenge the district court’s conclusion the case was moot, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Somerset Court, et al. v. Burgum, et al." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court's review centered on whether an order of the Administrative Law Court (ALC) that includes a remand to a state agency is a final decision, and thus appealable. Petitioner South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) appealed an adverse ruling rendered by the ALC. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as interlocutory. After review, the Supreme Court determined the ALC's order here was a final decision notwithstanding the remand to the SCDC. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for the court of appeals to address the merits of SCDC's appeal. View "Torrence v. SCDOC" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the class action antitrust claims brought by plaintiff against the Hospital Authority. The court concluded that the Hospital Authority is a "special function governmental unit" under section 34(1)(B) of the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984. The court explained that Sandcrest Outpatient Servs., P.A. v. Cumberland Cnty. Hosp. Sys., Inc., 853 F.2d 1139, 1142 (4th Cir. 1988), did not address, much less decide, the issues here. The court was unpersuaded that either the Act's text or the statutory interpretation principle noscitur a sociis supports plaintiff's contention that "special function governmental unit" as described in section 34(1)(B) applies only to governmental entities with certain powers and/or characteristics, which the Hospital Authority lacks. The court reasoned that there is no magic combination of powers that a governmental body must have to be classified as a "special function governmental unit," however those of the Hospital Authority readily qualify.The court explained that the Hospital Authority is far more similar to the hospital in Sweeney v. Athens Regional Medical Center, than to the public trust hospital in Tarabishi v. McAlester Regional Hospital, 951 F.2d 1558 (10th Cir. 1991). Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's contention that, even if the Hospital Authority was a "local government" when it was established, it has outgrown its immunity. The court stated that the text of the Act asks only whether an organization qualifies as a "local government" as defined by the Act and that determination requires examining the state law applicable to the entity's creation. Therefore, the court agreed with the district court that the Hospital Authority is a "special function governmental unit" and is therefore a "local government" under the Act. View "Benitez v. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority" on Justia Law