Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-appellee Christina Smith was the mother of Joshua England. Her claims arose from the death of England from a ruptured appendix in May 2018, while England was housed at the Joseph Harp Correctional Center (JHCC), an Oklahoma Department of Corrections (ODOC) facility in Lexington, Oklahoma. England was a 21-year-old prisoner at JHCC who was a few months away from release when he submitted multiple sick call requests. At the fifth such request, England complained his stomach hurt and he was short of breath. Unable to bear the pain while waiting at the clinic, England died in his cell from a ruptured appendix with acute peritonitis. Defendants-Appellants Joe Allbaugh, the Director of the Department of Corrections at the time this claim arose, and Carl Bear, the Warden of Joseph Harp Correctional Center (collectively, Defendants) appealed the district court’s order denying their motion to dismiss Smith's subsequent lawsuit relating to England's death on grounds of qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding Smith alleged only that JHCC medical staff failed to follow procedure, not that Defendants failed to enforce those policies. Furthermore, the Court determined Smith failed to plead sufficient factual allegations to support deliberate indifference on the part of these defendants. Likewise, Smith failed to sufficiently plead Defendants improperly hired, supervised, and retained certain medical staff employees. View "Smith v. Allbaugh" on Justia Law

In this dispute between Cascade County and the Montana Petroleum Tank Release Compensation Board regarding reimbursement for the cost of remediating petroleum contamination at the County's shop complex the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court on judicial review, holding that the district court erred in remanding the case to the Board to address issues the Board rejected.The Board concluded that the County was time barred from recovery by Mont. Code Ann. 27-2-231. The district court concluded that the Board erred when it relied on section 27-2-231 because the procedure for reimbursement is provided in Mont. Code Ann. 75-11-309. The court, however, remanded the case to the Board for further fact-finding. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not err in determining that section 27-2-231 did not time bar the County from submitting additional applications for eligibility to the Board; and (2) the district court erred in remanding the case to the Board to rule on the issues it rejected in its final decision. View "Cascade Co. v. Montana Petroleum Tank Release Compensation Board" on Justia Law

Voters in Calhoun County, South Carolina, approved a referendum in the November 2018 general election imposing a one percent sales and use tax ("a penny tax") to fund a list of fifteen projects. Nearly five months later, Appellants filed suit, contending four of the projects were not authorized pursuant to section S.C. Code Ann. sections 4-10-300 to -390 (2019). The County responded that the statute of limitations had expired, and alternatively, the projects fell within the scope of the Act. The circuit court found the thirty-day limitations period barred the action and did not address the merits. After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding the statute of limitations had run. View "South Carolina Public Interest Foundation v. Calhoun County Council" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for judicial review seeking to set aside the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and other relief, holding that the BIA's decision must be upheld.On appeal, Petitioner's principal assignment of error challenged the denial of his asylum claim. Petitioner specifically argued against the adverse credibility determination of the immigration judge (IJ), which the BIA upheld. The First Circuit denied the petition for review, holding (1) the IJ's adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence in the record, and therefore, the BIA's denial of Petitioner's asylum claim must be upheld; (2) because Petitioner failed to satisfy the standard required for asylum, his claim for withholding of removal necessarily failed; and (3) Petitioner's claim for CAT protection is deemed abandoned. View "Zaruma-Guaman v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the amended report and order issued by the Public Service Commission (PSC) disallowing a portion of Spire Missouri, Inc.'s rate case expenses, including some of the proceeds from a sale of a facility in setting Spire's new rates, and determining that Spire Missouri East's prepaid pension was less than Spire contended, holding that an increase in the amount of Spire East's pension was warranted.Spire, an investor-owned public utility regulated by the PSC, filed tariff to increase its general rates for gas services in its Spire Missouri East and Spire Missouri West territories. The PSC suspended Spire's new tariffs and established a test year and then issued its contested amended report and order. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Spire's points challenging the PSC's decision to exclude a portion of Spire's rate case expenses were unavailing; (2) the PSC's order that relocation proceeds from the sale of the facility be used to reduce rates was not an abuse of discretion; but (3) the PSC's decision to extend the period in which it determined Spire East used cash accounting to value its pension asset from 1994 to 1996 was not supported by competent and substantial evidence. View "Spire Missouri, Inc. v. Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of rulemaking issued by the Public Service Commission (PSC), holding that the order fell within the PSC's statutory authority and that the private entity fiscal note accompanying the promulgated regulation complied with the applicable statutes.In 2018, the PSC promulgated a rule (the Rule) that provided new regulations related to certificates of convenience and necessity. Kansas City Power & Light Company and KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations Company appealed, arguing that the order promulgating the Rule exceeded PSC's authority and that the fiscal note was deficient, rendering the Rule void and unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed the order, holding (1) the order promulgated by the PSC was supported by statutory authority and was reasonable; and (2) the accompanying fiscal note was not deficient. View "Kansas City Power & Light v. Missouri Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

Property owners (taxpayers) appealed ad valorem tax assessments made during 2012-2015 to the Tulsa County District Court after their appeals to the Tulsa County Board of Equalization were denied. Taxpayers were successful in the District Court appeal by showing one parcel of property was exempt and a second parcel partially exempt from ad valorem taxation. The District Court determined the amounts of the tax refund and stated the Tulsa County Treasurer "pay the Petitioners interest on such amounts as allowed by law." The Tulsa County Assessor appealed, but the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held the general postjudgment statute, 12 O.S. section 727.1, did not apply to taxpayers' ad valorem tax protest appeal, and the procedure for interest on taxpayers' protested tax payments was provided by the ad valorem statute, 68 O.S. section 2884. View "In the Matter of the Assessments for Tax Year 2012" on Justia Law

A 2017 “tweet” by @realDonaldTrump stated: “The Amazon Washington Post fabricated the facts on my ending massive, dangerous, and wasteful payments to Syrian rebels fighting Assad.” BuzzFeed requested CIA records about Agency payments to Syrian rebels, citing the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(3)(A). The Agency invoked Exemptions 1 and 3. The district court granted the Agency summary judgment, explaining that the “tweet did not mention the [Agency] or create any inference that such a program would be linked to or run by the [Agency].”BuzzFeed sent another, more broadly stated, request. The Agency asserted that a response would reveal whether it had an intelligence interest in, intelligence sources about, and connection to programs related to Syrian rebels — information exempt from disclosure under Exemptions 1 and 3. Exemption 1 covers “matters”2 that are “specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Exemption 3 covers matters “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute,” the National Security Act qualifies as a withholding statute under Exemption 3, 50 U.S.C. 3024(i)(1).The district court granted BuzzFeed summary judgment, holding that the tweet officially acknowledged “the government’s intelligence interest in the broader categories of records that BuzzFeed has requested.” The D.C. Circuit reversed. The tweet was not an official acknowledgment of the existence (or not) of Agency records. View "Leopold v. Central Intelligence Agency" on Justia Law

Plaintiff The New London Hospital Association, Inc. (Hospital), challenged a superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Town of Newport (Town), in the Hospital’s appeal of the Town’s denial of the Hospital’s application for a charitable tax exemption, and denying the Hospital’s motion to amend its complaint. At a meeting held on August 29, 2016, the Newport Board of Selectmen (board) voted to deny the Hospital’s application for the 2016 tax year “because the application for the exemption was untimely and because the level of charity care provided by the hospital is very small and it is a fee for service operation.” The Town informed the Hospital of the board’s decision by letter dated September 7, 2016. Aside from the filing of a related tax form on May 23, 2016, the parties did not communicate at all regarding the Hospital’s application for a charitable exemption for tax year 2016 between the date the Form A-9 was filed and the date the application was denied by the board. The Hospital did not dispute its form was untimely filed. However, the Hospital argued the Town waived any objection to the timeliness of the Hospital’s application, and because the Hospital was able to satisfy the statutory standard of accident, mistake or misfortune. While the summary judgment motion was pending, the Hospital moved to amend its complaint to add a claim alleging an equal protection violation based upon the Town’s administrative policy, uncovered by the Hospital during discovery, of notifying particular entities, not including the Hospital, of approaching filing deadlines for tax exemptions. The trial court denied the Hospital’s motion, ruling that the amendment introduced an entirely new cause of action, would call for substantially different evidence, and would not cure the defect in the complaint. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court determined the trial court properly granted the Town's motion for summary judgment, and sustainably exercised its discretion in denying the Hospital's motion to amend. View "The New London Hospital Association, Inc. v. Town of Newport" on Justia Law

In these three consolidated appeals arising out of the Title III debt-restructuring proceedings brought by the Financial Oversight and Management Board (Board) for Puerto Rico on behalf of the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation (COFINA) under the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) the First Circuit held that certain appeals were equitably moot and another claim was properly dismissed.The Title III court approved a plan of adjustment (the Plan) proposed by the Board resolving disputes between the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and COFINA and between the junior and senior holders of COFINA's outstanding debt. The Elliott and Pinto-Lugo groups objected to the Plan, arguing, among other things, that it unlawfully abrogated their rights as junior COFINA bondholders. Peter Hein, an individual creditor, challenged the dismissal of his proof of claim against COFINA. The Title III court dismissed Hein's challenges and overruled the objections to the Plan. On Appeal, the First Circuit (1) dismissed the Elliott and Pinto-Lugo appeals as equitably moot; and (2) affirmed the dismissal of Hein's claims against COFINA. View "Pinto Lugo v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico" on Justia Law